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PLATO'S

APOLOGY AND CRITO

WITH NOTES

BY

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Nae ego hand paullo hunc animum malim, quam eorum omnium
fortunas, qui de hoc judicaverunt. Cic. Tusc. Disp. i. 42

REVISED EDITION

NEW YORK
D. APPLETON AND COMPANY
1887
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TO

PROFESSOR FELTON,
OF HARVARD UNIVERSITY,

THIS EDITION OF THE APOLOGY AND CRITO

Is Dedicated,

AS A MEMORIAL OF PERSONAL FRIENDSHIP,

AND AS A TOKEN OF HIGH REGARD

FOR HIS DISTINGUISHED SERVICES TO CLASSICAL SCHOLARSHIP,

AND HIS PHIL-HELLENIC SPIRIT.
The "Græca Majora," which was all the Greek read in college by many successive generations of American students, contained Plato's Crito and the narrative part of the Phædo; and, among all the extracts in that admirable collection, none are cherished in fresher remembrance or with a more reverential love than these inimitable productions of the great spiritual philosopher of ancient Greece. The simple beauty of the style and the almost inspired truth and grandeur of the sentiments have graven these immortal compositions, as with the point of a diamond, on thousands of hearts, and entitle them to the high place which they have held among the select educational instruments of former generations. Many a scholar saw with regret Plato dropped for a time entirely out of the academic course, and accessible to American students only in the obsolete Græca Majora, or in the imported editions of
foreign scholars. And, though their favorite classic author is now brought again within the reach of American students, and restored in some measure to his proper place in college education, in President Woolsey's scholarly edition of the Gorgias, and Professor Lewis' profound Annotations on portions of the Laws, still many an older and many a younger scholar cannot but sigh to see the simpler and more Socratic Dialogues of Plato superseded, even by the more finished dramatic imitations of his middle life, or the more profound moral and political speculations of his riper years. It is to meet expressed regrets and felt wants of this kind that the present edition of the Apology and Crito is given to the public.

While these pieces breathe in every part the moral purity, the poetic beauty, and the almost prophetic sublimity, which pervade all Plato's writings, and which have won for him the epithet "divine," they exhibit Socrates more adequately than he appears in any of the works of Xenophon, more truly and purely, just as he was, than he is seen in any of the other writings of Plato. They are therefore the connecting link between the two beloved disciples, and the clue to the interpretation of both. The Apology, especially, written shortly after the death of the Moral Philosopher, and under the full inspiration of his last words and last hours,
gives us the very soul of Socrates speaking, as it were, with the very lips of Plato. Mr. Grote has seen this and, with characteristic wisdom, has made the Apology the corner-stone of his admirable chapter on Socrates. How superior to the cold and barren defence which bears the name of Xenophon on the one hand, and on the other, how free from the unpractical and impracticable speculations which Plato has interwoven in some of his later dialogues! It is doubtless a faithful representation of the defence, or rather justification, we might almost say, glorification, of his own life, character, and mission, which Socrates actually pronounced before his judges. At the same time, perhaps, it may be regarded as an exemplification of Plato's beau ideal of the true Orator, whose aim and office it is, not to save the life of the accused by whatever means of falsehood, bribery, and seduction he can invent, but to set forth the claims of truth and justice in all their native right to command universal obedience. In this view the Apology may, perhaps, be considered as the counterpart of the exposure of rhetoric falsely so called in the Gorgias, and so take its place among the consecutive labors of Plato to realize the idea of all the arts and sciences; though it must be confessed that the want of the introduction and the dialectic structure, which are so characteristic of the scientific dialogues, seems rather
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(not to set it aside, as Ast would set it aside, as un-
Platonic, for it has all the palpable and marked
peculiarities of Plato's style), but to set it apart to
the more specific and no less sacred purpose of a
defence by a gifted and beloved disciple of his
honored and revered master.

The exordium opens, if we may be allowed to
go before the reader with a brief analysis of the
piece, with an expression of the astonishment of
Socrates at the misrepresentations of his accusers,
who have represented nothing as it is, and a decla-
ration of his purpose to speak the plain and simple
truth, in the same plain and simple language which
he has been accustomed to use in his every day
conversations; and as this is his whole office as an
orator speaking in his own defence, so it is their
sole duty, as judges, to consider whether or not he
speaks the truth. (17, 18, A.) This exordium, if it
does not set forth Plato's ideal of true oratory, in
contrast with the studied and false rhetoric of the
forum and the schools, yet no doubt exhibits the
author's idea of the style and manner in which
Socrates actually defended himself when on trial
for his life. Accordingly, we shall find the Socrates
of the Apology excluding all artificial rhetoric, all
appeals to prejudice or passion, and declaring the
truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth,
with the simplicity and directness, the frankness
and fearlessness of a philosopher who values truth and justice far more than life.*

After this brief and plain exordium, Socrates asks leave to reply first to his first accusers, those less formal but more powerful and formidable accusers, to wit, who had been insinuating their slanders into the public mind during his life, and who had all the advantage of numbers and time, of a tribunal numerous and credulous, and of not being confronted with the accused; nay, of being personally unknown, except some one of them might chance to be a comic poet (18, ν. o.), alluding especially to Aristophanes, whose name is mentioned further on, and his comedy of The Clouds distinctly pointed out. (19, o.) The charges thus informally brought against him were, that, "with a wicked and mischievous curiosity, he inquired into things in heaven above and things under the earth; that he made the worse appear the better reason; and that he taught others to do the same; in short, that he was a natural philosopher and a sophist." (19, ν. cf. 18, ν.) Socrates utterly denies the truth of these charges; declares his entire ignorance of natural philosophy as then taught, as well as of the sophist’s art; offers to present witnesses in proof

* Cf. Valer. Max. VI., 4: Maluitque Socrates extingui, quam Lysias superesse—in allusion to the Oration which Lysias prepared for the use of Socrates, but which Socrates refused to deliver.
that he taught no such things to his disciples, and
calls upon all present to testify against him, if they
had ever heard from him any conversation, great or
small, on such subjects. (19, c. d.) Moreover, he
did not profess to be a teacher, like Gorgias the
Leontine, Prodicus the Cean, Hippias the Elean,
and Evenus the Parian, who drew away the young
from the society of the wisest and best citizens
(which they might enjoy gratuitously), to receive
their instructions at a great price. He congratu-
lated the possessors of such wisdom and power, and
would doubtless be very proud if he possessed it
himself. But truth obliges him to confess, that he
has no part nor lot, great or small, in such knowl-
edge. (19, e.; 20 c.) The modesty and irony which
mark this passage, the short dialogue, into which he
runs unconsciously, and which is given in the form
and the words of the original conversation, and the
unfavorable view which he takes of the vague and
unprofitable speculations of the physical philoso-
phers who preceded him, are all highly character-
istic of Socrates, as he appears in the Memorabilia
of Xenophon. (Cf. Mem. I., 1, 11, seqq.; I., 2, 3,
seqq. et passim.)

"But what then is your business or profession?
What have you said or done to raise all this hue
and cry about you?" In answer to this question,
Socrates admits that he bore the name of philoso-
pher, or wise man. But he pretended to merely human wisdom, such as man may properly aspire to, and such as pertains to the proper regulation of human life. (20, n. c.) This wisdom he did indeed possess. And in proof that he did, he would refer them to no less authority than the God at Delphi. (21, a.) He never supposed himself to be wise in any sense, till, in response to a question of his friend and the friend of the people (Chærephon), the Delphic Oracle declared, that there was none wiser than he. Not daring to discredit the Oracle, he then set himself to discover in what possible sense, if indeed in any sense, he was wiser than others. (21, b. c.) Accordingly he visited successively various classes of men in high repute for wisdom — politicians, poets, orators, philosophers, artisans, &c.; and he discovered to his surprise, that while they really understood pretty well their respective departments, they fancied they understood every thing else (22, n.), though, in fact, with a partial exception in favor of the artisans, they did not understand the fundamental principles even of their own profession. (22, c.) And they all, without exception, thought they knew a great deal more than they did know, while he was conscious that he knew almost nothing. (21, n.) And when he came to inquire whether he would choose to be as he was, or to have their wisdom with their want of self-
knowledge, he was constrained to answer, that he would rather be as he was, and so to assent to the truth of the Oracle (22, τ.); though he modestly adds, that the chief intent of the Oracle was doubtless to teach this general truth, that he was the wisest of men, who preferred that kind of wisdom which Socrates cultivated, viz., the moral and practical, and who, like Socrates, was conscious of the poverty of his acquirements in knowledge, and the comparative worthlessness of all the wisdom of men. (23, A. B.)

In the course of the investigation which he thus prosecuted, he offended all whom he visited, by showing them that they knew far less than they supposed. At the same time, his pupils (or rather his young friends and followers, for, as in Xenophon, so in Plato, Socrates never speaks of his disciples) delighted themselves in exposing, after his example, the ignorance of the many pretenders to superior knowledge. (23, c.) And they were angry, not with themselves, but with the innocent occasion of their humiliation. Accordingly they began to call him a most impious fellow, a corrupter of youth, and the like. When asked how; what he did; what he taught; having nothing else to say, they took up and turned against him the prejudice and calumny which the multitude were so ready to entertain against philosophers in general. (23, d.)
They confounded him with the very naturalists and sophists whom he had ever labored to confute, and thus sought to concentrate upon him the suspicion and indignation which they had incurred.

So much for the informal charges. And these prepared the way for the formal indictment for corrupting the youth and endeavoring to subvert the religion of his country. Of his three accusers, Socrates informs the judges that Meletus was angry with him for exposing, as above described, the poets, Anytus for the artisans and politicians, and Lycon for the orators. (23, e.) They were all actuated by selfish and revengeful feelings. Anytus, it should be added, was a rich leather-seller, and a man of influence in the democracy; and when Socrates, seeing signs of intellectual capacity in his son, endeavored to dissuade the father from bringing up his son to his own trade, Anytus was personally offended (Apol. Xen. 29), and was able easily to turn the passions of the populace against the reputed master of the tyrant Critias and the now hated Alcibiades. (Cf. Xen. Mem. I., 2, 12.)

In defence of himself against the charge of corrupting the youth, Socrates enters into a very characteristic dialogue with Meletus, asking, who it is that corrupts the youth, and who makes them wiser and better; whether the judges, senators, and members of the Assembly also corrupt them, or whether
he is their only corrupter, and whether it is likely to be the single individual that corrupts, and the multitude that instruct and reform, or quite the contrary, just as it is in the training of horses and the lower animals; and if he is such a corrupter of the young, whether he does it voluntarily or involuntarily, of which alternatives the former is quite incredible, since he must know that he could not corrupt them without injuring himself, and in the latter alternative, he ought not to be impeached and punished, but to be instructed and made wiser. (24, b.; 26, A.) The conclusion of this very Socratic piece of extemporized dialectics is, that Socrates, if not too wise and good to corrupt the youth, must be too ignorant to deserve punishment for it; and that Meletus, with all his assumed superiority in wisdom and virtue, neither knows nor cares how young men can be made either better or worse. The argument, by which Socrates exculpates himself, will probably strike most modern readers as more subtle than conclusive in its reasoning, and somewhat dangerous withal in its practical tendency, since, carried out to its legitimate result, it would seem to prove that all crimes must be involuntary, and all criminals proper objects of commiseration and instruction, rather than of punishment. And we see not how the objection can be answered. It lies, however, not only against the argument here,
but against the doctrine of Socrates, which, everywhere, in Xenophon and Plato alike, resolves all the virtues into knowledge, and, by consequence, all the vices into sins of ignorance.

Taking up the other point in the indictment, Socrates now asks, whether his accuser means to charge him only with denying the gods of the state, or with downright atheism; and on being distinctly charged with the latter, he shows that this is utterly inconsistent with the language of the indictment itself, which charges him with recognizing and teaching "other divine things," and if there are "divine things," then surely there must be divinities. Just as he who speaks of human affairs, must needs recognize the existence of human beings, so in teaching δαιμόνια, he must needs recognize δαίμονες; and if δαίμονες, then, according to the prevailing Greek idea, either gods or sons of gods; and if sons of gods, then of course gods. (26, ν.; 27, ε.)

Having thus disposed of his principal accuser, Socrates boldly tells the Athenians, that he has to fear, not the indictment of Meletus, but the envy and jealousy of the multitude, which have destroyed many other good men, and will probably destroy him. "Why then persist in a course of conduct which you expect will occasion your death?" "Because," such is the substance of the answer, "the
great question for a man to ask is not whether life or death will be the result of his conduct, but whether he is doing right or wrong, and acting the part of a good or bad man; as the heroes of the Trojan war, and all true heroes, have ever despised danger and death in the path of duty and glory.” (28, B. C. D.) “I should behave strangely,” he continues, “if when your commanders, Athenians, stationed me at Potidæa, at Amphipolis, and at Delium, I kept my post at the peril of my life, but when the God sets me down in Athens to spend my life in the pursuit of philosophy and in the examination of myself and others, then I should leave my post through fear of death. In that case, I might well and truly be charged with not believing in the gods, since I disobeyed the Oracle and feared death, and thought myself wise when I was not. For to fear death is to think one’s self wise, when he is not; for it is to think one knows what he does not know. None know death. They do not know but it is the greatest good; yet they fear it, as if they knew it was the greatest of evils. I will never flee from what may be the greatest good, viz., death, into such base and criminal acts as must be the greatest evils.” (28, B.C.; 29, A. D.)

“If you were to assure me of my acquittal in case I would pledge myself to abandon this philosophizing and questioning manner of life, my reply
would be, I respect and love you, but I will obey the God rather than you. While I live and breathe, I will never cease to proclaim the superiority of wisdom and virtue and the well-being of the soul, to riches and honor and the welfare of the body, to young and old, to citizens and foreigners, but especially to you, my fellow-citizens, as you are most nearly related to me, and because it especially becomes the honored name of Athenians. For this is the divine command, and this is for your highest interest. (29, c.; 30, c.) And if you put me to death, be assured you will not injure me so much as yourselves. Me none of my accusers could injure in the least; for I do not think it lawful, or possible, in the nature of things, for a better man to be injured by a worse man. I am therefore now defending, not so much myself as you; that you may not put me to death and so reject the gift of God to you, for you will not soon find another such. (30, d. e.) That I am the gift of God to the city, you will see from this. Does it seem merely human that I have neglected my own affairs so many years and attended to your interests, persuading you like a father or an elder brother, to cultivate virtue? And all this without any pecuniary compensation; for, among all their false accusations, they have not dared to accuse me of receiving pay for my instruction; and if they had, my poverty
would have been a sufficient witness against them.” (30, ε.; 31, c.)

If any were disposed to ask why he went about and persuaded them privately and personally, instead of coming before the people and counselling them as a body, he had been kept back from the latter course by a certain divine monitor* which had attended him from his childhood—a sort of voice which always deterred him from doing what he should not do, and which had usually forbidden his participation in public affairs. And well it might, for, if he had undertaken to act his part in public, he would have been put to death long ago, and that without having rendered any real service to them or to himself; for no man could be safe in publicly opposing the inclinations of the Athenian or any other popular assembly, and forbidding them to do wrong. (31.) In proof of this, he adverts to the imminent peril to which he was exposed in the only instance in which he had held an office, when, as senator and presiding officer in the popular assembly, he resisted the will of the demus, and defended the lives of the ten generals when they were intent on putting them to death by one sweeping and extra-judicial decree. (32, A. B.) He had also incurred a similar peril, and exhibited the

* Touching the nature of this divine voice and monitor, see the discussion in the notes.
same disregard for danger and death, in refusing to obey an unrighteous command of the oligarchy, when they possessed the government. (32, c. d.)

These were well-known facts, which might be proved by any number of witnesses. And such facts showed that he, or any one else who would contend strenuously for the right, must do it privately rather than politically, if he would preserve his life even for a short period. They proved also that his influence over the young, by precept and especially by example, so far from corrupting, was suited to inspire them with an inflexible regard for justice. And if further proof was required, since his accusers had failed to bring forward the proper witnesses at the proper time, he would gladly yield the stand and let them bring forward now the fathers and elder brothers of the very young men who had been his most constant hearers and companions; for, though the young men themselves might have some reason for withholding the truth, if he had corrupted them, certainly their fathers and elder brothers could have no such motive, and the judges ought to be put in possession of their testimony. (33, d.; 34, b.)

Having thus finished his defence, Socrates proceeds to excuse himself from any attempt to enlist the sympathies and excite the compassion of the
judges in his behalf. This practice had indeed become very common in the courts of justice—so common, that it might seem strange and even arrogant for him not to do likewise. He had a wife and children, and friends whom he tenderly loved, and whose grief at his death would doubtless be very great. But such weakness, worthy only of women, was especially unworthy of Athenian men; and if seen in their great men, particularly in one who, like himself, was reputed, whether justly or unjustly, to be a man of extraordinary virtue, it was not only dishonorable to him, but it would reflect dishonor on the whole people. (35, A. B. C.) Besides, it was doing a great wrong to the judges, who needed not entreaties, but instruction and persuasion, and whose duty it was, not to sacrifice justice to personal feelings and interests, but simply to execute the laws. And not only justice but piety forbade the offering of any inducements to them to violate their oath of office; and if he should hold out any such inducements, he would thereby teach them that there were no gods, and so convict himself of atheism in the very act of defending himself against the charge. They must therefore excuse him from resorting to such methods of securing his acquittal, which he could not but regard as at once dishonorable, unholy, and unjust. (35, D.)
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With these noble sentiments, asking no favor of his judges, he submits himself to their sense of justice. They condemn him by a small majority of votes. Resuming his address, he declares that he is neither grieved nor surprised by the result. He is only surprised by the smallness of the majority by which he was condemned. (36, A.) Pronounced guilty by his judges, the next question was, what should be the penalty. His accusers said, Death. In naming a counter-proposition, as the laws allowed him to do, if he looked simply at the justice and fitness of the thing, he should propose that he be supported in the Prytaneum (State-House) at the public expense, that he might devote himself without interruption to the instruction of the people. This was a suitable return for his disinterested devotion to their highest good in time past, and this would be for their highest welfare in time to come. If this honor was justly conferred on the victor at the Olympic Games, who did not need it and who ministered only to their seeming happiness, much more was it due to him, who needed it, and who had spent his life in promoting their real good. (36, B. C. D.) And with longer time, he might perhaps be able to persuade them of his innocence. (37, A.) He deserved only good at their hands. If he should suffer death, that would perhaps prove a good. Why then should he
propose an alternative penalty, which would be a
certain evil? Should he propose imprisonment?
That were to subject himself to the power and
caprice of the Eleven, whoever they might chance
to be. (37, b. c.) Exile? His countrymen could
not endure his instruction and reproof, much less
would strangers. (37, d.) And for him to keep
silence, though they would not believe it, were to
disobey the God, and for that reason it were quite
impossible. (37, e.) To live without examining
himself and others were no life to him—were a
life not worthy to be lived by any human being.
(38, a.) Should he then propose a fine? If he had
property he would part with it cheerfully, for loss
of property was no evil. But he had not property
enough. If indeed a mina (about $17) would suf-
fice, perhaps he could pay a mina. He would
therefore propose a fine of one mina. And since
his friends, Plato, Crito, Critobulus, and Apollodorus
bade him propose thirty minæ, he would adjudge
himself to pay a fine of thirty minæ, and give these
friends as his security. (38, b.)

This high-toned vindication of his character and
deserts, together with his virtual refusal to name
any alternative punishment, sealed his death. He
doubtless expected it would, and intended it should.
The last chapter of Xenophon’s Memorabilia is de-
voted to a statement of the reasons, and those for the most part assigned in a conversation by Socrates himself, why it was better, in his own view—better for his happiness and usefulness as well as for his fame—that he should die now, rather than live to a more advanced age. With this deliberate preference, and in full view of the consequences, he made his defence so as almost to necessitate the desired result. By an increased majority he was now condemned to death. And, in resuming the thread of his discourse, he tells those who condemned him that he did not regret the result—that death would have come soon in the course of nature, and he would much rather die uttering such a defence, than live by such ignoble means as many use. (38, c. d. b.) It is not difficult to escape death—he could readily have escaped it*—but the difficulty is to escape sin, which is a swifter runner than even death, and has already overtaken his accusers, younger and swifter though they be than himself. (39, a. b.) And, as men are sometimes inspired with something like prophetic vision in their last hours, he warns his judges, who voted for his condemnation, that speedy vengeance will overtake them in the reproofs of their own conscience and of the numerous friends of virtue who would come

after him; and the only escape was not by cutting off their reprovers, but by reforming their own character and life. (39, c. d.)

Then turning to the judges who had voted for his acquittal, and who alone deserved the sacred name of judges, he labors to console them touching the issue, which they so much deplore, by giving them the true interpretation of it. (39, e.) He could not but argue that it was meant for good. For the prophetic voice—the voice of the divinity—which had often and always warned him heretofore when he was going to do wrong even in the smallest matters, now when life was at stake, and he was exposed to what are commonly regarded as the extremest of evils, had given him no warning in the whole course of his trial. Hence he inferred that death was not, as it was commonly supposed to be, an evil, but a good. (40, A. B.)

The presumption thus suggested by the divine Providence towards himself might be justified and confirmed by the following considerations: Death is either annihilation, or, which is essentially the same thing, a state of entire unconsciousness; or else it is a departure of the soul from this world to another. On the former supposition, death would be a wonderful gain; for how few of our days and nights are so happy as the hours we pass in sound sleep, undisturbed by so much as a dream; and in
that case, all time would seem no more than one such dreamless night. (40, c. d. e.) But if, on the other hand, death is a departure from this world to another, where dwell all the dead, what greater good could there be than this? There, freed from the power of judges falsely so called, he would find judges that deserved the name, such as Minos and Rhadamanthus; there he would associate with Orpheus, Musæus, Hesiod, and Homer; there he should meet with Palamedes, Ajax, and all who in past ages had fallen victims to perverted justice; and, what was better than all the rest, there he should examine and put to the test Agamemnon, Ulysses, and a multitude of other men and other women, as he examined men here, to see if they were truly wise, or only supposed themselves to be so; and this would be immense happiness: nor would he be put to death there for the exercise of this prerogative, since, besides their superior blessedness in other respects, the dwellers in that world are immortal. (41, A. B. C.) In conclusion, he assures his judges once more that no evil can befall a good man in life or death, since the gods take care of his interests, and these events have not befallen him by chance, but have been ordered by a wise and kind Providence; tells them that he harbors no resentment against them, since, though they meant it for evil, they had done him good; entreats
them to take vengeance on his sons, by inflicting on them the same pains he had inflicted on his pleasure-loving countrymen, if they are ever seen caring more for riches or any thing else than for virtue, or thinking more highly of themselves than they ought to think, for this, and this only, will be a just recompense for what he has done for the Athenian people; and then he takes leave of them, saying, Now it is time that we depart—I to die, you to live; and which of us is going to the better destiny is known only to the Deity.

Such, in substance, is the Defence of Socrates. So far from believing that we are indebted to the imagination of Plato for the lofty character of Socrates, as he appears in this Apology, we cannot but feel that we owe the elevation and eloquence of the Apology to the real greatness and heroism of its subject. The form and the words may be Plato's; but the substance and the spirit must be Socrates'; and we need only to have heard it from his lips to perfect the moral sublime. Profane literature has nowhere furnished a better delineation of the spiritual hero, rising superior to the fear and the favor of man in the strength of his own conscious integrity and of a serene trust in God. Faith in God, which had been the controlling principle of his life, was the power that sustained him
in view of approaching death, inspired him with more than human fortitude in his last days, and invested his dying words with a moral grandeur that "has less of earth in it than heaven." The consciousness of a divine mission was the leading trait in his character and the main secret of his power.* This directed his conversations, shaped his philosophy, imbued his very person, and controlled his life. This determined the time and manner of his death. And this abiding conviction, this "ruling passion strong in death," is the very life and breath and all-pervading atmosphere of the Apology.

Nor is the religious element less pervading and controlling in the Crito, though there social duty and political principle are also made prominent. This piece presents Socrates to us in prison awaiting the execution of his unjust sentence. There Crito—the friend and benefactor of his youth, the companion of his middle-life, and the stay and staff of his advanced years—calls upon him at break of day, and, finding him in sound sleep, sits down by his side in silent admiration of his calmness on the very eve of death. Socrates awakes, and a dialogue ensues, beginning in the natural and easy manner so characteristic of Plato, leading on easily to the

* Cf. Groti, Hist. of Greece, Part II., chap. lxxiii.
discussion of the topic which lies nearest Crito's heart, viz., the release of his friend, and ending, like the Apology, in a strain of rapt and inspired eloquence, before which Crito himself stands convinced, silenced, and overawed, as in the presence of some superior being.

After inquiring the hour, how Crito gained admission so early, and why he had not awaked him sooner, which leads him to remark upon the absurdity of shrinking from death, especially at his advanced age, Socrates asks the errand of his friend at that early hour. Crito replies, that the sacred ship (during whose voyage no one could be put to death at Athens) was drawing near on its return from Delos—that it would probably arrive that day, and on the day following, Socrates must die. (43, A. B. C. D.) Socrates expresses his readiness to die whenever it pleases the gods, but adds his belief that the ship would not arrive till the next day, and his execution would take place on the third day, assigning as the reason for that opinion a dream and vision, which he had just seen in sleep, and which it was well that Crito had not disturbed. A beautiful woman, dressed in white, had appeared to him, calling him and repeating the words of Homer touching the return of Achilles to his native land: "On the third day, Socrates, you will arrive at the fertile Plthia," which he interpreted
as a divine intimation, and therefore infallible proof, that on the third day he would reach his home in a better world. (44, A. B.) Beautiful fiction, if the dream was the offspring of Plato's imagination! More beautiful fact, if the dream was real! And we know not why we should doubt it. What more natural than that such a notorious dreamer, so familiar with all the poetry of his country, especially that of Homer, and meditating of his speedy departure with lively and joyful imaginings by day, should dream of it under so poetical and attractive a form by night!

Crito now proceeds to press him with various and urgent motives—justice to himself, duty to his wife and children, regard to the affection and reputation of his friends, and the like—to bribe his keepers, forfeit his bail, and make his escape, declaring that it can be done at a very small expense, and he and the other friends would gladly meet any losses or dangers which might befall them in such a course, rather than lose such a friend, and, moreover, incur the disgrace with the multitude of sacrificing him to the love of money. (44, c.; 46.) "But why, my dear Crito, why should we so much regard the opinion of the multitude? For the best men, whose opinion is most worthy of consideration, will believe that these things are, as they are in reality, and that not you, but myself, am re-
sponsible for my death." "Nevertheless, you see, Socrates, that it is necessary to pay attention to the opinion of the multitude, for the present circumstances show that the multitude can effect, not the smallest of evils only, but nearly the greatest, if one is calumniated among them." "I could wish, Crito, the multitude were able to effect the greatest evils, that they might also accomplish the greatest good; for then it would be well. But now they can do neither of these. For they can neither make a man wise nor unwise." The same simple but sublime sentiment with which we have become familiar in the Apology: Character is the only thing pertaining to man that is of any account; and this his bitterest enemies cannot touch. "But they do just what they happen to do." (44, d.) That is, the conduct of the multitude, instead of being regulated by intelligent principle, is governed by blind chance; and such labors, however strenuous, are always fruitless. Accordingly, next to his great moral and religious mission, it was the perpetual study of Socrates' life to bring his countrymen, especially the young men of Athens, to a right understanding of themselves, their duties, and their pursuits, and thereby to an intelligent discharge of all the functions of proper manhood in the light of established rules and fixed principles.

The opinions of the multitude, he goes on to
argue, are sometimes right and sometimes wrong; while the standard of rectitude is unchangeable and eternal. Our duty depends, not on the opinions of the multitude, nor does it change with the change of our circumstances and interests. It has nothing to do with the consequences of our actions. Imprisonment, exile, death itself—these are bugbears to frighten children with, but they will not deter the true man from the performance of his duty, or swerve him in the least from adherence to principle. As to his escape from the prison without the consent of the rulers of the state, the great question, and the only question he can entertain is, whether it is right, since right reason is the only friend to whose solicitation he ever allowed himself to yield. The alacrity of his friends was very commendable, if rightly directed, but if not, the greater it was, by so much it was the more blame-worthy. Against the dictates of reason and conscience, he could not be influenced in the least by a regard to the reputation of his friends or his own life. (46, b.; 47, a.)

A discussion ensues, in which Socrates proves to the conviction of Crito himself, that, in such a question, regard must be had, not to the opinions of the ignorant multitude, but of the truly wise, just as, in gymnastic exercises, the gymnast gives heed to the approbation or censure only of the
physician or the master of the gymnasium (47, b. c. d.), that by acting unwisely and unjustly the soul is corrupted and destroyed, which is a far greater evil than the disease or destruction of the body (47, ε.; 48, b.); that it is not right to injure or retaliate an injury in any case, least of all against one's country (49, Α. seqq.); that the well-being of our country depends on the sacredness of the laws and the obedience of the citizens (50, b.), and our country should be obeyed and reverenced as a more sacred thing than father, or mother, or the dearest friends (51, Α. b.); that a citizen by no means stands on an equal footing with his country, so as to have a right to treat her as she treats him, or to pronounce judgment on her acts as she does on his (50, ε.); that every citizen who remains in a free country, which allows the inhabitants full liberty to emigrate when and where they please (especially if, like Socrates, he has remained during a long life, and never gone abroad at all, and never complained of the laws), has virtually assented to the justice of the laws, and has entered into a tacit compact to obey them, as interpreted and executed by their appointed guardians, unless he can persuade them to alter their decisions (52, Α. ; 53, Α.); and that by escaping the penalty imposed upon him by the laws, he would convict himself of being a law-breaker, and make himself an object of sus-
picion as an enemy of law and justice, wherever he might go on earth, and even in Hades (53, a.; 54, b.). As the discussion proceeds, the laws seem to rise in dignity and sacredness, till they are seen embodied in a form more than human and enthroned in unearthly majesty; and they are heard, in meek yet authoritative tones, expostulating with Socrates on the injustice, folly, and pernicious tendency of the course which his friends are recommending. Socrates, too, catches the spirit of the laws, becomes instinct, as it were, with their life, and, like the Pythian priestess or an inspired corybant, deaf to every other voice, can do only as the voice of law (which is the voice of God) commands him: "The voice of these expostulations rings in my ears, and I am unable to hear other arguments. Be assured, if you urge any thing of a contrary tenor, you will labor in vain. This way God leads; and in this way let us follow."

The Crito, like the Apology and the other dialogues that were written soon after the death of Socrates, has a twofold object—the one practical and personal, the vindication of Socrates from the charge of impiety, and corrupting the youth—the other ideal and universal, to exhibit the true idea of the good citizen, or the good man in his relation to the state. And, it is not too much to say,
it accomplishes both these objects perfectly. It is a triumphant vindication of the character of Socrates, setting his patriotism in the strongest light, and showing that he sacrificed his life to what most men would deem an overscrupulous regard for the constituted authorities, even in an unjust and unrighteous exercise of the power intrusted to them. At the same time, it sets forth a perfect pattern of the patriotic and loyal citizen, submitting to an unrighteous sentence (so long as it was according to the form of law, and since it concerned only himself, while no usurped authority of oligarchy or democracy could force him to do wrong to others), and with heroic, nay, religious devotion, laying himself a willing victim before the laws and on the altar of his country.

As a work of art, the Crito ranks very high—higher than the Apology; though, we think, the latter is capable of full vindication in this light, and stands on higher ground, simply as a work of art, than is commonly supposed. But the Crito, though the plot is exceedingly simple, and the moral of the dialogue is every where conspicuous, is conformed to the most rigid rules of the drama. The unities of time, place and impression, are perfectly preserved. The scene is laid wholly in the prison—perhaps the same cell hewn out of the solid rock, near the Pnyx and the Agora, which
now bears the name of "The Prison of Socrates." The hour is the morn of his anticipated execution, when he is awaked out of sound sleep by a visit of his most intimate personal friend, who comes, if possible, to persuade him to escape, as he easily may, the execution of his unjust sentence. The characters are of the highest dignity and interest in themselves, and most intimately related to each other—Athens' wisest and best philosopher, and one of her wealthiest and most deserving citizens. The subject of discussion, as stated in the traditional caption of the dialogue, and in the dialogue itself, is ρεῖν πρακτέου, or, What ought to be done, involving the whole duty of the citizen to the laws of his country, and, more remotely, the fundamental theory of government and society. On the result hang the life of the philosopher, the reputation and happiness of his numerous friends, and the interests of good order and good government, not only in Athens, but wherever Athenian influence shall be felt to the end of time. The persons, the principles, the interests involved, all awaken the liveliest sympathy. The affectionate solicitations, the persuasive arguments, the pathetic appeals, the generous friendship and self-sacrificing devotion of Crito, go to our hearts. While he speaks, we are more than half inclined to think that not the desirable and the expedient only, but
the true and the right, are on his side. But Socrates, forgetting himself, overlooking his family and friends, and looking beyond the mere reputation of Athens, and even the right and wrong of the present case in itself considered, holds us sternly to the consideration of the great principles of law and order which it involves, and compels the assent of our reason and conscience, though against all our inclinations, and against the first dictates of our understanding. The conflict enters the breast of the reader. His judgment is perplexed with doubts and difficulties. His heart alternately hopes and fears the success of either party in the argument. As he feels constrained to assent more and more to the reasoning of Socrates, he wishes he could have decided otherwise. In the felicitous language of Stallbaum: "Etenim generosa Critonis amicitia aequa afficiat et commoveat legentium animos necesse est, atque Socratis in virtute, constantia et pia adversus leges publicas reverentia, ut velis idem et cum Socrate noluisse et cum Critone voluisse." And when, at the conclusion, Socrates, transported with veneration for the purity and dignity of the law, not of men only but of God also, and rapt with the vision of what awaited him beyond the grave, rises into something more than human, we sit looking on, by the side of his friend Crito and in the same state of mind, silenced, con-
vinced against our will, no longer pitying, still less censuring, but admiring, envying, almost worshiping him, as he looks upward and longs to take his flight.

The Apology and the Crito bear unequivocal evidence of proceeding from the same author; and that author, Ast to the contrary notwithstanding, Plato, and Plato under the same hallowing and inspiring influence, and in the same happy state of mind. The language, the style, the constructions, the idioms, are all Platonic. The sentiments and the spirit are those of Plato under the immediate inspiration of the life and death of Socrates. They are both dramatic, and this marks them both as of Platonic origin. True, the one is a monologue, and the other is a dialogue. But thus only could he act his proper part in the different circumstances in which he is placed. In the one, he pleads his cause in open court before his judges; in the other, he argues his case in prison with his friend. But in both, we see him, we hear him, we sit at his feet, we drink in his words, we catch his spirit. In the one, he stands before us the impersonation of the true orator; in the other, the model of the good citizen. But in both, the man rises far above his relations; the spirit overmasters the body and triumphs over all its outward circumstances. In both, we feel a spontaneous and irresistible conviction,
that we see and hear the real Socrates uttering essentially his own sentiments, in essentially his own language, in two of the most real and most critical emergencies of his life. But in both we see him dramatized and idealized, at the same time that he is made real and represented as he is, with that inimitable skill and grace, which, together with his high spirituality, are the undisputed prerogatives of the divine Plato.

The present edition is, in the main, an exact reprint of Stallbaum's third edition, 1846. The few exceptions are specified in the notes, and the reasons given for the choice of a different reading. The notes of Stallbaum are so felicitous, especially in the illustration of Plato's peculiar idioms and constructions, that any one who has read them bears the results almost unconsciously with him in all his subsequent reading of the same author. Wherever I have consciously borrowed from him, I have given him credit in the notes. I have also had before me the editions of Bekker, Fischer, Forster, Heindorf, Ast, Schleiermacher, Buttmann, Nüsslin, Elberling, etc., together with versions in German, French, and English, too numerous to mention; and have used them whenever they could be of use, though most of them have been of very little service. In conclusion, I can hardly leave a better wish for the student of these pages than
that, with far less labor than they have cost me, he may receive some small portion of the pleasure and profit which I have derived from them. He must be more or less than human, who can rise from the study of these immortal works of Plato, without higher ideas of the authority of law, the sacredness of duty, the power of faith, and the dignity of man's rational, moral, and immortal nature.
This edition has been carefully revised, the Notes have been largely rewritten, the text has been changed, and the whole has been reprinted and stereotyped anew. The text is that of Cron, in his eighth edition, which is the result of a more extended and careful recension of manuscripts, and which not only differs much, in orthographical particulars, from Stallbaum and other early standard texts, but shows greater irregularity than we were formerly wont to expect in Greek orthography, especially in regard to ν ἐφελκυστικόν, moveable ς, elision, hiatus, and the like details. The work of revision, begun by myself, but by necessity discontinued, has been mostly done by my son, Professor H. M. Tyler, of Smith College, under my own supervision and review however, and with valuable assistance from Mr. L. H. Elwell, instructor of Greek in Amherst College, who has made most of the grammatical references, and to whom we are also indebted for
not a few useful suggestions, the result of many years' use of the book in the class-room.

The preface of the first edition is retained entire, partly because it is largely in the nature of an introduction, which a whole generation of teachers and students have found to be useful, and have assured me that they would not willingly dispense with, and partly as a sort of educational landmark, or historic monument, which incidentally marks and records the progress of classical studies since the time when the "Græca Majora" contained in a single volume all, and more than all, of the Greek that was read in our colleges and universities. The chief object of the preface or introduction was not to instruct students in the philosophy of Socrates or Plato—the Apology and Crito are so entirely practical that they do not seem to be a suitable medium of such instruction—but to help them understand the life and character of the great moral philosopher, catch the sentiments and style and spirit of the author, and come under the educating and inspiring influence of these sublime productions. The chief end of the Notes, in the first edition and also in the revision, is the same; they are educational rather than critical or philosophical; they have respect not so much to the grammar as to the ethics and the politics, not so much to the language as to the literature and the life. At the
same time, it is hoped that the peculiarities of Plato's language, and the characteristic features of the Socratic philosophy, so far as they are contained or implied in the Apology and Crito, will be found to be sufficiently explained in the Notes. The grammatical references in this edition are chiefly to Goodwin and to Allen's edition of Hadley, occasionally to Jelf, and Goodwin's Moods and Tenses.

It is now almost thirty years since the appearance of the first edition. Meanwhile the book has gone through many editions, and borne some humble part in the education of no one knows how many thousands of noble youth in every section of our country. Thankful for the privilege of thus contributing to the discipline of young minds, the formation of right characters, and the inculcation of just and lofty sentiments in past years, we send it out again revised, we trust, improved, and we hope to meet with no less favor and do a still better work in time to come.

W. S. Tyler.

Amherst, January, 1887.
ΑΠΟΛΟΓΙΑ ΣΩΚΡΑΤΟΣ.

Ι. "Ότι μὲν ύμεῖς, δι' ἄνδρες Ἀθηναίοι, πεπόνθατε ὑπὸ τῶν ἐμῶν καθηγόρων, οὐκ οἶδα· ἐγὼ δὲ οὐν καὶ αὐτὸς ὑπ' αὐτῶν ὄλγου ἐμαυτοῦ ἐπελαθόμην· οὕτω πιθανῶς ἔλεγον. καίτοι ἄλλοις γε ὡς ἑπότες εἰπεῖν ὅσον εἰρήκασι. μάλιστα δὲ αὐτῶν ἐν ἑθαμασίᾳ τῶν πολλῶν ὃν ἐφεύσατο, τούτο ἐν δὲ ἔλεγον ὅσον χρή ὑμᾶς εὐλαβεῖσθαι μὴ ὑπ' ἐμοί ἐξαπατηθῆτε ὡς δεινοῦ ὄντος λέγειν. τὸ γὰρ μὴ αἰσχυνθῆναι ὅτι αὐτίκα ὑπ' ἐμοῖ ἔλεγεν ἂν ἰδού, ἐπειδὰν μηδ' ὀπωσοῦν ἐναποκτότατον εἶναι, εἰ μὴ ἀρα δεινὸν καλοῦσιν οὕτω λέγειν τῶν τύληθ' λέγοντα· εἰ μὲν γὰρ τούτο λέγομαι, ὅμοιογοίν ἂν ἔγογγεν οὐ κατὰ τούτους εἶναι ἢτορ. οὕτω καὶ μὲν οὖν, ὅσπερ ἐγώ λέγω, ἢ τι ἢ οὖν ἄλληθ' εἰρήκασιν· ύμεῖς δὲ μου ἀκούσεσθέ πᾶσαν τὴν ἀλήθειαν. οὕτως μέντοι μᾶ Δία, δι' ἄνδρες Ἀθηναίοι, κεκαλυπτήμενοι γε λόγους, ὅσπερ οἴ τούτοι, ῥήμασι τε καὶ ὀνόμασι οὖν οὐκ εκκοσμημένους, ἀλλὰ ἀκούσεσθε δὲ εἰκῇ λεγόμενα τοῖς ἐπιτυχοῦσιν ὀνόμασιν· πιστεύω γὰρ δίκαια εἶναι ἢ λέγω, καὶ μὴ δεῖ ύμῶν προσδοκη-
σάτω ἄλλως· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἂν δῆπον πρέποι, ὃ ἄνδρες,
τῇ δὲ τῇ ἡλικίᾳ ὡσπερ μειρακλὼ πλάττοντι λόγοις εἰς
ὑμᾶς εἰσινεῖαι. καὶ μέντοι καὶ πάνυ, ὃ ἄνδρες 'Αθη-
ναίοι, τούτο ὡμῶν δέομαι καὶ παρέμαι· ἐὰν διὰ τῶν
αὐτῶν λόγων ἀκούστε μου ἀπολογουμένου, δὴ ὡσπερ ἐ
εἰσὶνα λέγει καὶ ἐν ἀγορᾶ ἐπὶ τῶν τραπεζῶν, ῥνα
ὡς ἔχει θορυβεῖν τούτου ἔνεκα. ἔχει γὰρ ὅτως· νῦν
ἐγὼ πρῶτον ἔπλε βιαστήριον ἀναβέβηκα, ἐτῆς ἱερουσ.
ἀπεκρίσθης ὁ ξένος ἔχω τῆς ἐνθάδε 10
λέξεως. ὡσπερ οὖν ἂν, εἰ τῷ ὅπι ξένος ἐπίγχανον
18 ὁν, ἴσως γνώσκετε δῆπον ἂν μοι, εἰ ἐν ἐκείνῃ τῇ φοιν
τε καὶ τῷ τρόπῳ ἐλέγου, ἐν ὡσπερ ἐπεθράμμην, καὶ δὴ
καὶ νῦν τούτο ὡμῶν δέομαι δίκαιον ὡς ἐν μοι δοκῶ, τὸν
μὲν τρόπον τῆς λέξεως ἐὰν—ίσως μὲν γὰρ χεῖρον, 18
ίσως δὲ βελτίων ἂν ἐκη—αὐτὸ δὲ τούτο σκοπεῖν καὶ
τοῦτο τῷ νῦν προσέχειν, εἰ δίκαια λέγω ἢ μὴ·
δικαστοῦ μὲν γὰρ αὕτη ἀρετὴ, ῥήτορος δὲ τάληθη
λέγειν.

II. Πρῶτον μὲν οὖν δίκαιος εἰμὶ ἀπολογήσασθαι, 20
ὁ ἄνδρες 'Αθηναῖοι, πρὸς τὰ πρῶτά μου πειθή κατη-
γορημένα καὶ τοὺς πρῶτους κατηγόρους, ἐπειτά δὲ
Β πρὸς τὰ υστερα καὶ τοὺς υστερούς. ἐμοῦ γὰρ πολλοὶ
κατήγοροι γεγόνασίν πρὸς ύμᾶς καὶ πάλαι πολλὰ ἤδη
ἔτη καὶ οὐδὲν ἀληθῆς λέγουστε, οῆς ἐγὼ μᾶλλον φοβοῦ· 25
μαί ἂ τούς ἄμφι "Ανυτον, καλίτερας καὶ τούτους
dεινοὺς· ἄλλα ἐκείνων δειμότεροι, ὃ ἄνδρες, οἱ ύμῶν
τοὺς πολλοὺς ἐκ παλιῶν παραλαμβάνοντες ἐπειθόν τε
καὶ κατηγόρουν ἐμοῦ, ὡς ἐστὶ τις Σωκράτης, σοφὸς ἀνήρ, τά τε μετέώρα φροντιστής καὶ τά ὑπὸ γῆς ἄπαντα ἀνεξηγητικῶς καὶ τὸν ἐπὶ τὸν λόγον κρείττω ποιῶν. οὕτω, ὡς ἄνδρες Ἀθηναίοι, οἱ ταύτην τὴν φήμην κατα-σκέδασαντες οἱ δεινοὶ εἰσὶ μου κατηγοροῦ. οἱ γὰρ ἀκούοντες ἤροῦνταν τοὺς ταύτα ξητοῦντας οὐδὲ θεός νομίζειν. ἐπειτά εἰσιν οὕτωι οἱ κατηγοροὶ πολλοὶ καὶ πολὺν χρόνον ἦδη κατηγορηκότες, ἦτὶ δὲ καὶ ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ ἕλικῃ λέγοντες πρὸς ὑμᾶς, ἐν ᾧ ἂν μάλιστα ἐπι-στεύσατε, παῖδες ὑμεῖς, ἐνοικός ὑμῶν καὶ μειράκια, ἀτεχνῶς ἔρημην κατηγοροῦντες ἀπολογουμένου οὐδενός. ὡς δὲ πάντων ἀλογῶσασαν, ὡς οὐδὲ τὰ ὄνομα τὰ αὐτῶν εἰδέναι καὶ εἰπεῖν, πλὴν εἰ τὰ κομφόδοντα ποῖς τυγχάνει ἄν. ὁδοὶ δὲ φθόνῳ καὶ διαβολῇ χρώμενοι ἦμας ἀνέπεθον, οἱ δὲ καὶ αὐτοὶ πεπεισμένοι ἄλλοις πείθοντες, οὕτωι πάντες ἀπορῶσατο εἰσιν· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἀναβιβάσασθαι οἳν τ' ἐστὶν αὐτῶν ἐνταυθοὶ οὐδὲ ἐλέγξαι οὔδένα, ἀλλ' ἀνάγκη ἀτεχνῶς ὅσπερ σκιαμαχεῖν ἀπολογουμένον τε καὶ ἐλέγχειν μηδενὸς ἀποκρινομένου. ἀξιώσατε οὖν καὶ ὑμεῖς ὅσπερ ἐγὼ λέγω διττοὶς μου τοὺς κατηγόρους γεγονόταί, ἔτερονς μὲν τοὺς ἄρτως κατηγορήσαντας, ἔτερονς δὲ τοὺς πάλαι οὐδὲν ἐγὼ λέγω, καὶ οἰκῇ ἐνεῖρθε δεῖν πρὸς ἐκείνους πρῶτον μὲ ἀπολογήσασθαι· καὶ γὰρ ὑμεῖς ἐκεῖνων πρῶτον ήμυν ἐκοῦσατε κατηγοροῦντος, καὶ πολὺ μᾶλλον ἢ τῶν ὑπερον. εἰεν· ἀπολογητέου δή, ὡς ἄνδρες Ἀθηναίοι, καὶ ἔπισχειρεῖν ὑμῶν ἔξελθησα τὴν διαβολήν, ἢν ὑμεῖς ἐν πολλῷ χρόνῳ ἔσχετε, ταύτην ἐν οὕτως.
διήλιγχρόνιον. Βουλομένην μὲν οὖν ἂν τοῦτο οὕτως γενέσθαι, εἰ τι ἁμείνοι καὶ ὑμῖν καὶ ἐμοὶ, καὶ πλέον τί με ποιῆσαι ἀπολογούμενον· οἴμαι δὲ αὐτὸ χαλεπτὸν εἶναι, καὶ οὐ πάνυ με λαμβάνει αὐτόν ἑστὶν. ὃμως δὲ τούτῳ μὲν ἵπτῃ τῷ θεῷ φίλων, τῷ δὲ νόμῳ πειστέον καὶ ἀπολογητέον.

Β III. Ἀναλάβωμεν οὖν ἐξ ἀρχῆς, τὸς ἡ κατηγορία ἑστὶν ἐξ ᾧ ἡ ἐμὴ διαβολὴ γέγονεν, ἢ δὴ καὶ πιστεύων Μέλητός με ἐγράψατο τὴν γραφὴν ταύτην. εἰεν· τί δὴ λέγουτες διέβαλλον οἱ διαβάλλουσι; ὡσπερ οὖν καὶ 10 κατηγόρων τὴν ἀντώμοσιν δεὶ ἀναγρῶναι αὐτῶν. Σωκράτης ἀδικεῖ καὶ περιεργάζεται ἕξετέρω τὰ τέ ύπο γῆς καὶ οὐδόνια καὶ τὸν ἔπτω λόγον κρείττων ποιῶν καὶ ἄλλους τὰ αὐτὰ ταύτα διδάσκων. τοιαύτη τὸς ἑστὶ· ταύτα γὰρ ἐκράτει καὶ αὐτὸλ ἐν τῇ Ἀριστοφά-15 νοὺς κομψοῦς. Σωκράτης τινὰ ἐκεῖ περιφερόμενον, φάσκοντα τε ἀεροβατεῖν καὶ ἄλλην πολλὴν φλυαρίαν φλυαροῦντα, ὅν ἐγὼ οὖδέν οὔτε μέγα οὔτε μικρὸν πέρι ἐπάθω. καὶ οὐχ ὡς ἀτιμᾶζων λέγω τὴν τοιαύτην ἐπιστήμην, εἰ τις περὶ τῶν τοιούτων σοφὸς 20 Δέστιν, μὴ πως ἐγὼ ὑπὸ Μέλητον τοσαῦτας δίκαις φύγομι· ἄλλα γὰρ ἐμοὶ τούτων, ὡς ἀνδρεῖς Ὁθηναῖοι, οὐδὲν μέτεστι. μάρτυρας δὲ αὐτοῖς ὑμῶν τοὺς πολλοὺς παρέχομαι, καὶ ἄξιοθεν ὑμᾶς ἀλλήλους διδάσκεις τε καὶ φράξειν, ὅσοι ἐμοὶ πώποτε ἀκηκόατε διαλεγο-25 μένου. πολλοὶ δὲ ὑμῶν οἱ τοιοῦτοι εἰσὶν· φράζετε ὅλλος, εἰ πώποτε ὃ μικρὸν ἢ μέγα ἥκουσέ τις ὑμῶν ἐμοὶ περὶ τῶν τοιούτων διαλεγομένου· καὶ ἐκ
τούτων γνώσεσθε ὅτι τοιαύτη ἐστὶ καὶ τὰλλα περὶ ἐμοῦ ἃ οἱ πολλοὶ λέγουσιν.

IV. Ἀλλὰ γὰρ οὕτω τούτων οὐδὲν ἐστιν, οὐδὲ γὰρ τινος ἀκηκόατε ὡς ἐγὼ παιδεύειν ἐπισκευῶς ἄνθρωπος καὶ χρήματα πράττομαι, οὐδὲ τοῦτο ἀληθεῖς. ἐπεὶ καὶ τοῦτο γε μοι δοκεῖ καλὸν εἶναι, εἰ τις οἶς τε εἰη παιδεύειν ἄνθρωπος ὑστερ Γοργίας τε ὁ Δεοντῖνος καὶ Πρόδικος ὁ Κεῖνος καὶ Ἰππίας ὁ Ἡλεῖος. τούτων γὰρ ἔκαστος, ὁ ἄνδρες, οἷς τε ἐστὶν οἷς εἰς ἐκάστην
10 τῶν πόλεων τῶν νέων, οὐς ἔξεστι τῶν ἑαυτῶν πολιτῶν προῖκα ξυνεῖναι ὑπὸ ἀνθρωποτομοῖν, τούτους πείθουσιν ταῖς ἑκείνους ξυνοικίας ἀπολλύοντας σφίζον ξυνεῖναι ἐν χρήματα διδόντας καὶ χάριν προσειδέναι. ἐπεὶ καὶ ἄλλος ἄνήρ ἐστι Πάριος ἐνθάδε σοφός, ἵνα ἐγὼ ἡσθομήν
15 ἐπιδημοῦτα· ἐτυχον γὰρ προσελθῶν ἄνδρὶ δια τετελεκεῖν χρήματα σοφιστῶν πλείω ἡ ἐξώπαντες οἱ ἄλλοι, Καλλίας τῷ Ἰππονίκου· τούτων οὖν ἀνηρμὴν—ἐστιν γὰρ αὐτῷ δίον νεῖε—ὁ Καλλία, ἵνα δὲ ἐγώ, εἰ μὲν σου τὸ νεῖε πόλω ἡ μόσχῳ ἐγενέσθην, εἴχομεν ἂν αὐτῶν
20 ἐπιστάτην λαβεῖν καὶ μισθώσασθαι, διε ἐμέλλειν αὐτῷ καλὸν τε καὶ ἀγαθῶς ποιήσειν τὴν προσήκουσαν ἀρετήν· ἐν δὲ ἂν οὕτως ἂ τῶν ἱππικῶν τις ἂ τῶν γεωργικῶν ἡν ἐν ἐπιδῆ ἀνθρώπῳ ἐστῖν, τίνα αὐτῶν ἐν μῆ ἐχεις ἐπιστάτην λαβεῖν; τῆς τῆς τοιαύτης ἀρετῆς τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης τε καὶ πολιτικῆς, ἐπιστήμων ἐστίν; ομοιοι γὰρ σε ἐσκέφθαι διὰ τὴν τῶν νεῶν κτήσιν. ἐστὶ τις, ἐφην ἐγώ, ἢ οὖ; Πάνω γε, ἢ δὲ ὅσ. Τὸς, ἢν δὲ ἐγώ, καὶ ποδατός, καὶ πόνου διδάσκεις; Ἐθνος, ἐφή, ὅ
Σώκρατες, Πάριος, πέντε μνών· καὶ ἐγὼ τὸν Εὐήνου
εἰμακάριστα, εἰ ὡς ἀληθῶς ἔχω ταύτην τὴν τέχνην καὶ
οὕτως ἐμελεῖς διδάσκει. ἐγὼ οὖν καὶ αὐτὸς ἐκαλ-
λυνόμην τε καὶ ἥβρυνόμην ἂν, εἰ ἡπιστάμην ταύτα·
ἀλλ’ οὐ γὰρ ἐπισταμαι, ὁ ἄνδρας Ἀθηναίων.

V. Ἡπολάβοι ἄν οὖν τις ὑμῶν ἴσως· ἄλλ’, ὁ
Σώκρατες, το σον τί ἐστι πράγμα; πόθεν αἱ διαβολαὶ
σοι αὐταὶ γεγονασιν; οὐ γὰρ δῆπον σοῦ γε οὐδὲν τῶν
ἄλλων περίττότερον πραγματευομένου ἐπείτα τοσάυτη
φήμη τε καὶ λόγος ἑγόμεν, εἰ μὴ τί ἐπράττες ἄλλοιῶν 10
ἡ οἱ πολλοὶ· λέγει οὖν ἡμῖν τί ἐστιν, ἴνα μὴ ἡμεῖς
διαρέξωμεν ταῦτα μοι δοκεῖ δίκαια
λέγειν ὁ λέγων, κἂν υἱὸν πειράσομαι ἀποδείξαι τί
ποτ’ ἐστιν τούτο οὐκ ἔμοι πεποίηκε τὸ τε ὁνόμα καὶ τὴν
diαβολήν. ἥκοιτε δῆ. καὶ ἴσως μὲν δόξω των ὑμῶν
παλίζων, εὑρετοί οὐστε, πᾶσαν υἱὸν την ἄλληθειαν
ἐρῶ. ἑγὼ γὰρ, ὁ ἄνδρας Ἀθηναίων, δι’ οὐδὲν ἄλλ’ ἢ
dia σοφίαν τινὰ τοῦτο τὸ ὁνόμα ἕσχηκα. ποιῶν δὴ
sοφίαν ταύτην; ἦπερ ἐστὶν ἴσως ἀνθρωπίνη σοφία.
τῷ διὸ τις γὰρ κινδυνεύω ταύτην εἰναι σοφός· οὕτω δὲ ὡς
Ἐτάχ’ ἄν οὖς ἄρτι ἑλεγον μεῖξω τινὰ ἢ κατ’ ἀνθρώπον
σοφίαν σοφοὶ εἴεν, ἢ οὐκ ἔχω τὶ λέγω· οὐ γὰρ δὴ
ἐγγυει αὐτήν ἐπισταμαι, ἄλλ’ ὅστις φησὶ̣ ψεύδεται τε
καὶ ἐπὶ διαβολῆς τῇ ἐμῇ λέγει. καὶ μοι, ὁ ἄνδρας
Ἀθηναίων, μὴ θορυβήσῃς, μηδὲ ἂν δόξῳ τι ὑμῖν μέγα 20
λέγειν· οὐ γὰρ ἐμὸν ἔρω τὸν λόγον δυ οὖν ἄν λέγω, ἄλλ’
eis ἀξιόχρεων υἱῶν τῶν λέγοντα ἀνολοσ. τῆς γὰρ
ἐμῆς εἰ δὴ τις ἐστὶ σοφία καὶ οὐα μάρτυρα ὑμῖν παρέ·
ξομαί τὸν θεὸν τὸν ἐν Δελφοῖς. Χαίρετωντα γὰρ ἵστε πον. οὗτος ἐμὸς τὲ ἐταίρος ἢ ἢ ἐκ νεόν καὶ ὑμῶν τῷ 21 πλήθει ἐταίρος τε καὶ ξυνέφυγε τὴν φυγὴν ταύτην καὶ μεθ’ ὑμῶν κατήλθε. καὶ ἵστε δὴ ὅλος ἢν Χαίρετον, ὅσο σφοδρὸς ἐφ’ ὅτι ὅρμησεν. καὶ δὴ ποτὲ καὶ εἰς Δελφοὺς ἐλθὼν ἐτόλμησε τοῦτο μαντεύσασθαι· καὶ ὅπερ λέγω μὴ θορυβεῖτε, ὦ ἄνδρες· ἦρετο γὰρ δὴ εἰ τις ἐμὸν εἰπή σοφότερος. ἀνείλην οὖν ἡ Πυθία μηδένα σοφότερον εἶναι. καὶ τοῦτων πέρι ὁ ἀδελφὸς ὑμῖν 10 αὐτοῦ οὐτοσὶ μαρτυρῆσε, ἐπειδὴ ἐκεῖνος τετελεύτηκεν.

VI. Σκέψασθε δὲ ὅν ἔνεκα ταύτα λέγω· μέλλων ἐγὼ 15 ὑμᾶς διδάξειν ὅθεν μοι ἡ διαβολὴ γέγονε. ταῦτα γὰρ ἐγὼ ἀκούσας ἐνεθυμοῦμην οὕτωσι· τί ποτε λέγει ὁ θεὸς, καὶ τί ποτε αἰνιττεται; ἐγὼ γὰρ δὴ οὐτε μέγα 20 οὔτε σμικρὸν ἐξουσία ἐμαυτῷ σοφὸς ὡν· τί οὖν ποτε λέγει φάσκων ἐμὲ σοφότατον εἶναι; οὐ γὰρ δὴπον ψεύδεται γε· οὐ γὰρ θέμις αὐτῷ. καὶ πολὺν μὲν χρόνον ἤπορον τί ποτε λέγει, ἐπειτα μόνης πάνυ ἐπὶ ξύτησιν αὐτοῦ τοιαύτην τινὰ ἑρατόμην. ἦλθον ἐπὶ 25 τινα τῶν δοκούντων σοφῶν εἶναι, ὡς ἐνταῦθα, ἐξερ ποῦ, ἐλέγεσιν τὸ μαντειόν καὶ ἀποφανῶν τῷ χρησμῷ 30 ὅτι οὕτωσι ἐμὸν σοφότερος ἔστι, σὺ δ’ ἐμὲ ἐφησας. διασκοπῶν οὖν τούτων—ὅνοματε γὰρ οὔδ’ ἐδομαί λέγειν, ἢ ὅθεν τῶν πολλῶν—ὁ δὲ θεός τῶν πολλῶν ἐπὶ ἐγὼ σκοπῶν 25 τοιούτων τί ἔπαθον, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναίοι—καὶ διαλεγόμενοι αὐτῷ, ἐδοξεί μοι οὗτος ὁ ἄνδρος δοκεῖ τοῦτο τούτος ἀνθρώπους καὶ μάλιστα ἑαυτῷ, εἶναι δ’ οὖ· κάπετα ἐπειρώμην αὐτῷ δεικνύναι 5
δότι οὗτοι μὲν εἶναι σοφός, εἰγ' ὃς οὐ. ἐνετεύθεν οὖν τούτῳ τε ἀπηχθόμην καὶ πολλοῖς τῶν παρόντων· πρὸς ἐμαυτὸν δ' οὖν ἀπιῶν ἐλογιζόμην ὅτι τούτου μὲν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ἐγὼ σοφότερος εἰμι· κινδυνεύει μὲν γὰρ ἦμων οὐδέτερος οὐδὲν καλὸν κἀγαθὸν εἰδέναι, ἀλλ' ὅ οὖσας μὲν οἰκεὶ τι εἰδέναι οὐκ εἰδῶς, ἐγὼ δὲ ἀσπερ οὖν οὐκ οἶδα οὐδὲ οἴομαι. ἔσικά γ' οὖν τοῦτον γε σμικρῷ των αὐτῶ τούτῳ σοφότερος εἶναι, ὅτι δ' ἡ μή οἶδα οὐδὲ οἴομαι εἰδέναι. ἐνετεύθεν ἐπ' ἄλλον ᾧ τῶν ἑκείνου δοκοῦντων σοφώτερον εἶναι, καὶ μοι ταῦτα 10 ταῦτα ἔδοξε· καὶ ἐνταῦθα κάκελψ καὶ ἄλλους πολλοῖς ἀπηχθόμην.

VII. Μετὰ ταῦτ' οὖν ἦδη ἐφεξῆς ἦν αἰσθανόμενος μὲν καὶ λυπούμενος καὶ δεδώρ ὅτι ἀπηχθανόμην, ὡμοὶ δὲ ἀναγκαῖον ἔδοξε οὖν τῷ τοιῷθεν περὶ 15 πλείστου ποιεῖσθαι· ἵστεον οὖν σκοποῦντι τὸν χρησμὸν τῷ λέγει ἐπὶ ἀπαντασ τούς τι δοκοῦντας εἰδέναι. 22 καὶ νὴ τὸν κύνα, ὁ ἀνδρὸς Ἀθηναίοι—δεῖ γὰρ πρὸς ἕμας τάληθα λέγειν—ἡ μὴν ἐγὼ ἐπαθὸν τι τοιοῦτον· οἱ μὲν μᾶλλον εὐδοκιμοῦντες ἐδοξάν μοι ὄλοιν δεῖν 20 τοῦ πλείστου ἐνδεεῖς εἶναι ξητοῦντες κατὰ τὸν θεὸν, ἀλλ' δὲ δοκοῦντες φαντότεροι ἐπιεικέστεροι εἶναι ἀνδρὲς πρὸς τὸ φρονίμως ἐχεῖν. δεῖ δ' ὅ ἦμων τὴν ἑμὴν πλάνην ἐπιδειξάω ἀσπερ πόνους τινὰς πονοῦντος, ἵνα μοι καὶ ἀνελεγκτός ἢ μαντελα γένοιτο. μετὰ γὰρ 25 τοὺς πολτικοὺς ἢ ἐπὶ τοὺς ποιητὰς τοὺς τοῖς τῶν ἑγαγωνίων καὶ τοὺς τῶν διθυράμβων καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους, ὡς ἐνταῦθα ἐπὶ αὐτοφόρῳ καταληψόμενος ἐμαυτὸν
Ἀμαθέστερον ἔκεινον ὄντα. ἀναλαμβάνων οὖν αὐτῶν τὰ ποιήματα, ἡ μοι ἐδόκηει μάλιστα πεπραγματεύθησαν αὐτοῖς, διηρήτων δὲ αὐτοὺς τῇ λέγουσι, ἵν' ἀμα τι καὶ μανθάνομαι παρ' αὐτῶν. αἰσχύνομαι οὖν ὑμῖν εἰτεῖν, ὧδε ἀνδρεῖς, τὰληθῆ· δήμως δὲ ῥητέων. ὡς ἔπος γὰρ εἰτεῖν ὀλίγου αὐτῶν ἄπαντες οἱ παρόντες δὲν βέλτιων ἔλεγον περὶ δὲν αὐτοὶ ἑπεποιήκεσαν. ἔγνων οὖν καὶ περὶ τῶν ποιητῶν ἐν ὀλίγῳ τούτῳ, ὅτι οὐ σοφίᾳ ποιοίεν ὁ δὲ ποιοῖεν, ἀλλὰ φύσει τωλ καὶ ἐνθουσιάζοντες ὡσπερ 10 οἱ θεομάντεις καὶ οἱ χρησμωδοὶ· καὶ γὰρ οὕτω λέγουσι μὲν πολλὰ καὶ καλά, ἰσασὶ δὲ οὐδὲν ὄν ἠγούσι. τοιοῦτον τὸ μοι ἐφάνησαν πάθος καὶ οἱ ποιηταὶ πεπονθότες· καὶ ἀμα ἰσθόμην αὐτῶν διὰ τὴν ποιήσιν οἰομένων καὶ τᾶλλα σοφωτάτων εἶναι ἀνθρώπων δὲ οὐκ 15 ἡσαν. ἀπῆλθα οὖν καὶ ἐντείθην τῷ αὑτῷ οἰόμενος περιγεγονέναι ὡσπερ καὶ τῶν πολιτικῶν.

VIII. Τελευτῶν οὖν ἐπὶ τοὺς χειροτέχνας ἦν ἐμαυτῷ γὰρ ξυνήδειν οὐδὲν ἐπισταμένῳ ὡς ἐπος εἰτεῖν, δὲν τούτοις δὲ γ' ἤδειν ὅτι εὐρήσομι πολλὰ καὶ καλὰ 20 ἐπισταμένους. καὶ τούτου μὲν οὐκ ἐψεύσθην, ἀλλ' ἡπισταντο δὲ ἐγὼ οὖν ἡπιστάμην, καὶ μου ταύτη σοφότεροι ἦσαν. ἀλλ', ὡς ἀνδρεῖς Ἀθηναῖοι, ταύτων μοι ἔδοξαν ἔχειν ἁμάρτημα, ὡσπερ καὶ οἱ ποιηταὶ, καὶ οἱ ἀγαθοὶ δημιουργοί· διὰ τὸ τὴν τέχνην καλῶς ἐξεργά-26 ἔσθαι ἐκατόστος ἧξιν καὶ τᾶλλα τὰ μέγιστα σοφώτατος εἶναι, καὶ αὐτῶν αὐτῇ ἡ πλημμέλεια ἐκείνη τὴν σοφίαν ἀπέκρυμπτεν, ὡστε μὲ ἐμαυτῶν ἀνερωτάν ὑπὲρ τού χρησ-Ε μοῦ, πότερα δεξαμενὴν ἃν οὕτω ὡσπερ ἔχειν μήτε
τι σοφὸς ὁν τὴν ἐκεῖνην σοφίαν μήτε ἀμαθῆς τὴν ἀμαθίαν, ἢ ἀμφότερα ἢ ἐκεῖνοι ἔχουσιν ἔχειν. ἀπεκρινάμην οὖν ἐμαυτῷ καὶ τῷ χρησμῷ ὅτι μοι λυσιτελοὶ ὥσπερ ἔχω ἔχειν.

IX. Ἐκ ταυτησὶ δὴ τῆς ἐξετάσεως, ὃ ἄνδρες Ἀθη-5
23 ναιοι, πολλαὶ μὲν ἀπέχθειαι μοι γεγονασὶ καὶ οἱ ταχεῖαι καὶ βαρύταται, ὅστε πολλὰς διαβολὰς ἀπ' αὐτῶν γεγονέναι, δομομα δὲ τούτο λέγεσθαι, σοφὸς εἶναι. οἷονται γάρ με ἐκάστοτε οἱ παρόντες ταῦτα αὐτῶν εἶναι σοφῶν, ὃ ἄν ἄλλον ἔξελέγχω. τὸ δὲ 10 κινδυνεύει, ὃ ἄνδρες, τῷ ὄντι ὁ θεὸς σοφὸς εἶναι, καὶ ἐν τῷ χρησμῷ τούτῳ τούτῳ λέγειν, ὅτι ἡ ἀνθρωπίνη σοφία δλίγον τυός ἄξια ἐστὶ καὶ οὐδενός, καὶ φαίνεται τούτῳ λέγειν τὸν Σωκράτη, προσκεχρήσθαι δὲ τῷ ἐμῷ ὀνόματι ἐμὲ παράδειγμα ποιούμενος, ὥσπερ ἄν εἰ εἴποι 15 βοτι οὐτός ὑμῶν, ὃ ἀνθρωποί, σοφότατος ἐστιν, ὅστε ὥσπερ Σωκράτης ἐγνωκεν ὅτι οὐδενός ἄξιος ἐστι τῇ ἀληθειᾷ πρὸς σοφίαν. ταῦτ' οὖν ἐγὼ μὲν ἔτι καὶ νῦν περιών ξητῶ καὶ ἔρευννον κατὰ τὸν θεόν, καὶ τῶν ἀστῶν καὶ ἔρευνον ἄν τινα οἴωμαι σοφὸν εἶναι. καὶ ἐπειδὰν 20 μοι μὴ δοκῇ, τῷ θεῷ ἴσχυσθαι ἐνδείκνυμαι ὅτι οὐκ ἔστι κοσμῷ.

καὶ ὑπὸ ταύτης τῆς ἄσχολλας οὔτε τι τῶν τῆς πόλεως πρᾶξιν μοι σχολὴ γέγονεν ἄξιον λόγου οὔτε τῶν οἰκεῖων, ἀλλ' ἐν πενίᾳ μυρίᾳ εἰμὶ διὰ τὴν τοῦ θεοῦ λατρείαν.

X. Πρὸς δὲ τούτοις οἱ νέοι μοι ἐπακολουθοῦντες οἷς μάλιστα σχολὴ ἐστιν, οἱ τῶν πλουσιωτάτων, αὐτο-ματοι χαίρουσιν ἀκοίνοντες ἐξεταζομένων τῶν ἀνθρώ-
πων, καὶ αυτοὶ πολλάκις ἐμὲ μυμοῦνται, εἰτ' ἐπιχειροῦσιν ἀλλοὺς ἐξετάζειν. καὶ πεπεστα, ὁμαί, εὑρίσκουσιν πολλὰν ἄφθονίαν οἰσμένον μὲν εἰδέναι τι άνθρώπων, εἰδότων δὲ ὅλγα ἡ οὐδέν. ἐντεύθεν οὖν οἱ ὑπ' αὐτῶν ἐξετάζομεν εἰμοὶ ὁργίζονται, ἀλλ' οὐχ αὐτοῖς, καὶ λέγουσιν ὡς Σωκράτης τίς ἐστι μαρώτατος καὶ διαφθείρει τοὺς νέους. καὶ ἐπειδὰν τις αὐτοῦς ἔρωτα ὅτι ποιῶν καὶ ὅτι διδάσκων, ἔχουσι μὲν οὐδὲν εἰπεῖν, ἀλλ' ἁγιοῦσιν, ἦν δὲ μὴ δοκῶσιν ἀπορεῖν, τὰ κατὰ πάντων τῶν φιλοσοφοῦντων πρόχειρα ταύτα λέγουσιν, ὅτι τὰ μετέωρα καὶ τὰ ὑπὸ γῆς καὶ θεοὺς μὴ νομίζειν καὶ τὸν ήττο λόγον κρεῖττον ποιῶν. τὰ γὰρ ἁληθῆ, οἶσμαί, οὐκ ἂν ἐθέλοις λέγειν, ὅτι κατάδηλοι γλύγονται προσποιοῦμενοι μὲν εἰδέναι, εἰδότες δὲ οὐδέν. ἄτε οὖν, οἶσμα, φιλοτιμοὶ δυντε καὶ σφοδροὶ καὶ πολλοὶ καὶ ἐννεταγμέ-νως καὶ πιθανῶς λέγοντες περὶ ἐμοῦ, ἐμπεπλήκασιν ὑμῶν τὰ ὅτα καὶ πάλαι καὶ νῦν σφοδρῶς διαβάλλοντες. ἐκ τούτων καὶ Μέλητός μοι ἐπέθετο καὶ Ἁνυτος καὶ Λύκων, Μέλητος μὲν ὑπὲρ τῶν ποιητῶν ἀχθομενος, Ἁνυτος δὲ ὑπὲρ τῶν δημομυργῶν καὶ τῶν πολιτικῶν, Λύκων δὲ ὑπὲρ τῶν ῥητόρων· ὃστε, ὅπερ ἁρχόμενον ἐγὼ ἔλεγον, θαυμάζομε· ἄν εἰ οἶος ἐβ' ἑύθν ἐγὼ ὑμῶν ταύτην τὴν διαβολὴν ἐξελέσθαι εν οὖν ὑπὸς ὁλίγῳ χρόνῳ οὕτω πολλὴν γεγονυῖν. ταύτ' ἐστιν ὑμῖν, ὁ ἄνδρες Ἁθηναίοι, τάληθη, καὶ ὑμᾶς οὕτε μέγα οὕτε μικρῶν ἀποκρηφάμενος ἐγὼ λέγω σοῦ ὑποστειλάμενος. καὶ τοι αὐτὰ σχεδον ὅτι τοὺς αὐτοὺς ἀπεκθάνομαι· ὁ καὶ τεκμηριων ὅτι ἁληθῇ λέγω καὶ ὅτι αὐτὴ ἐστὶν ἡ δια-
βολὴ ἡ ἐμὴ καὶ τὰ αὐτὰ ταὐτὰ ἐστὶν. καὶ ἐὰν τε νῦν βέλων τε αὐθεσις ξητήσῃ ταῦτα, οὕτως εὑρήσετε.

XI. Περὶ μὲν οὖν ὁι πρῶτοι μου καθήγοροι καθηγόρουν αὐτὴ ἐστὶν ἱκανὴ ἀπολογία πρὸς ὑμᾶς. πρὸς δὲ Μέλητον τὸν ἀγαθὸν τε καὶ φιλότομον, ὡς φησί, καὶ τουσ υστέρους μετὰ ταῦτα πειράσομαι ἀπολογεῖσθαι. αὐθεσις γὰρ δὴ ὡσπερ ἐτέρων τούτων ὑποτην καθηγόρων λάβωμεν αὐ τὴν τούτων ἀντιμοσιᾶν. ἔχει δὲ πως φθείρῃ. Σωκράτη φησίν ἀδικεῖν τοὺς τε νέους διαφθείροντα καὶ θεοὺς οὗς ἢ πόλις νομίζει οὐ νομίζει.  

ζούτα, ἔτερα δὲ δαιμόνια καὶ ν. τὸ μὲν δὴ ἐγκλῆμα τοιοῦτον ἐστὶν τούτου δὲ τοῦ ἐγκλήματος ἐν ἐκαστὸν ἐξετάσωμεν. φησὶ γὰρ δὴ τοὺς νέους ἀδικεῖς με διαφθείροντα. ἐγὼ δὲ γε, ὁ ἀνδρεὶς Ἀθηναίοι, ἀδικεῖς φημὶ Μέλητον, οτι σπουδὴ χαιρετίζεται ῥαδίως εἰς ἀγῶνα καθιστὰς ἀνθρώπους, περὶ πραγμάτων προσποιούμενος σπουδάζει καὶ κηδεσθαι ὑπὸν ὑπὸν τοῦτῳ πώποτε ἐμέλησεν. ὡς δὲ τοῦτο οὕτως ἔχει πειράσομαι καὶ ὑμῖν ἐπιδείξαι.

XII. Καὶ μοι δεύρο, ὁ Μέλητε, εἰπὲ ἀλλὰ τι ἡ.  

δ' περὶ πολλοῦ ποιεῖ ὅπως ὁ βέλτιστοι οἱ νεότεροι ἔσονται; Ἐγωγε. Ἰθι δὴ νῦν εἰπὲ τούτοις τὶς αὐτοὶς βελτίων ποιεῖ; δήλου γὰρ ὅτι οἶσθα, μέλου γέ σοι. τὸν μὲν γὰρ διαφθείροντα ἐξευρόμεν, ὡς φησί, ἐμὲ εἰσάγεις τον τούτω καὶ καθηγορεῖσθαι. τὸν δὲ δὴ βελτίως ποιοῦντα ἑξ Ἰθι εἰπὲ καὶ μήνυσον αὐτοὶς τὶς ἐστὶν. ὥρας, ὁ Μέλητε, ὁτι συγκαὶ καὶ οὐκ ἔχεις εἰπεῖς; καὶ τοιο οὐκ αἴσχρον σοι δοκεῖ εἶναι καὶ ἱκανον τεκμήριον οὐ δὴ
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ἐγὼ λέγω, ὅτι σοι οὐδὲν μεμέληκεν; ἀλλ’ εἰπέ, ὡγαθέ, τίς αὐτοὺς ἁμέληνους ποιεῖ; Οἱ νόμοι. ἢ ΑΛΛ’ οὐ τοῦτο ἐρωτῶ, ὃ βέλτιστε, ἀλλὰ τίς ἀνθρωπος, ὡστε πρῶτον καὶ αὐτὸ τοῦτο οἴδε, τοὺς νόμους. Οὕτω, ὃ Σῶκρατες, οἱ δικασταὶ. Πῶς λέγεις, ὃ Μέλητε; οἴδε τοὺς νέους παιδεύειν οἶοι τε εἰσὶ καὶ βελτίους ποιοῦσιν; Μάλιστα. Πότερον ἀπαντεῖ, ὃ οἱ μὲν αὐτῶν, οἱ δ’ οὔ τε Ἀπαντεῖ. ἐν γε τῇ τινὶ Ἡραν λέγεις καὶ πολλὴν ἀφθονίαν τῶν ὦφελοῦντων. τί δὲ δὴ; οἴδε οἱ ἀκροαταὶ βελτίους ποιοῦσιν ἢ οὔ; Καὶ οὕτω. Τί δὲ οἱ βουλευταὶ; Καὶ ἡβ οἱ βουλευταὶ. ἢ ΑΛΛ’ ἄρα, ὃ Μέλητε, μὴ οἱ ἐν τῇ ἐκκλησίᾳ, οἱ ἐκκλησιασταὶ, διαφθείρουσι τοὺς νεωτέρους; ἢ κάκεινοι βελτίους ποιοῦσιν ἀπαντεῖς; Κάκεινοι. Πάντες ἄρα, ὃς οἰκεῖν, Ἀθηναίοι καλοὺς κἀγαθοὺς ποιοῦσι πλὴν ἐμοῦ, ἐγὼ δὲ μόνος διαφθείρω. οὐτω λέγεις; Πάνω σφόδρα ταῦτα λέγω. Πολλὴν γὰρ ἐμοῦ κατέγραψα δυστυχίαν. καὶ μοι ἀπόκριναι. ἢ καὶ περὶ ἢπποισι οὐτω σοι δοκεῖ ἐχεῖν. οἱ μὲν βελτίους ποιοῦντες αὐτοὺς πάντες ἀνθρωποὶ εἶναι, εἰς δὲ τις ὃ Β διαφθείρων; ἢ τοῦναντίον τοῦτο τὸν εἰς μὲν τοῖς ὁ βελτίους οἷος τε ὃν ποιεῖν ἢ πάνυ ὀλίγοι, οἱ ἢπποικοί· οἱ δὲ πολλοὶ, εάνπερ ξυνώσι καὶ χρόνωται ἢπποις, διαφθείρουσιν; οὐχ οὕτως ἐχεῖ, ὃ Μέλητε, καὶ περὶ ἢππωι καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀπάντων ξύρων; πάντως δὴ που, ἡ δὲ ντὶς καὶ Ἀνυτος οὐ φήτε εἰς τοῦ φήτε· πολλὴ γὰρ ἃν τις εὐδαιμονία εἰσὶν περὶ τοὺς νέους, εἰ εἰς μὲν μόνος αὐτοὺς διαφθείρει, οἱ δ’ ἄλλοι ὦφελοῦσιν. ἀλλὰ τῷ γὰρ, ὃ Μέλητε, ἰκανός ἐπιδείκνυσιν ὅτι οὐδεπώποτε
έφροντισας τῶν νέων, καὶ σαφῶς ἀποφαίνεις τὴν σαντού ἄμελειαν, ὅτι οὐδὲν σοι μεμέληκε περὶ ὧν ἐμὲ εἰσάγεις.

Χ. Ποτέν ἐνεπέ, ὅ πρὸς Δίως Μέλητε, πότερον ἐστίν οἰκεῖν ἀμεινοῦ ἐν πολέματι χρηστοῖς ἦς πολήροις; ὅταν, ἀπόκριναι· οὐδὲν γάρ τοι χαλέππον ἐρωτῶ. οὐχ οἱ μὲν πονηροὶ κακῶν τι ἐργάζονται τοῖς ἀεὶ ἐγχυτάτω ἐαυτῶν ὄνται, οἱ δ’ ἀγαθοὶ ἄγαθόν τι; Πάνυ γε. Ἐοτεν οὖν ὅστις βούλεται ὑπὸ τῶν ξυνόντων βλάπτεσθαι μᾶλλον ἡ ὀφελείσθαι; ἀποκρίνου, 10 ὃ ἀγαθέ· καὶ γὰρ ὁ νόμος κελεύει ἀποκρίνεσθαι. ἔσθ’ ὅστις βούλεται βλάπτεσθαι; Οὐ δήτα. Φέρε δὴ, ποτέρον ἐμὲ εἰσάγεις διεῦρ ὡς διαφθείροντα τοὺς νεωτέρους καὶ πονηροτέρους ποιοῦντα ἐκόντα ἢ ἄκουντα; Ἐκόντα ἐγὼ γε. Τι δήτα, ὁ Μέλητε; τοσοῦτον σὺ 15 ἐμοῦ σοφότερος εἰ τηλικοῦτον ὄντος τηλικόσες ὄν, ὡστε σὺ μὲν ἐγνωκας ὅτι οἱ μὲν κακοὶ κακῶν τι ἐργάζονται ἂν τοὺς μάλιστα πλησίον ἐαυτῶν, οἱ δὲ ἀγαθοὶ

Ἐ ἄγαθον· ἐγὼ δὲ δή εἰς τοσοῦτον ἁμαθίας ἦκω, ὡστε καὶ τούτο ἄγνοι, ὅτι, εάν τινα μοχθήρου ποιήσω τῶν 20 ξυνόντων, κινδυνεύσω κακῶν τι λαβεῖν ὁπ’ αὐτοῦ, ὡστε τούτο τὸ τοσοῦτον κακῶν ἐκῶν ποιῶ, ὡς φῆς σὺ; τάντα ἐγώ σοι ὁ πελθομα, ὁ Μέλητε, οἱμα δὲ οὐδὲ ἄλλον ἀνθρώπων οὐδένα· ἄλλ’ ἢ οὐ διαφθείρω, ἢ, εἰ διαφθείρω, 25 ἄκων διαφθείρω, τῶν τοσοῦτοι καὶ ἄκουσόν τιν ἁμαρτημάτων οὐ δεῦρ νόμος εἰσάγει περὶ ἀλλ’ ἢ ἰδίᾳ λαβόντα διδάσκειν καὶ νουθετεῖν· δὴ λογ’ γὰρ ὅτι, εάν μάθω,
παύσομαι ὁ γε ἄκων ποιῶ. σὺ δὲ ξυγγενέσθαι μὲν μοι καὶ διδάξαι ἐφυγες καὶ οὐκ ἥθελησας, δεύρο δὲ εἰσάγεις, οὐ νόμος ἑστὶν εἰσάγειν τοὺς κολάσεως δεομένους, ἄλλ' οὐ μαθῆσες.

5 ΧΙΩ. Ἄλλα γὰρ, ὁ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τούτο μὲν δῖλον ἤδη ἑστὶν, δὲ ἐγὼ ἔλεγον, ὅτι Μελήτη, τούτων οὐτε μέγα οὐτε μικρὸν πῶς πέποτε ἐμέλησεν· ὅμως δὲ δὴ ἐγὼ λέγει ἦμιν πόσας μὲ φης διαφθείρειν, ὁ Μέλητε, τοὺς νεωτέρους; ἡ δὴ κατὰ τὴν γραφὴν ἦν ἐγράψας

10 θεοὺς διδάσκοντα μὴ νομίζειν οὐς ἡ πόλις νομίζει, ἔτερα δὲ δαίμονα καίνα;· οὖ ταῦτα λέγεις ὅτι διδάσκων διαφθείρω; Πάνυ μὲν οὖν σφόδρα ταῦτα λέγω. Πρὸς αὐτῶν τοίνυν, ὁ Μέλητε, τούτων τῶν θεῶν ὃν νῦν ὁ λόγος ἑστὶν, εἰπὲ ἐτί σαφέστερον καὶ ἐμοὶ καὶ τοῖς

15 ἄνδρασι τούτοις. ἐγὼ γὰρ οὐ δύναμαι μαθεῖν πότερον ἐλέγεις διδάσκεις μὲ νομίζειν εἰναι τινας θεοὺς, καὶ αὐτῶς ἄρα νομίζω εἰναι θεοὺς, καὶ οὐκ εἰμὶ τὸ παράπαν ἄθεος οὐδὲ ταὐτή ἄδικῶ, οὐ μέντοι οὕσπερ γε ἡ πόλις, ἄλλα ἐτέρους, καὶ τοῦτ' ἑστίν ὃ μοι ἐγκαλεῖς, ὅτι ἐτέρους. ἡ παντάπασι μὲ φης οὔτε αὐτῶν νομίζεις θεοὺς τοὺς τε ἄλλους ταῦτα διδάσκεις. Ταῦτα λέγω, ὃς τὸ παράπαν οὐ νομίζεις θεοὺς. ὁ θαυμάστη Μέλητε, ἵνα τί ταῦτα λέγεις; οὐδὲ ἦλιον οὐδὲ σελήνην ἄρα νομίζω ὅ

20 θεοὺς εἰναι ὦσπερ οἱ ἄλλοι ἄνθρωποι; Μᾶ Δί', ὁ ἄνδρες δικασταλ, ἐπεὶ τὸν μὲν ἦλιον λίθον φησὶν εἶναι, τὴν δὲ σελήνην γῆν. Ἀναξαγόρου οἷος κατηγορεῖν, ὁ φίλε Μέλητε, καὶ οὕτω καταφρονεῖς τὸν ὁδὲ καὶ οἷος αὐτοῦς ἀπείρους γραμμάτων εἶναι, ὡστε οὐκ εἰδέναι
ὅτι τὰ Ἀναξαγόρου βιβλία τοῦ Κλαξομενίου γέμει τούτων τῶν λόγων; καὶ δὴ καὶ οἱ νέοι ταῦτα παρ' ἐμοῦ μανθάνουσιν, ὃ ἐξεστὶν ἐνίοτε, εἰ πάνω πολλοῦ, ἔδραχμης ἐκ τῆς ὀρχήστρας πριαμένου Σωκράτους καταγελᾶν, ἕαν προσποιήται ἕαυτον εἶναι, ἄλλως τε ὁ ὁὐτῶς ἀτοπα ὄντα. ἀλλ' ὁ πρὸς Δίὸς, οὕτωσι σοι δοκῶ οὐδένα νομίζεις θεοῦ εἶναι; Οὐ μὲντοι μὰ Δί᾽ οὐδ᾽ ὀπωσδέοιν. Ἄπιστός γ᾽ εἰ, ὁ Μέλητε, καὶ ταῦτα μέντοι, ὃς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖς, σαυτῷ. ἐμοὶ γὰρ δοκεῖ οὕτωσι, ὃ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναίοι, πάνω εἶναι υβριστὴς καὶ ἀκόλασος-10 τος, καὶ ἀτεχνῶς τὴν γραφὴν ταῦτην ὑβρεί τινα καὶ ἀκολασία καὶ νέοτητι γράψασθαι. ἔσκε γὰρ ὡσπερ 27 ἀνυνγμα ἐνυπιθέντι διαπερισμένῳ, ἀρα γνώσεται Σωκρά- της ὁ σοφὸς δὴ ἐμοὶ χαριεντισμένου καὶ ἐναντὶ ἐμαυ- τῷ λέγοντος, ἢ ἐξαιπατήσω αὐτὸν καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους τοὺς 13 ἀκουόντας; οὕτως γὰρ ἐμοὶ φαίνεται τὰ ἐναντία λέγειν αὐτὸς ἐναντίῳ ἐν τῇ γραφῇ, ὡσπερ ἀν εἰ εὔποι· ἀδικεὶ Σωκράτης θεοῦς οὐ νομίζουν, ἀλλὰ θεοῦς νομίζουν. καὶ τοῦτό ἐστι παίζοντος.

XV. Ξυνεπισκέψασθε δὴ, ὁ ἄνδρες, ἢ μοι φαίνε-20 ται ταῦτα λέγειν· σοὶ δὲ ἢμῖν ἀπόκριναι, ὁ Μέλητε· ὑμεῖς δὲ, ὡσπερ κατ' ἀρχὰς ύμᾶς παρηγορήσαμεν, μέμνησθε β μοι μὴ θορυβεῖν, ἐὰν ἐν τῷ εἰσορθὸτα τρόπῳ τοὺς λόγους ποιῆμαι. ἔστω δὲ οὕτως ἀνθρώπων, ὁ Μέλητε, ἀνθρώ- πεια μὲν νομίζει πράγματ' εἶναι, ἀνθρώπων δὲ οὐ 25 νομίζει; ἀποκρινέσθω, ὁ ἄνδρες, καὶ μὴ ἄλλα καὶ ἄλλα θορυβεῖτω· ἐσθ' ὡστε οὕποις μὲν οὐ νομίζει, ἵππικα δὲ πράγματα; ἢ αὐλητάς μὲν οὐ νομίζει εἶναι.
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αὐλητικά δὲ πράγματα; οὐκ ἔστων, ὦ ἄριστε ἀνδρῶν·
ei μή σὺ βούλει ἀποκρίνασθαι, ἐγώ σοι λέγω καὶ τοὺς
ἀλλοις τουτοις. ἀλλὰ τὸ ἐπὶ τοῦτο γε ἀπόκριναι·
ἐσθ' ὅστις δαιμόνια μὲν νομίζει πράγματ' εἶναι, δάλμω-
νας δὲ σὺ νομίζει· Οὔκ ἔστων· Ὡς ὁμήσας ὅτι μόνος
ἀπεκρίνω ὑπὸ τοσοῦτον ἀναγκαζόμενος. οὐκοῦν δαιμό-
να μὲν φής με καὶ νομίζει καὶ διδάσκειν, εἴτ' οὖν
καὶ κἂν εἴτε παλαιά· ἀλλ' οὖν δαιμόνια γε νομίζω κατὰ
tὸν σὸν λόγον, καὶ ταῦτα καὶ διωμόσω εὖ τῇ ἀντι-
10γραφῇ. εἰ δὲ δαιμόνια νομίζω καὶ δαιμόνια δῆσον
πολλὰ ἀνάγκη νομίζειν μὲ ἔστων· οὐχ οὕτως ἔχει;
ἔχει δὴ· τίθημι γάρ σε ὀμολογοῦντα, ἐπειδὴ οὐκ
ἀποκρίνει· τοὺς δὲ δαίμονας οὐχὶ ήτοι θεοὺς γε ἡγοῦ-Δ
μεθα ἡ θεῶν παίδας; φής ἡ οὖ; Πάνω γε. Οὐκοῦν
15εἴπερ δαίμονας ἡγούμαι, ὡς σὺ φής, εἰ μὲν θεοὶ τινὲς
εἰσιν οἱ δαίμονες, τοῦτ' ἂν εἰ δ' ἐγὼ φημὶ σε αἰνὶ-
tεσθαί καὶ χαριεντίζεσθαί, θεοὺς οὐχ ἡγούμενον φάναι
ἐμὲ θεοὺς αὖ ἡγεῖσθαι πάλιν, ἐπειδήπερ γε δαίμονας
ἡγούμαι· εἰ δ' αὖ οἱ δαίμονες θεῶν παίδες εἰσὶ νόθοι
20τινές ἡ ἐκ νυμφῶν ἢ ἐκ τινῶν ἄλλων, ὅν δὴ καὶ
λέγονται, τίς ἂν ἀνθρώπων θεῶν μὲν παίδας ἡγοίτο
εἶναι, θεοὺς δὲ μή; ὁμοίως γὰρ ἂν ἀτοποὶ εἰς, ὅσπερ Ε
ἀν εἰ τις ἵππων μὲν παίδας ἡγοίτο ἢ [καὶ] ὅνων [τοὺς
ἡμῶν], ὅππους δὲ καὶ ὅνους μὴ ἡγοίτο εἶναι. ἀλλ',
25οὶ Μέλητε, οὐκ ἔστων ὅπως σὺ ταῦτα οὐχὶ ἀποπειρό-
μενος ἡμῶν ἐγράψω [τὴν γραφὴν ταύτην] ἢ ἀποροῦν
ὅτι ἐγκαλοίς ἐμοὶ ἀληθὲς ἀδίκειμα· ὅπως δὲ σὺ τίνα
πείθοις ἂν καὶ σμικρὸν νοῦν ἔχοντα ἀνθρώπων, ὅς
[οὐ] τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἑστὶ καὶ δαμόνια καὶ θεία ἡγεῖσθαι, καὶ αὖ τοῦ αὐτοῦ μῆτε δαλμονας μῆτε θεοὺς μῆτε ἡρωικ, οὔδεμια μηχανή ἑστὶν.

28 XVI. Ἀλλὰ γὰρ, ὃς ἀνδρεῖς Ἀθηναῖοι, ὡς μὲν ἐγὼ οὖκ ἄδικω κατὰ τὴν Μελήτου γραφήν, οὐ πολλῆς μοι δοκεῖ εἶναι ἀπολογίας, ἀλλὰ ἱκανὰ καὶ ταύτα· δὲ δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἐμπροσθεν ἔλεγον, ὅτι πολλή μοι ἀπέχθεια γέγονε καὶ πρὸς πολλοὺς, εὖ ἵστε ὅτι ἄληθές ἐστι. καὶ τούτῳ ἑστὶν ὃ ἐμὲ αἰρήσει, εἰνάπερ αἱρῇ, οὐ Μέλητος οὐδὲ Ἀνυτος, ἀλλὰ ἡ τῶν πολλῶν διαβολή τε καὶ 10 φθόνος. ὃ δὴ πολλοὺς καὶ ἄλλους καὶ ἁγαθοὺς ἄνδρας βὴρηκεν, οἶμαι δὲ καὶ αἰρήσεως· οὔδὲν δὲ δεινὸν μὴ ἐν ἐμοὶ στή. ἵσως δ’ ἂν οὖν εἴποι τις· εἰτ’ οὐκ αἰσχύνει, ὃ Σώκρατες, τοιοῦτον ἐπιτήδευμα ἐπιτηδεύσας, εξ’ οὗ κινδυνεύεις νυνὶ ἀποθανεῖν; ἐγὼ δὲ τούτῳ ἂν δίκαιον 16 λόγον ἀντελπομὶ, ὅτι οὐ καλῶς λέγεις, ὃ ἄνθρωπε, εἰ οἴει δειν κινδυνον ὑπολογίζεσθαι τοῦ ζῆν ἡ τεθνάναι ἄνδρα ὅτου τι καὶ συμεραν ὀφελὸς ἑστιν, ἀλλ’ οὐκ ἐκεῖνο μόνον σκοπεῖν, ὅταν πράττῃ, πότερα δίκαια ἡ ἄδικα πράττει καὶ ἄνδρὸς ἁγαθοῦ ἐργα ἡ κακοῦ. 20

C φαίλοι γὰρ ἂν τῷ γε σφ’ λόγῳ εἶνεν τῶν ἡμιθέων ὅσοι ἐν Τροίᾳ τετελευτήκασιν οἳ τε ἄλλοι καὶ ὁ τῆς Θέτιδος νῦός, δ’ ὅσοι τοῦ κινδύνου κατεφύγησε παρὰ τὸ αἰσχρόν τι ὑπομείναι, ὅστε ἐπειδὴ εἶπεν ἡ μῆτηρ αὐτῷ προθυμομυμένῳ Ἐκτόρα ἀποκτείναι, θεὸς υἱός, 25 οὔτωσι πως ὡς ἐγὼ οἶμαι· ὃ παῖ, εἰ τιμωρήσεις Πατρόκλῳ τῷ ἔταλρῳ τὸν φόνον καὶ Ἐκτόρα ἀποκτενεῖς, αὐτὸς ἀποθανεῖ. αὐτίκα γὰρ τοι, φησί, μεθ’
Ἐκτορα πτόμος ἐτούμος· ὥδε ταῦτα ἀκούσας τοῦ μὲν θανάτου καὶ τοῦ κυνίουν ὄλυγάρθησε, πολὺ δὲ μᾶλλον δεῖσαι τὸ ξῆν κακῶς ὃν καὶ τοὺς φίλους μὴ τιμωρεῖν, διὰ αὐτικὰ, φησὶν, τεθναίνην δείην ἐπιθέει τῷ ἀδικοῦντι, ὥστε ἐνθάδε μὲν καταγέλαστος παρὰ νησὶ κορονίσσων ἄχθος ἄρούρης. μὴ αὐτῶν οἷοι φροντίσαι θανάτου καὶ κυνίουν; οὗτῳ γὰρ ἔχει, ὥδε ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τῇ ἀληθεᾷ· οὐ καὶ τοῖς ἑαυτῶν τάξιν ἤγησάμενος βέλτιστον εἶναι ἢ ἣν ἄρχοντος ταχθῇ, ἐνταῦθα δὲὶ ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ μένοντα κυνδυνεύειν μηδὲν ἐπολογιζόμενον μήτε θάνατον μὴτε ἄλλο μηδὲν πρὸ τοῦ αἰσχροῦ.

XVII. Ἕγὼ οὖν δεινὰ ἢν εἶήν εἰργασμένοι, ὥδε ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, εἰ, οτὲ μὲν με οἱ ἄρχοντες ἔταττον, ἐν οἷς ἤμεις εἴλεσθε ἅρχειν μου, καὶ ἐν Ποτίδαιᾳ καὶ ἐν Αμφιπόλει καὶ ἐπὶ Δηλίῳ, τοτε μὲν οὐ ἐκεῖνοι ἔταττον ἐμενὸν ὅσπερ καὶ ἄλλος τις καὶ ἐκυκλώμενον ἀποθανεῖν, τοὔ δὲ θεοῦ τάττοντος, ὡς ἑγὼ φώθην τε καὶ ὑπέλαβον, φιλοσοφοῦντά με δεῖν ἄρρην καὶ ἔξετάζοντα ἐμαυτὸν καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους, ἐνταῦθα δὲ φοβηθῆς ἢ θάνατον ἢ ἄλλο ὡς ὑπομενον πράγμα λάποιμι τὴν τάξιν. δεινῶν τὰν εἰη, καὶ ἔτοιμον ἃν ἄλθος τοῦτ' ἢν μὲ δικαίως εἰσάγοντι τις εἰς δικαστήριον, ὡς οὐ νομίζω σειρίν ἣν ἀπειθῶν τῇ μαντέλα καὶ δεδίως θάνατον καὶ οἴκομενος σοφὸς εἶναι οὐκ ὃν. τὸ γὰρ τοῦ θάνατον δεδέναι, ὥδε ἄνδρες, οὔτε ἄλλο ἐστὶν ὡς δοκεῖν σοφὸν εἶναι μὴ ὅντα· δοκεῖν γὰρ εἰδέναι ἐστὶν ὅτι οὐκ οἴδειν. οὐδεὶς μὲν γὰρ οὐδεὶς τὸν θάνατον οὐδὲ εἰ ὑπεχάνει τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ πάντων μέγιστον ὃν ὑπὸ ἀγαθῶν, δεδει τὴ ὥς εἰδὲς ὅτι μέγιστον τῶν κακῶν.
Βέστι. καὶ τοῦτο πῶς οὐκ ἀμαθα ἐστὶν αὕτη ἡ ἐπο-
νεολιστὸς ἡ τοῦ οἴεσθαι εἰδέναι ἢ οὐκ οἶδεν; ἡγὼ δ’, ὁ ἀνδρεὶς, τοῦτω καὶ ἑνταῦθα ἵσως διαφέρω τῶν πολλῶν ἀνθρώπων, καὶ εἰ δὴ τῷ σοφότερῷ τοῦ φαίην εἶναι, τοῦτῳ ἂν, ὅτι οὐκ εἰδὼς ἱκανῶς περὶ τῶν ἐν Ἀἰδών ὁμώ καὶ οἷομαί οὐκ εἰδέναι. τὸ δὲ ἄδικεῖν καὶ ἀπειθεῖν τῷ βελτίων, καὶ θεῷ καὶ ἀνθρώπῳ, ὅτι κακὸν καὶ αἰσχρὸν ἐστὶν οἶδα. πρὸ ὁδὸν τῶν κακῶν ἃν οἶδα ὅτι κακά ἐστιν, ἡ μὴ οἶδα εἰ ἀγαθὰ ὅντα τυγχάνει οὐδὲ-

ποτε φοβήσομαι οὐδὲ φεύξομαι. ὅστε οὖν εἰ μὲ νῦν ὁμαι ἂφετε Ἀνύτω ἀπιστήσαντες, ὅτι ἐφη ἡ τῇ ἀρχῇ οὐ δεῖν ἐμὲ δεύρο εἰσελθεῖν ἥ, ἐπειδὴ εἰσῆλθον, ὅν ὃν τε εἰναι τὸ μὴ ἀποκτείναί με, λέγων πρὸς ὕμᾶς ὡς, εἰ διαφεύξοιμην, ἢ δὴ ἂν ὑμῶν οἱ νεῖς ἐπιτη-

dεύουντες ἡ Ἑωκράτης διδάσκει πάντες παντάπασιν διαφαρμαχοῦνται εἴ μοι πρὸς τὴν εἶποτε. ὃ Σώκρατες, νῦν μὲν Ἀνύτω ὅ πεισόμεθα, ἀλλὰ ἂφε-

tεν τῷ εἰτε οὔτῳ μὲντοι ἔφθασε ὀνταῦτη τῇ ἀντίσησι διατρίβειν μηδὲ φιλοσοφεῖν. ἐὰν δὲ ἄλφος ἂτι

τοῦτο πράττων, ἀποθανεῖ. εἰ οὖν μὲ, ὅπερ εἶπον, ἐπὶ τῶν ἂφίοτε, εἶπομι ἂν ὑμῖν ὃτι ἐγὼ ὑμᾶς, ἄνδρες Ἁθηναῖοι, ἀσπάζομαι μὲν καὶ φίλῳ, πείομαι δὲ μᾶλ-

λον τῷ θεῷ ἡ ὑμῖν, καὶ ἑσπερὶ ὃν ἑμπνεόν καὶ οἶοι τε ὀς, οὐ μὴ παύσωμαι φιλοσοφῶν καὶ ὑμῖν παρακελεύ-

μενός τε καὶ ἐνδεικνύμενος διὸ καὶ ἀλή ἐντυγχάνον ὑμῶν, λέγων ὁλόπερ εἴωθα, ὅτι ὁ ἄριστος ἄνδρον, Ἁθηναῖος ὁμώ, πόλεως τῆς μεγίστης καὶ εὐδοκιμοτάτης εἰς σοφίαν καὶ ἴσχυν, χρημάτων μὲν οὐκ ἀσχένει ἐπιμελοῦμενος
ὅπως σοι ἦσται ὡς πλείστα καὶ δόξης καὶ τιμῆς, φρονῇ· ἐ
σεως δὲ καὶ ἀληθείας καὶ τῆς ψυχῆς ὅπως ὡς βελτίστη ἦσται οὐκ ἐπιμελεῖ οὐδὲ φροντίζεις; καὶ εἰ ἂν τὰς ὑμῶν ἀμφισβήτη καὶ φη ἐπιμελεῖσθαι, οὐκ εὐθὺς ἀφίσω
5 αὐτὸν οὖδ' ἀπειμι, ἀλλ' ἐρήσομαι αὐτὸν καὶ ἐξετάσω καὶ ἐλέγξω, καὶ ἐὰν μοι μὴ δοκῇ κεκτῆθαι ἀρετήν, φάναι δὲ, ὅνειδιὼ δι' τὰ πλείστου ἀξία περὶ ἐλαχίστου
ποιεῖται, τὰ δὲ φαινότερα περὶ πλείονος. ταῦτα καὶ 80
νεωτέρος καὶ πρεσβυτέρῳ, ὅτως ἀν ἐντυγχάνω, ποιήσω,
10 καὶ ξένῳ καὶ ἀστῷ, μᾶλλον δὲ τοῖς ἀστοῖς, ὅσῳ μου ἐγνυτέρω ἐστὲ γένει. ταῦτα γὰρ κελεύει ὁ θεός, εἰ
ἰστε, καὶ ἐγὼ οἴομαι οὐδέν πω ὑμῶν μείζων ἁγαθὸν
gενέσθαι εἰ τῇ πόλει ἡ τῇ ἐμὴν τῷ θεῷ ἑπιτρέπειν. οὐδὲν γὰρ ἄλλο πράττων ἐγώ περιέρχομαι ἢ πειθῶν
15 ὑμῶν καὶ νεωτέρους καὶ πρεσβυτέρους μήτε σωμάτων Β
ἐπιμελείσθαι μήτε χρησίμων πρότερον μηδὲ οὕτω σφόδρα ὡς τῆς ψυχῆς ὅπως ὡς ἀριστή ἦσται, λέγων·
οὐκ ἐκ χρησίμων ἀρετὴ γίνεται, ἀλλ' εἰ ἀρετῆς χρη-
ματα καὶ τὰ άλλα ἁγαθὰ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ἀπαιντα καὶ
20 ἰδία καὶ δημοσίᾳ. εἰ μὲν οὖν ταῦτα λέγων διαφθείρω
τοὺς νέους, ταῦτ' ἄν εἰπ' ἐβαζερά· εἰ δὲ τίς μὲ φησιν
ἄλλα λέγειν ἢ ταῦτα, οὐδὲν λέγει. πρὸς ταῦτα, φαίη
ἀν, ὁ Ἀθηναίοι, ἢ πείθεσθε Ἀνύτῳ ἢ μή, καὶ ἢ ἀφί
ητε ἢ μή ἀφίετε, ὡς ἐμοί οὖν ἄν ποιήσωντος ἄλλα, οὐδ' εἰ
25 μέλλων πολλάκις τεθνάναι.

ΧVIII. Μὴ θορυβεῖτε, ἄνδρες Ἀθηναίοι, ἀλλὰ ἐμμελεῖτε μοι οὐς ἐδείχθην ὑμῶν, μὴ θορυβεῖν εφ' οἷς ἄν λέγω, ἀλλ' ἀκούειν· καὶ γὰρ, ὡς ἐγὼ οἴμαι, ὀνήσεσθε
άκουόντες. μέλλω γὰρ οὖν ἄττα υμῖν ἔρειν καὶ ἄλλα,
ἐφ' οἷς ἵσως βοήσεσθε· ἄλλα μηδαμῶς ποιεῖτε τοῦτο.
εὖ γὰρ ἦστε, ἐάν ἐμὲ ἀποκτείνητε τοιοῦτον οὔτα οἷν
ἐγὼ λέγω, οὐκ ἐμὲ μείζω βλάψετε ἢ ύμᾶς αὐτούς·
ἐμὲ μὲν γὰρ οὖδὲν ἂν βλάψειειν οὔτε Μέλητος οὔτε Ὁ
'Ἀντός· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἂν δύναιτο· οὐ γὰρ οἶομαι θεμιτὸν
δ' εἶναι ἀμείνοι ἀνδρὶ ὑπὸ χείρονος βλάπτεσθαι. ἀποκ-
τείνετε μεντὰν ἵσως ἢ ἐξελάσειεν ἢ ἀτιμώσειεν· ἄλλα
ταῦτα οὕτος μὲν ἵσως οἴεται καὶ ἄλλος τὸς που μεγάλα
κακά, ἐγὼ δ' οὖκ οἶομαι, ἄλλα πολὺ μᾶλλον ποιεῖν ἢ
οὕτος νυν ποιεῖ, ἀνδρὰ ἀδίκως ἐπιχειρεῖν ἀποκτείνηται.
νῦν οὖν, οἷς ἄνδρες Ἄθηναῖοι, πολλοὶ δέω ἐγὼ ὑπὲρ
ἐμαντοῦ ἀπολογείσθαι, ὡς τις ἂν οὔοιτο, ἄλλ' ὑπὲρ
ὑμῶν, μή τι ἔξαμαρτητε περὶ τὴν τοῦ θεοῦ δόσιν ύμῖν
Ε' ἐμοὶ καταψηφισάμενοι. ἐὰν γὰρ ἐμὲ ἀποκτείνητε, οὐ 18
ῥάδιος ἄλλον τοιοῦτον εὑρίσετε, ἀτεχνῶς, εἰ καὶ γε-
λοιότερον εἰπεῖν, προσκελμένον τῇ πόλει [ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ],
ἀστερ ὑπερ μεγάλῳ μὲν καὶ γενναῖῳ, ὑπὸ μεγέθους δὲ
νοθεστέρῳ καὶ δεομένῳ ἐγείρεσθαι ὑπὸ μύστος τινος·
οἶον δὴ μοι δοκεῖ ὁ θεὸς ἐμὲ τῇ πόλει προστεθεικέναι 20
τοιοῦτόν τινα, διὸ ύμᾶς ἐγείρων καὶ πείθων καὶ ὄνει-
31 δίξων ἢν ἐκαστὸν οὖδὲν παύομαι τῇν ἡμέραν ὅλην
πανταχοῦ προσκαβαζόν. τοιοῦτος οὖν ἄλλος οὗ ῥάδιος
ὑμῶν γενήσεται, ὁ ἄνδρες, ἄλλ' ἐαυτὸ πείθομεθε,
φείσεσθε μου· ύμεῖς ὁ οἷος τάχ' ἂν ἁχθόμενοι, ὅστερ 25
οὶ νυστάζοντες ἐγείρομενοι, κρούσαντες ἂν με, πείθο-
μενοι Ὁ. Αὐτῷ, ῥάδιος ἂν ἀποκτείναιε, εἰτα τὸν λυπτὸν
βλοὺ καθεύδοντες διατείλοιτε ἂν, εἰ μή τινα ἄλλον ὁ
 Homer ὑμῖν ἐπιστήμην κηδόμενος ὑμῶν. ὅτι δὲ ἐγὼ ταυτόν καὶ τούτο, οἷος ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ τῇ πόλει δεδόσθαι, ἄνθεντε ἄν κατανοήσαιτε· οὐ γὰρ ἀνθρωπίνῳ Β ἔσοχε τὸ ἐμὲ τῶν μὲν ἐμαυτοῦ ἀπάντων ἡμεληκέναι καὶ δ ἀνέχεσθαι τῶν οἰκείων ἀμελουμένων τοσάτα ἦδη ἔτη, τὸ δὲ ὑμέτερον πράττειν ἀεὶ, ἢ ἢ ἐκάστῳ προσιόντα ὁσπερ πατέρα ἢ ἀδελφὸν πρεσβυτέρον, πειθοῦτα ἐπιμελείσθαι ἀρετῆς. καὶ εἰ μέντοι τι ἀπὸ τούτων ἀπέλλαξον καὶ μισθῶν λαμβάνων ταῦτα παρεκελευόμην, 10 εἶχον ἂν τινα λόγον· νῦν δὲ ὅρατε ἦν καὶ οὐς, ὅτι οἱ κατηγοροῦν τὰλλα πάντα ἀναισχύνως οὕτω κατηγοροῦντες τοῦτό γε ὡς οἷοι τε ἐγένοτο ἀπαισχυνθήσατε, παρασχόμενοι μάρτυρα, ὡς ἐγὼ τοτέ τινα ἢ 15 ἐπραξάμην μισθῶν ἢ ἔτησα. ἵκανον γὰρ, οἴμαι, ἐγὼ παρέχομαι τού μάρτυρα, ὡς ἀληθῆ λέγω, τὴν πενίαν.

XIX. Ἰσως ἂν οὐν δόξειν ἄτοπον εἶναι ὅτι δὴ ἐγὼ ἢ ἢ καὶ μὲν ταῦτα ἐγὼ ζημβουλεύω περισσῶν καὶ πολυπραγμονώ, δημοσίᾳ δὲ οὐ τολμῶ ἀναβαλλων εἰς τὸ πλῆθος τὸ ὑμέτερον ἐγώ καὶ τοῦτο μέτα τῇ πόλει. τούτου 20 δὲ αἰτίων ἐστιν ὑμᾶς ἐμοὶ πολλάκις ἀκηκόατε πολλαχοῦ λέγοντος, ὅτι μοι θείοι τι καὶ δαμαδόνιον γῆρεται, δ ἐγὼ ἄλλο καὶ ἐν τῇ γραφῇ ἐπικωμιῶν Μέλητος ἐγράψατο· ἐμοὶ δὲ τούτο ἐστιν ἐκ παιδὸς ἠρξάμενον φωνὴ τῆς γυναικοῦ, ἃ ὅταν γένηται ἀεὶ ἀποτρέπετι με τούτο 25 δ ἂν μέλλω πράττειν, προτρέπει δὲ οὕτω· τούτο ἐστιν ὅτι μοι ἐναιτούνται τὰ πολιτικὰ πράττειν. καὶ παγκάλος γέ μοι δοκεῖ ἐναιτούςθαι· εὐ γὰρ ἴστε, ᾧ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναίοι, εἰ ἐγὼ πάλαι ἐπεχείρησα πράττειν
tà πολιτικά πράγματα, πάλαι ἀν ἀπολώλη καὶ οὕτ᾿ ἐὰν ὑμᾶς ὠφελήσῃ οὐδὲν οὐτ᾿ ἂν ἔμαυτόν. καὶ μοι μὴ ἁχθεσθε λέγοντι ταληθῆ· οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν δόσις ἀνθρώπως σωθήσεται οὔτε ὑμῶν οὔτε ἄλλα πλῆθει οὐδεὶς γνησίως ἐναντιούμενος καὶ διακωλύων πολλὰ ἄδικα καὶ 5 παράνομα ἐν τῇ πόλει γύρνεσθαι, ἀλλ᾿ ἀναγκαίον ἔστι τὸν τῷ οὐτὶ μαχούμενον ὑπὲρ τοῦ δικαλοῦ, καὶ εἰ μέλλει διλγον χρόνον σωθήσεσθαι, ἱδιωτεύειν, ἀλλὰ μὴ δημοσίευειν.

XX. Μεγάλα δ᾿ ἔγγυα ὑμῶν τεκμήρια παρέξομαι 10 τοῖτοι, οὐ λόγους, ἀλλ᾿ δ᾿ ὑμεῖς τιμᾶτε, ἔργα. ἀκούσατε δὴ μου τὰ ἐμοὶ ξυμβεβηκότα, ἵνα εἰδῆτε ὅτι οὐδὲν ἐν ὑπεκάθοιμι παρὰ τὸ δίκαιον δέλσας θάνατον, μὴ ὑπελκὼν δὲ ἀμα καὶ ἀμα ἂν ἀπολοίμην. ἐρῶ δὲ ὑμῶν φορτικὴ μὲν καὶ δικανικὰ, ἄληθῆ δὲ. ἐγὼ γὰρ, ὁ 15 Β᾿Αθηναίοι, ἀλλήν μὲν ἄρχην οὐδεμίαν πώποτε ἤρξα ἐν τῇ πόλει, ἐβούλευσα δὲ· καὶ ἔτυχεν ἡμῶν ἡ φυλὴ Ἀντιοχὸς πρυτανεύουσα, ὅτε ὑμεῖς τοὺς δέκα στρατηγοὺς τοὺς οὐκ ἀνελομένους τοὺς ἐκ τῆς ναυμαχίας ἐβούλεσθε ἄθροισιν κρίνειν, παρανόμως, ὡς ἐν τῷ 20 ὑστέρῳ χρόνῳ πάσιν ὑμῶν ἔδοξε. τὸτ’ ἐγὼ μόνος τῶν πρυτάνεων ἡπαντώθην μηδὲν ποιεῖν παρὰ τοὺς νόμους [καὶ ἑναντία ἐψηφισάμην], καὶ ἐτολμῶν δυντόν ἐνδεικνύων καὶ καὶ ἀπάγια τῶν ῥητόρων καὶ ὑμῶν C κελευόντων καὶ βοῶντων, μετὰ τοῦ νόμου καὶ τοῦ 25 δικαλοῦ φθινὸν μᾶλλον μὲ δεῖν διακινδυνεύειν ἡ μεθ᾿ ὑμῶν γενέσθαι μὴ δίκαια βουλευομένων φοβηθέντα δεσμόν ἢ θάνατον. καὶ ταῦτα μὲν ἤν ἐτὶ δημοκρα-
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tουμένης τῆς πόλεως. ἐπειδὴ δὲ ὅλγαρχα ἐγένετο, οἱ ὑπότακτοι αὐτοῖς μεταπεμφάμενοι με πέμπτον αὐτὸν εἰς
τὴν θόλον προσέταξαν ἄγαγεῖν ἐκ Σαλαμίνος Λέοντα
tῶν Σαλαμίνων ἵνα ἀποθάνωτοι. οὐδὲ δὴ καὶ ἄλλοις
5 ἑκείνοι πολλοὶ πολλὰ προσέταττον βουλόμενοι ὡς
πλείστους ἀναπλήσαι αὐτῶν· τότε μέντοι ἔγον οὐ
λόγοι ἄλλοι ἔργη ἀν ἐνεδειξάμην, ὅτι ἔμοι θανάτου μὲν
μέλει, εἰ μὴ ἀγγονὸτέρον ἦν εἰπεῖν, οὐδ' ὁτιοῦν, τούτῳ
δὲ μηδὲν ἄδικου μηδ' ἀνόσιον ἐργάζεσθαι, τούτῳ δὲ τῷ
10 πάν μέλει. ἐμὲ γὰρ ἐκείνη ἡ ἀρχὴ οὐκ ἔξεπληξέν
οὕτως ἱσχύρα ὅσα ὡστε ἄδικον τι ἐργάσασθαι, ἄλλῃ
ἐπειδὴ ἐκ τῆς θόλου ἐξῆλθομεν, οἱ μὲν τέταρτες φίλοι
εἰς Σαλαμίνα καὶ ἤγαγον Λέοντα, ἔγον δὲ φίλομην ἀπὸ
οὐκαδε. καὶ ἴσως ἂν διὰ ταῦτ' ἀπέθανοι, εἰ μὴ ἡ
15 ἀρχὴ διὰ ταχέων κατελύθη· καὶ τούτων ὑμῖν ἑσοῦνται
πολλοὶ μάρτυρες.

XXI. 'Αρ' οὖν ἂν με οἴσουσιν τοσάδε ἐτή διαγενέ-Ε
σθαι, εἰ ἐπραπτοῦ τὰ δημόσια καὶ πράττων ἄξιως ἄνδρός
ἀγαθοῦ ἐξοθήσουν τοῖς δικαίοις καὶ ὡσπερ χρὴ τούτῳ
20 περὶ πλείστου ἐποιούμην; πολλοὶ γε δεῖ, ὁ ἄνδρες
Ἀθηναίοι· οὗτο νὰρ ἂν ἄλλος ἀνθρώπων οὐδεὶς. ἄλλ']
33 εἴῃ διὰ παντὸς τοῦ βλου δημοσία τε, εἰ ποῦ τι ἐπρα-
ξα, τοιοῦτος φαινόμεν, καὶ ἰδία ὁ αὐτὸς οὕτως, οὗτοι
πῶπτοτε ἐν χγχρήσας οὐδεὶν παρὰ τὸ δίκαιον οὕτε ἄλλῳ
25 οὕτε τούτων οὕτωι, οὕς οἱ διαβάλλοντες ἐμὲ φασὶν
ἐμοὺς μαθήται εἶναι. ἐγὼ δὲ διδάσκαλος μὲν οὐδενὸς
πῶπτοτ' ἐγενόμην· εἰ δὲ τίς μου λέγοντος καὶ τὰ ἐμαυ-
τοῦ πράττοντος ἐπιθυμεῖ ἀκούειν, εἶτε νεώτερος εἴτε
πρεσβύτερος, ούδεν πώποτε ἐφθάνησα, ούδὲ χρήματα μὲν λαμβάνων διαλέγομαι, μὴ λαμβάνων δὲ οὖ, ἀλλ' ὀμοίως καὶ πλουσίω καὶ πένητος παρέχω ἐμαυτὸν ἐρω-βτάν, καὶ εὰν τὶς βούλησαι ἀποκρινόμενος ἀκούειν δὲν ἂν λέγω. καὶ τούτων ἔγω εἰτε τις χρηστὸς γῆγεται εἰτε δὲ μή, οὐκ ἂν δικαίως τὴν αἰτίαν ὑπέχοιμυ, δὲν μὴτε ὑπεσχόμην μηδὲν πώποτε μάθημα μῆτε ἐδι-δαξά· εἰ δὲ τὶς φησὶ παρ' ἐμοῦ πώποτε τι μαθεῖν ἢ ἀκούσαι ἦδη ὅτι μὴ καὶ ἄλλοι πάντες, εὖ ἢστε ὅτι οὐκ ἀληθῆ λέγει.

XXII. Ἀλλα διὰ τὴν ποτὲ μετ' ἐμὸν χαλρουσι τνεὶς πολὺν χρόνον διατρίβοντες; ἀκριβεῖτο, ὁ ἄνδρες ο' Αθηναῖοι· πάσαν ὑμῶν τὴν ἀλήθειαν ἐγὼ εἶπον, ὅτι ἀκούοντες χαλρουσιν ἐξεταζομένους τοὺς οἰομένους μὲν εἶναι σοφοῖς, οὐσὶ δ' οὖ· ἐστι γὰρ οὐκ ἀθέτε. ἐμὸ δὲ 15 τούτῳ, ὅσ' ἐγὼ φημι, προστετακτι ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ πράττειν καὶ ἐκ μαντείων καὶ ἐξ ἐνυπνίων καὶ παντὶ τρόπῳ, ἐπερ τὸς ποτὲ καὶ ἄλλη θελα μοῖρα ἄνθρωποι καὶ ὅτι οὐν προσέταξε πράττειν. ταῦτα, ὁ Ἀθηναῖοι, καὶ ἀληθῆ ἐστι καὶ εὐσεβείτα. εἰ γὰρ δὴ ἔγωγε τῶν νέων τοὺς 20 δ μὲν διαφθείρω, τοὺς δὲ διεσθορκα, χρῆν δήπον, εἰτε τινὲς αὐτῶν πρεσβύτεροι γενόμενοι ἐγνωσαν ὅτι νέοις οὕσων αὐτοῖς ἐγὼ κακὸν πώποτε τι ἐνεβούλευσα, νῦν αὐτοὺς ἀναβαίνοντας ἐμοὶ κατηγορεῖν καὶ τιμωρεῖσθαι· εἰ δὲ μὴ αὐτὸν ἥθελον, τῶν οἰκείων τινὰς τῶν ἑκείνων, 25 πατέρας καὶ ἀδελφοὺς καὶ ἄλλους τοὺς προσήκοντας, εἰπερ ὅπ' ἐμὸ τι κακὸν ἐπεπόνθεσαν αὐτῶν οἱ οἰκεῖοι, νῦν μεμυῆσθαι [καὶ τιμωρεῖσθαι]. πάντως δὲ πάρεισιν
ΑΠΟΛΟΓΙΑ ΣΟΚΡΑΤΗΣ.

αὐτῶν πολλοὶ ἐνταῦθ᾽ οὸς ἐγὼ ὁ Ῥώ, πρῶτον μὲν Κρίτων οὔτος, ἐμὸς ἥλικιότης καὶ δημότης, Κριτο-Εὐβοῦλου τοῦδε πατήρ· ἔπεται Δυσανδας ὁ Σφύττιος, Αἰσχίνου τοῦδε πατήρ· ἔτι Ἀντιφῶν ὁ Κηφισίευς ὁ οὔτος, Ἔπιγένους πατήρ· ἄλλοι τούνν οὔτοι ἃν οἱ ἀδελφοὶ ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ διατριβῇ γεγονασι, Νικόστρατος Θεοστίδου, ἀδελφὸς Θεοδώτου—καὶ ὁ μὲν Θεόδωτος τετελεύτηκεν, ὡστε οὐκ ἂν ἐκείνος γε αὐτοῖς κατα-δεψθηκα—καὶ Πάραλος ὅδε ὁ Δημοδόκος ὁν ἤν Θεόγνθες 34
10 ἀδελφὸς. ὅδε δὲ Ἀδελμαντός ὁ Ἀρίστωνος ὁν ἀδελφὸς ὁν Πλάτων, καὶ Αἰαντόδωρος ὁν Ἀπολλόδωρος ὅδε ἀδελφὸς. καὶ ἄλλους πολλοὺς ἔγω ἔχω ὑμῖν εἰπεῖν ὅτι τινὰ ἔχρημα μάλιστα μὲν ἐν τῷ έαυτότῳ λόγῳ παρασχέσθαι Μέλητον μάρτυρη· εἰ δὲ τότε ἐπελάθητο, νῦν 15 παρασχέσθω, ἐγὼ παραχωρῶ, καὶ λεγότω, εἰ τί ἔχει τοιοῦτον. ἄλλα τοιοῦτον τῶν τούννιτυν εὑρίσετε, ὃ ἄνδρες, πάντας ἐμοί βοηθεῖν ἐτοίμους τῷ διαφθείροιτι, τῷ κακὰ ἐργαζόμενῳ τοὺς οἰκεῖους αὐτῶν, ὡς φασι Μέλητος καὶ Ἀνυστός. αὐτοὶ μὲν γάρ οἱ διεφθαρμένοι ὁ 20 τάχι ἄν λόγον ἔχως βοηθοῦντε· οἰ δὲ ἀδιάφθαρτοι, πρεσβύτεροι ἦδη ἄνδρες, οἱ τούτων προσήκοντες, τίνα ἄλλον ἔχους λόγον βοηθοῦντες ἐμοὶ ἄλλο ἡ τῶν ὀρθῶν τε καὶ δικαίων, ὅτι ἄνυστοι Μελήτωρ μὲν ψευδομένῳ, ἐμοὶ δὲ ἄληθεύσοι:

XXIII. Εἰλὲν δή, ὃ ἄνδρες· ὃ μὲν ἐγὼ ἔχομι' ἄν ἀπολογεῖσθαι, σχεδόν ἐστι ταύτα καὶ ἄλλα ἰσως τουα-τα. τάχα δ' ἂν τις ὑμῶν ἀγανακτήσεις ἀνάμνησθεις ὁ ἑαυτόυ, εἰ ὁ μὲν καὶ ἐλάττων τούτων τοῦ ἁγῶνος ἁγῶνα
εμαυτοῦ ὡς θεοῦς οὐ νομίζω. ἄλλα πολλοῦ δεῖ οὕτως ἔχειν· νομίζω τὰ γὰρ, ὃ ἀνδρεῖς Ἀθηναῖοι, ὃς οὐδεὶς τῶν ἐμῶν κατηγόρων, καλ ὑμῖν ἐπιτρέπω καὶ τῷ θεῷ κρίναι περί ἐμοῦ ὅτι μέλλει ἐμοὶ τε ἀριστα εἶναι καὶ ὑμῖν.

Ε XXV. Τὸ μὲν μὴ ἀγανακτεῖν, ὃ ἀνδρεῖς Ἀθηναῖοι, 36 ἐπὶ τοῦτο τῷ γεγονότι, ὅτι μου κατεψηφίσασθε, ἄλλα τὲ μου πολλὰ ξυμβάλλεται, καὶ οὐκ ἀνελπιστῶν μου γέγονε τὸ γεγονός τούτο, ἄλλα πολὺ μᾶλλον θαυμάζω ἐκατέρων τῶν ψήφων τῶν γεγονότα ἀριθμόν. οὐ γὰρ ἔνθανεν ἔγαγεν οὕτω παρ᾽ ὅλγον ἔσεσθαι, ἄλλα παρὰ πολὺν ὑνὶ δὲ, ὃς ἔοικεν, εἰ τριάκοντα μόναι μετέπεσον τῶν ψήφων, ἀποπεφυγῆ ἄν. Μέλητον μὲν οὖν, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκῶ, καὶ νῦν ἀποπέφυγα, καὶ οὐ μόνον ἀποπέφυγα, ἄλλα παντὶ δήλον τούτῳ γε, ὅτι, εἰ μὴ ἀνέβη 15 Ἀνωτός καὶ Δύκων κατηγορήσοντες ἐμοῦ, κἂν ὡφλε Βχίλις δραχμᾶς οὐ μεταλαβὼν τὸ πέμπτον μέρος τῶν ψήφων.

XXVI. Τιμᾶται δ᾽ οὖν μοι ὃ ἀνήρ θανάτου. εἶνεν· ἐγὼ δὲ δὴ τίνος ὑμῖν ἀντιτιμήσομαι, ὃ ἀνδρεῖς Ἀθη-20 ναίοι; ἢ δήλον ὅτι τῆς ἀξίας; τῇ οὖν; τῇ ἀξίος εἰμὶ παθεῖν ἢ ἀποτίσαι, ὅτι μαθὼν ἐν τῷ βλε ὁχὶ ἁυχίαν ἤγγον, ἄλλα ἀμελήσας ὄντερ οἱ πολλοὶ, χρηματισμοῦ τε καὶ οἰκονομιᾶς καὶ στρατηγιῶν καὶ δημητριών καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀρχῶν καὶ ἐνυπομονών καὶ στάσεων τῶν 25 ἐν τῇ πόλει γυνομένων, ἱγνόμενος εμαυτὸν τῷ ὡς ὁ ἐπιεικέστερον εἶναι ἢ ὡστε εἰς ταύτ' ὄντα σφέσθαι,
ἐνταῦθα μὲν οὐκ ἦν, οἱ ἔλθον μήτε ύμῖν μήτε ἐμαυτῷ ἐμελλον μηδέν ὀφελος εἶναι, ἐπὶ δὲ τὸ ἱδία ἐκαστον ἰδὼν εὐργετεῖν τὴν μεγαστὴν εὐργεσίαν, ὡς ἐγὼ φημι, ἐνταῦθα ἦν, ἐπιχείρον ἐκαστον ύμῶν πείθειν μὴ προ-5τερον μήτε τῶν ἑαυτοῦ μηδενὸς ἐπιμελεῖσθαι, πρὶν ἑαυτοῦ ἐπιμεληθεῖν ὅπως ὡς βέλτιστος καὶ φρονιμώ-10τατος ἔσοιτο, μήτε τῶν τῆς πόλεως πρὶν αὐτῆς τῆς πόλεως, τῶν τε ἄλλων οὕτω κατὰ τῶν αὐτῶν τρόπων ἐπιμελεῖσθαι. τί οὖν εἰμι ἄξιος παθεῖν τοιοῦτος οὖν; ὃ15ἀγαθὸν τι, ὁ ἀνδρεῖς Ἀθηναῖοι, εἰ δεῖ γε κατὰ τὴν ἀξίαν τῇ ἀληθείᾳ τιμᾶσθαι· καὶ ταύτα γε ἀγαθὸν τοιοῦτον, ὅτι ἁν πρέποι ἐμοῖ. τί οὖν πρέπει ἀνδρὶ πένητε εὐργέτη δεομένῳ ἄγειν σχολὴν ἐπὶ τῇ ὑμετέρᾳ παρακελεύσει; οὐκ ἐσθ' ὅτι μᾶλλον, ὁ ἀνδρεῖς Ἀθη-20ναῖοι, πρέπει οὕτως, ὡς τὸν τοιοῦτον ἄνδρα ἐν προτα-νεῖρ φιντεύσθαι, πολὺ γε μᾶλλον ἡ εἰ τις ύμῶν ὑπ' ἑν ἡμοιρίδι ἡ ζεύγηι νευληκεν Ὀλυμπιάστιν. ὁ μὲν γὰρ ύμᾶς ποιεῖ εὐδαίμονας δοκεῖ εἶναι, ἐγὼ δὲ εἶναι· καὶ ἐ25μὲν τροφῆς οὐδὲν δεῖται, ἐγὼ δὲ δέσομαι. εἰ οὖν δεῖ με κατὰ τὸ δώκαιον τῆς ἀξίας τιμᾶσθαι, τοῦτον τιμῶμαι, 37ἐν προτανείρι φιντήσεως.

XXVII. Ἰσως οὖν ύμῖν καὶ ταύτι λέγων παρα-πλησίως δοκεῖ λέγειν ὡσπερ περὶ τοῦ οὐκτον καὶ τῆς ἀντιβολῆσεως, ἀπανθαδιζόμενοι· τὸ δὲ οὐκ ἔστων, ὃ25Ἀθηναῖοι, τοιοῦτον, ἀλλὰ τοιόνδε μᾶλλον. πεπεισμαι ἐγὼ ἐκὼν εἶναι μηδένα ἀδικεῖν ἀνθρώπων, ἀλλὰ ύμᾶς τούτο οὐ πείθω· ὄλγον γὰρ χρόνων ἀλλήλως διε-37λέγεμαι· ἐπεί, ὡς ἐγώμαι, εἰ ἦν ύμῖν νόμοις, ὡσπερ καὶ Β
állois ánthróptous, perì thnátoù µή µèan ἡµέραν µόνου κρίνειν, ἄλλα πολλάς, ἐπεισοδήτη αὖ· νῦν δ' οὐ ράδιων ἐν χρόνῳ ὀλύμφο μεγάλας διαβολὰς ἀπολύεσθαι. πεπεισµένοι δὴ ἐγὼ µηδένα ἀδικείν πολλοῦ δέω ἐµαυτόν ἐκ ἀδικήσεων καὶ κατ' ἐµαυτόν ἔρειν αὐτός, ὡς ἄξιος ἐµεῖ οὖτως καὶ τούτου τιῶς ἐµαυτῷ. τὶ δεῖσαι; ἢ µή πάθω τούτο οὔ Μέλητος µοι τιµᾶται, ὁ φηµι οὐκ εἰδέναι οὔτ' εἰ ὄγαθον οὔτ' εἰ κακόν ἔστων; ἀντὶ τούτου δὴ ἔλαµµα δὲν εὖ οἶδ' ὅτι κακῶν ὄντων, τούτου τιµησάμενος; πότερον δεσµοῦ; καὶ τὶ µὲ δεῖ 10 Κηβὴ ἐν δεσµωτηρίῳ, δουλεύοντα τῇ ἀεὶ καθισταµένῃ ἄρχῃ, τοῖς ἔνδεκα; ἄλλα χρηµάτων, καὶ δεδεσθαι ἐκεῖν ἐν εκτίσει; ἄλλα ταύτων µὸι ἐστίν ὅπερ νῦν δὴ ἔλεγον· οὐ γὰρ ἐστὶ µοι χρήµατα ὅποθεν εκτίσω. ἀλλὰ δὴ φυγῆς τιµήσωµαι; ἵσως γὰρ ἄν µοι τοῦτον 15 τιµήσωτε. πολλῇ µεντάν µὲ φιλωφυχίᾳ ἔχοι, εἰ οὕτως ἀλογιστός εἰµί ὅτε µὴ δύνασθαι λογίζεσθαι, ὅτι ὑµεῖς µὲν οὕτε πολῶταλ µοι οὐχ οἶοι τε ἐγένεσθε ἐνεγκεῖν τὰς ἐµὰς διατριβὰς καὶ τοῦς λόγους, ἀλλ' ἡ ὁµίν βαρύτεραι γεγόνασι καὶ ἐπιθυμοῦτεραι, ὡστε 20 ξητείτη αὐτῶν νυν ἀπαλλαγήναι· ἄλλοι δὲ ἄρα αὐτάς οἰςοντει ράδιως; πολλοῦ γε δεῖ, ὡ 'Αθηναίοι. καὶ δὲς οὖν ἃν µοι ὁ βίος εἰ ἐξελθόντι τηλικῷ ἀνθρώπῳ ἀλλων ἐξ ἀλλης πόλεως ἀµειβοµένῳ καὶ ἐξελαυνοµένῳ ζην. εὖ γὰρ οἶδ' ὅτι, ὅποι ἂν ἔλθω, 25 λέγωντος ἐµοῦ ἀκροάσσονται οἱ νέοι ὅστερ ἐνθάδε. κἂν µὲν τούτως ἀπελαύνω, οὔτοι ἐµὲ αὐτὸι ἐξελῶσι πείθοντες τοὺς πρεσβυτέρους· ἐὰν δὲ µὴ ἀπε
λαῦνω, οἱ τοῦτων πατέρες τε καὶ οἴκειοι δι' αὐτοῦς τούτους.

XXVIII. Ἡσυχίαιν ἄγας, οἱ Σώκρατες, οὐχ οἶος τ' ἔσει ἤμιν ἐξελθὼν ζήν; τούτι δὴ ἐστὶ πάντων χαλεπότατον πείσα τινας ὑμᾶν. εάν τε γὰρ λέγω ὅτι τῷ θεῷ ἀπειθεῖν τούτη ἐστὶν καὶ διὰ τούτο ἀδύνατον ἡσυχίαν ἄγιν, οὐ πελεσθεί μοι ὡς εἰρωνευομένῳ· εάν τ' αὐτ' λέγω ὅτι καὶ τυγχάνει μέγιστον ὡγαθὸν ὁ ἀνθρώπος. οὐκ ἂν "τοῦτο, ἐκάστης ἡμέρας περὶ ἄρετῆς τοῦς λόγους ποιεῖται καὶ τῶν ἀλλων περὶ δὲ ὑμεῖς ἐμοῦ ἀκούετε διαλεγομένου καὶ ἐμαυτῶν καὶ ἀλλος ἐξετάζοντος, δὲ ἀνεξέταστος βίος οὐ βιωτὸς ἀνθρώπως, ταῦτα δ' ἐτο ήττον πελεσθὲ μοι λέγοντι. τὰ δὲ ἔχει μὲν "οὐτος ὡς ἐγὼ φήμ, 'ὁ ἄνδρες, πείθειν δὲ οὐ βάδιον. καὶ ἐγὼ ἀμα οὐκ ἐθύμοι ἐμαυτῶν ἢγίων κα κού ousdevοs. εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἦν μοι χρήματα, ἐτιμησάμην ἀν χρημάτων σα ση ἐμελλον ἐκτίσεων· τιδὲν γὰρ ἄν ἐβιλάβην· νῦν δὲ οὐ γὰρ ἐστὶ, εἰ μὴ ἁρα δοσον δὲ ν ἐγὸ δυναμὴν ἐκτίσαι, τοσούτου βούλεσθε μοι τιμῆσαι. ἡσυχιώς δ' ἄν δυναίμην ἐκτίσαι ὑμᾶν μνᾶν ἄργυριον· τοσούτων οὖν τιμῶμαι. Πλάτων δὲ ὁδε, ὁ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναίοι, καὶ Κρίτων καὶ Κριτοβούλος καὶ Ἀπόλλονδορος καὶ κελεύοντι με τριάκοντα μνᾶν τιμῆσασθαι, 25 αὐτῶν δ' ἐγγυόρθαι· τιμῶμαι οὖν τοσούτον, ἐγγυταλ δ' ὑμᾶν ἔσονται τοῦ ἄργυριον οὕτως ἄξιόχρεος.
XXIX. Οὐ πολλοῦ γ’ ἐνεκα χρόνου, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, ἄνομα ἔστε καὶ αἰτίαν ὑπὸ τῶν βουλομένων τήν πόλιν λοιποῖν, ὡς Σωκράτη ἀπεκτάνατε, ἄνδρα σοφὸν· φήσουν γὰρ δὴ σοφὸν εἶναι, εἰ καὶ μὴ εἰμὶ, οἱ βουλόμενοι ὑμῖν ὑνειδίζειν. εἰ οὖν περιεμένατε ὄλγον χρόνον, ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτομάτου ἂν ὑμῖν τοῦτο ἐγένετο· ὅρατε γὰρ δὴ τὴν ἡμερὰν ὅτι πόρρω ἤδη ἐστὶ τοῦ βίου, θανάτου δὲ ἐγγὺς. λέγω δὲ τοῦτο οὐ πρὸς δικαίως ὑμᾶς, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τοὺς ἐμοῦ καταψηφισμένους θάνατον. λέγω δὲ καὶ τὸδε πρὸς τοὺς αὐτοὺς τούτους. ἵσως με οἴεσθε, ὦ ἄνδρες, ἀπορία λόγων ἐαλωκέναι τοιούτων, οὐ δὲ ὑμᾶς ἐπεισά, εἰ δὲν ἔπιν ἀπαντὰ ποιεῖν καὶ λέγειν ὅστε ἀποφυγεῖν τὴν δίκην. πολλοῦ γε δεῖ. ἀλλ’ ἀπορία μὲν ἐαλωκα, οὐ μέντοι λόγου, ἀλλὰ τόλμησι καὶ ἀναισχυντίας καὶ τοῦ ἔθελεος 15 λέγειν πρὸς ὑμᾶς τοιαύτα, οι δὲν ὑμῖν ἡδίστα ἦν Ἐάκουειν, θρησκυντός τέ μου καὶ ὀδυρομένου καὶ ἀλλὰ ποιοῦντος καὶ λέγοντος πολλὰ καὶ ἀνάξια ἐμοῦ, ὡς ἐγὼ φημὶ· οἷα δὴ καὶ ἐθισθὲν ὑμεῖς τῶν ἄλλων ἁκοῦειν. ἀλλ’ οὔτε τότε φήβην δεῖν ἐνεκα τοῦ κινδύνου 20 πράξαι οὐδὲν ἀνελεύθερον, οὔτε νῦν μοι μεταμέλει οὔτως ἀπολογησαμένῳ, ἀλλὰ πολὺ μᾶλλον αἴροιμαι ὥστε ἀπολογησάμενος τεθυναί ἡ ἐκείνως ζῆν· οὔτε γὰρ ἐν δίκῃ οὔτ’ ἐν πολέμῳ οὔτ’ ἐμὲ οὔτ’ ἄλλον 39 οὔδένα δεῖ τούτο μηχανάσθαι, ὅπως ἀποφεύγεται πάν 25 ποιῶν θάνατον. καὶ γὰρ ἐν ταῖς μάχαις πολλάκις δήλον γίνεται ὅτι τὸ γε ἀποθανεῖν ἂν τις ἐκφύγων καὶ ὑπ’ αὑτοῖς καὶ ἐφ’ ἱκετείαν τραπόμενος τῶν διωκόντων·
καὶ ἀλλαὶ μηχαναὶ πολλαὶ εἰσιν ἐν ἐκάστοις τοῖς κινδύνοις ὡστε διαφεύγειν θάνατον, εάν τις τολμᾷ πάντα ποιεῖν καὶ λέγειν. ἀλλὰ μῆ οὐ τούτ’ ἢ χαλετόν, ὃ ἀνδρεῖς, θάνατον ἐκφυγεῖν, ἀλλὰ πολὺ χαλεπῶτερον ὅ ποιηριάν· θάττον γὰρ θανάτον θεῖ. καὶ νῦν ἐγὼ μὲν ἢ ἂτε βραδὺς ὄν καὶ πρεσβύτης ὑπὸ τοῦ βραδυτέρου ἐάλων, ὦ πέμοι κατήγοροι ἂτε δεινοι καὶ ὥς ὅντες ὑπὸ τοῦ θάττονος, τῆς κακλᾶς. καὶ νῦν ἐγὼ μὲν ἀπειμί ὑφ’ ὑμῶν θανάτον δίκην ὀφλῶν, οὕτω δ’ ὑπὸ τῆς 10 ἀληθείας ὡφληκότες μοχθηρίαν καὶ ὕδικλαι. καὶ ἐγὼ τε τῷ τιμῆματι ἐμένω καὶ οὕτω. ταῦτα μὲν ποι ἵσως οὕτω καὶ ἐδει σχεῖν, καὶ ἰμαι αὐτὰ μετρίως ἔχειν.

XXX. Τὸ δὲ δὴ μετὰ τοῦτο ἐπιθυμῶ ὑμῶν χρησ. 15 μοιδῆσαι, ὁ καταψηφισάμενοι μου. καὶ γὰρ εἰμὶ ἡ ἡ ἐνταύθα, ἐν δ’ μάλιστ’ ἄνθρωποι χρησμοφοβοῦσιν, ὅταν μέλλωσιν ὑποθανείσθαι. φημὶ γὰρ, ἄνδρες, οἳ ἐμὲ ἀπεκτόνατε, τιμωρίαν ὑμῶν ἤξειν εὐθὺς μετὰ τὸν ἐμὸν θάνατον πολὺ χαλεπώτεραν καὶ Διὰ ἡ οἶαι ἐμὲ ἀπεκτό- 20 νατε· νῦν γὰρ τοῦτο εἰργάσασθε οἰόμενοι ἀπαλλάξεισθαι τοῦ διδόναι ἐλεγχον τοῦ βλου. τὸ δὲ ὑμῶν πολὺ ἐναντίον ἀποβῆσθαι, ὡς ἐγὼ φημι. πλείους ἐσονται ὑμᾶς οἱ ἐλεγχοντες, οδι νῦν ἐγὼ κατεῖχο, ὑμεῖς δὲ ὁ οὐκ ἡσθάνεσθε· καὶ χαλεπώτεροι ἐσονται ὡς νεώτεροι 25 εἰσι, καὶ ὑμεῖς μᾶλλον ἀγανακτήσετε. εἰ γὰρ οἴσετε ἀποκτείνουτε ἄνθρωποις ἐπισχῆσετε τοῦ ἀνειδίξεων τινὰ ὑμῶν ὅτι οὐκ ὄρθως ζῆτε, οὐκ ὄρθως διανοεῖσθε. οὐ γὰρ ἐσθ’ αὕτη ἡ ἀπαλλαγῇ οὕτε πάνω δυνατῆ οὕτε
καλῆ, ἀλλ’ ἐκείνη καὶ καλλίστη καὶ ῥάστη, μὴ τοὺς ἄλλους κολούειν, ἀλλ’ ἐαυτὸν παρασκευάζειν ὅπως ἔσται ὡς βέλτιστος. ταῦτα μὲν οὖν ὑμῖν τοὺς κατα-
ψηφισμένους μαντευσόμενος ἀπαλλάττομαι.

XXXI. Τοῖς δὲ ἀποψηφισμένος ἥδεως ἀν δια-
Ε λεχθείν ὑπὲρ τοῦ γεγονότος τοιτοῦ πράγματος, ἐν ὃι ἄρχοντες ἀσχολίαν ἄγουσι καὶ οὕτω ἔρχομαι οἱ ἐλθόντα με δεὶ τεθνᾶναι. ἀλλὰ μοι, ὡς ἄνδρες, παρα-
μείνατε τοσοῦτον χρόνον· οὐδὲν γὰρ κολύει διαμυθο-
λογήσαι πρὸς ἀλλήλους ἕως ἔξεστιν· ὑμῖν γὰρ ὡς 10
40 φίλοις οὖσιν ἐπίδειξα ἐθέλω τὸ νυνὶ μοι ξυμβεβηκὸς
t’ ποτε νοεῖ. ἐμοὶ γὰρ, ὡς ἄνδρες δικασταὶ—ὑμᾶς
gὰρ δικαστάς καλῶν ὀρθῶς ἃν καλοῖν—θαυμάσιον
t’ γέγονεν. ἡ γὰρ εἰσωθυῖα μοι μαντικὴ ἡ τοῦ δαιμο-
νίου ἐν μὲν τῷ πρόσθεν χρόνῳ παντὶ πάντων πυκνὴ ἀεὶ 18
ἡν καὶ πάντων ἐπὶ σμικροῖς ἐναίσχουμεν, εἰ. τι μέλλοιμι
μὴ ὀρθῶς πράξεω· νυνὶ δὲ ξυμβεβηκέ μοι, ἀπερ ὀρᾶτε
καὶ αὐτὸλ, ταῦτα ἂ γε δὴ ὄνθει ἃν τις καὶ νομίζεται
Βέσχατα κακῶν εἰναι, ἐμοὶ δὲ οὕτε ἐξῴντε ἔσθεν οἴκοθεν
ἡμαντιώθη τὸ τοῦ θεοῦ σημεῖον, οὕτε ἡνίκα ἀνέβαινον 20
ἐνταῦθι ἐπὶ τὸ δικαστήριον, οὕτε ἐν τῷ λόγῳ ὀδαμοῦ
μέλλοντι τι ἔρειν· καίτοι ἐν ἄλλοις λόγοις τολλαχοῦ
dὴ με. ἐπέσχε λέγοντα μεταξὺ· νῦν δὲ ὀδαμοῦ περὶ
tαύτην τῇ πράξει οὕτ’ ἐν ἔργῳ οὐδεὶς οὕτ’ ἐν λόγῳ
ἡμαντιώταται μοι. τί οὖν αἰτίων εἰναι ὑπολαμβάνω; 25
ἔγω ὑμῖν ἔρῳ· κινδυνεύει γὰρ μοι τὸ ξυμβεβηκὸς
tοῦτο ἁγαθὸν γεγονέναι, καὶ οὐκ ἐσθ’ ὅπως ἡμεῖς
Σὸρθὸς ὑπολαμβάνομεν ὅσοι οἴομεθα κακῶν εἰναι τὸ
τεθνάναι. μέγα μοι τεκμήριαν τούτου γέγονεν· οὐ γὰρ ἔσθι ὅπως οὐκ ἤναυτιόθη ἃν μοι τὸ εἰωθὸς σημεῖον, εἰ μὴ τι ἔμελλον ἑγὼ ἄγαθον πράξειν.

XXXII. Ἐννοούσωμεν δὲ καὶ τῇδε ὡς πολλῆ ἐπὶς ἡ ἐστιν ἄγαθον αὐτὸ εἶναι. δυοίν γὰρ θάτερον ἔστι τὸ τεθνάναι· ἢ γὰρ οἷον μηδὲν εἶναι μηδὲ αἴσθησιν μηδὲν μηδενὸς ἔχειν τὸν τεθνεῶτα, ἢ κατὰ τὰ λεγόμενα μεταβολή τις τυγχάνει οὐσα καὶ μεταλκήσεις τῇ ψυχῇ τοῦ τόπου τοῦ ἐνθεοῦτε εἰς ἄλλου τόπον. καὶ εἶτε

10 μηδεμιά αἴσθησις ἐστιν, ἀλλ' οἷον ὑπνὸς ἐπειδὰν τις καθεύδων μηδ' ἄναρ μηδὲν ὀρῷ, θαναμάσιον κέρδος ἄν εἴη τὸ θάνατος. ἐγὼ γὰρ ἂν οἶμαι, εἰ τινα ἐκλεξάμενον δέοι ταύτην τὴν ψυχά, ἐν δ' οὐτω κατέδαρθεν ὡστε μηδὲ ἄναρ ἰδεῖν, καὶ τὰς ἄλλας νύκτας τα καὶ ἡμέρας τὰς τοῦ βίου τοῦ ἐαυτοῦ ἀντιπαραθέντα ταύτη τῇ νυκτὶ δέοι σκεφάμενον εἰπεῖν, πόσας ἁμεινον καὶ ἢδιον ἡμέρας καὶ νύκτας ταύτης τῆς νυκτὸς βεβλωκεν ἐν τῷ ἐαυτοῦ βίῳ, οἶμαι ἄν μὴ ὅτι ἱδώτην τινά, ἀλλὰ τῶν μέγαν βασιλέα εὐφραγίμητον ἄν εὑρεῖν αὐτὸν ταύτας ἐπὶ πρὸς τὰς ἄλλας ἡμέρας καὶ νύκτας. εἰ οὖν τοιοῦτον ὁ θάνατος ἔστι, κέρδος ἐγγυε λέγω· καὶ γὰρ οὖθεν πλειον ὁ πᾶς χρόνος φαίνεται οὖτω δὴ εἶναι ἢ μια νύξ. εἰ δ' αὖ οἶλον ἀπόδημησαῖ ἐστιν ὁ θάνατος ἐνθέντε εἰς ἄλλου τόπου, καὶ ἀληθῆ ἔστι τὰ λεγόμενα ὡς ἀρα 20 ἐκεῖ εἰσὶν ἀπαίτες οἱ τεθνεῶτες, τί μεῖζον ἄγαθον τούτου εἶν ἂν, δ' ἄνδρες δικασταῖ; εἰ γὰρ τις ἀφικόμενος εἰς Ἀιδοῦ, ἀπαλλαγεῖς τούτων τῶν φασικόντων δικαστῶν εἰναι, εὐρήσῃ τοὺς ἀληθῶς δικαστὰς, οὕτε καὶ λέγονται.
ἐκεῖ δικάζειν, Μίνως τε καὶ Ἀράμανθος καὶ Ἀλκός καὶ Τριππόλεμος καὶ ἄλλοι ὅσοι τῶν ἡμιθέων δίκαιοι ἐγένοντο ἐν τῷ ἔαντὼν βλέψει, ἀρα φαύλη ἄν εἰς ἡ ἀποδημία; ἡ αὐτῷ Ὁρφεῖ ξυγγενέσθαι καὶ Μουσαλῷ καὶ Ἡσίόδῳ καὶ Ὁμήρῳ ἐπὶ πόσῳ ἂν τις δέξαι ἄν ύμων; ἐγὼ μὲν ὡς γὰρ πολλάκις θέλω τεθνάναι, εἰ τάῦτ' ἐστὶν ἂληθή· ἐπεὶ ἔμοι χρήσαι καὶ αὐτῷ βλαψματί ἄν εἰς ἡ διατριβὴ αὐτῷ τῷ δίποτε, ὅπως ἐντύχωμεν Παλαμήδει καὶ Ἀλκάτερ τῷ Τελαμώνι καὶ εἰ τις ἄλλος τῶν παλαιῶν διὰ κρίσιν ἄδικων τέθηκεν. ἀντιπαραβάλλοντι τὰ ἐμαυτὸ πάθη πρὸς τὸ ἐκεῖνων, ὡς ἐγὼ ὁμοί, οὐκ ἂν ἄρησε εἰς. καὶ δὴ τὸ μέγιστον, τοὺς ἐκεῖ εξετάζοντα καὶ ἐρεινώντα ὡσπερ τοὺς ἐνταῦθα διάγεις, τίς δὴ αὐτῶν σοφός ἐστιν καὶ τίς ὀφείλει μὲν, ἐστὶν δ' οὖ. ἐπὶ πόσῳ δ' ἂν τις, δ' ἄνδρες δικαστὰς, δέξαμεν εξετάζοις τὸν ἐπὶ Τρολαντῶν ἡμῶν τῇ πολλῇ στρατίῳ τῶν Ἐορδαίων καὶ Σίσυφον, ἡ ἄλλος μυρλὼς ἄν τις εἶποι καὶ ἄνδρας καὶ γυναῖκας, ὃς ἐκεῖ διαλέγεσθαι καὶ ξυνεῖναι καὶ εξετάζειν ἄμελην ἄν εἰς εὐδαιμονίας. πάντως οὐ δήποτε τούτον ἂν ἐνεκα οἱ ἐκεῖ ἀποκτείνουσι· τὰ τῷ γαρ ἄλλα εὐδαιμο-νέστεροι εἰσών οἱ ἐκεῖ τῶν ἐνθάδε, καὶ ἡδὴ τῶν λοιπῶν χρόνων ἄθανατοι εἰσών, εἴπερ γε τὰ λεγόμενα ἂληθή ἐστιν.

XXXIII. Ἀλλὰ καὶ ὑμᾶς χρῆ, δ' ἄνδρες δικασταὶ, εὐθέλπισας εἶναι πρὸς τῶν θάνατον, καὶ ἔν τι τοῦτο 25 διανοεῖσθαι ἂληθές, ὅτι οὐκ ἐστὶν ἄνδρι ἀγαθῷ κακόν οὐδὲν οὔτε ζωτὶ οὔτε τελευτάσαντι, οὐδὲ ἀμελεῖται ἢπὸ θεῶν τὰ τοῦτο πράγματα· οὐδὲ τὰ ἐμὰ νῦν ἀπὸ
τοῦ αὐτομάτου γέγονεν, ἀλλὰ μοι δῆλον ἔστι τοῦτο, ὅτι ἦδη τεθνάναι καὶ ἀπηλλάχθαι πραγμάτων βέλτιον ἦν μοι. διὰ τοῦτο καὶ ἐμὲ οὖν ἀνέπτυσεν τὸ σημεῖον, καὶ ἔγορα τοῖς καταψηφισμένοις μου καὶ τοῖς ὃ κατηγόροις οὐ πάνω χαλεπαίνω. καὶ τοιού ὑπαίτη τῆς διανολῆς καταψηφισμένοι μου καὶ κατηγόροις, ἀλλ’ οἷος ἐμεν ἔλαμπτες· τούτῳ αὐτῶς ἁξιών μέμφεσθαί. τὸ· ἐκ σόνδε μέντοι δέομαι αὐτῶν· τοὺς νιεῖς μου ἑπειδὰν ἦβησοσί τιμωρήσασθε, ὃ ἀνδρεῖς, ταῦτα ταῦτα λυποῦντες ἀπέρ ἡμᾶς ἐλύσαν, ἕαν ἡμῶν δοκῶσιν ἢ χρημάτων ἢ ἄλλου του πρῶτου ἐπιμελεῖσθαι ἢ ἀρετῆς, καὶ ἐάν δοκῶσι τι εἶναι μηδὲν ὄντες, ὄνειδίζετε αὐτῶς ὡσπερ ἡγό ἡμῶν, ὅτι σὺν ἐπιμελοῦνται δόν δεῖ καὶ οἴοντας τι εἶναι ὄντες οὐδένος ἁξιώ. καὶ ἐάν ταῦτα ποιήσετε, δίκαια πεπονθῶς ἡγό ἐσομαι ὃς ἡμῶν, ἀλλὸ τε καὶ οἱ νιεῖς. ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἦδη ὤρα ἀπλέναι, ἠμοί μὲν ἀποθανοῦμεν, ἡμῶν δὲ βιωσομένους· ὁπότεροι δὲ ἡμῶν ἔρχονται ἐπὶ ἀμείων πράγμα, ἀδηλοῦν παντὶ πλήν ἢ τῷ θεῷ.
ΚΡΙΤΩΝ.

ΤΑ ΤΟΤ ΔΙΑΛΟΓΟΤ ΠΡΟΣΩΠΑ.
ΣΟΚΡΑΤΗΣ ΚΡΙΤΩΝ.

43 Ι. ΣΩ. Τι τηνικάδε ἀφίξαι, ὦ Κρίτων; ἢ οὐ πρὸ ἔτι ἔστιν;
       ΚΡ. Πάννυ μὲν οἶν.
       ΣΩ. Πηνίκα μάλιστα;
       ΚΡ. Ὅρθρος βαθύς.

6 ΣΩ. Θαυμαζόμην ὅπως ἠθέλησέ σοι ὁ τοῦ δεσμονυμη
       ρίου φύλαξ ὑπακούσαι.
       ΚΡ. Ἐννήθησις ἢδη μοι ἐστιν, ὦ Σώκρατες, διὰ τὸ
       πολλάκις δεύρο φοντάν, καὶ τι καὶ ἐνεργέτηται ὑπ’ ἔμοι.

10 ΣΩ. Ἄρτι δὲ ἥκεις ἢ πάλαι;
       ΚΡ. Ἐπιεικῶς πάλαι.

Β ΣΩ. Εἴτε πῶς οὖκ εὖθὺς ἐπήγειράς με, ἄλλα συγὴ
       παρακάθησαι;
       ΚΡ. Οὐ μᾶ τὸν Δία, ὦ Σώκρατε, οὐδ’ ἂν αὐτὸς ἔθελον ἐν
       τοσάττη τῇ ἀγρυπνίᾳ καὶ λύπῃ εἶναι.
       ἄλλα καὶ σοῦ πάλαι θαυμαζόμην αἰσθανόμενος ὡς ἠδέως
       καθεύδεις. καὶ ἐπίτηδες σε οὖκ ἤγειρον, ἵνα ὡς ἡδίστα
διάγγες. καὶ πολλάκις μὲν δὴ σε καὶ πρότερον ἐν παντὶ τῷ βίῳ εὐδαιμονία τοῦ τρόπου, πολὺ δὲ μᾶλλον ἐν τῇ νῦν παρεστώσῃ ξυμφορᾷ ὡς ραδίως αὐτὴν καὶ πρῶς φέρεις.

5 Σ.Ω. Καὶ γὰρ ἂν, ὁ Κρίτων, πλημμέλης εἰς ἀγανακτεῖν τηλικοῦτον ὄντα, εἰ δεῖ ἢδη τελευτᾶν.

ΚΡ. Καὶ ἄλλοι, ὁ Σώκρατης, τηλικοῦτοι ἐν τοιαῦτας ξυμφοραῖς ἄλλοκονται, ἀλλ' ουδὲν αὐτοῖς ἐπιλύεται ἢ ἡμεῖς τὸ μὴ σφιχτὰ ἀγανακτεῖν τῇ παροῦσῃ τῷ τύχῃ.

10 τύχῃ.

Σ.Ω. Ἐστι ταύτα. ἄλλα τὶ δὴ οὕτω πρὸ θύρα ;

ΚΡ. Ἀργελλαίων, ὁ Σώκρατης, φέρων χαλεπῆς, οὐ σοι, ὡς ἐμοὶ φαίνεται, ἀλλ' εἰμὶ καὶ τοῖς σοῖς ἐπιτηδείοις πᾶσι καὶ χαλεπῆς καὶ βαρεῖαν, ὡς ἐγώ ὡς ἐμοὶ 15 δοκῶ ἐν τοῖς βαρύταται ἀν εὐγενικαίμ.

Σ.Ω. Τίνα ταύτην; ἢ το τροῖον ἀφίκεται ἐκ Δῆλου, οὐ δεὶ ἄφικεμένου τεθνάναι με; D

ΚΡ. Οὕτωι δὴ ἀφίκεται, ἄλλα δοκεῖ μὲν μοι ἦξεις τῇ μεροὶ ἐξ ὧν ἀπαγγέλλοντον ἠκούσας τινα ἀπὸ 20 Σουνίου καὶ καταλαμπόντος ἐκεῖ αὐτό. δῆλον οὖν ἐκ τούτων ἄγγελων ὃς ἦξει τῇ μεροῖ, καὶ ἀνάγκη δὴ εἰς αὕριον ἔσται, ὁ Σώκρατης, τὸν βιον σε τελευτᾶν.

Π. Σ.Ω. Ἀλλ', ὁ Κρίτων, τῷ ἀγαθῷ. εἰ ταύτῃ τοῖς θεοῖς φιλον, ταύτῃ ἔστω. οὐ μέντοι οἵματι ἦξειν 44 25 αὐτὸ τῇ μεροὶ.

ΚΡ. Πόθεν τούτο τεκμαλρέι;

Σ.Ω. Ἐγὼ σοι ἔρωτη τῇ γάρ που ὑπεραλὰ δεῖ με ἀποθεοῦσκειν ἢ ὥς αὐξῃ τὸ πλοῖον.
ΚΡ. Φασὶ γέ τοι δὴ οἱ τοῦτων κύριοι.
ΣΩ. Οὐ τοῖς τῆς ἐπιούσις ἁμέρας οἷμαι αὐτῷ ἤξεις, ἀλλὰ τῆς ἐτέρας. τεκμαίρομαι δὲ ἐκ τινος ἐννυπνίου ὡς ἐόρακα ὄλγον πρότερον ταύτης τῆς νυκτὸς· καὶ κινδυνεύεις ἐν καιρῶ τινι οὐκ ἐγείρατι με. 5
ΚΡ. Ἡν δὲ δὴ τι τὸ ἐννύπνιον;
ΣΩ. Ἐδόκει τίς μοι γνῆ προσέλθονσα καλή καὶ εὐειδής, λευκὰ ἰμάτια ἔχουσα, καλέσαι με καὶ εἰπέων·
βὸ Σώκρατες, ἣματι κεῖν τριτάτῳ Φθίνην ἐρίβωλον ἱκοῦ.
ΚΡ. Ἄτοπον τὸ ἐννύπνιον, ὁ Σώκρατες. 10
ΣΩ. Ἐναργεῦς μὲν οὖν ὃς γε μοι δοκεῖ, ὁ Κρίτων.
ΠΡ. ΚΡ. Διὰν γε, ὡς ἐοικεν. ἀλλὰ ὁ δαίμονι
Σώκρατες, ἐτι καὶ νῦν ἐμοὶ πείθου καὶ σώθητι· ὡς ἐμοὶ, ἑαυτὸν ἀποθάνεις, οὐ μία χυμοφόρα ἑστών, ἀλλὰ χωρίς μὲν τοῦ ἐστερηθάς τοιοῦτον ἐπιτηδεοῦν, οἷον 15 ἐγὼ οὐδένα μὴ ποτε εὐρήσω, ἐτι δὲ καὶ πολλοὺς δόξω, οὐ̇ εμὲ καὶ σὲ μὴ σαφῶς ἴσασίν, ὡς οἶδος τε ὡς σε σφέων, εἰ ἥθελον ἀναλίκειες χρήματα, ἁμελήσαι. καλ-
τις ἂν αὐθάλων εἰπα ταύτης δόξα ἢ δοκεῖν χρήματα
περὶ πλεονος ποιεῖσθαι ἢ φίλους; οὐ γὰρ πελεόνται 20
οἱ πολλοὶ ὡς σὺ αὐτὸς οὐκ ἥθελησας ὑπεῖην εὐθεία
ἡμῶν προθυμομένων.
ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ τί ἥμιν, ὁ μακάριε Κρίτων, οὗτῳ τῆς
tῶν πολλῶν δόξης μέλει; οὐ γὰρ ἐπιεικέστατοι, ὃν 25
μᾶλλον ἄξιον φρουτιζεῖν, ἡγησόμεθα αὐτὰ οὗτῳ πε- ἁπὶ
πράξαι ὡσπερ ἀν πράξῃ.
ΚΡ. Ἀλλῷ ὥρᾳς δὴ ὅτι ἀνάγκη, ὁ Σώκρατες, καὶ
tῆς τῶν πολλῶν δόξης μέλειν. αὐτὰ δὲ δῆλα τὰ
κατα των κακῶν ἐξεργάζεσθαι, ἀλλὰ τὰ μέγιστα σχεδόν, εάν τις εἰς αὐτοὺς διαβεβλημένος ἦ.

ΣΩ. Εἰ γὰρ ὠφελοῦν, ὁ Κρίτων, οὔτε εἰς οὐκ ὁ πολλοὶ τὰ μέγιστα κακὰ ἐργάζεσθαι, ινα οὔτε τὰ ἱσαν καὶ ἄγαθα τὰ μέγιστα, καὶ καλῶς ἄν εἴχεν. νῦν δὲ οὐδέτερα οὐλεί τε ὁ γὰρ φρόνιμον οὔτε ἀφρόν δυνατὸ ποιῆσαι, ποιοῦσι δὲ τούτῳ ὅτι ἄν τύχωσιν.

IV. KR. Τάντα μὲν δὴ οὕτως ἔχετο· τάδε δὲ, ὁ

10 Ἐκκρατεῖς, εἰπέ μοι· ἀρὰ γε μὴ ἐμοῦ προμηθεῖ καὶ τῶν ἐ

ἀλλῶν ἐπιτηδείων, μὴ, ἐὰν σὺ ἐνθένδε ἐξέλθῃς, οἱ συ-

κοφάνται ἣμιν πρῶτομα παρέχωσιν ὡς σὲ ἐνθένδε ἐκκλέψασιν, καὶ ἀναγκασθῶμεν ἢ καὶ πάσαν τὴν

οὐσίαν ἀποβαλεῖν ἢ συνῆκα χρήματα, ἢ καὶ ἄλλω τι

15 πρὸς τούτους παθεῖν· εἰ γὰρ τι τοιοῦτον φοβεῖ, ἔσον

αὐτὸ χαίρειν· ἡμεῖς γὰρ που δίκαιοι ἐσμεν σώσαντες σὺ

σε κυνουρεύειν τοῦτον τὸν κυνωνοῦν καὶ ἐὰν δὲν ἐτι

τούτου μελζω. ἀλλὰ ἐμοὶ πείθου καὶ μὴ ἄλλως πολεί.

ΣΩ. Καὶ τάντα προμηθοῦμαι, ὁ Κρίτων, καὶ ἄλλα

20 πολλά.

KR. Μήτε τοίνυν τάντα φοβοῦ. καὶ γὰρ οὐδὲ πολὺ

τάργυρίων ἔστω, ὃ θέλουσιν λαβόντες τινὲς σώσαλ σὲ

καὶ ἑξαγαγαῖν ἐνθένδε. ἔπειτα οὗ ὅρας τούτους τοὺς

συκοφάντας ὡς εἰτελεῖσι, καὶ οὐδὲν ἄν δεύο ἐπὶ αὐτοὺς

25 πολλοῦ ἀργυρίου; σοι δὲ ὑπάρχει μὲν τὰ ἐμὰ χρήματα B

ὡς ἐγὼ οἶμαι ἱκανά· ἔπειτα καὶ εἰ τι ἐμοῦ κηδόμενον

οὐκ οἶε δεῖν ἀναλόγειν τάμα, ξένοι οὕτω ἐνθάδε ἔτοι-

μοι ἀναλόγειν· εἰς δὲ καὶ κεκόμεκεν ἐπὶ αὐτὸ τοῦτο
άργυριον ἰκανόν, Συμμίας ὁ Ὑθβαῖος· ἔτοιμος δὲ καὶ Κέβης καὶ ἄλλοι πολλοὶ πάνυ. ὥστε, ὅπερ λέγω, μήτε ταῦτα φοβούμενοι ἀποκάμμησαν σαυτὸν σῶσαι, μήτε ὁ ἔλεγες ἐν τῷ δικαστήρῳ δυσχερέσει σοι γενέσθω, ὅτι σοῦ ἂν ἔχουσι ἐξελθὼν ὅτι χρῆσι σαυτῷ· πολλαχοὶ μὲν ἦσαν γὰρ καὶ ἀλλοισέ ὅποι ἂν ἄφθηγα ἀγαπήσουσι σε· ἔιν δὲ θ' ἰημένη εἰς Θεττάλλαν ἱέναι, εἰςόν ἔμοι ἐκεῖ ξένοι, οἳ σε περὶ πολλοὶ ποιήσονται καὶ ἀσφαλείαν σοι παρέξονται ὥστε σε μηδένα λυπεῖν τῶν κατὰ Θεττάλλαν.

V. Ἐστι δὲ, ὦ Σώκρατε, οὐδὲ δικαίων μοι δοκεῖς ἐπιχειρεῖν πράγμα, σαυτὸν προδοῦναι, ἐξὸν σωθῆναι· καὶ τοιαῦτα σπεύδεις περὶ σαυτὸν γενέσθαι, ἄπερ ἄν καὶ οἱ ἐχθροὶ σου σπεύσασιν τε καὶ ἐσπευσάσαιε διὰ φθείρας βουλόμενοι. πρὸς δὲ τούτοις καὶ τούς νεῖς τοὺς σαυτὸν ἐμούνα δοκεῖς προδοῖσαι, οὗς σου ἐξὸν καὶ 15 δέκατάσθαι καὶ ἐκπαιδεύσαι αἰχμῆς καταλαττῶν, καὶ τὸ σὸν μέρος, ὅτι δὲν τούχωσι, τούτο πράξον· τεύχονται δὲ ὃς τὸ εἰκὸς τοιῶν ὀλοίπερ εἰσεθε γηγενέσθαι ἐν ταῖς ὀρφανίαις περὶ τούς ὀρφανοὺς. ἢ γὰρ οὐ χρῆ ποιεῖσθαι παῖς, ἢ ξυνισταλαυσπορὲι καὶ τρέφοντα καὶ παῖς· 20 δένονται· σω δὲ μοι δοκεῖς τὰ ρηθομότατα αἰρεῖσθαι· χρῆ δὲ, ἄπερ ἄν ἄνερ ἄγαθος καὶ ἀνδρείος ἐλεόσι, ταῦτα αἰρεῖσθαι, φάσκοντα γε δὴ ἀρετῆς διὰ παντὸς τοῦ βλου ἐπιμελεῖσθαι· ὡς ἔγογκα καὶ ὑπὲρ σοῦ καὶ καὶ ἐνέπερ ἡμῶν τῶν σῶν ἐπιτηδείων αἰσχύνομαι, μὴ δόξῃ 25 ἀπαν τὸ πράγμα τὸ περὶ σὲ ἀνανδρία τῷ τῇ ἡμετέρᾳ πεπράξχαι, καὶ ἡ εἰσόδος τῆς δίκης εἰς τὸ δικαστήριον ὡς εἰσῆλθεν ἐξὸν μὴ εἰσέλθειν, καὶ αὐτὸς ὁ ἄγων τῆς
δίκης ώς ἐγένετο, καὶ τὸ τελευταῖον δὴ τούτῃ ὡσπέρ κατάγελος τῆς πράξεως κακία τινὶ καὶ ἄνανδρα τῇ ἰμετέρᾳ διαπεφυγέναι ἡμᾶς δοκεῖν, οὕτως σε οὐχὶ ἐσώσαμεν οὐδὲ σὺ σαντόν, οἶον τε δὲ ἄν καὶ δυνατόν, εἰ 16 τί καὶ μικρὸν ἡμῶν ὀφελὸς ἦν. ταῦτα οὖν, ὁ Σῶκρατες, ὃρα μὴ ἀμα τῷ κακῷ καὶ αἰσχρᾷ ἣ σοι τε καὶ ἡμῖν. ἀλλὰ βουλεύον, μᾶλλον δὲ οὐδὲ βουλεύουσαί ἐτι ὃρα, ἀλλὰ βεβουλεύουσαί. μᾶ δὲ βούλῃ τῆς γὰρ ἐπιούσης νυκτὸς πάντα ταῦτα δεὶ πεπράχθαι. εἰ δέ 10 τι περιμενοῦμεν, ἀδύνατον καὶ οὐκέτι οἶον τε. ἀλλὰ παντὶ τρόπῳ, ὁ Σῶκρατες, πελθοῦ μοι καὶ μηδαμῶς ἀλλως τολει.

VI. ΣΩ. Ὁ φίλε Κρίτων, ἡ προθύμησα σου πολλοῦ ἄξια, εἰ μετὰ των τρόθητος εἴη· εἰ δὲ μή, ὅσοι 15 μελζοῦν, τοσοῦτον χαλεπωτέρα. σκοπεῖσθαι οὖν χρὴ ἡμᾶς εἴτε ταῦτα πρακτέον εἴτε μή· ὃς ἐγὼ οὐ μόνον νῦν ἀλλὰ καὶ ἂει τοιοῦτος οἴος τῶν ἐμῶν μηδενὶ ἀλλοπεθεσθαι ἢ τῷ λόγῳ, δεὶ ἂν μοι λογιζομένῳ βέλτιστος φαίνηται. τοὺς δὲ λόγους οὖς ἐν τῷ ἐμπροσθεν ἔλεγον 20 οὐ δύναμαι νῦν ἐκβάλειν, ἐπειδὴ μοι ἢδε ἢ τύχη γέγονεν, ἀλλὰ σχεδὸν τι δρομοὶ φαίνονται μοι καὶ τοὺς αὐτοὺς πρεσβεῖον καὶ τιμῶν ὡσπέρ καὶ πρότερον· διὸ 25 εὰν μὴ βελτίων ἔχωμεν λέγειν ἐν τῷ παρόντι, εἴ Ισθι ὅτι οὐ μή σοι ξυγχωρήσω, οὖδὲ ἄν πλεῖον τῶν νῦν παρόντων ἢ τῶν πολλῶν δύναμις ὡσπέρ παιδας ἡμᾶς μομολύττηται, δεσμοῦς καὶ θανάτους ἐπιπέμπουσα καὶ χρημάτων ἀφαίρεσεις. πῶς οὖν ἄν μετριώτατα σκοποίμεθα αὐτά; εἰ πρῶτον μὲν τούτον τὸν λόγον
άναλάβομεν, δι' αυτόν λέγεις περὶ τῶν δοξῶν, πότερον καλῶς ἔλεγετο ἐκάστοτε ή oū, ὅτι ταῖς μὲν δεῖ τῶν Δοξῶν προσέχεις τῶν νοῦν, ταῖς δὲ oū· ἡ πρὶν μὲν ἕμε δεῖν ἀποδημήκαιν καλῶς ἔλεγετο, λῦν δὲ κατάδηλος ἔρα ἐγένετο διὸ ἄλλας ἔνεκα λόγου ἔλεγετο, ἂν δὲ παιδιά ἐκαλ χλυνάρια ὡς ἄληθῶς; ἐπιθυμῶ δ' ἔγον ἐπισκέψασθαι, ὃ Κρίτων, κοινὴ μετὰ σοῦ, εἶ τι μοι ἄλλωτερος φανεῖται ἐπειδὴ φηδὲ ἔχω ὡς αὐτός, καὶ εὔσημον χάριν γέ αὐτός ἐγγὺς ἐκάστοτε φηδὲ ὑπὸ τῶν οἰκομένων τι λέγεις, ὥσπερ λίν δ' ἔγον ἔλεγον, ὅτι τῶν δοξῶν ἂν οἱ ἀνθρώποι δοξάζουσι δέοι τὰς μὲν περὶ πολλοῦ ποιεῖσθαι, τὰς δὲ μῆ. τούτῳ πρὸς θεῶν, ὃ Κρίτων, οὐ δοκεῖ καλῶς σου λέγεσθαι; ἐν γὰρ ὡς ταὐτόπτερα ἐκτὸς εἶ τοῦ μέλλειν ἀποδημήκαιν αὐριον, καὶ οὐκ ἂν σε παρακρούνῃ ἡ παροῦσα δὲ ξυμφορά· σκόπει δ' ὃποι ἰκανῶς δοκεῖ σοι λέγεσθαι, ὅτι οὐ πάσας χρῆ τὰς δόξας τῶν ἀνθρώπων τιμῶν, ἀλλὰ τὰς μὲν, τὰς δ' oū· [οὐδὲ πάντων, ἄλλα τῶν μὲν, τῶν δ' oū·] τι φής; ταῦτα οὐχὶ καλῶς λέγεσθαι;

ΚΡ. Καλῶς.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τὰς μὲν χρηστὰς τιμῶν, τὰς δὲ πονηρὰς μὴ;

ΚΡ. Νάλ.

ΣΩ. Χρηστάλ δὲ οὖν αἱ τῶν φρονίμων, πονηρὰλ δὲ αἱ τῶν ἀφρόνων;

ΚΡ. Πῶς δ' oū·

VII. ΣΩ. Φέρε δῆ, πῶς αὖ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἔλεγετο;

β γυμναζόμενος ἀνήρ καὶ τοῦτο πράττων πότερον παντός.
άνδρος ἐπαίνῳ καὶ ψόγῳ καὶ δόξῃ τῶν νοῦν προσέχει, ἢ ἐνὸς μόνου ἐκεῖνον ὅς ἀν τυγχάνῃ ἰατρὸς ἢ παιδοτρίβης ὁ ἦν;

ΚΡ. ' Ἐνὸς μόνου.

Σ.Ω. Οὐκοῦν φοβεῖσθαι χρή τοὺς ψόγους καὶ ἀσπάζεσθαι τοὺς ἐπαίνους τοὺς τοῦ ἐνὸς ἐκεῖνον, ἄλλα μὴ τοὺς τῶν πολλῶν;

ΚΡ. Δῆλα δή.

Σ.Ω. Ταύτη ἀρα αὐτῷ πρακτεῖν καὶ γυμναστεῖν καὶ ἐδεστεῖν γε καὶ ποτεῖν, ἢ ἐν τῷ ἔνι δοκῇ τῷ ἑπιστάτῃ καὶ ἐπαίνοιται, μᾶλλον ἢ ἢ ξύμπασι τοῖς ἄλλοις;

ΚΡ. ' Ἑστὶ ταύτα.

Σ.Ω. Εἴπο. ἀπειθήσασι δὲ τῷ ἐνὶ καὶ ἀτιμάσας 5 αὐτοῦ τὴν δόξαν καὶ τοὺς ἐπαίνους, τιμήσας δὲ τοὺς τῶν πολλῶν λόγους καὶ μηδὲν ἐπαίνωτων, ἀρα οὐδὲν κακὸν πείσεται;

ΚΡ. Πῶς γὰρ οὗ;

Σ.Ω. Τί δὲ ἐστὶ τὸ κακὸν τοῦτο καὶ ποῦ τείνει καὶ 20 εἰς τί τῶν τοῦ ἀπειθοῦντος;

ΚΡ. Δῆλον ὅτι εἰς τὸ σῶμα. τοῦτο γὰρ διὸλυσων.

Σ.Ω. Καλῶς λέγεισιν. οὐκοῦν καὶ τάλλα, δ' Κρίτων, οὔτως ἣν μὴ πάντα διώμεν, καὶ δὴ καὶ περὶ τῶν 25 δικαλῶν καὶ ἀδίκων καὶ αἰσχρῶν καὶ καλῶν καὶ ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν, περὶ ὧν νῦν ἢ βουλή ἢ μᾶς ἐστίν; πότερον τῇ τῶν πολλῶν δόξῃ δεῖ ἡμᾶς ἐπεσθαι καὶ φοβεῖσθαι δ' αὐτῆς, ἢ τῇ τοῦ ἐνὸς, εἴ τίς ἐστὶν ἐπαίνων, δὲν δεῖ καὶ
αιχύνεσθαι καὶ φοβεῖσθαι μᾶλλον ἡ ἐξουσία τοὺς ἀλλούς, δι' εἰ μὴ ἀκολουθήσομεν, διαφθερούμεν ἐκεῖνο
καὶ λωβησόμεθα, δ' τῷ μὲν δικαίῳ βέλτιον ἐγγύνετο, τῷ
dὲ ἀδικῷ ἀπώλλυτο; ἢ οὐδὲν ἐστὶ τούτῳ;

ΚΡ. Οἴμαι ἔγωγε, ὦ Σώκρατες.

VIII. ΣΩ. Φέρε δὴ, ἐὰν τὸ ὑπὸ τοῦ ἴγνωστοῦ μὲν
βέλτιον γνωρίσαμον, ὑπὸ τοῦ νοσῶν δὲ διαφθειρό-
μενον διολέσαμεν πειθόμενοι μὴ τῇ τῶν ἐπαινότων
Εὐδοξῇ, ἃρα βιωτὸν ἡμῖν ἐστὶν διεφθαρμένου αὐτοῦ;
ἐστὶ δὲ ποινοῦ τοῦ σώματος ἢ οὐχὶ;

ΚΡ. Ναὶ.

ΣΩ. Ἀρ' οὖν βιωτὸν ἡμῖν ἐστὶν μετὰ μορφῆρον
καὶ διεφθαρμένου σώματος;

ΚΡ. Οὐδαμῶς.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ μετ᾽ ἑκείνου ἄρ' ἡμῖν βιωτὸν διεφθαρ-15
μένον, δ' τῷ ἀδικοῦ μὲν λωβὰται, τῷ δὲ δικαιοῦ οὐνίσκον;
ἡ φαυλότερον ἡγούμεθα εἰναι τοῦ σώματος ἑκείνο, ὡς
48ποτ' ἐστὶ τῶν ἡμετέρων, περὶ δὴ η τῇ ἀδικίᾳ καὶ ἡ
δικαιοσύνη ἐστὶν;

ΚΡ. Οὐδαμῶς.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ τιμώτερον;

ΚΡ. Πολὺ γε.

ΣΩ. Οὐκ ἃρα, ὁ βέλτιστος, πάνυ ἡμῖν οὕτω φρον-
τιστέον, τί ἐροῦσιν οἱ πολλοὶ ἡμῶς, ἀλλ' ὅτι ὁ ἐπαίνω
περὶ τῶν δικαίων καὶ ἀδικῶν, ὁ εἰς, καὶ αὐτή ἡ ἀλήθεια. 25
διότι πρὸ τοῦ μὲν ταύτῃ οὐκ ὀρθῶς εἰσηγεῖ, εἰσηγού-
μενοσ τῆς τῶν πολλῶν δόξης δειν ἡμᾶς φροντίζειν περὶ
tῶν δικαίων καὶ καλῶν καὶ ἁγαθῶν καὶ τῶν ἐναντίων.
άλλα μὲν δή, φαίη γ' ἂν τις, οἰοὶ τέ εἰσιν ἡμᾶς οἱ πολλοὶ ἀποκτινώναι.

ΚΡ. Δήλα δή καὶ ταῦτα· φαίη γὰρ ἂν, ὁ Σῶ-Β κρατεῖ.

5 Ἡ. Ἀληθῆ λέγεις. ἄλλα, ὁ θανάσιος, οὐτὸς τε ὁ λόγος δὲν διεληλύθαμεν ἐμοῦ γένει ἐτί ὁμοιὸς εἶναι [τῷ] καὶ πρῶτον· καὶ τόνδε ἀν σκόπει κε ἔτι μένει ἦμῖν ἢ οὐ, ὅτι οὐ τὸ ζήν περὶ πλεοῦστον ποιητέον, ἄλλα τὸ εὖ ζήν.

10 ΚΡ. Ἀλλὰ μένει.

Ἡ. Τὸ δὲ εὖ καὶ καλῶς καὶ δικαίως ὅτι ταῦτον ἐστί, μένει ἢ οὐ μένει;

ΚΡ. Μένει.

IX. Η. Οὔκοιν ἐκ τῶν ὑμολογομένων τούτων σκεπτέον, πότερον δικαῖον εἰμὲ ἐνθένυ ὑπεράσθαι ἐξεῖναι μὴ ἀφιέντων Ἀθηναίων, ἢ οὐ δικαῖον; καὶ εὰν μὲν οἱ φαίηται δικαῖον, πειρόμεθα, εἰ δὲ μὴ, ἔσθεν. ἂς δὲ σὺ λέγεις τὰς σκέψεις περὶ τε ἀναλώσεως χρημάτων καὶ δόξης καὶ παλδῶν τροφῆς, μὴ ὡς ἀληθῶς ταύτα, ὁ

20 Κρίτων, σκέμματα ἢ τῶν ράδιως ἀποκτινώντων καὶ ἀναβιωσκόμενων γ' ἄν, εἰ οἰοὶ τ' ἔσαι, οὔδεν ἔψων μὴ, τούτων τῶν πολλῶν. ἦμῖν δ' ἐπειδῆ ὁ λόγος οὗτος αἱρεῖ μὴ οὐδὲν ἄλλο σκεπτέον ἢ ἡ ὀπερ νῦν δὴ ἐλέγομεν, πότερον δικαία πράξομεν καὶ χρήματα τελοῦστες τούτων τούτων ἐμὲ ἐνθένυ ἐξάγουσι καὶ χάριτας καὶ αὐτοὶ δ' ἐξάγοντες τε καὶ ἐξαγόμενοι, ἢ τῇ ἀληθείᾳ ἀδιεχόμενον πάντα ταῦτα ποιοῦντες· καὶ φαινόμεθα ἢδικα αὐτὰ ἐργαζόμενοι, μὴ οὐ δὲν ὑπολογίζουσι οὔτε εἰ ἀπο-
θυήσκειν δεῖ παραμένοντας καὶ ἴσως λαύν ἁγοντας οὕτε ἄλλο ὅτι ὅτι τῶν πάσχεις πρὸ τοῦ ἄδικεῖν.

ΚΡ. Καλῶς μὲν μοι δοκεῖς λέγειν, ὁ Σώκρατες· ὅρα δὲ τί δρῶμεν.

Σ. ὁ αγαθὲ, κοινῇ, καὶ εἰ τῇ ἔχεις ἀντιλέγειν ἐμοῦ λέγοντος, ἀντιλέγει, καὶ σοὶ πείσομαι· ἐκ δὲ μή, παύσαι ἡδή, ὁ μακάρω, πολλάκις μοι λέγων τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον, ὡς χρή ἐνθέντε ἀκόντων Ἀθηναίων ἐμὲ ἀπείναι· ὡς ἐγὼ περὶ πολλοῦ πουώμαι πείσας σε ταύτα πράττειν, ἀλλὰ μή ἀκόντος. ὅρα δὲ δὴ τῆς 10 σκέψεως τὴν ἀρχήν, εάν σοι ἰκανός λέγηται, καὶ πείρῳ 49 ἀποκρίνεσθαι τὸ ἐρωτώμενον ἢ ἄν μάλιστα οὕτη.

ΚΡ. Ἀλλὰ πειράσομαι.

Χ. Σ. Ὕδεν τρόποι φαμέν ἐκόντας ἀδικητέον εἶναι, ἢ τινὶ μὲν ἀδικητέον τρόποι, τινὶ δὲ οὐ; ὡς οὖδα-15 μῶς τό γε ἂδικεῖν οὕτε ἁγαθὸν οὕτε καλὸν, ὡς πολλάκις ἡμῖν καὶ ἐν τῷ ἐμπροσθεν χρόνῳ ὀμολογήθη; [ὁπερ καὶ ἄρτι ἐλέγετο:] ἡ πᾶσαι ἡμῖν ἐκεῖναι αἱ πρόσθεν ὀμολογηθεὶν ἐν ταύτῃ ταῖς ὀλγαῖς ἡμέραις ἐκκεχεχμανεῖ εἰςίν, καὶ πάλαι, ὁ Κρίτων, ἀρα τηλικοῖς [γέροντες] 20 βάνδρες πρὸς ἀλλήλους σπουδὴ διαλεγόμενοι ἐλάθομεν ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς παλῶν οὖδὲν διαφέροντες; ὡς παντὸς μάλλον οὕτως ἐχει ὡσπερ τότε ἐλέγετο ἡμῖν, εἴτε φασίν οἱ πολλοὶ εἴτε μή, καὶ εἴτε δὲ ἡμᾶς ἔτι τῶν ὁρώντων φαληστέρα πάσχειν εἴτε καὶ πραότερα, ὡμοὶ τὸ γε 28 ἂδικεῖν τῷ ἂδικοῦντε καὶ κακῶν καὶ αἰσχρῶν τυγχάνει ὃν οὖν τρόποι; φαμέν ἢ οὐ;  

ΚΡ. Φαμέν.
ΣΩ. Οὐδαμῶς ἄρα δεῖ ἀδικεῖν;
KR. Οὐ δήτα.
ΣΩ. Οὐδὲ ἀδικοῦμενον ἄρα ἀνταδικεῖν, ὡς οἱ πολλοὶ οἴονται, ἐπειδή γε οὐδαμῶς δεῖ ἀδικεῖν;

KR. Οὐ φανέται.
ΣΩ. Τί δὲ δή; κακουργεῖν δεῖ, ὁ Κρίτων, ἢ οὐ;
KR. Οὐ δεῖ δήτου, ὁ Σωκράτης.
ΣΩ. Τί δὲ; ἀντικακουργεῖν κακῶς πάσχοντα, ὡς οἱ πολλοὶ φασί, δίκαιον ἢ οὐ δίκαιον;

KR. Οὐδαμῶς.
ΣΩ. Τὸ γάρ που κακῶς ποιεῖν ἀνθρώπους τοῦ ἀδικεῖν οὐδὲν διαφέρει.
KR. 'Ἄληθῆ λέγεις.
ΣΩ. Οὐτε ἄρα ἀνταδικεῖν δεῖ οὔτε κακῶς ποιεῖν οὐδένα ἀνθρώπων, οὐδ' ἀν ὁτιοῦν πάσχη ὑπ' αὐτῶν. καὶ ὁρὰ, ὁ Κρίτων, ταῦτα καθομολογῶν ὅπως μὴ παρὰ δόξαιν ὀμολογῆσαι. οἶδα γὰρ ὅτι ὅλγοις τοῖς ταῦτα καὶ δοκεῖ καὶ δόξει. οῖς οὖν οὕτω δέδοκται καὶ οἷς μὴ, τοῦτοι οὐκ ἔστι κοινῆ βουλή, ἀλλὰ ἀνάγκη τοῦτοι ἀλλήλων καταφρονεῖν, ὀρῶντας τὰ ἀλλήλων βουλεύματα. οὐκ ὅτι δὴ οὖν καὶ οὐ εὕ μάλα, πότερον κοινονεῖς καὶ εὐνοοῦντες καὶ ἀρχὸμεθα ἐντεῦθεν βουλευόμενος, οὐδέποτε ὅρθως ἔχοντος οὔτε τοῦ ἀδικεῖν οὔτε τοῦ ἀνταδικεῖν οὔτε κακῶς πάσχοντα ἀμώνεσθαι ἀν—

25 τιδρῶντα κακῶς: ἢ ἀφλοστασία καὶ οὐ κοινονεῖς τῆς ἀρχῆς; ἐμοὶ μὲν γὰρ καὶ πάλαι οὕτω καὶ νῦν ἔτι δοκεῖ, εἴ οὐ δὲ εἴ πη ἀλλη δέδοκται, λέγε καὶ δίδασκε. εἴ δὲ ἐμένεις τοὺς πρόςθε, τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο ἄκουε.
ΚΡ. ἈΛΛ' ἐμμένω τε καὶ ξυνδοκεῖ μοι· ἄλλα λέγε.

ΣΩ. Δέγω δὴ αὐ τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο, μᾶλλον δ' ἔρωτ方位· πότερον δ' ἂν τις ὀμολογήσῃ τῷ δίκαιῳ δύνα ποιητέον ἢ ἐξαπατητέον;

ΚΡ. Ποιητέον.

XI. ΣΩ. Ἐκ τούτων δὴ ἀθρεῖ· ἀπιόντες ἐνθένδε 50 ἡμεῖς μὴ πελάςαντες τὴν πόλιν πότερον κακῶς τινας ποιούμεν, καὶ ταῦτα οὐς ἤκουσα δεῖ, ἢ οὔ; καὶ ἐμμένοις οἰς ὀμολογήσαμεν δικαίως οὖσιν ἢ οὔ;

ΚΡ. Οὐκ ἔχω, ὦ Σώκρατε, ἀποκρίνασθαι πρὸς ὑ ἐρωτάς· οὐ γὰρ ἐννοῶ.

ΣΩ. ἈΛΛ' φοις σκόπει. εἰ μέλλονσιν ἡμῖν ἐνθένδε ἐς τε ἀποδιδράςκειν, εἴδ' ὅπως δεῖ ὀνομάσαι τοῦτο, ἐλθόντες οἱ νόμοι καὶ τὸ κοινὸν τῆς πόλεος ἐπιστάντες 15 ἔρωτο· εἰπτε ἡμοί, ὦ Σώκρατε, τὸ ἐν νη ἔχεις ποιεῖν; ἄλλο τι ή τοῦτο τῷ ἔργῳ ἡ ἐπιχειρεῖς διανοεῖ τοῦς τε Ἠὔμων ἡμᾶς ἀπολέσαι καὶ ἔξωμασαν τὴν πόλιν τὸ σὸν μέρος; ἢ δοκεῖ σοι οἶνόν τε ἐτὶ ἐκείνην τὴν πόλιν εἶναι καὶ μὴ ἀνατετράφθαι, ἐν ἢ αἰ γενόμεναι δίκαιοι μηδὲν 20 ἁγχόνωσιν, ἀλλ' ὑπὸ ἰδιωτῶν ἀκυρὸν τὲ γίγνονται καὶ διαφθείρονται; τὸ ἔροῦμεν, ὦ Κριτῶν, πρὸς ταῦτα καὶ ἄλλα τοιαῦτα; πολλὰ γὰρ ἂν τις ἔχω ἄλλωσ τε καὶ ρήτωρ εἰπτεῖν ὑπὲρ τοῦτο τοῦ νόμου ἀπολλυμένου, ὡς τὰς δίκας τὰς δικασθέσας προστάτευε κυρίας εἶναι. 25 ἢ ἔροῦμεν πρὸς αὐτοὺς ὅτι ἡδικεῖ γὰρ ἡμᾶς ἡ πόλις καὶ οὖκ ὀρθῶς τὴν δίκην ἔκρινεν; ταῦτα ἢ τὸ ἔροῦμεν;

ΚΡ. Ταῦτα νη Δία, ὦ Σώκρατε.
ΧΙΙ. ΣΩ. Τί οὖν, ἂν εἴπωσιν οἱ νόμοι· ὁ Σώκρατες, ἢ καὶ ταύτα ὁμολόγητο ἡμῶν τε καὶ σοί, ἢ ἐμμένειν ταῖς δίκαιοις αἰς ἄν ἡ πόλει δικάζῃ; εἰ οὖν αὐτῶν θαυμάζοιμεν λεγόντων, ἵως ἂν εἴποιεν ὅτι, ὁ Σώκρατες, μὴ θαυμάζῃ τα τε λεγόμενα, ἀλλ' ἀποκρίνου, ἐπειδὴ καὶ εἰσθανα χρήσθαι τῷ ἐρωτῶν τε καὶ ἀποκρίνεσθαι. φέρε γάρ, τί ἐγκαλῶ ἡμῶν καὶ τῇ πόλει ἐπὶ-χειρεῖς ἡμᾶς ἀπολλύναι; οὐ πρῶτον μὲν σε ἐγεννήσαμεν ἡμεῖς καὶ δι' ἡμῶν ἐλάμβανεν τὴν μνημέα σου ὁ πατὴρ καὶ ἐφότευσέν σε; φράσον οὖν, τοῦτοις ἡμῶν, τοῖς νόμοις τοῖς περὶ τοὺς γάμους, μέμφει τι ὡς οὐ καλῶς ἔχουσιν; οὐ μέμφομαι, φαίην ἂν. ἀλλὰ τοῖς περὶ τὴν τοῦ γενομένου τροφῆν τε καὶ παιδείαν ἐν ἢ καὶ σοὶ ἐπαίδευσθης; ἢ οὐ καλῶς προσέταττον ἡμῶν οἱ ἐπὶ 15 τούτοις τεταγμένοι νόμοι, παραγγέλλοντες τῷ πατρὶ τῷ σῷ σε ἐν μουσική καὶ γυμναστικῇ παιδείᾳ; καλῶςς ἔφαν ἂν. εἰεν. ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἐγένος καὶ ἐξετράφης καὶ ἐπαίδευσθης, ἔχουσιν δὲ εἰσεῖν πρῶτον μὲν ὡς οὐχὶ ἡμέτερος ἦσαν καὶ ἔκγονος καὶ δοῦλος, αὐτός τε καὶ οἱ 20 σοὶ πρόγονοι; καὶ εἰ τοῦτ' οὕτως ἔχει, ἄρ' εἴς ἰσον οἶει ἐναὶ σοὶ τὸ δίκαιον καὶ ἡμῖν, καὶ ἄττ' ἂν ἡμεῖς σε ἐπιχειρῶμεν ποιεῖν, καὶ σοὶ ταύτα ἀντιποιεῖν οἶει δίκαιον εἶναι; η ἢ πρὸς μὲν ἁρα σοὶ τὸν πατέρα οὐκ ἐξ ἵσου ἢν τὸ δίκαιον καὶ πρὸς τὸν διστότην, εἰ σοι δὲν 25 ἐτύγχανεν, ὡστε, ἀπερ πάσχοις, ταύτα καὶ ἀντιποιεῖν, οὔτε κακῶς ἄκοινοντα ἀντιλέγειν οὔτε τυπτόμενον ἀντι-τύπτειν οὔτε ἄλλα τοιαύτα πολλά· πρὸς δὲ τὴν 61 πατρίδα ἄρα καὶ τοὺς νόμους ἔσται σοι, ὡστε, ἐὰν σε
ἐπιχειρῶμεν ἡμεῖς ἀπολλύναι δίκαιον ἡγούμενοι εἶναι, καὶ σὺ δὲ ἡμᾶς τοὺς νόμους καὶ τὴν πατρίδα καθ’ όσον δύνασαι ἐπιχειρήσεις ἀνταπολλύναι, καὶ φήσεις ταῦτα ποιῶν δίκαια πράττειν, ὁ τῇ ἄληθείᾳ τῆς ἀρετῆς ἐπιμελέμενος; ἢ οὕτως εἰ σοφὸς, ὦστε λέληθεν σε ὅτι ἡ μητρός τε καὶ πατρὸς καὶ τῶν ἄλλων προγόνων ἀπάντων τιμιώτερον ἐστὶν ἡ πατρίς καὶ σεμύοτερον καὶ βακχιότερον καὶ ἐν μελζονι μοίρα καὶ παρὰ θεοὶ καὶ παρ’ ἀνθρώπως τοῖς νοῦν ἔχουσι, καὶ σέβεσθαί δεῖ καὶ μᾶλλον ἅπεικεῖν καὶ θωπείειν πατρίδα χαλεπαίνουσαν 10 ἡ πατέρα, καὶ ἢ πείθειν ἢ ποιεῖν ἃ ἄν κελεύῃ, καὶ πάσχειν, εάν τι προστάτῃ παθεῖν, ἡσυχίαν ἀγοντα, εάν τε τύπτεσθαι εάν τε δεῖσθαι, εάν τε εἰς πόλεμον ἀγγειοσώμενον ἢ ἀποθανοῦμενον, ποιητέων ταύτα, καὶ τὸ δίκαιον οὕτως ἔχει, καὶ οὐχὶ ὑπεκτέον οὐδὲ ἐν ἀναχωρητέον οὐδὲ λειπτέον τὴν τάξειν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν πολέμῳ καὶ ἐν δικαστηρίῳ καὶ πανταχοῦ ποιητέον ἃ 20 ἄν κελεύῃ ἢ τόλμῃ καὶ ἢ πατρίς, ἢ πείθειν αὐτήν ἢ τὸ δίκαιον πέφυκε, βιάζεσθαι οὔτε οὐχὶ οὔτε ἐπειρά οὔτε πατέρα, πολύ δὲ τούτων ἢτι ἦττον τὴν πατρίδα; 20 τῇ φήσειν πρὸς ταύτα, ὃς Κρίτων; ἀληθὴ λέγειν τοὺς νόμους ἢ οὐ;

ΚΡ. Ἐμονε δοκεῖ.

XIII, ΣΩ. Σκότη τοῖνν, ὁ Σώκρατες, φαίνει ἀν ἵσως οἱ νόμοι, εἰ ἡμεῖς ταῦτα ἀληθῆ λέγομεν, ὦτι οὐ 28 δίκαια ἡμᾶς ἐπιχειρεῖς δράν ἃ νῦν ἐπιχειρείς. ἡμεῖς γὰρ σε γεννήσαντες, ἐκθέσαντες, παδεύσαντες, μεταδόντες ἀπάντων ἃν οἶοι τε ἡμεῖς καλῶν σοὶ καὶ τοῖς
άλλως πάσι πολίταις, ὃμως προσαγορεύομεν τῷ ἐξουσίαν ὁ πεποιηκέναι Ἀθηναίων τῷ βουλομένῳ, ἐπειδὰν δοκιμασθῇ καὶ ἢδε ταῦ ἐν τῇ πόλει πράγματα καὶ ἡμᾶς τούς νόμους, ὃ ἂν μὴ ἀρέσκομεν ἡμεῖς, ἐξείναι λαβόντα τὰ αὐτοῦ ἀπίνειν ὅποι ἂν βούληται. καὶ οὐδεὶς ἡμῶν τῶν νόμων ἐμποδούν ἐστὶν οὐδὲ ἀπαγορεύει, ἕτεροι τίς βούλεται ἡμῶν εἰς ἀποκίνησιν ἴναι, εἰ μὴ ἀρέσκομεν ἡμεῖς τις καὶ ἡ πόλις, ἐὰν τε μετοικεῖν ἀλλοσε ποι ἔλθων, ἴναι εἰκεῖσε ὅποι ἂν βούληται ἐχοντα τὰ αὐ- τοῦ. δὴ δ' ἂν ἡμῶν παραμεῖνῃ, ὅρων ἂν τρόπον ἡμεῖς Ε τάς τε δίκας δικάζομεν καὶ τάλλα τὴν πόλιν διουκοῦμεν, ἢδη φαμέν τούτων ὁμολογηκέναι ἐργον ἡμῶν ἄν ἡμεῖς κελεύομεν ποιήσειν ταῦτα, καὶ τῶν μη πειθόμενον τριχὶ φαμέν ἀδικεῖν, ὅτι τε γεννηταῖς οὕσιν ἡμῶν οὗ πειθεῖται, καὶ ὅτι τροφεύσῃ, καὶ ὅτι ὁμολογήσει ἡμῶν πείθεσθαι οὔτε πείθεται οὔτε πείθει ἡμᾶς, εἰ μὴ καλῶς τί ποιοῦμεν, προτιθέντων ἡμῶν καὶ οὐκ ἀγρίως ἑπιταττόντων 52 ποιεῖν ἄν κελεύομεν, ἀλλὰ ἑφίεντων δυοὶς θάτερα, ἡ πείθεις ἡμᾶς ἡ ποιεῖν, τοῦτων οὐδέτερα ποιεῖ.

XIV. Ταύτας δὴ φαμέν καὶ σέ, Σώκρατε, ταῖς αἰτίαις ἐνέξεσθαι, εἴπερ ποιήσεις ἄ ἐπιποιεῖς, καὶ οὐκ ἡμιστα Ἀθηναίων σέ, ἀλλ' ἐν τοῖς μάλιστα. εἰ οὖν ἐγώ ἐπιποιῆσαι διὰ τῇ δή; ἦσος ἂν μου δικαίως καθαπτισμένοι λέγοντες, ὅτι ἐν τοῖς μάλιστα Ἀθηναίων ἐγὼ 28 αὐτοῖς ὁμολογηκός τυγχάνω ταύτην τὴν ὁμολογίαν. φαίνει γὰρ ὅτι δ' Σώκρατες, μεγάλα ἡμῖν τούτων ἑκατομήγοροι εστίν, ὅτι σοι καὶ ἡμεῖς ἀρέσκομεν καὶ ἡ πόλις, οὐ γὰρ ἂν ποτε τῶν ἄλλων Ἀθηναίων ἀπάντησων.
διαφέροντως ἐν αὐτῇ ἐπεδήμεις, εἰ μὴ σοὶ διαφερόντως ἥρεσκε, καὶ οὐτ' ἐπὶ θεωρίαν πώποτ' ἐκ τῆς πόλεως ἐξῆλθες, [ὅτι μὴ ἀπαξ ἔις Ἰσθμόν,] οὔτε ἀλλοσε οὐδαμόσε, εἰ μὴ ποι στρατευσόμενος, οὔτε γάλλην ἀποδημιάν ἐποιήσω πῶποτε ὁσπέρ οἱ ἄλλοι ἀνθρώποι, οὐδ' ἐπιθυμία σε ἀλλης πόλεως οὔδὲ ἄλλων νόμων ἐλαβέν εἰδέναι, ἂλλα ἡμεῖς σοὶ ἱκανοὶ ἡμεν καὶ ἡ ἡμετέρα πόλις· οὔτω σφόδρα ἡμᾶς ἤροῦ καὶ ὁμολογεῖς καθ' ἡμᾶς πολιτεύσθαι τά τε ἄλλα καὶ παῖδας ἐν αὐτῇ ἐποιήσω ὡς ἀρεσκούσης σοι τῆς πόλεως. ἔτι 10 τοῦν ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ δικῇ ἐξῆν σοι φυγής τιμήσασθαι, εἰ ἐβουλοῦν, καὶ οὔτε νῦν ἀκούσης τῆς πόλεως ἐπιχειρεῖς, τότε ἐκούσης ποιήσαι. σὺ δὲ τότε μὲν ἐκαλλωτικοῦ ὡς οὐκ ἀγανακτῶν, εἰ δει τεθνάναι σε, ἄλλα ἦρο, ὡς ἐφήσα, πρὸ τῆς φυγῆς θάνατον· νῦν δὲ οὔτε ἐκείνους 15 τοὺς λόγους αἰσχύνει, οὔτε ἡμῶν τῶν νόμων ἐντρέπτει, ἐπιχειρῶν διαφθείραι, πράττεις τε ἀπερ ἁν δουλὸς φανλότατος πράξεις, ἀποδιδράσκεις ἐπιχειρῶν παρὰ τᾶς ξυνθήκας τε καὶ τᾶς ὁμολογίας, καθ' ἃς ἡμῶν ξυνέθου πολιτεύσθαι. πρῶτον μὲν οὖν ἡμῶν τοῦτο 20 αὐτὸ ἀπόκριναι, εἰ ἀληθῇ λέγομεν φάσκοντες σε ὁμολογηκέναι πολιτεύσθαι καθ' ἡμᾶς ἔργο, ἄλλ' οὖν λόγος, ἡ οὐκ ἀληθῆ. τῇ φόρμεν πρὸς ταύτα, ὁ Κρίτων; ἄλλο τι ἡ ὁμολογώμεν; ὑπὸ ΚΡ. Ἀνάγκη, ὁ Σέωκρατες. 25
χρόνος ἀναγκασθεὶς βουλεύσασθαι, ᾥλὶ ἐν ἔτεσιν ἐβδομήκοντα, ἐν οἷς ἔξην σοι ἀπιέναι, εἰ μὴ ἥρεσκομεν ἡμεῖς μηδὲ δικαιαὶ ἐφαίνοντό σοι αἱ ὁμολογίαι εἶναι. σὺ δὲ οὔτε Δακεδάμονα προηροῦ οὔτε Κρήτην, ὡς δὴ ἐκκαστοτε φης εὐνομεῖσθαι, οὔτε ἄλλην οὐδέμιαν τῶν Ἐλληνῶν πόλεων οὐδὲ τῶν βαρβαρῶν ἀλλὰ ἐλάτ-53 τῶ ἐξ αὐτής ἀπεδήμησας ἢ ὁ χωλοὶ τε καὶ τυφλοὶ καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι ἀνάπηροι· οὕτω σοι διαφερόντως τῶν ἄλλων Ἀθηναίων ἰχρεσκεν ἡ πόλις τε καὶ ἡμεῖς οἱ νόμοι δήλον 10 ὑπὲρ τὸν γὰρ ἐν πόλις ἀρέσκοι ἀνευ νόμων; νῦν δὲ δὴ ὁ εἰκὸν ἐμμένειν τοὺς ὁμολογημένους; εάν ἡμῖν γε πεθῇ, ὁ Σώκρατες· καὶ οὐ καταγέλαστὸς γε ἔσει ἐκ τῆς πόλεως ἐξελθόν.

ΧV. Σκόπει γὰρ δὴ, ταῦτα παραθάσ καὶ ἐξάμαρ-Β 15 τάκων τι τούτων τι ἁγαθὸν ἐργάσει σαυτῶν ἢ τοὺς ἐπιτηδείους τοὺς σαυτῶ; ὡς μὲν γὰρ κινδυνεύσωσιν γέ σου οἱ ἐπιτηδεῖοι καὶ αὐτοὶ φεύγειν καὶ στερηθῆναι τῆς πόλεως ἢ τὴν οὔσιαν ἀπολέσαι, σχεδὸν τι δήλον· αὐτὸς δὲ πρῶτον μὲν εἀν εἰς τῶν ἐγγύτατα τυφα πόλεων 20 ἑλθῃς, ἢ Θῆβαῖε ἢ Μέγαράδε — εὐνομοῦνται γὰρ ἁμφό- τεραι — πολέμου ἥξεις, ὁ Σώκρατες, τῇ τούτων πολυτελῇ, καὶ δοσυπέρ κήδονται τῶν αὐτῶν πόλεων, ὑπο- βλέψοντα σε διαφθορά ἀγομένου τῶν νόμων, καὶ βεβαιώσεις τοῖς δικασταῖς τὴν δόξαν ὅστε δοκεῖν 25 ὁρθῶς τὴν δικήν δικάσαι· δετις γὰρ νόμων διαφθορεῖς ἑστι, σφόδρα ποινα ὅποι δόξειν ἄν νέων γε καὶ ἀνοίητων ἀνθρώπων διαφθορεῖς εἶναι. πότερον οὖν φεύξει τὰς τε εὐνομουμένας πόλεις καὶ τῶν ἀνθρῶν τοὺς κοσμωτά-
τους; καὶ τὸ τοῦτο ποιοῦντι ἄρα ἄξιον σοι ξὴν ἐσται; ἢ πλησιάσεις τούτους καὶ ἀναισχυνθῆσεις διαλεγόμενος—τίνας λόγους, ὦ Σῶκρατε; ἢ οὔσπερ ἐνθάδε, ὦς ἡ ἀρετή καὶ ἡ δικαιοσύνη πλείστου ἄξιου τοῖς ἀνθρώποις καὶ τὰ νόμιμα καὶ οἱ νόμοι; καὶ οὐκ οὐεὶ ἄσχημον οὖν ὃς

D φανεῖσθαι τὸ τοῦ Σωκράτους πράγμα; οἴεσθαι γε χρῆ.

ἀλλ’ ἐκ μὲν τούτων τῶν τόπων ἀπαρεῖς, ἥξεις δὲ εἰς Θετταλίαν παρὰ τοὺς ξένους τοῖς Κρίτωνοι· ἐκεί γὰρ δὴ πλείστη ἄταξία καὶ ἀκολούθια, καὶ ἵσως ἀν ἢδεως σου ἀκούοιες ὡς γελοῖος ἐκ τοῦ δεσμωτηρίου ἀπεδε—10 δρασκῆς σκεῦην τέ τινα περιθέμενος, ἡ διφθέραν λαβὼν ἡ ἠλλα οἶα δὴ εἰσόθασιν ἐνσκευάζονται οἱ ἀποδιδρά-

σκοποῦσι, καὶ τὸ σχῆμα τὸ σαυτοῦ μεταλλάξας· δότι δὲ γέρων ἄνὴρ, σμικρὸν χρόνον τῷ βίῳ λοιποῦ ὑντος ὡς

ΕΤΟΙ ἐκόσι, ἐτόλμησας οὕτως αἰσχρῶς ἐπιθυμεῖν ξῆν,15 νόμους τοὺς μεγάλους παραβάς, οὐδεὶς δὲ ἔρει; ἵσως, ἄν μὴ τινα λυπῆς· εἰ δὲ μὴ, ἀκούσει, ὦ Σῶκρατης, πολλὰ καὶ ἀνάξια σαυτοῦ. ἐπερχόμενος δὴ βιῶσει πάντας ἀνθρώπους καὶ δουλεύον· τί ποιών ἢ εὐωχοῦ-

μενος ἐν Θετταλίᾳ, ὀσπερ ἐπὶ δεύτην ἀποδεδημηκώς 20 εἰς Θετταλίαν; λόγοι δὲ ἐκεῖνοι οἱ περὶ δικαιοσύνης τε

54 καὶ τῆς ἀλλης ἀρετῆς που ἢμιν ἐσονται; ἀλλὰ δὴ τῶν παῖδων ἐνεκα βούλει ξῆν, ἓνα αὐτοὺς ἐκθρέψης καὶ παιδεύσης; τί δὲ; εἰς Θετταλίαν αὐτοὺς ἀγαγῶν θρέψεις τε καὶ παιδεύσεις, ξένους ποιήσας, ἓνα καὶ 25 τοῦτο ἀπολαύσωσιν, ἢ τοῦτο μὲν οὐ, αὐτοῦ δὲ τρεφό-

μενοι σοῦ ξένων βέλτιον θρέψεσαι καὶ παιδεύσοσαι, μὴ ξυνόντος σοῦ αὐτοὺς; οἱ γὰρ ἐπιτήδειοι οἱ σοι ἐπι-
μελήσονται αὐτῶν. πότερον εὰν εἰς Θετταλίαν ἀπο-
δημήσῃς ἐπιμελήσονται, εὰν δὲ εἰς Ἀιδοῦ ἀποδη-
mήσῃς οὐχὶ ἐπιμελήσονται; ἐπερ γέ τι θέλεις αὐτῶν ἐστι τῶν σου φασκόντων ἐπιτηδείων εἶναι, οἶσθαι ὅγε χρή.

XVI. Ἀλλʼ, ὁ Σώκρατες, πειθόμενος ἦμῖν τοὺς
σωσί τροφεῦσι μήτε παῖδας περὶ πλεονος ποιοῦ μήτε
τὸ ζῆν μήτε ἄλλο μηδὲν πρὸ τοῦ δικαλοῦ, ἵνα εἰς
"Αιδοῦ ἔλθων ἔχῃς πάντα ταῦτα ἀπολογήσασθαι
τοὺς ἕκει ἀρχουσιν ὁπότε γὰρ ἐνθάδε σοι φαῦνει
ταῦτα πράττοντι ἄμεινον εἶναι οὐδὲ δικαίωτερον οὐδὲ
ὅσιώτερον, οὐδὲ ἄλλο τῶν σῶν οὖν οὐδεὶς, ὁπότε ἐκεῖσε
ἀφικομένοι ἄμεινον ἑσταὶ. ἀλλὰ νῦν μὲν ἡδυκημένος
ἀπει, εὰν ἀπῆς, οὐχ ὑφ ἡμῶν τῶν νόμων ἀλλὰ ἢπὸ ἀνθρώπων· εάν δὲ ἐξελθησι οὕτως αἰσχρῶς ἀνταδική-
σας τε καὶ ἀντικακουργήσας, τὰς σαυτὸν ὁμολογιας
tε καὶ ἐννήμας τας πρὸς ἡμᾶς παραβᾶς καὶ κακὰ
ἐργασάμενος τούτους οὐς ἥκιστα ἔδει, σαυτὸν τε καὶ
φίλους καὶ πατρίδα καὶ ἡμᾶς, ἥμεις τὲ σοι χαλεπανοῦ-
μεν ἐστιν, καὶ ἐκεῖ οἱ ἡμέτεροι ἀδελφοὶ οἱ ἐν "Αιδοῦ
νόμοι οὐκ εἰμενῶς σε ὑποδέχονται, εἰδῶτες ὅτι καὶ
ἡμᾶς ἐπεχειρήσας ἀπολέσαι τὸ σὸν μέρος. ἀλλὰ μὴ
σε πεῖσῃ Κρίτων ποιεῖν ἃ λέγει μᾶλλον ἢ ἥμεις.

XVII. Ταῦτα, ὁ φίλε ἐταίρε Κρίτων, εῦ ἰσθι
τι ἐγὼ δοκῶ ἀκοίνειν, ὡσπερ οἱ κορυθαντίωτες τῶν
αὐλῶν δοκοῦσιν ἀκοίνειν, καὶ ἐν ἔμοι αὐτῇ ἡ ἡχὴ
tοῦτων τῶν λόγων βομβεῖ καὶ ποιεῖ μὴ δύνασθαι
tῶν ἄλλων ἀκοίνειν. ἀλλὰ ἰσθι, ὅσα γε τὰ νῦν ἔμοι
δοκοῦντα, ἐὰν λέγης παρὰ ταῦτα, μάτην ἐρεῖς. ὡμως
μέντοι εἰ τι οὐει πλέον ποιήσεων, λέγε.

ΚΡ. Ἀλλ', ὁ Σώκρατες, οὐκ ἔχω λέγειν.

Ε ῾Σ. Ἐὰ τοίνυν, ὁ Κρίτων, καὶ πρᾶττομεν ταύτῃ,
ἐπειδή ταύτῃ ὁ θεὸς ὑψηλεῖται.
NOTES.
δοκούντα, ἐὰν λέγης παρὰ ταῦτα, μάτην ἔρεις. ὅμως μέντοι εἰ τι οἱ οὐκ πλέον ποιήσειν, λέγε.

ΚΡ. ἈΛΛ', ὁ Σώκρατες, οὐκ ἔχω λέγειν.

Ε ὍΣ. Ἡπων οἱ Κρίτων, καὶ πρῶτῳμεν ταῦτῃ,
 ἐπειδὴ ταῦτῃ ὁ θεὸς ύβηγείται.
NOTES.
NOTES.

APOLOGIA SOCRATIS.

A. Line 1. ὁ τι... κατηγόρων. In what manner you have been affected by my accusers, i.e., by their harangues, which had immediately preceded the defense of Socrates. μέν following ὁ τι contrasts the clauses; following ἒμείς it would contrast the pronouns ἒμείς and ἐγώ. Since πεπάθηκε denotes the receiving of an action, it is followed by ἔπαι, as if it were a passive verb. G. 165, N. 1; H. A. 820.* So ἐν αὐτῶν just below; and in like manner aō in Latin. The accusers or prosecutors of Socrates were three, Anytus, 18 B., Meletus, 19 B., and Lycon, 23 E. ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι. The trial of Socrates took place before the Heliæan, the most numerous and popular, and, at that time, by far the most important court at Athens. It consisted in all of 6,000 Athenian citizens (though they usually administered justice in sections of 500 each), and being also often thronged by spectators from the populace, its members might well be addressed by the same honorable title as the members of the popular assembly, ἄνδρες Ἀθηναίοι, instead of the more distinctive title ἄνδρες δικασταὶ. Socrates uses the latter in addressing those judges who voted for his acquittal in the concluding paragraph of his defense, capp. xxxi–xxxiii, and gives his reason for it at 40.

The 6,000 Heliasts were a majority of the adult citizens of Athens. The name ἡλιαῖα is connected in root with δάλα, which in the Dorian states was the common term for an assembly of the people, and these Attic juries, even in their judicial functions, represented the people. Cf. Wachsmuth’s His. Ant., Sec. 47, Meier’s Attic Process, Smith’s Dict. of Antiq., and Grote’s Hist. of Greece, vol. iv., chap. 31; also Mahaffy’s Primer of Old Greek Life, Secc. 98–101. On the compliment implied in the title Ἀθηναῖος, cf. 29 D. 2. δ’ οὖν. But then, at any rate, affirming the truth of the following statement, notwithstanding his ignorance about that in the previous clause. 3. ἐλέγου, sc. δεύν, literally, to want little = almost. G. 263; H. A. 743, b. Cf. ἐλέγου δεύν, 22, Α. ἐμαυτοῦ ἐπελαθόμην, forgot myself, i.e., my true character. 4. ὡς ἐπος εἰςεύν limits οὐδὲν εἰρήκασιν, and is designed to qualify, or apologize for, that otherwise absolute negation of all truth in his accusers: they have said, so to speak, nothing that is true at least. Cf. Stallbaum in loc., and Gorg. 450 B, also Woolsey, ibid. 5. αὐτῶν ἐν ἐθάνατοσ, etc. One thing of theirs I most wondered at of the many falsehoods which they stated, viz., this. αὐτῶν relates to persons and is the gen. of the possessor, while τῶν πολλῶν is the partitive gen. after the same word ἐν. Cf. Stallbaum ad loc.

B. 6. χρή. χρίπ, impf., has the better MSS. authority, but χρή, pres., gives the better, not to say the only suitable meaning, and is adopted by Cron, Wagner, and other recent editors. 8. μὴ ἀλοχονθήνατε. μή rather than οὐ regularly accompanies the inf., because the inf., from its very nature, usually denotes a mere conception: that they should not be ashamed. ἐπί = because. 9. ἐργῇ, by the fact, the actual trial. 9. μηδ’ ἐπωττοῖον. Observe the emphasis: not even in any way whatever. 10. αὐτῶν, of them, or in them. Cf. note on αὐτῶν ἐν ἐθάνατοσ above. 11. εἰ μὴ ἄρα = nisi forte, unless perchance. Often used ironically: unless forsooth. 12. λέγειν depends on δεύν = powerful (literally, terrible) to speak. εἰ . . . λέγοντων may be rendered, if they mean this. 13. οὐ κατὰ τῶντων, not after their example. He would acknowledge, that he was an orator according to that definition, but not
according to their exemplification of it, since they, as he proceeds to say, had spoken little or nothing that was true. 14. ἂν τι ἢ οὔδεὶν = little or nothing, next to nothing. Cf. Herod. III, 140, ἀναβεβηκε δὲ ἂν τι ἢ οὐκεὶς καὶ παρ ἡμῖν αὐτῶν. 15. πᾶσαν τὴν αἰθέσεων, truth throughout, differing slightly from τὴν πᾶσαν ἀθέσεων. G. 142, 4, N. 5; H. A. 672. Cf. Xen. Mem. 4, 8, 9: τὴν δικαίαν ἀθέσειντα εἰσέν. 16. οὐ μὲν ου δι᾽ ἐνι οὕσαν. Not, however, by any means. Athenians, speeches rhetorically decked out as theirs were in choice words and phrases, nor carefully arranged in ornate periods, but you shall hear facts, stated without premeditation in the words which chance to occur to me. There is the most perfect rhetoric in Plato's presentation of this defense of Socrates. The conversational style is everywhere admirably kept up. 17. δοσυχεην τούτων, so. λόγοι ήσαν. In such comparative clauses, the noun may take the case of the preceding noun, or may be put in the nominative. λόγοι is the object of ἀκούσεσθε, which is expressed in the last instead of the first clause, in order to declare emphatically and affirmatively what they shall hear. According to Stallbaum, ὁνόματα = singula nomina, ῥηματα = nomina una cum predicato. In the technical language of Greek grammar, ὁνόματα = nouns, ῥηματα = verbs.

O. 19. πιστεύω γὰρ, k.τ.λ., in this connection implies, that just sentiments do not need rhetorical ornaments. 1. δήσου, as usual, is somewhat playful = methinks, to be sure. 2. τῇ δέ τῇ ἡλικίᾳ, est: mihi homini id estatis—verbum abstractum loco verbi concreti positum. Stallb. Socrates was 70 years old at the time of his trial. Of. D. πλάτοςντι takes the gender of μερακιώ, or of ἐμοι, implied in τῇ δέ τῇ ἡλικίᾳ, and implies more or less of fictitious and false elaboration. It is to be remembered that at this time the successful speeches in the Athenian courts were usually prepared by rhetoricians, and delivered as if their own by the parties. Lysias prepared scores of such orations, and wrote one for Socrates, which he declined to use. eis ὑμᾶς εἰσινεῖαι, to come into your presence, your dicastery, or your assembly. 4. παρέματι. Ruhnken, as cited and approved by Stallbaum, says: παρήμι = admitto, παρέματι = ad me admitti volo, i.e., precor, deprecor. 6. Kai
Both in the agora at the counters, and elsewhere. Of Mat. 21, 12: τὰς τραπέζας τῶν κολλυβιστῶν. τραπέζα in modern Greek = bank.

D. 8. ἔχει γὰρ οἴνῳι. For the fact is thus, sc. as follows. Then follows the explanatory clause, which, as usual, is without any connective (asyndeton). 9. ἀναβιβάζον, sc. the βῆμα, or stand of the accused. The accuser also had his βῆμα or elevated stand in the court. 10. τῆς ἐνθάδε λέξεως. The language of judicial proceedings. For the gen. see G. 182, 1; H. A. 756. 11. δωσπερ εἰν ἀν. This ἀν belongs to the apodosis with ξυνεψακετε, where it is repeated (δηποῦ ἀν). It stands with δωσπερ to intimate at the outset (by way of anticipation), that the example is a mere supposition, and then, after the intervening protasis with εἰ, it is repeated with the verb or some other important word of the apodosis. G. 212, 2; H. A. 864. τῆς ὁρίος = in fact. So very often, especially in Plato. ξίνος, not an Athenian but still a Greek, who might be understood in the Athenian courts, but would speak in the dialect, tone, and manner of his native country. Compare Schleiermacher's note ad loc. 13. δωσπερ. G. 151, N. 2; H. A. 628.

A. 18. Καὶ δὴ καὶ νῦν, k. r. l., = so also now, i. e., in my case at present, I make this request of you, a reasonable one as to me it certainly seems. For the personal form δοκῶ, instead of the impersonal δοκεῖ, see H. A. 944. The γε emphasizes the clause, not the pronoun, which therefore takes the unemphatic form μοι. Al. ὁς γ' ἐμοί. 16. aitô τῶν, this very thing, i. e., this single point, viz., whether I speak what is just or not. Here the demonstrative (enforced by the intensive, of which combination Plato is particularly fond) prepares the way for a clause, as it does above for the infinitive. 18. ἡσυγή = the virtue, being in the predicate, omits the article in Greek, but requires it in English. G. 141, N. 8; H. A. 669. 20. δίκαιος εἰμι instead of δίκαιον εἰμι with the acc. and infinitive; another example of the personal for the impersonal construction.

B. 24. πολλὰ ἡδὴ ἡμι explains πάλαι, which is altogether indefinite: for some time, many years now. πάλαι. The
Clouds of Aristophanes was put on the stage 27 years before the time of this trial. Cf. note 19, C, p. 46, l. 15. 26. τοὺς δυμφι Ἀντυτ. Anytus and his associates, sc. Meletus and Lycon. For this use of δυμφι see Léxicon. Anytus is named, as being the most popular and at the same time the most hostile of the three prosecutors of Socrates. He was a man of large fortune but loose principles. He gained the favor of the people as a leader of the exiles at Phyle in the time of the Thirty Tyrants, and having taken offense at Socrates partly on personal and partly on professional grounds (cf. 23, E), induced Meletus and Lycon to join with him in a prosecution. According to Diogenes Laertius (2, 38, 39), the Athenians repented of their condemnation of Socrates and put Meletus to death, and sent Anytus and Lycon into banishment. Grote disbelieves and denies this. His. of Gr., vol. viii, chap. 68. Cf. Stallb. and Smith’s Dict. of Biog. and Mythol., Anytus. 27. τὸ ... παπαλαμβάνωτες, who taking the mass of you from your boyhood, sc. as it were, under their instruction. 1. ἦσε ἔστι, κ.τ.λ., saying, there is one Socrates, etc. The introductory particle appropriate to an indirect quotation is followed by a direct quotation, and must be omitted in English. σοφὸς ἀνήρ, a philosopher. Compare the Latin sapiens. σοφός, as well as σοφιστής and φιλόσοφος, was more or less a term of reproach with the ignorant multitude. Cf. Grote, His. Gr., vol. viii, chap. 67, Eng. ed. 2. τὰ τε μετέωρα φρονιστής. φρονιστής governs the acc. as retaining the active force of φρονιζεῖν. G. 158, N. 3; H. A. 718. 3. τὸν ἡμερο... ποιῶν; making the weaker the stronger argument, or, as it is often expressed, making the worse appear the better reason. Cf. Cic. Brut. 8: docere quemadmodum causa inferior dicendo fieri superior possit. The Sophists were open to this charge, as the physical philosophers were to that of inquiring into everything in the heavens above and in the earth beneath; and the art of the enemies of Socrates consisted in arraying against him the prejudices which the public mind already cherished, with greater or less reason, against them—in short, in confounding him with them, though he was, in fact, diametrically opposed to them both in faith and
in philosophy. Cf. below, 28, D: τὰ κατὰ πάντων τῶν φιλοσοφοῦντων πρόξειρα ταῦτα λέγουσιν.

O. 5. οἱ δὲ δεῖκον as pred.; those before mentioned as δεῖκον. G. 141, N. 8; H. A. 669, a. 6. οἰδὲ δὲ καὶ μὴ τοῦτο, do not even believe in the existence of the gods. This, it is well known, was one point in the indictment against Socrates. Cf. Xen. Mem. 1, 1, 1; also below, 24 B. The physical philosophers of the age afforded a plausible, not to say just, occasion for this charge, since they, for the most part, dispensed with all efficient causes, and either failed to recognize the Deity, or else confounded him with his works. The systems, if not the men, were chargeable with atheism or pantheism. Cicero ascribes to Anaxagoras the first distinct recognition of the divine existence and agency, as an intelligent cause, in the universe.

7. ἐνεργα ... ἐν δὲ καὶ = then ... still further also; or in the second place ... in the third place also. 8. σαύρα τῆς ἡμερας. Explained by παῖες δύτες, κ. τ. λ. 9. ἐν ... ἐπιτυχέοντες. ἐν η, where you would have been most likely to believe. G. 220, 2, N. 2. 11. ἑρῆμην καθηγοροῦντες, accusing me in my absence. The form of expression (ἑρῆμην, so. δίκη) is derived from a suit at law, in which one of the parties does not appear. ἀπεχράσει = absolutely, really, used especially by Plato and comic writers to affirm the improbable or unreasonable. See below, 18 D. 12. δὲ πάντων ἄριστωρον, but what is most unreasonable of all is the fact that. Sometimes the δὲ also, as well as τοῦτο ἐστιν, is omitted, thus leaving the following clause in direct apposition, as we often do in English. 13. εἰ ... τυχόντα ἐν implies no uncertainty: εἰ = in case, or when. The allusion is particularly to Aristophanes, who is named below, 19, C; though Cratinus, Ameipsias, Eupolis, and other comic poets, ridiculed Socrates. Cf. Stallb. ad loc.

D. 14. διότι δὲ, another more inaccessible class. ἀρέσχομαι καὶ ἀρεσκόμεθα = with envy and calumny. The part. denotes means or manner, and may often be rendered with. See Lex. It belongs properly to ἀρεσκόμαι, and is extended to ἀρέσχομαι by a species of zeugma. ἀντικροβοῦν. The impf. expresses the persistence of the persuasion and the growth of the calumny. 15. οἱ δὲ introduces another class of persuaders,
as if of μὲν had preceded with φθάνω ... χρόμενοι, the one being the envious and calumniuous, the other those who were really persuaded in their own minds of the guilt of Socrates. 16. ἄρωσαν, most inaccessible (ἀ and πόρος), most difficult to approach and convince. Cf. Lysis, 223, B: ἄροσαν προσφί-ρεισαν. 17. ἀναβαζόσασθαι ... ἐνακόατοι, to make ... come up hither, i. e., summon him to appear in court. Observe the force of the middle voice: for my benefit, cf. ἐξελέοςα. 19, A. αὐτῶν is partitive genitive = any of them, separated from οὖν for emphasis. 18. ἐσπέρ ... ἀνακριβομένου, to fight with shadows, as it were, in defending myself, and also to cross-examine while no one replies. The participle and the infinitive in each part form a complex idea, and then the two parts or ideas are connected together by τε καί. Thus is the apparent confusion of participles and infinitives explained by Fischer. See his note ad loc. 20. Ἀνάφθιος = esteem, hold, or deem; so Bekker, Ast, Stallbaum; or, as Wagner, grant, assume.

E. 23. ἰκείνους, those, so. earlier and more remote accusers. ἰκείνος refers to the more remote idea, though, as in this instance, it be to the latter word or clause. 26. Εἰπ. Well, be it so. For the root and signification of this particle see Lex. Schleiermacher: ωλ. It marks the establishment and completion of what goes before and the transition to another topic. 27. ἐξελέος. Cf. note on ἀναβαζόσασθα, 18, D. τὴν διαβολήν ... χρόνῳ. The calum- ny (misconception produced by calumny) which you have en- tertained a long time, this to eradicate in so short a time. τούτῳ οὖν γενέομαι, so. the eradication of false impressions from the minds of his judges. It is still further explained by καὶ πλὴν ... ἀπολογοῦμεν, and to accomplish something by my defense. On πλὴν τι ποιεῖν = proficere aliquid, to get on or forward with a thing, to gain something by it; see Lexi- con.

A. 2. εἰ τι ἄμεινον, κ.τ.λ. The sequel shows that he not only doubted whether it was best for him to be acquitted, but that he did not desire to live by any such means as were likely to influence his judges to acquit him. He makes his
defense rather as a matter of form in obedience to the laws, than with the expectation or desire of success.

B. 7. Ἀναλάβωµεν ἐκ δρᾶς. Let us take up anew, from the beginning. He has adverted to the charge in general terms before (18, B); but here he would resume its examination from the first, as if he had not before mentioned it. 8. ἡ ἐµὴ διαβολὴ, the false opinion of me. ἐµὴ = objective gen. Cf. εὐνοία τῇ σῇ, good will to you, Gorg. 486, Α.; G. 147, N. 1; H. A. 694. 9. με ἐγράψατο τὴν γραφὴν ταύτην. For the force of the middle voice, see G. 199, N. 3; H. A. 816, 6. For the double acc. (of the cognate signification γραφῆς, and the direct object με), see G. 159, N. 4; H. A. 725. Render: has preferred against me this indictment. γραφὴ is a public indictment for a criminal offense; δίκη is applicable either to public or private causes, but when used in contradistinction to γραφὴ, it denotes a private suit. 10. δοσολογοῦ, κ.τ.λ. Therefore just as it is customary to read the bill of indictment presented by formal accusers, so must we read theirs. ἀνωμοσία is primarily the oath of a party at law, and then the bill or form of indictment. 12. περιπεριβάλεται, is over-busy, excessively curious, is a busy-body.

C. 14. τοιαῦτα τίς, something like this. He does not profess to give it exactly. Cf. Xen. Mem. 1, 1, 1. 15. ἐν τὴν Ἀριστοφάνου κοµῳδία. The Clouds, perhaps the master-piece of Aristophanes, in which he introduces Socrates, as the principal character, sitting in a basket in the air, and uttering declamations as windy as his position. Very different explanations are given of the motives which induced the poet to treat the moral philosopher with such palpable injustice. Some have supposed that he was influenced by personal hostility, and further instigated and suborned by the enemies of Socrates. But this supposition does not accord either with the comparatively respectful tone in which Aristophanes elsewhere alludes to Socrates (cf. Birds, 1280, 1554; Frogs, 1487), or with the mild and even complimentary terms in which Plato speaks of Aristophanes here and elsewhere. Had Plato regarded Aristophanes as a bitter personal enemy of Socrates, or as having occasioned his master's death, he never would
have introduced the poet and the philosopher conversing on such friendly terms as in the Symposium, still less furnished for the poet’s tomb such an epitaph as the following: “Jupiter, wishing to find an asylum for all the graces, found the soul of Aristophanes.” Others have thought that Aristophanes really mistook the true character of Socrates, confounded his teachings with those of the Sophists, whom he opposed, and so in sober earnest visited upon his head the storm of indignation which was merited by the class, and by him as its leader and ablest representative. But, to say nothing of the want of discernment which is thus imputed to Aristophanes, the matter was not viewed in so serious a light either by Plato (as the considerations just mentioned suffice to show), or by Socrates, who, if we may credit the traditions, was present when the piece was performed, and stood forth before the audience that he might be recognized as “a host who furnished a large company an agreeable entertainment.” There was enough of general resemblance between him and the Sophists in their talkative habits, the subjects on which they conversed, and the manner in which they reasoned (especially as he often met them on their own ground, and refuted them with their own weapons), to give plausibility to the representation of him as an arch-sophist. Doubtless also the ultra-conservative poet viewed the speculating and revolutionizing spirit of the Socratic philosophy with not a little of the same fear and aversion with which he regarded the demoralizing instructions of the Sophists. Moreover, Socrates stood in the most friendly relations to Alcibiades and Euripides, both of whom, as arch-innovators though in different spheres, were subjects of unsparing ridicule and reproof in the comedies of Aristophanes. So much of objective reality we may suppose lay at the basis of the representation which is made of Socrates in the Clouds. The rest is comic exaggeration and extravagance got up purposely, but not maliciously, for the amusement of the πολυγέλου Αθηναίοι. And surely never was comic furnished with a more fruitful theme for inextinguishable laughter than the grotesque person, outlandish dress, and singular gait of Socrates, with which friend and foe, Athenian and stranger, all had become
familiar as he stood and stared, or started and ran through the streets, or fascinated some and bored and vexed others in the shops and the market-places. The intent of the piece and its author may have been misunderstood by some, and it may have had some effect in preparing the way for the prosecution, which it suggests. But it is referred to in the Apology as an illustration of popular prejudices of long standing, rather than as a cause of the present indictment. And the utter failure of the Clouds to make any serious impression on the popular mind against Socrates is seen, not only in its want of success at the time (for it gained no favor and won no prize), but also in the fact that a period of twenty-four years intervened between its exhibition and the condemnation of the Moral Philosopher. Cf. Stallb. ad loc.; Smith’s Dict. of Biog. 16. περιφερόμενον, sc. in a basket (κρεμάσθρα), cf. the Clouds, 225 seqq. 17. δεροβατείν. When asked what he is doing, Socrates replies in the play: δεροβατῶ καὶ περιφρονῶ τὸν ἡλιον. 18. δὲ ... περὶ ἐπαινῶ. Observe the anastrophe and the position of περὶ, as in English: which I know nothing about. Socrates, as represented in the Phædo, suggests that he had in early life been a student of physics, 96 A. Xenophon quotes him as disparaging such studies, Mem. i, 1, 11. 19. λέγω, sc. the foregoing = I say this. ἀγιμάτων governs ἐπιστήμην. The Socratic irony is manifest in this clause, and in the following, which is parenthetical: let me not, by any means, be prosecuted by Meletus on so weighty a charge! sc. as undervaluing this kind of knowledge.

D. 22. διὰ γὰρ, κ.τ.λ. But I must speak, for, etc. 23. αὐτῶν ὑμῶν τοῦ πολλοῦ. The greater part of yourselves. 24. διδὰσκεῖν τε καὶ φράσειν, hysteron proteron. With φράσειν, διδασκείσ is to be supplied from the accusative. 28. ἐκ τοῦτον, Al. τοῦτον. The Greeks very often employ the plural of the demonstrative in reference to a foregoing clause or single idea, where we should use the singular. Render: from this.

H. A. 635. 1. περὶ ἐμοῦ is placed before ἄ for emphasis = which the many say about me. 8. τοῦτον, the charges in the foregoing context—inquiring into things above, making the
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worse the better reason, etc. οἴδε γ' εἰ, κ.τ.λ. We should expect οἴνοε answering to the οἴνοε in the previous clause, but οἴδε γε is more emphatic and therefore more appropriate to introduce a new topic of special importance. It is made still more emphatic by being repeated before τοῦτο ἄρσεν. 5. χρηματὰ πράττομα. This charge also confounded Socrates with the Sophists, who amassed large sums of money for tuition. It is denied by Xenophon, Mem. i, 2, 60.

Ε. 5. ἔτει καὶ τοῦτο, κ.τ.λ. The Attics use ἔτει often like γάρ = for; and sometimes, like quum in Latin, it may be well rendered although. Socrates treats this charge, just as he did the other, ironically, representing it as a very beautiful and honorable thing, if one were only wise and capable of doing it; and yet he feels constrained to deny it simply because it is not true. 7. Γοργίας τε ὑ Αιοτίνως, κ.τ.λ. He enumerates several of the most popular Sophists and rhetoricians who had enriched themselves by teaching the sons of the wealthy at Athens. They were all foreigners. For Gorgias of Leontini, a city of Sicily, cf. Diog. Laer. 9, 52; Cic. de Orat. i, 22; Brut. 8; Plat. Gorg., Hip., and Protag. For Prodicus of Ceos, one of the Cyclades Islands, cf. Cic. Brut. 8; Xen. Mem. n, 1, 21 seqq.; Plat. Protag. and Cratyl. For Hippias of Elis, a city of the Peloponnesus, cf. Cic. de Orat. 32, Brut. 8; Plat. Hip. and Minos. See also Smith’s Dict. Biog. and Mythol., and Grote’s His. Gr., vol. viii, chap. 67. Grote defends the Sophists as a class with great learning and eloquence. Doubtless they have been condemned too much in the gross—with too indiscriminate severity. But they belonged to an age which was losing its faith, and had the misfortune to be the recognized teachers of the people, with no instruction to offer which could reach the real difficulty. So, though there were doubtless wise and good men among them, it was not unnatural that they were charged with exerting an influence hostile to morals and religion, nor that they received the censure which Plato everywhere attaches to them. 10. τοῦς νέους would regularly be the object of πείθων, depending on οἷσι τ’ ἔτιον, instead of which, however, by a singular anacoluthon, we have πείθουσι. H. A. 1063. It should be ob-
served, that Plato abounds in such irregular constructions and unexpected changes, doubtless to keep up the appearance of a colloquial style appropriate to the dialogue, and which is no less appropriate to the plain talk which Socrates promises to hold with his judges in this Apology. The plural verb with ἵκαςτος is not unnatural. H. A. 609, a. πολιτῶν is partitive genitive after ὁ: who have the opportunity to associate gratuitously with whosoever they please of their fellow-citizens. 13. πρωσευδέια: and besides (paying them money) to feel under obligation to them.

A. ἔτρει introduces an illustration = γάρ, for, cf. note, 20 19, E. Schleiermacher renders it by the German ja. 14. ἄν... ἐπισεμοῦρα, of whose sojournings here I lately became aware. The reference is to Eunus, the poet and Sophist, as appears below, B. He was a native of the island Paros. He is mentioned in the Phædo, 60, D, and Phædrus, 267, A. Callias, the son of Hipponicus, who informed Socrates of Eunus’ stay in the city, was proverbially rich (ὁ πλούσιος, Plutarch), and his lavish expenditure upon the Sophists is often referred to. He in fact utterly squandered his vast property and died in poverty. Protag. 814, B, C; Xen. Symp. 1, 5; Aristoph. Birds, 285. See also Boeckh’s Pub. Econ. Athens, vol. ii, p. 242. 20. ἐμελλεν is assimilated to the tense on which it depends, the thought being still under the influence of the unfulfilled condition. H. A. 919, b.

B. 21. ἀπερίπ. Acc. of specification, or more accurately a cognate acc. with the adjective: in the virtue (or excellence) becoming them. So, in a similar illustration, Xenophon makes Socrates use the word δικαῖος of a horse and an ox, that is obedient to his proper law and trained for his appropriate work. Socrates used such illustrations, drawn from the lower animals and the common affairs of life, till they were threadbare and almost offensive, at least to those who could not but feel their force as directed against themselves. The “Great Teacher” abounded in this method of instruction. 22. ἢν εἰς odhomes. And this (overseer) would be, etc. 24. τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης τῆς καὶ πολιτικῆς, that which is appropriate to man and also to
the state. 1. περε μνῶν = some $88. This was a small sum in comparison with the tuition fees which Protagoras, Gorgias, and some others exacted, who received 100 minæ. With the Greek μνᾶ compare the Latin mina and our word money. 2. ἵμακάρω: the aor. is used to express the momentary action as having just taken place, or perhaps it would be better to say, without reference to time. It is so employed especially in the vividness of the drama. M. and T., 19, N. 5; II. A. 842.

C. 3. ἐμελῶς, according to Stallbaum, has a double application to the style of teaching and to the price of tuition = so properly (literally, in tune), so excellently in both respects. He says, there is great urbanity in the expression. If Socrates had said, οὖν εἰμελῶς, he would have too clearly ridiculed Evenus and so Callias. He used, therefore, a word by which, while he seemed to praise Evenus, he yet severely censured both his levity and the avarice of the other Sophists. It is used of a moderate or reasonable price in the Laws, 776, B, 760, A. 5. ἀλλ' οὗ γάρ, κ.τ.λ. The ellipsis is obvious: but I can not thus pride myself, for, etc. γάρ in such connection may be rendered really, certainly: but I really do not know. Cf. H. A. 1050, d. 6. ἰπολάβοι. Compare our take up. 7. οὖν τι ἐστι πράγμα, your business, what is it? The emphasis is on your: you deny any acquaintance with the profession of the naturalist who inquires into the secrets of the universe, or of the Sophist who teaches, and is well paid for teaching, the art of persuasion; what then, Socrates, is your business, profession, or pursuit? 9. οὐδὲν περαιτέρων, nothing more or other, nihil aliud. Stallbaum renders: nihil curiosius. έπερα, then, in that case, I suppose so much talk and discussion would not have arisen, as have arisen. γέγονεν stands where Ἀν ἐγένετο would regularly have been used, to denote that this bruit has actually arisen. Cron suggests that the conditional idea can not be contained in σοῦ . . . πραγμα-τευκόμενον, for we should not then have οὐδέν. He translates: It is inconceivable that such a report should have arisen about you alone who are no more busy than others.

D. 18. τι πορ', quid tandem. In questions, pori, like
tandem, indicates surprise, wonder, impatience, or some other lively emotion. It is here retained in the indirect question, just as it would have been used in the direct, as expressive of the wonder of the inquirer. 14. το τε δνομα και την διαβολην, both the name, sc. of a wise man, and the calumny connected with it. 16. ει μνητου ιστη, κ.τ.λ. Be assured, however, I will tell you the whole truth. Observe the omission of ὅτε. So in Crit. 54, D, ἀλλὰ ἵστη, δια νε, κ.τ.λ., and elsewhere after ει ιστη. 17. ἀλλ' ἦ. H. A. 1046, 2 c; cf. also Jelf, 778, ob. 1. 18. ποιαν δὴ σοφιαν ταίνην, pray what sort of wisdom this. Cf. Laches, 194 D. Ἡμ. Καὶ μοι δοκεί ἄνηρ σοφιαν τινα την ἄνθρωπον λέγειν. Ανα. Ποιαν, καὶ Σωκρατες, σοφιαν; the clause takes the construction of σοφιαν in the preceding (acc. after δια). The omission of the preposition is especially frequent in questions and answers, and serves to give a more familiar form to the dialogue. This effect is illustrated by the fact that the usage belongs to comedy but not to tragedy; cf. Jelf, 650, 5. 19. ἡπερ ἑστὶν ἵστη, κ.τ.λ. Just that, perhaps, which is, etc. 20. τω ἐστιν, in reality. ταίνην, in this, acc. of specification. So σοφιαν in the next clause.

E. 21. ἦ καὶ ἄνθρωπον, than pertains to man, quam pro homine, H. A. 646. 22. ἦν οὐκ ἐκω, τὶ λέγω, or else I know not what to call it—certainly it is not human wisdom—it is not any such wisdom as I possess. The irony of the passage is evident. λέγω is subjunctive. 24. εἰπ διαβολη τῆς ἐμης, for the sake of calumniating me. For the sense of εἰπ, cf. H. A. 799, 2, c; also Jelf, 634, 3, a. For τῆς ἐμης, instead of the objective gen., ἐμα, cf. note, 19, A. 25. μηθορυφησητε. Do not raise a tumult against me, or, as a speaker would say to a modern assembly, do not hiss me = ne obtrepatis. The reader will remember the popular constitution of the court, cf. note, 17, A. For the aor. subj. in prohibitions with μη and its compounds, cf. G. 254; H. A. 874. μηδε ἀν, not even if. μεγα λέγειν, properly denotes boasting, as μέγα φρονεῖν does pride. In the later Greek, it meant to say something marvelous. But it was the seeming pride and arrogance of what he said, which, he feared, would give offense, and which did actually give offense to the judges. Cf. Xen. Apol.
Soc. as cited below, 21, A; also Xen. Apol. Soc. 1, where he speaks of the μεγαληπρεύτη, which all the Apologies ascribe to Socrates in his defense. 27. ἀξιόρεστος, responsible, primarily in regard to money, secondarily in regard to testimony. Cf. 38, B. τίς γὰρ ἐμῆς, εἰ δὴ τίς ἐστι σοφία καὶ αὖ, for of my wisdom, whether now I have any, and of what sort it is, etc. By a somewhat peculiar attraction, σοφία is drawn from the principal into the subordinate clause.

A. 2. ἐμὸς ἐστιν. Hence often attacked by Aristophanes in the Clouds and elsewhere. τῷ πλήθει. It is to be remembered that the word was used with frequent application to the Athenian democracy. 3. ξυνάφυγε ... κατὰλθε, he went with you in your recent exile and with you returned. The allusion is to the exile of the principal men of the Athenian democracy under the Thirty Tyrants, which having taken place quite recently, is called τὴν φυγήν ταύτην. This allusion was calculated to recommend Chersophon to popular favor. 5. ὡς σφαδρός. Cf. Aristoph. Clouds, 104, 508, seq., Birds, 1570; Xen. Mem. π, 8; Plat. Gorg., Charm., etc., pass. 6. καὶ, ἕπερ λέγω, μὴ θερπῆστε, and, I repeat it, do not be raising a tumult. It will be observed, that the aor. subj. is used in the first request (μὴ θερπῆστε above), but in the repetition the pres. imp. The former is a general request not to do it at all; the latter is more definite, and means: don’t be doing it, as you are doing and will be very liable to do while I proceed, especially with this to you most surprising and perhaps offensive part of my narrative. G. 202, 1; H. A. 874, a. The Apology, which bears the name of Xenophon, declares expressly, that this part of Socrates’ Defense did call forth repeated expressions of displeasure from the judges. Xen. Apol. Soc. 15. 7. ἵππηγε γὰρ δῆ. The Greeks use the particles, γὰρ, δῆ, οὖν, in resuming a sentence after a parenthesis, where we use I say. 8. ἀνείλει, responded, literally, took up, sc. her response. This famous response is worded differently in different authorities. Cf. Xen. Apol. Socr. 14; Diog. Laert. 2, 37; Schol. Aristoph. Clouds, 144. 9. δὲιλαφός, sc. Chersocrates, Xen. Mem. π, 8. 10. οὕτως ... ἐκέινος. Cf. note, 18, E.
B. 13. \textit{τί ποτε, what in the world.} Cf. note, 20, D. 15. ξύνοια ἐμαυτῷ σοφὸς ὄν. After ξύνοια, συγγυόσκε, etc., the participle expresses \textit{that of which one is conscious}, and may either agree with the subject of the verb in the \textit{nom.} or with the reflexive which follows the verb and refers to the same person, in the \textit{dative}. Here we have the former construction; below, 22, D, we have the other: ἐμαυτῷ ξυγόδειν οὐδὲν ἐπισταμένου. G. 280, N. 2; H. A. 982, a. μέγα and σμικρῶν are adverbial accusatives. H. A. 719, b. 15. \textit{τι οὖν ποτε λέγει, what in the world then, I say, does he mean?} οὖν is resumptive like γάρ, above, 21, A; and λέγει is best rendered, as it often is, by the English \textit{mean}. Below the same form of expression follows ἡπόρον, instead of the oratio obliqua, ἃ τι . . . λέγοι. G. 247; H. A. 932. 18. ἔπεσε . . . ἐτραπόμην, but at length, with much labor, I betook myself to an examination of it (sc. the oracle or the meaning of the god, τί ποτε λέγει) somewhat as follows. τοιοῦτος usually refers to the foregoing, τοιότῳ to the following (cf. note, 37, A), but not always. G. 148, N. 1; H. A. 696. Cf. τοιοῦτο τις, 19, C, and note, ibid. 19. ἡλθον stands without a connective, because this clause is in \textit{apposition} as it were with the preceding, being a fuller and more exact statement of the examination there mentioned. Cf. 17, D, and note, ibid. The reader will observe that such clauses or sentences are syndetic; while, with the exception of such, each clause and sentence of connected discourse in Greek usually begins with some connective particle, δὲ, καὶ, γάρ, οὖν, etc. Cf. H. A. 1039.

C. 20. ὡς . . . ἑιγέναι, supposing, that there, if anywhere, \textit{I should confute}, etc. G. 277, N. 2; H. A. 978. 22. ὅτι Οὐ-τοι. Cf. note on ὡς ἢτοι, 18, B. σὺ δὲ ἐμὲ ἐφισθα, but you (sc. the oracle) said I (sc. was wiser). 24. πρὸς δὲν . . . ἔφαβεν, in looking to whom I met with such an experience. 25. καλ διαλεγόμενος. Kal connects διαλεγόμενος to διασκοπᾶν (the intervening clause being parenthetical), and the participle, belonging to the principal subject of the discourse (Socrates), is in the nominative, though, to agree with what follows, it should be in the dative with μοι. It is a species of anacoluthon. H. A. 1063.
NOTES.

D. 1. ἐνεργεῖν is both temporal and causal = from that time and for that reason. 3. πρὸς ἐμαυτὸν... ἐλογιζόμεν, I reasoned with myself. τούτῳ μὲν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου. μὲν = μὴν, indeed. H. A. 1087, 12. The μὴν after κυδονευεῖ is correlative to ἀλλ', after which follows again the more usual cor-
relation οὕτως μὲν... ἕως δὲ. After δὲντερ οὐν οὐκ οἶδα, οὕτως
is understood. 7. οὐν denotes not an inference but a cor-
respondence with what he has before said of the ignorance of himself and others: while I, just as in fact, and as I have
already said, I do not know, so I do not even suppose that I
know. 8. σμικρὰ τιν denotes the degree, and αὐτῷ τούτω the
respect in which he is wiser. αὐτῷ = alone, see Lex. 1, 3.
G. 188, 2; 188, 1, N. 1; H. A. 781, 780; cf. 18, A. The
difference between μη and οὐδὲ, the contingent and the abso-
lute negative, is well illustrated in the clause ᾧ μὴ οἶδα, κ.τ.λ.: what I chance not to know, I do not even suppose that I
know.

E. 14. δὲ ἀπιγχθανόμεν. Observe the imp. here and the
aor. above. These words connect with each of the preceding
participles, but in the different relations of the fact and the
cause—with ἀλογιζόμενος, δὲ would strictly require to be
rendered that; with λυποῦμενος and δεδώκω, because. 15. τὸ
tοῦ θεοῦ. G. 141, N. 4; H. A. 621, b. 16. ἱέον οὖν σκοποῦντι.
Socrates here passes suddenly from the indirect to the direct
narration, and gives us the very language of his heart at the
time when he made this examination: I must go then (thought
I), in investigating the oracle what it means, to all, etc. σκο-
ποῦντι agrees with μοι implied as the dative of the agent after
ἱέον. For χρησμῶν, put as the object of σκοποῦντι instead of
the subject of λέγει, see H. A. 878.

A. 18. νὴ τοῦ κύρα. A very common oath in the mouth 22
of Socrates. Cf. Gorg. 460, B; 482, B, and Prof. Woolsey's
notes, ibid. In the last cited passage, Socrates adds: τὸν
Ἀγνωπτίων θεῶ, which is probably to be regarded as a humor-
ous addition. See Mitchell's note, D, App. to Aristoph.
Wasps. Fischer, followed by Stallbaum, Cousin, etc., refers
the origin of such oaths to Rhadamanthus, who is said, in
order to avoid swearing always by the gods, to have invented
several other formulæ as substitutes, such as by the dog, by

11
the oak, by the goose, etc. In Xenophon, as well as Plato, Socrates is represented as swearing (somewhat singularly) by Juno, infra, 24, E; Gorg. 449, D; Hip. Maj. 291, 9; Xen. Mem. 1, 5, 5; iii. 10, 9; iv. 2, 9, et al. 20. οἱ μὲν μάλιστα, κ.τ.λ. An explanatory clause, hence without a connective. Cf. notes, 17, D; 21, B. 20. ἐλεγον δεῖν. Cf. note 17, A. 21. τοῦ πλείστου is governed by ἐνδείκτις. The reader will observe the juxtaposition of the two contrasted words, φανεροῖς and ἐπικείμενοι. 24. πλάνην, wandering, so. to visit and examine the reputed wise men. πολούντος agrees with μου implied in ἐμὴν. πάνως alludes to labors like those of Hercules. 25. ἦν... γένοιτο: that after all the oracle might in the end prove irrefutable, i.e.; in addition to all his labors, also (καί) to bring about a result the opposite of what he set out to accomplish, which was to show that the oracle must be false. Such seems to be the true interpretation of this much disputed passage. Cf. Fischer's Defense of Platonic Passages against the Amendments of Stephens; also the notes of Schleiermacher and Stallbaum ad loc. The opt. is used in γένοιτο because πολούντος is imperfect in sense. G. 204, N. 1; H. A. 856, a.

B. 28. ὡς... καταληψάμενος. Cf. note 21, C. ἐπ' αὐτοφόρῳ καταληψάμενος contains an allusion to the detection of a criminal in the very act. 2. μάλιστα πεπαγμενεύοντα: to have been most carefully composed. 3. διερώσων ἂν. The imperfect with ἂν denotes repetition according to the circumstances in each case: I would ask them in each instance, what they meant to say. G. 206; H. A. 835. So below, ἐν βεβαίως. Ἐλεγον: almost all who were present would speak better (i.e., give a better account) than they (the poets) of the poems which they themselves had composed.

C. 8. ὁ σοφία, κ.τ.λ. So in Ion 533, E, Socrates says, that poets and musicians, like prophets and soothsayers, compose their productions, not by art, but by an inspiration which displaces reason. The fundamental difference between real science or art, as based on established rules and understood reasons, and mere unintelligent knack, or unconscious instinct or inspiration, is an idea, on which Socrates often and
earnestly insists. Cf. Gorgias pass.; Grote’s His. Gr., vol. viii, chap. lxviii. 14. oiovèou. G. 280; H. A. 982. einai ándrópos. G. 136, N. 3; H. A. 941. á, like its antecedent tάllα, is acc. of specification, and σοφιστάω is understood in the predicate after ἦσαν: in which they were not, sc. the wisest. 15. τῷ αὐτῷ οἰόμενος περιγεγονέναι: supposing that I surpassed them in the same respect in which I surpassed also the politicians. Cf. 21, D. 17. τελευτάω, lastly. H. A. 968, a.

D. 18. ἐμαυτῷ . . . ἐπισταμένῳ. Cf. note, 21, B. ὡς ἐπος εἰπεῖν. Cf. note, 17, A. 20. τοῦτον: τό τι. G. 171, 1; H. A. 748. 24. δημουργοὶ is subject of ἔδοξαν. Besides its emphatic position, it is also made emphatic by καὶ, which is likewise repeated before the other subject of comparison of ποιησις, where it is superfluous in English, though very often so used in Greek. See above, C: καὶ ἐπεστῆ . . . διότι καὶ τῶν πολιτικῶν. Cf. also Gorg. 479, B: κυθενεύουσι γάρ ἐκ τῶν νῦν ὑμῖν ἀμολογημένοι τοιούτως τι ποιεῖν καὶ οἱ τήν δίκην φεύγωτε. 25. τάλλα τά μέγατα, e. g., the administration of the government, to which Socrates particularly refers. 27. ἀνερρωθῆναι, to ask again, as in the case of the poets and the politicians. ἐπὶ τοῦ χρησμοῦ: nomine oraculi. Stallb.

E. 28. δεξαίμεν, in the sense of prefer, is very frequent in Plato. Cf. Gorg. 468, E; 471, C, et passim. 2. ἀμφότερα is neuter, though it refers to the feminine nouns σοφία and ἀμθίλαν = both the things. G. 138, N. 2, a; H. A. 615 (2).

A. 8. σοφὸς εἶναι explains δνομα τοῦτο = called this name, 23 sc. to be wise. To be is superfluous in English; but εἶναι often follows verbs of calling. Cf. Protagoras, 311, E: σοφιστήν δνομάζουσι τὸν ἄνδρα εἶναι. σοφὸς is nom. instead of acc., because, in the mind of the speaker, himself is the main subject of the sentence, as having become odious—as if he had said ἀπεκθῇσθα γέγονα instead of ἀπεκθεία τοι γεγόνατε. On the popular prejudice against this name, see note 18, B, and Grote as there cited. 10. ἃ δέν ἄλλον ἐξελέγξω: in which I may chance to confute another, or in whatsoever I may confute another. G. 233; H. A. 913. τῷ δὲ: but as to the matter of fact. It is strengthened by τῷ ἄντι = in reality. The fuller
formula, τὸ δὲ ἀλῆθες, is often used in the same way. 11. κυνονεύει: seems likely, lit., runs the risk, has a chance. The use of this verb with this signification is especially common in Plato. It was suited to express his view of the uncertainty, or the probability only of all human knowledge.

13. ὀλίγοι τινὸς . . . καὶ οὐδὲν: a little and indeed nothing. So often μικρὰ καὶ οὐδὲν = little or nothing. So atque in Latin sometimes adds a clause, which corrects, and at the same time increases the force of, the foregoing. For the force of τινὸς, cf. ἤ τι ἢ οὐδὲν, 17, B, and note ibid. καὶ φαίνεται . . . Σωκράτης: and he appears to mean this of Socrates, sc. that human wisdom is of no account. For two acc. after a verb of saying, cf. G. 165; H. A. 725, a. 14. προσεχρήστων: made use of my name besides, i. e., incidentally, for another purpose. 15. ὡσπερ ἄν εἰ εἴην: as if he would say. There is an ellipsis of ποιοῖο or some such verb, constituting an implied apodosis, with which the ἄν belongs. Cf. note, 17, D, ὡσπερ οὖν ἄν. ἄν not infrequently leaves its verb to be supplied from the connection. So especially with ὡσπερ ἄν, also with τῶς γὰρ ἄν, and similar phrases.

B. 19. κατὰ τὸν θεὸν: according to the god, i. e., in accordance with his oracle, or out of regard to his authority. So in Rom. viii, 27, and elsewhere in the New Testament. καὶ τῶν ἀστῶν καὶ τῶν ξένων, κ.τ.λ.: both of the citizens and of the foreigners if I suppose any to be wise. Partitive gen. after των. 22. τι τῶν τῆς πόλεως. Socrates apologizes elsewhere in Plato (e. g., below, 31, 32) and in Xenophon (e. g., Mem. i, 6, 15) for not participating in the affairs of the state. His was a higher mission, viz., to educate the individual citizens. 24. πενίᾳ μετίᾳ: the greatest poverty. μετίᾳ, Ridg- dell compares Legg. 677, c, μετίᾳ τῶν φοβερῶν ἑρμίῳ. πενίᾳ = paupertas, poverty; πτώματα = agestas, destitution. The former is the usual condition of the poorer and laboring classes; the latter, of mendicants. As to the pecuniary circumstances of Socrates, cf. Xen. Econ. 2, 3, where it appears he was commonly called πενίς, and where it is said his house and all his property were worth five minae; cf. also 88, B.

C. 27. οἱ τῶν πλουσιωτάτων. For omission of substantive,
see G. 141, N. 4; H. A. 621, c. This is no unimportant circumstance to show how the prejudices and passions of the multitude were awakened against him. 27. αὐτόματος. Socrates, as not being a professional teacher, will not be responsible for his associates, who are entirely free. 1. εἰπέρ instead of καὶ εἰπέρ, as we often use then for and then between two verbs. 5. ἀλλ’ οὐχ αὐτοῖς, but not with themselves, as they might well be angry with themselves for their own ignorance, instead of being angry with him who exposed it. Al. αὐτοῖς, sc. the young men, but this would require ἐκείνοις.

D. 9. τὰ κατὰ πάντων τῶν φιλοσοφοῦντων, κ.τ.λ. Cf. notes, 18, 10. ὅτι τὰ μετέωρα, κ.τ.λ., sc. διαφθείρει τοὺς νέους διδάσκον; that he corrupts the young by teaching things in heaven and things under the earth, and not to believe in the gods, etc.

E. 18. ἐκ τούτων, as the outcome of these. Μελητός μὲν ὑπὲρ τῶν ποιητῶν. Al. Μελητός. This man is ridiculed by Aristophanes as well as Plato for his person, his character, and his bad tragic poetry. We learn from the Euthyphron (2, B, C), that his share in the prosecution of Socrates was to bring the indictment before the Archon Basilens, at which time he is described as still young and obscure, but vain and conceited. Besides his professional resentment in common with his brother poets, he had a personal grudge against Socrates for having refused to participate in, and severely animadverted upon, the arrest and “rendition” of Leon of Salamis by Meletus and three others at the command of the Thirty Tyrants. Xen. Mem. iv, 4, 3; Andoc. De Myster. 20. Ἀνωτέρων ὑπὲρ τῶν δημιουργῶν. He was a leather-dresser, and, besides sharing with other “mechanics” in the resentment provoked by Socrates’ exposure of their ignorance as above described, he had, very likely, taken offense at his constant reference to shoemakers and other mechanics in the familiar illustration of his sentiments. He was also a popular demagogue, and had received the highest honors of the Athenian democracy. Hence in the text, ὑπὲρ τῶν πολιτικῶν. See note, 18, B. In Plato’s Men. (91, A–C), we find him warning Socrates against a too free use of his tongue, lest he
should get himself into trouble. 21. Δύναν ὑπὲρ τῶν ῥητόρων.
Lycon was an orator and demagogue, probably the same who
is held up as a drunken brawler by Aristophanes, Wasps,
1801. It was his part to prepare the accusation against Soc-
rates. On all these accusers, see further in Stallbaum ad loc.,
and Smith's Dict. Ant.

24 A. 21. ἀρχόμενος. G. 277, 1; Π. Α. 968, a. 24. ταύτι
ἔστω ὑμῖν . . . τάληθι. This is the truth for you, sc. which I
promised to tell you, cf. 17, B. 27. τοῖς ἀντίς ἀνεχθάνομαι.
I incur hatred by the same, sc. τάληθι. On the sentiments of
this and the following clause, cf. John, viii, 46, v. 48; Gal.
iv, 16.

B. 5. τῶν ἄγαθῶν τε καὶ φιλόπολιν. These epithets are
applied in accordance with polite usage, and yet not without
irony. φιλόπολις differs from φιλόπαρπις, according to Stallb.,
as friend of Athens from friend of Greece. 7. οὖθε γὰρ δὴ
. . . λάβομεν αὐτοῖ: for now again let us take up on the other
hand. The language implies some formality and gravity in
the examination of this, as also of the former accusation.
ὅπερ ἐπέγραφα τοῖς ὄντων κατηγόρων: inasmuch as these are
different accusers, i. e., another class, a second, in contradist-
inction to the first, whom he has just disposed of. 8. ἀντώ-
τοιαύτη τίς, 19, C, and note ibid. The order of the points in
the indictment is inverted, as it is given by Xenophon, Mem.
r, 1, 1. Diogenes Laertius gives it on the authority of Phavo-
rinus, as still existing in due form in the second century, in
these words: “Socrates is guilty in not recognizing the gods
that the state recognizes, but introducing other new divini-
ties; and he is guilty also of corrupting the youth. Penalty,
death.” φησίν, sc. Meletus. 11. δαμόνα, not = δαίμονες,
divinities, but divine things, or things pertaining to gods.

C. 14. ἐγώ δὲ γε, but I for my part. The γε is omitted
in the earlier editions, but inserted by Bekker, Ast, Stall-
baum, etc., on the authority of the best MSS. 15. σπουδὴ
χαρινητήτως, seriō ludit; literally, jokes in earnest. It is an
example of the figure called oxymoron. It is explained by the
following participial clauses. Meletus seemed as if he must
be merely joking, playing a part, when he pretended to feel so much concern about matters (such as the education of the youth and the worship of the gods) on which he never had bestowed an anxious thought; and yet he made a serious business of it when he rashly (παθώς) brought men to trial (ἐς ἀφωνα καθιστάς ἀδρότως). 17. ἐν τούτῳ ἐμφασεν. G. 184, N. 1.

D. 20. δεῦρο,ither, ἄγε being understood, or instead of ἵππο. The law allowed the parties in a suit to question each other, and obliged the party questioned to answer. Cf. below, note, 25, D. Few probably ever turned the law to so good account, as Socrates knew how to do by his method of question and answer. Ἀλλῳ τι ᾧ. This formula, frequently with τι omitted, is often used, especially in Plato’s Dialogues, simply to ask a question, implying an affirmative answer, like οὐκοίν, or nonne, only with perhaps still stronger affirmative implication. G. 282, 8; H. A. 1015, b. Render: do you not, etc. 21. ἐπώς ... ἔρωντα. ἐπώς, with the fut. ind., emphasizes the future fact; with the aor. subj. the present purpose. The former = how they shall be; the latter = how they may be. Render: Do you not make it a question of much importance how the young shall be of the best character possible? G. 217; H. A. 885; M. and T. 45. 23. μελον γε σου, especially (γε) since it so concerns you, or even more vague, since you are so careful. The participle is used in acc. absolute, with its subject the suggested thought of the previous clause. G. 278, 2; H. A. 973, a. 24. τὸν μὲν ... διαφθείροντα, the one who is corrupting them. It is in emphatic contrast to τὸν δὲ ποιοῦντα, which is also made emphatic by prolepsis. H. A. 878. ἐμεί is appositive and explanatory of τὸν διαφθείροντα, and together with that is the object both of ἐμφαν and εἰσάγεσ. εἰσάγεσ, literally, bring in, sc. to court, cf. 29, A: εἰσάγον ... εἰς δικαστήριον. Here, however, it is followed by a dative of the persons, before whom he is brought, sc. the judges (τουτον). Either the magistrate or the prosecutor might be said εἰσάγεσ, though more properly the former. It may usually be rendered impeach, or prosecute.

E. 4. οὖντοι, κ.τ.λ., these the judges. 8. τῆν Ἰρα. Cf. note, 22, A. 9. ἄποχραλ. The spectators, at trials of
any interest before the Heliaea, were very numerous, thus bringing that court still more under popular influence.

A. 10. οἱ βουλευταὶ. The members of the βουλή, or senate, of which there were two, the Senate of the Areopagus and the Senate of Five Hundred. Both kinds of senators are perhaps here intended. 11. 'Ἀλλ' ἄρα, κ.τ.λ. But then, Melites, do those in the assembly, the assemblymen, corrupt the young? The μὴ implies a negative answer, and here suggests some fear or anxiety, lest it may be so. ἄρα (not ἄρα) is used as suggesting that this is the only class left. 17. ἔμοι. G. 178, 2, N.; H. A. 752. The κατὰ in comp. gives disadvantageous or hostile sense to the verb.

B. 18. οἱ μὲν βελτίους ποιοὺσες αὐτοὺς, sc. δοκοῦσι, supplied from the preceding clause, of which this is explanatory, and therefore without a connective. 20. τοίνυν τοῦτον πᾶν. τοίνυν is to be taken as an appositive of the previous sentence, or a resumption of its thought, independent of construction. It may be considered as either nom. or acc. G. 137, N. 3; H. A. 626, b. 24. πᾶσθαι δήμου, altogether so no doubt, whether you and Anytus deny it or not. οὐ, instead of μὴ, follows the conditional particle (ἐάν), because it unites with φησε to convey one idea, οὐ φησε = ἀδειγμ. 27. εἰ . . . διαφθείρει. The use of the ind. pres. implies a kind of ironical assent to the truth of the supposition: ὃ (really, as you affirm) only one corrupts them. G. 227, 1; H. A. 901, b. οἱ ἄλλοι, the rest, all others.

C. 27. ἀλλὰ γὰρ, but it is not so, for; or but really, cf. note, 20, C. 28. ὁ μέλητε . . . ἀμέλειαν . . . μεμέληκε. A play upon the name: Careful One, you show your want of care, that you have never cared, etc. 8. εἰσάγαγς, cf. note, 24, D. 4. οἱ πρὸς Διὸς Μέλητε. The πρὸς Διὸς seems to be placed between ὁ and Μέλητε to carry out the play on the name in the foregoing sentence: Thou before Zeus, Careful One. Notice, however, Mem. 71, D: οἱ πρὸς Θεῶν Μίνων. Cases are more numerous where we have οἱ πρὸς Διὸς with the voc. omitted. 7. τοὺς δὲl . . . διάθεσαι. δει, preceded by the art. and followed by a part. means, in every case, i. e., in every instance, in which the supposition holds.
D. 11. ὁ νόμος κελεύει ἀποκρίνεσθαι. The very words of the law are cited by Demosthenes in his Second Oration against Stephanus: Νόμος. Τοῖν ἀντιδίκων ἐπάναγκες εἶναι ἀποκρίνεσθαι ἀλλὰς τὸ ἑρωτόμενον, μαρτυρεῖν δὲ μὴ. 16. τηλικοῦτοι, at my time of life, sc. so old, i.e., 70, cf. 17, D. τηλικόδε, at your time of time, sc. so young, cf. note, 23, E. The words both mean the same, viz., either so old or so young, according to the connection.

E. 22. ταῦτα, the active of πείθω takes two accusatives, and one is retained with pass. H. A. 724. 23. εἰμι ... οὐδένα, sc. πείθεσθαι σου. So in the next clause, there is an ellipsis of διαφθείρω with ἀκων, and still further on of ποιῶν with πάνσομαι. Throughout this passage Socrates manifestly takes the ground that virtue is coextensive with knowledge. It is impossible for any man to injure others without injuring himself; and no man who really knows this, will wrong another any sooner than he would injure himself, which no one ever does intentionally. Such is his argument here. So in Xen. Mem. iii, 9, 5, he reasons, that no man who knows temperance, justice, and moral excellence, would prefer anything else to these virtues. These virtues, therefore, are all resolvable into knowledge or wisdom. Every man does what seems to him best, and if he knows what is best, he will do it, and therefore do right. See also Xen. Mem. iv, 2, 20; Arist. Ethic. Eudem. 1, 5; Protag. 345; Gorg. 460; and Prof. Woolsey's remarks upon it in his Introduction.

B. 9. ὡς κατὰ τὴν γραφὴν, ἡν ἑγράψαν, sc. με φῆς διαφθείρων τοὺς νεωτέρους, repeated from above. 11. οὗ ταῦτα, κ.τ.λ. ταῦτα is the obj. of διδάσκων placed where it is for emphasis. 13. ἐν νῦν ὁ λόγος ἐστίν, of whom our discussion now is. ἐν is objective genitive, = ὃς λέγομεν.

C. 10. Καὶ αὐτὸς ἀπα, and I myself accordingly. 18. οὗ μεντο, κ.τ.λ., not however the same as the city indeed recognizes, but others, and this is what you accuse me of; that (I teach them to believe that there are) others; or do you say that I both do not believe in any gods at all myself; and that I teach others this doctrine. Observe the correlation of οὗ —τε, in the last member of this somewhat complicated and
irregular sentence. θεώς usually omits the article after νομι-ζεω, ηγεισθαι, etc., = believe in gods.

D. 22. ὣν τι, with verb omitted, cf. Lex.; also H. A. 612. The idiom was, however, so established that a Greek would probably be unconscious of the ellipsis. 23. οὐδὲ ... οὐδὲ, not simply correlative, like οὔτε ... οὔτε = neither ... nor, but emphatic = not even ... nor yet. Cf. note, 18, C. The language implies that it was quite incredible that Socrates should not believe even in gods so universally recognized as the sun and the moon. For the omission of the article with ἡλιον and ἀείμνη, cf. H. A. 663. 24. Μᾶ Δή, sc. οὗ νομιζει, which is understood from the foregoing question. Μᾶ is not of itself negative; hence it may be used with either ναι or οὐ; but when preceded by neither of these particles, a negative clause precedes or follows, or it is clear from the context and from an accompanying adversative particle, that the sentence is to be understood as negative. Cf. G. 163; H. A. 728; see also Lex. 26. Ἀναξαγόρων. Anaxagoras of Clazomene taught (according to Diog. Laert. ii, 8) that the sun was a mass of hot iron, as some understand it, or stone, as Socrates takes it here and Xen. Mem. iv, 7, 7, and the moon an earthy body, like our own planet. There was the more plausibility in imputing to Socrates the doctrines of Anaxagoras, since Socrates was a disciple of Archelaus Physicus, who was a disciple of Anaxagoras. 28. οὐκ εἰδέναι. For οὐκ, instead of μὴ, see note on οὐ φησε, 25, B. 2. Καὶ δή καὶ, and so now, etc. The sentence which follows is ironical, cf. σοφὸς δὴ, 27. 8. ἀ is the object of πριμίνους.

E. εἰ πάνοι πολλοῖ, δραχμῆς, for a drachma at the very highest. πολλοῖ, like δραχμῆς, is gen. of price. This was the highest price which the managers could lawfully demand for a seat in the theatre. The common price was two oboli (Dem. de Cor. 28), which was paid out of the treasury. Cf. Boeckh’s Pub. Econ. Ath. ii, 13; Beck. Char. Ex. Sc. 10; and Smith’s Dict. Antiq. The doctrines of the philosophers were brought upon the stage, partly to be commended, as by Euripides in his tragedies, partly to be ridiculed, as by Aristophanes in his comedies. Some have thought that the
allusion is not to the performances on the stage, but to the sale of the books of Anaxagoras at the orchestra. Cf. Schleiermacher ad loc. But as Forster well remarks, we never read of book sales there. See also Journal of Philology (English), vol. x, pp. 37, 38. 5. ἄλλως τε καὶ, κ.τ.λ., especially when they are so absurd; literally, for other reasons and also (in particular) they being so absurd. 6. οὐπωςι, thus entirely and absolutely. 8. Ἀναστός γ' εἰ...δοκεῖς. Cf. note on δικαίως εἰμι, 18, A.

A. 18. ποιε...διαπεραρένῃ, for he seems like one hav-ing composed (i. e., he seems to have composed) as it were an enigma, testing the question, Whether will Socrates, the wise man forsooth, know, etc. In the earlier editions καὶ is in-serted between the two participles. But Plato often uses two or more participles without a connective, especially when, as here, the action expressed by one participle is preliminary to that expressed by the other—he seems to have composed as it were an enigma in order to test. Cf. Gorg.: τεραχα ἐκείνη διαπεραρένῃ, ἐποδώσα, κ.τ.λ.—having divided herself into four parts and thus put on, or in order to put on, etc. For the use of the part. after ποιε, cf. G. 280; H. A. 981. The nom. would be possible. Compare note on κύνοινα with the part. 21, B. 14. ἐμοῖ χαρινετζομένου. γυνώσκω, though usually followed by the acc., sometimes takes the gen. in common with other verbs denoting mental state. Jelf, 485. 17. ὁστερ ἄν. Cf. note, 17, D. 20. ἢ...λέγειν, how it is clear to me that he is speaking thus, so. contradictions.

B. 28. ἐν τῷ εἰσβορί τρόπῳ, in my usual method, sc. of question and answer, with common illustrations. 26. ἄλλα καὶ ἄλλα, one after another, again and again. The acc. is cognate. 3. τὸ ἐπὶ τοῦτο, the question which follows, i. e., in order and thought.

C. 4. δαμώνια μὲν νομίζει πράγματ' εἶναι. δαμώνια is here-constructed as an adjective. So Cicero translates τὸ δαμώνιον by divinum quiddam, de Div. 1, 54. Schleiermacher and Stallbaum (see their notes ad loc.) argue, that Xenophon, Plato, and Aristotle understood it to be used in this sense in the indictment. Certainly if he could have taken it as a noun...
(meaning divinities, instead of an adjective meaning divine things), it would have been far easier for Socrates to show the glaring inconsistency of his accuser, and he might have spared all his argumentation and illustration drawn from ἵππως πρᾶγμα, ἀνθρώπως πρᾶγμα, etc. The expression in the indictment had reference to those divine voices or monitions which Socrates professed to hear and obey as the guide of his life (cf. 31, D, and notes ibid.), and which would more properly be called divine things, than divinities. 5. ὅς δὲ δοσις: what a service you have rendered—how obliging you are—que tu m'oblige. Cousin. Al. δοσις. μόνον = tandem aliquando, Stallb. 8. ἀλλ' ὅπως δαμόνια γε νομίζω, but then I believe in divine things at all events, sc. whether they be old or new, i. e., though they be new ones as charged in the indictment. 9. ἀναγραφῇ = ἀναμνήσθη, cf. note, 19, B, and Fischer's note ad loc.

D. 13. ἢτοι θεοὶ γε ἤγονῳθά ἢ θεῶν παιδας. The word δαμόνια, in Homer and the early Greek poets, is synonymous with θεοί; in Plato and other writers of his day it denotes more especially the inferior deities constituting an intermediate and connecting link between the superior gods and men; and in Plutarch and some of the latest Greek classics, it sometimes signifies bad as well as good beings of a superhuman order, thus approaching to the New Testament sense of demons or evil spirits. Cf. Symp. 202, E: πάν το δαμόνιαν μεταχ' ἐστι θεοὶ τε καὶ θηριοῦ, κ.τ.λ. 16. τούτων ... χαρινικήθη, this would be wherein I say (27, A) that you speak riddles and joke, to say that I who do not believe in gods, on the other hand do again believe in gods; since at all events I believe in demons. The last clause repeats the premise (already laid down at the beginning of the sentence) in closer connection with the main point in the conclusion—a practice not unfrequent with Plato, and one of many by which his style is made to resemble the language of conversation. 20. ἢν δὴ καὶ λέγονται, from whom you know they are said to be. The preposition (ἐκ) is often omitted before the relative after having been inserted before the antecedent. H. A. 1007. 23. ἢ [καὶ] ἄνων. Forsterus delendam censebat hanc particu-
lam (ἢ); sine causa idonea; nam ἡμίονοι dici possunt, et ἐποὺοι παιδες, et ὠνοι παιδες. Fischer. That is, mules may have horses or also asses for their male parents, for the case to be illustrated limits the comparison to male parents.

E. 25. στρε' limits ἔγραψω; ἀποπεράμενος denotes the end in view = for the purpose of testing me, and ἀπορῶν the cause = because you were at a loss. 27. ἐποὺ δὲ σὺ, κ.τ.λ. But that you should persuade any man possessed of the least understanding, that it is the part of the same man to believe in things pertaining both to demons and to gods, and the same man not to believe either in demons or gods or heroes, is beyond the scope of human ingenuity, lit., there is no means by which (ἐποὺς) you could persuade, etc. I have inclosed σὺ in brackets (as does also Cron), because, though found in most of the MSS., and therefore inserted by Becker and Stallbaum, neither they nor any other editor has been able to explain or translate it, and it is omitted by Forster, Fischer, Ast, Schlieirmacher, and Cousin.

4. Ἀλλὰ γὰρ. Cf. note, 25, C. Socrates here brings the direct defense to a close, saying that it does not require much argument, since what he has to fear is not the indictment or the prosecutors, but the multitude—not the evidence or the argument, but popular prejudice and passion. What follows is intended, not so much to avert the sentence which he anticipates from the judges or even to deprecate the displeasure of the people, as to vindicate his character, assert his mission, and bear witness to the truth, that more impartial judges may appreciate his merits—that a better age may honor him, as a missionary and a martyr. 9. καὶ τοῦτο... αἰτήσει, and this it is which will convict me, if indeed it should lead to my conviction. 10. ἀλλὰ... φθονός. This clause is an emphatic repetition and explanation of the τοῦτο at the beginning. Such colloquial repetitions (cf. note, 27, D) are especially frequent in antithetic clauses. 12. οὔτε δὲ δεινὸν μὴ ἐν ἐμοὶ στή, and there is no reason to fear lest it should (that it will) stop with me, i.e., that I shall be the last victim.

B. 13. Εἰρ' οὖν αἰσχύνει. Eira in questions implies astonishment or indignation, as πορεῖ does surprise and wonder, cf.
NOTES.

note, 20, D. 17. τοῦ ζήν ἣ τεθνάαι are taken together as a limiting gen. with κινδύνον, literally, the risk of living or dying, i. e., the question of life or death. 18. ἄνθρωπος, a man emphatically, not merely a human being, ἄνθρωπον. It is the subject of ὑπολογίζομαι. ἄνθρωπος ἢ τεθνάαι, who is of any use, however little. ἄνθρωπος takes the person to whom it belongs, or of whom it is predicated, in the genitive. See examples in the Lexicon. With the sentiment of this passage compare Crito, 48.

C. 22. οἱ τῇ ἄλλῃ καὶ = especially; literally, both the others and (in particular) the son of Thetis. For ἄλλος τῇ καὶ = especially, cf. note, 26, E. The allusion is to Achilles, Hom. II. xviii, 90–125. 28. παρὰ τῷ ἀιχρῷ τῷ ὑπομείνα, in comparison with (properly, alongside of) submitting to anything dishonorable. 25. θεός ὁ Óσα, being a goddess, and therefore able to foretell the future. 26. τιμωρήσεις. G. 199, N. 3; H. A. 816, 12. Render: if you shall avenge the murder of Patroclus your friend. 28. αὐτίκα γὰρ τοῖς ξυλ. κ.τ.λ.; the very words of Thetis to her son, II. xviii, 96. This quotation interrupts the sentence, and instead of a clause depending on δοτε (l. 24), which should regularly have followed, it goes on with an independent clause connected by δὲ. 2. τοῦ θανάτου. The article is unusual with θανάτου as abstract.

D. 3. Κακὸς ἢν denotes the state in which to live were to be dreaded more than death: to live being a bad man, that is, an unethical friend and a cowardly soldier. 4. ἄυτίκα τεθναῦν ... ἄθεος ἀρωρής. Parts of two Homeric verses (II. xviii, 98 and 104) brought together. 6. μὴ ... οἰς, you do not suppose, do you, implies a neg. answer. G. 282, 2; H. A. 1015. 7. οὐὶ γὰρ ἔχει. Cf. note, 17, D. 8. οὐ ἂν, wherever. 9. ἤ ὑπ’ ἄρχοντος ταξίδη. Ἀνασολοθον for ἥ ὑπ’ ἄρχοντος ταξίδεις, which would correspond with ἥ ἡγησάμενος βέλτων; instead of which we have ὑπ’ ἄρχοντος ταξίδη, corresponding to ἐκτὸσ τάξις, as if the first ἤ had preceded τάξις, instead of ἡγησάμενος. 11. πρὸ τοῦ ἀιχροῦ, before, i. e., more than the dishonorable.

E. 12. εἰς ἔργασμένος. Heindorf makes ἔργαζομαι here, as he says it often is, equivalent to ποιεῖν. But Stallbaum,
with good reason, renders εἰπεν εἰργασμένος, I should have perpetrated (not merely done). 18. εἰ, ὅτε μὲν με ... τάτε μὲν οὖ ... τοῦ δὲ θεοῦ ... ἐνταῦθα δὲ, if, when on the one hand the commanders ... then on the one hand I ... but when on the other hand the god ... then on the other hand I, etc. μὲν ... μὲν and δὲ ... δὲ, with their clauses, seldom appear so regularly and formally balanced. Cf. Jelf, 765, 6. The clauses introduced by δὲ contain the main point, which the clauses introduced by μὲν only illustrate and enforce. 14. οὐφείστε εἴλεσθε. The judges are taken as representing the entire people. 16. εἰμενον (past tense of the ind.) denotes an historical fact; λιπαμω (contingent) implies a mere supposition. The bravery and physical endurance of Socrates, as a soldier, were a prodigy and a proverb in that already somewhat degenerate age. In the battle at Delium, the Athenian general Laches declared, that if all the Athenians had fought as bravely as he, the Boeotians would have erected no trophies. It will be observed, that the preposition εἰς is used to denote the locality of this battle, while ἐν is used with Ποιοῦσα and Ἀμφιπόλει. Wherever this battle is referred to, it is thus designated εἰς Δηλίῳ (cf. Xen. Mem. iii, 5, 4), whereas in other battles ἐν is the usual preposition. The reason seems to be, that Delium was properly the name of the temple of Apollo, and, though the city received the same designation, the old association forbade its extension so as to embrace the surrounding country, where the battle was fought. 18. δεῖν is used as appropriate to φήσῃν rather than to τάσσωνος, to which it should belong. The style is conversational.

A. 20. δεινῶν τὰν εἶν, a strange thing indeed it would be. 29
It is a repetition or resumption of δεινὰ ἐν εἰπεν εἰργασμένος at the beginning of the section. 21. ὡς ἄληθὲς. ὡς gives emphasis to some adverbs and adjectives besides superlatives. There is an ellipsis of a corresponding demonstrative (οὗτως), and also of an appropriate verb: εἰσάγων οὗτος ὡς ἄληθως εἰσάγων. εἰσάγων εἰς δικαστήριον. Cf. note, 24, D. 27. τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ, to man, i.e., mankind. H. A. 659. 27. ὡς is attracted into the gender of the predicate.

B. 1. Καὶ τοῦτο, κ.τ.λ., and this, how is not this ignorance
which is to be censured, that of supposing that one knows what he does not know. 3. τοῦτο καὶ ἐνραῦθα, in this respect and here, emphatic repetition in order to limit the superiority strictly to this single point. 4. τῷ, in anything, dat. of the respect. 5. τοῦτο ἀν, so. φαίην εἰσα, I should say that it was (i.e., that I was wiser) in this. 6. οὐκ οἷομαι corresponds to οὐκ εἶδός, which is equivalent to ὅσπερ οὐκ οἶδα. 7. τῷ βελτίων, καὶ θεῷ καὶ ἀνθρώπῳ, the better, whether god or man. 8. πρὸ οὖν τῶν κακῶν ἄν, κ.τ.λ., in comparison therefore with the evils which (ἄν, gen. by attraction) I know to be evils, I will never fear nor flee those which I know not if perchance they are good, that is, I will never shun the latter rather than the former—the uncertain rather than the certain. Cf. πρὸ τοῦ ἀσχροῦ, 28, D.

C. 11. ἀπησθαντες = ἀπειθαντες, which Stephens substituted for it in his edition = disobeying, disregarding. τὴν ἀρχὴν with a negative means, not in the first instance, i.e., not at all. 12. εἰσελθεῖν for εἰσάγεσθαι, to be brought in hither for trial. 13. ἀποκτεῖναι, to put me to death, i.e., condemn me to death. So Xen. Mem. iv, 8, 5. 14. εἰ διαφέυγοιμην. G. 202, 4; H. A. 855, a. ἄν ... ἐπηρεύωντες ... διαφθαρῆσονται. On the use of ἄν with the fut. ind., which is rare in the Attic Greek and entirely denied by some, see G. 208, 2, at end; H. A. 845. Stallbaum is inclined here to connect ἄν with ἐπηρεύωντες only = ἄν ... ἐπηρεύων ... καὶ ... διαφθαρῆσονται. But it is more natural to suppose that ἄν gives a contingent sense to διαφθαρῆσονται also. 18. ἐπὶ τοῦτο μέτοικον, ἐφ’ ὅτε, on this condition, however, that you no longer, etc. ἐφ’ ὅτε is equivalent to ὅστε, and is accordingly followed by the inf. G. 267; H. A. 999, a.

D. 20. εἰ οὖν ... ἀφιότε. οὖν is here resumptive = I say. It will be observed that the same protasis is resumed twice—that is, the sentence is commenced with essentially the same condition, varied only in form, three times (εἰ με νῦν ὑμεῖς ἀφιέτε ... εἰ μοι πρὸς ταύτα εἴποτε ... εἰ οὖν με, ὅσπερ εἴπον, ἐπὶ τούτοις ἀφιότε), before the apodosis is subjoined. In the first instance, the ind. (ἀφιέτε) is used, implying some probability of his release; in the other instances,
the same condition is expressed as a mere contingency by the use of the opt. (ἐπίστευτος, ἀπόκειτος), corresponding to which we have the opt. with ἄν (ἐπιστεύτος ἄν ὑμῖν) in the apodosis. 22. ἀσπάζομαι μίν καὶ φιλῶ. Ἀσπάζομαι est aliquem salutare ita ut sum amplerctaris; φιλεῖν, salutare aliquem ita, ut sum osculatus. Hoc loco significant haec verba: grato letaque animo vestram humanitatem et clementiam amplerctor atque veneror. Stallbaum. 22. πείσομαι μᾶλλον τῷ θεῷ ἢ ὑμῖν. Cf. Acts v, 29, and iv, 19. 24. οὐ μὴ πείσομαι. οὐ μὴ, with the subj. instead of the fut., is used in strong denial. G. 257; H. A. 1032. 25. ἔστε, continually, from time to time. 26. Ἀθηναίος ἄν, πολεως, being a citizen of Athens, the greatest city. G. 187, N. 1. 28. ἱσχύω, strength of mind, intellectual and moral power, particularly fortitude and the kindred masculine virtues, as appears from what follows. Compare the glorification of Athens in the funeral oration of Pericles. Thuc. ii, 85.

Ε. 5. ἄπειμα. The present of εἰμι and its compounds is generally used by the Attics in a future sense. So in English, I go or am going = I shall or will go. ἐρήσομαι, εἰσιν, ἐλέγξω. Notice the progressive meaning of the words as descriptive of the Socratic method. 7. φῶς δέ, but to say that he does. In Laches, 187, 188, Nicias gives a very similar though more minute account of the manner in which Socrates would hold every one he conversed with to the work of self-examination: “You do not seem to know, that whoever is nearest to Socrates in reasoning, just as in relationship, and whoever approaches him in conversation, even though he should begin to converse at first on some other subject, he will, with infallible certainty, be brought round in the discussion, till he is obliged to give an account of himself, in what manner he is now living, and how he has lived his past life; and once caught in it, Socrates will not let him go, till he has well and beautifully put all these things to the test . . . and I almost knew, long ago, that our discussion now, being in the presence of Socrates, would not be about the young men, but about ourselves.”

Δ. 9. Καὶ νεωτέρῳ καὶ πρεσβυτέρῳ. Cf. καὶ θεῷ καὶ ὑπ'
Verbs of *doing* and *saying* more commonly take the indirect as well as the direct object in the acc. G. 165, N. 3. The dat. suggests *for the sake of*. 10. ὅσον, *by as much as*.* The full construction would require a corresponding demonstrative (τοσοῦτον) with μᾶλλον, denoting the *degree of difference*. G. 188, 2; H. A. 781, a. 11. ἐγγυτέρω may be followed either by a gen. or a dat. denoting that *to which* there is *a nearness*. G. 182, 2, and 186. That *in which*, or *in respect to which*, the nearness exists, may also be either gen. or dat. But it is not according to usage to put both in the gen. or both in the dat. See Stallbaum's note on the proper reading of this passage, and compare ad rem, as well as ad verba, the passage above cited from Laches: ὦς ἂν ἐγγυτάτω Σωκράτους ὑπογράφω δίπερ γίνεται. 13. τὴν ἐμὴν τῷ θεῷ ὑπηρεσίαν, *my service to the god*. The dat. to or for can follow substantives. G. 185; H. A. 765, a. 16. μὴ δὲ οὖν ὑπὸ σφόδρα, *no, nor so zealously*, cf. note on ὑπὸ ὑπωστοιοῦ, 17, B.

B. 17. λέγων, κ.τ.λ. Observe the sentiment, that the higher good includes the lower, as the greater does the less. 20. εἰ . . . διαφθείρω. Of. note, 25, B. 21. ταῦτ' ἂν εἰη βλαβερά, *these instructions and persuasions must be injurious*. Compare the argument of Xen. Mem. i, 2, 8: how then could such a man corrupt the young, unless the cultivation of virtue is corrupting. 22. οὐδὲν λέγει, *he says nothing*, that is, *he is utterly mistaken*. Cf. Laches, 195, B.; N. 1: ἀλλὰ μοι δοκεῖ, ὡσκαρτεῖ, Δάχης ἐπιθυμεῖν καμένε φανήσαι μὴ δέν λέγοντα, ὅτι καὶ αὐτὸς ἄρτι τοιοῦτος τις ἐφάνη. ΛΛ. Πάνω μὲν οὖν, ὡς Νικία· καὶ πειράζομαι γε ἀποφήναι. οὐδὲν γὰρ λέγει. So τι λέγειν is to say something, i. e., to speak well and truly, cf. Crit. 46, D; Xen. Mem: η, 1, 12. πρὸς ταῦτα, *wherefore*, literally, in reference to these things, in *view of them*. 23. η πείδεσθε . . . η μῆ, *that is, unconditionally—don't propose any conditional acquittal, like that suggested 29, C; since I would not on any condition (ἂν refers to an implied condition) do differently, not even if I must die (strictly and emphatically be dead) many times over. ὦς has its ordinary subjective effect. G. 277, N. 2; H. A. 978. Notice ἂν with future participle is
a peculiar apodosis representing τοίχως Ἀν. Cf. 29, C; M. 68 and T. 41, 4; p. 58, l. 3, and reference there.

C. 26. Μὴ θυροβείρε. Cf. note, 21, A. Socrates here enters upon another topic, and discourses upon it with such freedom and boldness, such a consciousness of his own innocence not merely, but such an assurance of his divine mission, and such compassion not for himself but for them if they should reject his instructions and condemn him to death, that they must either recognize his superior wisdom or take offense at his arrogance. Some modern critics even, Ast for example, regard the self-complacency of this and some other parts of the Apology as quite insufferable, quite un-Socratic. But is there not the Socratic irony here? Are there not at the same time Socratic truthfulness, fearlessness, and earnestness? It should be remembered that he presents himself throughout as vindicating, not so much himself as truth and justice, philosophy and religion, and God. 27. ἐμείνατε μοι οἷς ἐδείησα ὑμὸν, stand by what I asked of you. Cf. 17, D. μοι is the ethical dat., and may be expressed by pray.

1. μελλω γὰρ οὖν, for I am about now (οὖν, accordingly, in accordance with that request) to say also some other things at which perhaps you will cry out. This clause is connected by γὰρ οὖν (more closely than it would be by γὰρ alone), not to the clause which immediately precedes, but to the previous one (ἐμείνατε, κ.τ.λ.). 6. οὐδὲ γὰρ ἂν δύναντο, for they would not even be able, sc. if they wished. ἂν referring to an implied condition. G. 226, b; II. A. 903.

D. 6. οὐ...θεμιτὸν = nefas, not in accordance with the law of nature and of God, and therefore not possible in the nature of things. Schleiermacher: nicht in der Ordnung. Cousin: pas... au pouvoir. Stallbaum: neque legibus divinis sapientiae respondere. 7. ἄμεινον ἄνδρι, for a better man to be injured by a worse, instead of ἄμεινον ἄνδρα, that a better man, etc., the design being to link it more closely with οὐ...θεμιτὸν εἶναι. This famous saying of Socrates has been widely quoted and commented on from the earliest times. Cf. Epic. Encheir. 52; Max. Tyr. Diss. 18, 8; Plut. de Tranq. 17; and not only by philosophers but by the Christian Fathers,
as Origen, Theodoret, etc. The reason for the assertion, as explained by Plutarch, and illustrated by Crito, 44, D, is, that bad men, however numerous and powerful, can not make the good man bad or the wise man a fool, and that is the only real evil which can befall a man. ἀποκτείνεις. Of note, 2, C. Here the word not only refers to the condemnation rather than the execution of the sentence, but, like the two verbs which follow, it has a causative sense = procure my condemnation to death, to exile, or to disfranchisement. 8. ἀρνησσέων denotes (not dishonor in general, as some have understood it, but) deprivation of civil rights. This might deprive of all rights and privileges, or do so only in part. ἄλλα ταῦτα, κ.τ.λ., but these this man (viz.; the prosecutor) probably supposed, and many another man perchance, to be great evils. τίς here gives an indefinite extension and application to ἄλλος, like many a in English. 10. ἄλλα πολὺ μᾶλλον, intellig. οἵοιμαι μέγα κακῶν. Stalib. 12. πολλοῦ δὲ ἐγὼ ὑπὲρ ἐμαυτοῦ ἀπολογεῖοι, I am very far from making a defense for my own sake. Observe the emphatic insertion and juxtaposition of ἐγὼ with ὑπὲρ ἐμαυτοῦ = I for myself. H. A. 1062. 14. ὑμῖν, dat. after δοῦν. Of note, 30, A. Socrates means that he was given or sent to the Athenians by Apollo to be their monitor and reprover.

E. 16. ἀφενός... προσκείμενον, really, though the comparison may be too ridiculous, attached to, etc. προσκείμενον, besides the passive sense of being attached to, involves also the active signification of pressing upon or following up, as a gadfly does a horse, to suit which the word was chosen. γέλοιωτερον. H. A. 649, b. The clause explains τοιοῦτον instead of the more regular construction with ὑμῖν. 19. μῶσος may mean a spur or a gadfly. Ficinus, Schleiermacher, Ast, Cousin, and some others, take it here in the former sense. But the epithets προσκείμενον, προστεθεικένα, and προσκαθίζων, apply better to a gadfly. Moreover, this makes the comparison more laughable (γέλοιωτερον), and is more in the spirit of the Socratic irony. So Forster, Stallbaum, Carey, etc. 20. οἶον δὴ, as for instance now, introduces the explanation or application of the simile of the gadfly. Such is the prevailing use of οἶον by Plato.
A. 25. ἵσως is often strengthened by τάχια, and is equivalent to mayhap. ἀχθόμενοι...πειθόμενοι. The reader will observe the singular succession of participles. Some of them may be rendered into English by verbs; ἀν gives a potential sense to the participle (κρούσατες), G. 207, 1; H. A. 987, a: but you mayhap being offended, just like sleepers when they are roused out of sleep, would (will) dash at me, and hearkening to Anytus, rashly put me to death. 26. κρούσατες still keeps up the allusion to the gadfly. So does ἐπιπέμψεις, send upon you. 1. ἄρι ο' εἰν ὑγχάσῳ, κ.τ.λ., but that I am just (ὑγχάσῳ ἂν) such a person, as to have been given by the god to the city, you might discern from this fact. The thing to be proved is that his character is such, that he might well be supposed to have a divine mission; and the proof is his self-forgetfulness and disinterested devotedness to the highest good of others, which, he argues, is something more than human (οὗ γὰρ ἄνθρωπων ὦκε). Compare Cousin's translation and Stallbaum's note ad loc. δεδόσθαι. G. 261; H. A. 952.

B. 5. ἀνέχεσθαι τῶν οἰκείων ἀμελουμένων, to suffer my private affairs to be neglected. It will be seen, from the τοσάτα ἢ ἢ ἢ, that both ἀνέχεσθαι and πράττειν express continued past action, in other words, they are imperfects. 10. εἰχον ἂν τινα λόγον, I should have some reason, i. e., my conduct would be explicable on ordinary grounds without supposing a divine mission. 12. τοῦτο...ἀπαναχυντήσας, to reach this (such a) pitch of shamelessness. G. 159, N. 2; H. A. 716, b. ἀπὸ in the verb is emphatic, to be so utterly shameless.

O. 14. ἢ ἐσπαξάμην...ἡ ὕπνοια, that I ever either exacted or asked pay of any one. πράττεσθαι = exigere (ex-agere), ausmachen, make money. ἰκανον...πενιαν, for sufficient, I think, is the witness (observe the article τὸν μάρτυρα) I bring forward, that I speak the truth, viz., my (well-known) poverty: παρέχομαι μάρτυρα καὶ δ μάρτυς ἂν παρέχομαι ἰκανός ἐστιν, pred. use of adj. Ad rem, cf. note, 28, B. 18. ἀναβαίνων, unemphatic. Socrates, like other citizens, was obliged to be present in the assembly.
D. 21. θεῖον τι καὶ δαιμόνιον, something divine and demoniacal, if we may be allowed to use the word demoniacal in its etymological sense of superhuman, or proceeding from daimones. Cf. note, 27, D. 22. ἐπικαμφθὼν, calumniating or satirizing after the manner of the ancient comedy. The reference is to the ἐπεισόδια δαιμόνια καὶ ἡδίστημι of the indictment, 24, B. 24. δεὶ ἐπορεύεται . . . προφητεύει δὲ ὡσπορεῖ. Ast makes this statement an argument against the Platonic authorship of the Apology, as being inconsistent with what Xenophon (Mem. iv, 8, 5) and others say of the positive as well as negative character of the divine influence. But the same declaration is made almost in the same words in the Theages, 128, D. So Cicero likewise understood it, de Div. 1, 54: nunquam impellenti, sæpe revocanti. And though Xenophon, and Plato himself in other passages (e.g., Phaed. 242, B, C; Theæt. 151. A), appear to ascribe to the voice a persuasive as well as dissuasive influence, that is only a general statement of the fact, whereas here we have a more definite and precise explanation of the manner; for, after all, the discrepancy is more apparent than real, since a dissuasive from all that he should not do, involved instruction in all that he should do. Cf. 40, A, B, C; also Schleiermacher’s note ad loc. As to the nature of this voice, or sign or oracle, as he elsewhere calls it (ἡ μαντήκη ἡ τοῦ δαιμονίου . . . τὸ τοῦ θεοῦ σημείον, 40, A), there has always been much discussion, and the question may still perhaps be said to be sub judice. Some have supposed that Socrates believed himself to be under the guidance of a particular daimon, guardian genius or tutelar divinity, whose special, if not sole office, was to lead and protect him. But no such idea would be gathered from this, nor indeed from any other passage in Plato or Xenophon, where this subject is mentioned. Others have gone to the opposite extreme and have come to the conclusion that the daimon of Socrates was nothing more than the voice of reason, considered as the voice of God, in his own soul. But this falls as far below the demands of the passage before us—of the appropriate significance of the language of Socrates—as the other goes beyond and superadds to it. After a diligent
comparison of the language of Plato and Xenophon, together

with such light as Plutarch, Cicero, and subsequent writers
have shed on the subject, I find scarcely any room left for
doubt that Socrates meant by his φωνή, and θείων τι καὶ
dαιμόνιον, very nearly that same divine teaching and guidance
which good men in every age have believed to be communica-
ted to themselves, and to all who seek it by prayer and in
the use of proper means—partly within the soul, and yet not
from within but from above—partly by outward signs, omens,
oracles, dreams, and visions. Cf. below 88, C; ἐκ μαντείων
καὶ ἐξ ἐνυπνίων, κ.τ.λ. Certainly the Apology gives us no in-
timation of a tutelary divinity peculiar to himself, and in the
Memorabilia, Socrates explicitly declares, that the same divine
teaching is within the reach of all men. Cf. below, 40, A,
B, C; Xen. Mem. i, 1, 3, 4; i, 4, 15, 18; iv, 9, 13; iv, 8, 1.
See also an interesting discussion of this question in Plutarch,
De Genio Socratis. 24. τοῦτο is the object of πράττειν, which
is transferred to the relative clause = τοῦτο πράττειν δὲ ἐν
μέλῳ πράξειν. Al. τούτου gen. after ἀπορρέει. 28. πάλαι.
He would be allowed to take part in public life from the
age of 20.

Ε. 1. ἀπολάλη ... ἀφελήκη. This form of the pluperfect

is common in Plato, though not to the exclusion of the com-
mong form, cf. ἡνύθειν ... ἢθειν, 22, D. G. 119, 4; H. A.
458, a. Observe the repetition of ἐν in each disjunctive clause
(πάλαι ἐν ... οὕτ᾿ ἐν ὑμᾶς ... οὕτ᾿ ἐν ἐμαυτῶν) and compare
the examples in Stallb. here and at Gorg. 476, E. 3. οὐ γὰρ
ἔστων ... οὕτ᾿ ὑμῖν οὕτ᾿ ἄλλῳ πλήθει οὐδενὶ ... ἐναντιοῦμενος.
A striking repetition of the negative. Socrates shows him-
self no demagogue or even democrat. In this, he had the
company and sympathy of most of the literary men and
philosophers of Athens, who, as a class, cherished little re-
spect or affection—and had little reason, in their personal
relations to it, to cherish respect or affection—for the Athenian
democracy. But more than this, the unbending integrity and
firmness of Socrates placed him often in the attitude of oppo-
sition to the existing government, whether democratic or
aristocratic, in so much that he was deemed quite an impracti-
cable. Compare his resistance to the popular assembly as described below, 32, B, with his refusal to obey the thirty tyrants in the arrest and "rendition" of a fugitive from oppression, 32, D; Xen. Mem. iv, 4, 2, 3.

32 A. 7. Kal el μελλει. Kal el, even if, is to be distinguished from el kal, although. kal el concedes what is not true, or what is true only to a limited degree (the limit here being marked by δέλγον χρόνον); el kal concedes what is true, simply and without degrees. Cf. Hermann ad Viger. 882; Stallb. ad loc.; and H. A. 1053, 2, a. 8: μη δημοσιεύειν. In Xen. Mem. i, 6, 15, Socrates gives as a reason for not engaging in public affairs, that he could do more to control and benefit the state by educating as many others as possible to be good citizens and able statesmen, than he could by undertaking the affairs of state in his own person. 13. οὕτως ἀν ἐνί ῥηεκάθοιμι, I would not yield in the least to any one whatever. οὕτως... ἐνι is more emphatic than οὕδεν. ῥηεκάθοιμι: for the form, cf. G. 119, 11; H. A. 494. The verbs of this form have been taken as intensive, but examples fail to prove that they differ in meaning from the simple forms. It remains also a matter of question whether they should be treated as presents or sorists, though this verb is now generally taken as the latter.

14. μὴ ῥηεκὼν δὲ, κ.τ.λ., and as soon as I did not yield, just so soon I should perish. The first ἄμα belongs with ῥηεκὼν, the second, strengthened by kal, with ἀπολογεῖν. 15. φορτικὰ μὲν καὶ διακακὰ, displeasing and wearisome indeed. διακακὰ has reference primarily to pleadings in the courts of law, which are apt to be tediously minute and circumstantial. Some take it here in the sense of boastful. It is fair to say that the exact meaning of these words is not very well established.

B. 16. ἄλλην μὲν... ἔβολευοα δὲ, I never held any other office, but I was made a member of the βουλή (council of five hundred). See the same fact, and βουλεύω used in the same sense, Xen. Mem. i, 1, 18. For the use of the aor. to signify entrance upon the office, cf. G. 200, N. 5, b; H. A. 841. 17. ἦμὼν ἡ φυλή 'Αντιόχεις, the tribe to which Socrates belonged, viz., Antiochis. 18. πρυγενεύουσα, presiding, i. e., furnishing
the prytanes, who acted as presidents both of the council and of the popular assembly. Each of the ten tribes chose by lot fifty representatives in the council, and these representatives, or the tribe through them, presided during about one tenth of the lunar year, or thirty-five days. Moreover, these fifty representatives of the tribe were subdivided into five bodies of ten men each, each of which presided during a fifth part of the presidency of the tribe, i.e., about one week. Out of these ten proedri (as they were called) for the week, an ἐπιστάτης or chief president was chosen by lot, who held the keys of the public treasury and archives, and presided as chairman in the council and also in the assembly for one day. Socrates was ἐπιστάτης on that day when the fate of the ten generals was to be decided, and refused to put the illegal proposition to vote in the assembly. Cf. Xen. Mem. iv, 4, 2: ἐν ταῖς ἐκκλησίαις ἐπιστάτης γενόμενος. τοὺς δέκα στρατηγοὺς. The Athenians chose ten generals, one for each tribe, at the commencement of a war. Sometimes they were all in the field together. More frequently, however, only three were sent out to carry on the war, while the others took charge of the war department at home. In the case before us, the battle at Arginusæ, only eight were actually present. For the details, see Xen. Hellen. i, 7. 19. τοὺς οὐκ ἄνελομπον, who did not bring away for burial the bodies of the slain. They were victorious in the battle (over the Lacedemonians at Arginusæ), and in order to pursue the enemy, they left the care of the dead to some of the inferior officers, instead of attending to it in person. For this they were accused before the assembly, and, in spite of the intervention of Socrates, condemned, and six of them actually put to death. The fact illustrates in a striking manner the sacred interest and importance which the Greeks attached to the rite of burial. Though they had gained the victory, the generals had not done their duty or finished their work, till the dead were buried. So the Iliad was not deemed complete till the burial rites of the heroes, Achilles and Hector, were narrated in the 23d and 24th Books; and the Ajax and Antigone of Sophocles are prolonged to considerable extent beyond the
catastrophe for the same purpose—to put the minds of Grecian hearers and readers at rest from that pious horror which they entertained of remaining unburied. Had certain critics of the Homeric poems considered this matter duly, they would not have found in the last two books an argument against the unity of the Iliad. For the account of the feeling at Athens, cf. Grote, Part II, chap. lxiv. τοις ἐκ τῆς ναυμαχίας. Cf. G. 191, N. 6; H. A. 788 and a. 20. ἀδρόνους, together, by one vote, cf. μὴ ψήφος, Xen. Mem. i, 1, 18. παρανόμως. The law required that the vote should be taken separately, cf. Xen. Hel. i, 7, 37: κρίνομαι δίχα ἐκαστὸν. ἐσθοοεῖ. Xenophon says (Hel. i, 7, 39), they soon repented of it, and punished the authors of the measure as deceivers of the people. 21. ἐγὼ μένος, κ.τ.λ. The prytanes all opposed at first, but when threatened with the vengeance of the people, they all gave in except Socrates, the son of Sophroniscus. Xen. Hel. i, 7, 15. 22. μυθέν ποιεῖν. G. 283, 6; H. A. 1029. Compare, however, 31, D and E. It is to be noticed that κωλύω does not take μή with its inf. ἐνδεικνύω καὶ ἀπάγω, to indict me and lead me away to punishment. As Attic law terms, these verbs signify an especially summary proceeding without the formality or delay of a criminal prosecution. See Lex. under ἐνδείξεις and ἀπαγωγή. 25. βοῶτον. See in Xen. Hel. i, 7, 13, 14, the tumult and uproar of the meeting.

O. 1. Ἑπείδη δὲ ἐλιγμαχία ... οἱ τριάκοντα. There was always an oligarchic faction at Athens, who were aided and sustained by Lacedemonian influence; and when, at the close of the Peloponnesian war, the Lacedemonians triumphed, they placed thirty of this faction in the supreme power, who were afterward known as the thirty (or the thirty tyrants). The noun added to the numeral is a later expression. 2. με πείρατον ἄντων, myself and four others. H. A. 681, b. εἰς τὴν θόλον. The round building where the fifty prytanes held their sittings and dined together at public expense, used also by the thirty. Compare the round temple of Vesta in Rome, which was the fireside or hearthstone of the early Romans. 3. Διονυσία τῶν Σαλαμίνων. A native of Salamis, but a citizen of Athens,
who had withdrawn to Salamis to escape the power of the tyrants. 6. ἀναπλήσας αἶρόν, to implicate in their own crimes.

D. 7. ἀν, again, or in turn, sc. as in the case of the ten generals under the democracy. So also above, l. 2. He resisted the democracy and the oligarchy alike in their wrong doings. 8. εἰ μὴ ἀγροκύτερον, if it were not too rude (rustic) an expression, is an apology for the use of οὐδὲ ὁμοίων in such a connection as would probably offend the polite ears of the Athenians. Of. Enuthyd. 283, E; Gorg. 509, A. 9. τούτον δὲ τῶ πῶν μέλει, for this, I say, I care everything. τῶ πῶν is an adverbial or synecdochial acc., the exact opposite of οὐδὲ ὁμοίων. 10. ἐμὲ γὰρ ἐκεῖνη ἡ ἀρχὴ, κ.τ.λ., for me (emphatic both in form and position) that government (of the thirty), strong as it then was, did not so terrify. 13. ἡγαγὼν Δέωντα. He was put to death. Xen. Hel. ii, 8, 39. φύλονται, went immediately home. 15. διὰ ταχέως = ταχέως. The government of the Thirty Tyrants lasted only about eight months before Thrasybulus advanced against them. It was then some months later before peace was established.

E. 17. τούσδε ἵτη, so many years as I have lived. 18. ἐπραττόν. The imperf. denotes continued action. 19. τοῖς δίκαιοις, the things that are just = justice. ἐπερ χρῆ, as one ought always to do—this is implied in the present. 21. οὐδὲ γὰρ ἂν ἄλλος ἀνθρώπων οὐδείς, sc. διεγένετο, would have lived so many years.

A. 28. τούτωσ φανοῦμαι, shall be found (on examination) 33 such a man, sc. one who has never fallen in with any one in anything contrary to justice, as explained by the following clause. 26. ἐμοῖς μαθητὰς ἐλνα. Socrates was charged by his enemies with the crimes of Critias and Alcibiades, the one the prince of demagogues and the other the leader of the Thirty Tyrants. They had indeed listened to his conversations; but neither they nor indeed any other man (he proceeds to say) were his disciples, for he had no disciples, and never professed to be a teacher. Hence he never called his hearers μαθηταῖ, but οἱ συνόντες. See this whole topic discussed at length, Xen. Mem. i, 2. 27. τὰ ἐμαυτοῦ, my proper
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business, my appointed mission, already described as assigned him by Apollo.

B. 1. οὐδὲ gives emphatic denial to both clauses as unified by μὲν and δὲ. 2. μὴ λαμβάνων δὲ οὐ, sc. διαλέγομαι, but in case I do not receive pay, not converse. 3. παρέχω . . . ἐρωτᾶν, I give liberty to question me to rich and poor alike, and if any one choose to answer my question, and hear what I may say, I give him liberty to do that. παρέχω ἐμαυτόν is to be supplied from the previous clause. For the voice of ἐρωτᾶν, cf. G. 261, 2, R; H. A. 952, a. Compare Gorgias, 480, D, ἐκεῖνον μὲν γε πληγῶν ἡξα ἡμερῶν τίπτειν παρέχομαι. 5. τοῦτον . . . δὲν . . . μηδεὶς. Of (in respect to) these (alleged disciples) I should not justly bear the responsibility, to no one of whom I ever promised, etc.

C. 18. ὁ δὲ ἀκούοντες χαίροντοι, κ.τ.λ. The same words are used above, 23, C. There, however, the participle ἀκούοντες stands last, and is followed by its proper case, the genitive, ἔτεσαμενοι, κ.τ.λ., while here the verb χαίροντο follows the participle and is followed by its appropriate case, the dative, viz., ἔτεσαμενοι, κ.τ.λ., I told you the whole truth, viz., that they enjoy hearing examined those who think they are wise but are not. 16. τοῦτο, sc. to examine those who suppose that they are wise but are not. ὡς ἐγώ φημι, resumptive of the claim as made before. 17. παρ᾽ ἑαυτῷ. Among these ways, Xenophon (Mem. 1, 1, 8) specifies οἰνοῖς, θυσίας, φήμας, συμβάλλως. 20. εὐλεγεῖτα, strictly, easy to be confuted; but here, easy to be tested and proved. εἰ γὰρ δὲν, for if really.

D. 21. χρῆν δήπορ, they ought surely. The imperf. implies that they were not doing it. G. 222, N. 2; H. A. 897. εἶναι τινες αὐτῶν πρεσβύτεροι γενόμενοι . . . νινοὶ οὖν αὐτοῖς, κ.τ.λ., both if any of them, after having become older, became conscious that when they were young, etc. Instead of εἶναι the correlative member of the sentence begins with the more emphatic εἰ δέ. So below, 40, D, E, εἶναι δὴ μνημεία αὐτοθυσ. . . . εἰ δὲ αὖ οὖν ἀποδημῆσαι. So δὲ is sometimes antithetic to τέ, and οὖν τέ οὖτε. 25. αὐτοῖς, themselves, in contradistinction from their relatives. So αὐτοῖς in the previous clause. 28. μεμψημέναι depends on χρῆν in the antithetic member of
the sentence, the force of which still continues. 1. ἔπαθοι. H. A. 788, b. 2. Κρίνων οίνωρι, this Crito here. His name has become identified with that of Socrates, as his friend and patron, and is perpetuated in the Platonic dialogue, or rather monologue, called Crito. He was a wealthy Athenian, of the same δῆμος (δημός) or ward as Socrates, viz., Alopece, and now, it seems, like him, far advanced in life. The son Critobulus seems to have evoked great admiration for his beauty, but as an example of enlarged manhood to have done little credit either to his father or his teacher. Cf. Xen. Mem. i, 3, 8 seqq.; Athen. 220, A; Xen. Symp. iv, 10.

E. 3. Αὐρανίες. Cf. Diog. Laert. 2, 60. ὁ Σφῆττος, of the deme Sphettus. It was customary at Athens to add by way of distinction to the name of the individual the ward to which he belonged, and often also the name of his father. The same object was accomplished at Rome, as it also is in modern times, by several names. 4. Αλοχίνων, usually called the Socratic, to distinguish him from the orator of the same name. He established no school of philosophy, but taught the doctrines of his master for money, and wrote Socratic dialogues. The extant dialogues, however, which bear his name are not genuine. ὁ Κρήσων, of the deme Cephisia. This Antiphon is to be distinguished from the orator and from several others of the same name. The son, Epigenes, is mentioned by Xenophon (Mem. iii, 12), as well as by Plato in his Phædo, 59. 5. τοῖνυ, moreover, is not inferential but transitional, as it often is in the orators as well as the philosophers. Cf. Stallb. ad loc., also Schaefer ad Demosth. Several of the names which follow are found only here, e. g., Nicostratus, Theodotus, Paralus, and Αἰαντοδόρος. Touching Demodocus, see Theag. 127, E; Adeimantus, brother of Plato, de Repub. 857–868, 548; Apollodorus, Phæd. 59, A, 117, D; Xen. Mem. iii, 11, 17. Apollodorus was a most ardent and devoted follower of Socrates. Theages and Plato also were favorite disciples. 8. καταδηνθεῖν = Latin, deprecari, sensus est: non potest Theodotus Nicostratum fratrem rogere, ne me accuset et contra me testetur. Stallb.

A. 13. μᾶλιστα μὲν is correlative to εἰ δὲ τὸν. The best 34
time for Meletus to call some of these witnesses—the time when he ought especially to have called them—was in the course of his argument before the court; but if he forgot it then, etc. 15. παρακατάφυ, give way, yield him the floor, as we say, or in the technical language of the Greek bar, let him speak or testify during my water (the measure of time by the clepsydra). Cf. Mahaffy, Primer of Old Greek Life, sect. 98.

B. 20. ἀν λὸγον ἑγοῦν βοηθοῦντες, might have a reason for helping me, i.e., for defending me, right or wrong. 22. ἀλλὰ ἦ. Cf. note, 20. D. 23. ξοισίας Μελήτος, κ.τ.λ. They know as Meletus knows, etc. Comp. note, 21. B. 25. Βέλω. Cf. note, 19. A. Socrates here concludes his direct defense, ἄ μὲν ... ἀπολογεῖσθαι ... τοιῶτα, and proceeds to justify himself in not resorting to the ordinary means of moving the compassion of his judges and so saving his life. Cf. Mahaffy, Primer of Greek Life, sect. 96. 27. Ταχὰ δὲ ἃν, κ.τ.λ. Such means of acquittal were expressly prohibited by law. Cf. Demost. adv. Timocr.; Xen. Mem. iv, 4, 4. But the law was disregarded, and it was the prevailing practice to bring in the wives and children of the accused, and to resort to all possible ways of exciting the compassion of the judges, as is manifest from many passages of the orators and of Aristophanes, e.g., Vesp. 568 sqq.; Demost. in Mid. 99; Isoc. de Perm. 31. Ast thinks the Apology here a manifest imitation of Isocrates in the passage last cited, and therefore not genuine; but with how little reason, see Schleiermacher ad loc.

C. 4. ἐγὼ δὲ οὐδὲν ἄρα, κ.τ.λ., while I, as ought to have been expected (ἄρα), will do none of these things. 5. καὶ τοιῶτα, and that, too, when incurring, etc.

D. 9. οὐκ ἀγιῶ ἡμῖν γὰρ ἔγωγε, εἰ δὲ οὖν, for I for my part do not expect it, but if, I say, any one of you is in such a state of mind. For άγιω, cf. 19, D; for οὖν, 21, A. 11. καὶ γὰρ τοιὸν αὐτὸ τὸ τοῖς Ομήρου, and well I may have, for in the very language of Homer. Acc. in apposition with a sentence, G. 137, N. 3; Η. A. 626, b. So quotations, especially proverbs, are often introduced. The quotation is from Od. 19, 163, where Odysseus, in the guise of a beggar, is thus addressed by Penelope. The expression is proverbial, and denotes that
the person to whom it is applied is a man among men, sprung from men and related to them. 14. vieis ... τρεις, and sons even, men of Athens, three of them, cf. Crit. 47, B, note. μενάκας, a young man, sc. Lamprocles, who is called μεγας in Phæd. 65, and is introduced in Xen. Mem. ii, 2, holding a conversation with his father touching his filial duty to his termagant mother. 15. παιδία, small children, sc. Sophroniscus and Menexenus, cf. Phæd. 8, where they are called σφυρηλ. Seneca (Epis. 104) says that the sons of Socrates resembled their mother rather than their father.

E. 18. ἄλλοι εἰ μὲν, κ.τ.λ., but whether I can meet death with confidence or not is another question. He barely hints at this as one reason for his course, but modestly dismisses it as not exactly pertinent on the present occasion. 20. πρὸς δὲ οὖν δύκα, however that may be, for reputation both mine and yours, etc. Cf. note, 17, A. So just below, ἄλλοι οὖν δεδογμένων, but whatever may be the fact, it is at least supposed. 22. τηλικώνδε, sc. seventy, cf. 17, D. τούτο τοῦτοντα, sc. σοφός, cf. 23, A. 23. ψεῦδος, the subs. is often associated with the adj. ἀπειθείς, as shown by Heindorf, Ast, and Stallbaum.

A. 28. τι εἶναι. H. A. 708, a. 2. ὅπερ . . . ἐσομένων. G. 277, N. 3; 278, 1, N.; H. A. 978, a; 972, a. 9. καὶ ὅτι εἶναι, to be even anything whatever, i.e., to have any weight of character, however inconsiderable. 14. χωρὶς δὲ τῆς δύκας, but irrespective of the reputation, sc. which attaches to me and of which we have been speaking. Observe the force of the article. The emphatic negative οὔτε should also be noticed; it appears to me that it is not even right. The second οὔτε is not merely correlative to the first, but emphatic = no nor, or nor even.

O. 17. καταχαρίζεσθαι τὰ δίκαια is to pervert justice for the sake of pleasing. So κατα-χρώσθαι = mis-use or abuse. 18. ταύτα, sc. τὰ δίκαια = justice. δικαστής. The oath of office taken by the δικαστής, and the security it afforded, are very often adverted to, particularly by the Attic orators, e.g., Demos. de Cor. 2 and 6. The substance of the oath was that they would administer justice according to the laws so far as
there were laws, and where no laws existed, according to their own best judgment of what was right. Cf. Poll. Onom. 8, 122; Demos. adv. Lept. 118. 21. ἐθίζεσθαι. The passive has permissive meaning, nor should you permit yourselves to be accustomed. Cf. Crito, 48, D: ἄγομενοι, permitting ourselves to be taken away.

D. 24. ἄλλως τε μὲν τοι... πάνωσ καὶ, both every other way, to be sure, but especially when accused of impiety, etc., cf. note on ἄλλως τε καὶ, 26, E. The expected order is broken suddenly to emphasize the utter inconsistency of such a proposition. 25. σαφῶς γὰρ ἂν, cf. note, ἀσπέρ σοι ἂν, 17, D. 27. θεοῖ... εἰναι. Observe the emphatic position of these words, the one at the beginning, the other at the end of the clause: I should teach you not to believe in the existence of the gods. 2. νομίζω τε γὰρ, sc. θεοῖς, for I both believe in them. ὡς οἶδεις = more than any. 3. καὶ ὑμῖν εἰπτρέπω καὶ τῷ θεῷ κρίνα, and I commit it to you and the god to decide. This clause is to be closely connected with its correlative clause (νομίζω τε... καὶ... εἰπτρέπω), and in that connection it implies, that he shows his belief in the gods practically by his calm reliance on the providence of God in this trial for his life. It will be observed that Socrates here uses the singular τῷ θεῷ, though he has been using the plural just before. He may refer to the god at Delphi, of whom he has often before spoken particularly, and in the singular number (cf. τὸν θεὸν τὸν ἐν Δαλφοῖς, 20, E, sqq.), and who, having indirectly, by means of the oracle, involved him in difficulty, would now provide for the best result; or he may refer to the supreme God, whom he often, as represented in the writings both of Plato and Xenophon, singles out and distinguishes from the inferior deities (cf. Xen. Mem. iv, 8, 13).

With the above words of pious resignation and confidence, Socrates concludes the first and principal part of his defense, and submits the question of guilty or not guilty to his judges. They pronounce him guilty by a small majority of votes. The question still remained, what punishment should be inflicted. In all those cases, where the laws do not prescribe the penalty (ἄγονες ἀτιμητο) — and charges of impiety were of this sort,
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cf. Dem. in Timoc. 702, 5—it was customary for the accuser to propose what he deemed a suitable penalty (τιμᾶσθαι), and the accused, if he chose, to propose some other punishment (ἀντιτιμᾶσθαι or ὑποτιμᾶσθαι), and then the judges decided between these two, no third proposition being admissible. Cf. Grote, vol. viii, chap. 68; also Boeckh, Meier and Schöemann, and Smith's Dict. Antiqg.: Ἀγώνες ἀντιμητοὶ καὶ τιμητοὶ. The accusers of Socrates pronounced him worthy of death. Had Socrates chosen to propose banishment, for instance, instead of death, he might doubtless have escaped the extreme penalty, cf. 37, O; Crit. 52, C. But when he disdained to acknowledge guilt by any counter-proposal, and even claimed reward instead of punishment as his due, the judges took offense and sentenced him to death. His remarks on what he thought the proper sentence constitute the second part of the Apology, capp. 25–29.

A. 6. τὸ μὲν μη ἀγανακτεῖν depends on ξυμβάλλεται. The 36 infinitive is emphatic in its position, and suggests a word of prevention, as in the mind. ξυμβάλλεται would regularly take a preposition—εἰς or possibly πρὸς, cf. Rep. 1, 331, B, where the inf. is repeated in εἰς τοῦτο. The article simply marks the infinitive a little more distinctly as the object of the main action; otherwise we should expect the infinitive alone. The μὲν is correlative to δὲ at the commencement of the next chapter: Τιμᾶται δ' οὖν. 7. μου. G. 178, 2, N.; H. A. 752. ἄλλα τε... καὶ, both many other things conspire to cause, and especially the fact that it has happened to me not unexpectedly, cf. note on ἄλλα τε καὶ, 28, C. The full and regular construction would have been καὶ δὴ καὶ τοῦτο δὲι οὖκ ἄνθρωπον, κ.τ.λ. ἄλλα and its derivatives are used with reference to objects of fear as well as hope. So spee and sperare in Latin, cf. Verg. At sperate Deos memores fandi atque nefandi. 11. παρ' ἀλίγον... παρὰ πολὺ. παρὰ implies comparison, for I, for my part, did not suppose it would be thus by little, but by much, sc. that the votes against me would exceed those in my favor. Cf. H. A. 802, near the end. οὐτω belongs to ἀλίγον, cf. 40, Α: πάνω ἐνὶ σμικροῖς, where πάνω goes with σμικροῖς. 12. εἰ τριάκοντα μόναι, κ.τ.λ. We have accepted here the reading of
Stallbaum, Cron, and the best MSS., instead of the common reading τρεῖς. If a change of thirty votes would have turned the scale, the majority against Socrates must have been sixty. Diogenes Laertius, ii, 41, as usually interpreted, says that the number of votes against him was 281. Deducting 60 from this number, we have 221 for the number of votes in his favor, and 502 for the whole number of votes cast. But the sections of the Heliastic courts usually consisted of 500 each, or a multiple of 500, with one additional dicast to avoid a tie vote. And if 281 of the 501 dicasts voted against Socrates, only 220 could have voted for him, and then a transfer of 30 votes would not have secured his acquittal. We may suppose, however, that he was content with an approximate statement in round numbers. 12. μετέπεσον, fallen over, sc. into the other urn, which received the votes for acquittal. 13. ἀποπεφεύγη. For this form of the plup. see note, 31, E. 15. ἄφθινη, etc. Upon the βῆμα to aid Meletus in the advocacy of his cause, cf. note, 18, B. 17. χιλίας δραχμάς. The prosecutor, unless he received a fifth part of the votes, was liable to a fine of a thousand drachmas and also a forfeiture (ἀρμία) of the right to appear as prosecutor in future—a very useful and very necessary check on the virulence of public prosecutions in the Athenian courts. Cf. Dem. de Cor. 103; in Mid. 28; Boeckh, Pub. Econ. Ath., chap. ix, 11. Socrates argues that Meletus (not being the most popular or influential of the three accusers), if he had been the sole prosecutor, would not have carried more than a third as many votes as were actually gained by the joint influence of the three, and consequently would not have received a fifth part of all the votes. Cf. Schleier. ad loc. τὸ πέμπτον μέρος. Observe the force of the article, the required fifth according to the well-known law. Demosthenes (de Cor. 103) uses simply τὸ μέρος in the same way, the required portion.

B. 19. ὁ ἀνήρ, sc. the accuser, of whom he had just been speaking in the foregoing chapter. τιμᾶται is middle voice. The usage in regard to the penalty and counter-penalty (τιμᾶσθαι and ἀντιτιμᾶσθαι) has been explained above. 20. ἵμαν can be taken as ethical dative. τῆς αξίας is gen. of price after
ANTEINHMOSAI, to be supplied from the question. 21. ἢ δῆλον, or is it needless to ask—is it evident, etc. 22. παθέω refers to corporal punishment, ἀποκήρυκα to a pecuniary penalty. The question is asked in the words of a judicial formula, cf. Dem. in Timoc. 105. ὃ τι μαθὼν differs from τι μαθὼν only in being relative and indirect. It may be rendered because, but further indicates surprise or censure. This implication can be expressed in English only by a parenthesis: because I did not keep quiet (and what had I taken into my head, literally, learned, that I did not). Cf. M. and T. 109, N. 7, b, near the end; Η. Α. 968, c. 23. ὑπαρχεῖν οἱ πολλοί, so. ἐπιμελοῦνται, supplied from ἀμελήσας, as often a positive from a corresponding negative word, not caring for those things which the mass care for. 25. τῶν Ἀλλῶν ἀρχῶν, not the other magistracies, for the specifications which precede are not all magistracies, but the rest, so. the magistracies, or the magistracies besides. So Gorg. 478, C: πολίτων καὶ τῶν Ἀλλῶν ξένων=the citizens and the rest, viz., the strangers. So οἱ Ἀλλοι is often used. See Lex. Ἀλλος, 8. ξυνωμοσύνα καὶ στάσεων. Conspiracies and factions abounded at Athens in the age of Socrates. 27. εἰςεκινήσεως ... σφίγησε, too upright a man to be safe if I went into these things. ἄντα is better established than ἔστα. Its pregnant meaning with εἰς has a parallel in πάρεισιν ἐνταῦθα, 83, D. Notice also ἐνταῦθα with ἢ in the next line. For both, cf. Η. Α. 788.

C. 1. ἐνταῦθα here is equivalent to ἐν τῷ τούτῳ, answering to ἐν τῷ εὐρέστειν, and ἢ ἕν is redundant: but to go and confer on each individually the greatest benefit, to this (literally, there) I went. 8. τῶν τε Ἀλλῶν ... ἐπιμελεῖσθαι, that is, on the principle that the man is more than his property, the state more than its possessions, and in general persons or things more than their appurtenances. The same great principle is often inculcated by our Lord in the gospels, cf. Mat. vi, 25, 88.

D. 11. τιμᾶσθαι here also is mid. = to amerce myself. Compare E, below: εἰ οὖν δεῖ με κατὰ τὸ δίκαιον τὴς ἐξίας τιμᾶσθαι. 12. τουτοῦτον δὲ τι, instead of τουτοῦτον οὖν, to make it more indefinite; such a good of whatever kind it may be, as, etc. Below we have a still more singular mixing of correlative: μᾶλλον πρέπει οὖν, ὡς, where we should expect
μᾶλλον ... ἢ or οὖν ὡς, but find both forms brought together. A similar construction occurs at 30, A: πρότερον μηδὲ οὖν σφόδρα ὡς, except that there μηδὲ is interpolated between πρότερον and οὖν, and makes the construction somewhat less concise and abrupt. 18. πείητε. Cf. note, 28, B. εὐεργήτης, a public benefactor, a term of honor, which the Athenians conferred by formal vote on those who had deserved well of the state, and which foreigners, and even foreign kings and princes, were ambitious to receive. So in Egypt, Ptolemy Euergetes. ἐπὶ τῇ ὑμετέρᾳ παρακελεύεις, for your admonition, i.e., to instruct you, the adj. taking the place of the objective gen. 14. μᾶλλον πρέπει, see above. 15. ἐν πρυτανείᾳ οἰκεῖος. The Prytaneum was a sort of city hall or state house, where the laws and public archives were kept, where some of the magistrates had their meals, and entertained, at the public expense, not only ambassadors from foreign states, but citizens who had deserved well of the state. Cron says, "as table companion of certain officials. Not of the archons who ate in the θεσμοθεσίων, nor of the prytanes who ate in the θαλά, but apparently of certain priests." To be thus entertained was the highest honor. Socrates claims it as a εὐεργήτης who has rendered the most useful services to the state, and also as affording him the requisite leisure, that he might devote himself wholly to the instruction of the citizens.

16. πολύ γε μᾶλλον. Victors in the public games were honored with entertainment at the Prytaneum. Socrates claims the honor as due to himself much more at least than to such. ἵππος, a race-horse under a rider; ξυνωπίδι, a two-horse chariot; ξεύγει, a general term for carriage, here denotes especially a chariot drawn by more than two horses, and may be rendered four-horse chariot. 17. Ὀλυμπιάδων, at the Olympic games. The acc. (Ὀλυμπιάδα or Ὀλύμπια) more frequently follows μνᾶ. See Lex. under μνᾶ. 18. δοκεῖν εἰναί ... εἰναι. Socrates was an uncompromising enemy of all seeming, and often exposes the folly, as well as the baseness of it, since the best way to seem to be good (in whatever excellence), is to be good. Cf. Xen. Mem. 1, 7, 1. Compare the immortal verse of Ἀeschylus, 592, "Ἐπὶ Ἐπι Θήβας: ὦ γὰρ δοκεῖν ἄμιτος
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άλλα εἶναι ἰδέα. 19. ὁ μὲν τροφής οὐδὲν δεῖται, ἐγὼ δὲ δέομαι, sc. because he is rich, as the victor in a chariot must be, while I am poor. He here has respect to the πίστις above, as in the preceding clause he refers to the εὐφημία. He is a real benefactor, and he is really poor. He both deserves and needs to be provided for in the Prytaneum.

A. 22. παραπλησίως . . . ἄσπερ περὶ τοῦ οἰκτοῦ καὶ τῆς 37 ἀντιβολῆς. The reference is to chap. xxiii, where he scorns to resort to supplications or appeals to compassion, and yet denies that he does this ἀδοξάσεως, from arrogance. Here he employs the rare word ἀντιβολή instead of the usual ἅκρα. 25. τοιοῦτον ἀλλὰ τοιόνυν, not such as that, but such as this; not such as you suppose, but such as I proceed to explain (cf. note, 21, B), i. e., it is not arrogance but truth and duty that impels me. 26. ἐκῶν εἶναι is stronger than ἐκών alone. It means, so far as depends on my will. Cf. G. 268, N.; H. A. 956, a. 27. πείθω sometimes takes two acc. δειλέγετα. The perf. has respect to this apology, which he regards as virtually finished—it was finished so far as the question of guilt or innocence was concerned. 28. ἄσπερ καὶ ἄλλος ἀνθρώπους. He probably has particular reference to the Lacedemonians, whose laws Socrates, in common with most of the philosophers, highly revered, and who, as Thucydides and Plutarch inform us, never decided capital trials hastily, but extended them over several days.

B. 5. ἅδικήσεως. G. 202, 3, b. 6. τοῦ κακοῦ, some evil, i. e., any punishment. So τοιοῦτοι τινός, anything of this sort. It is gen. of price or penalty, and is accompanied with the dat. of the person (ἐμαυτῷ) on whom the penalty is assessed. The same construction is seen in ὧδε Μέλητος μοι τιμᾶτα, et passim. Ad rem, cf. note, 38, B. 7. ἢ μὴ πάθω. ἢ is interrogative: shall I do it through fear that I may suffer death, when I am so ignorant of death that I do not know whether it is a good or an evil? 9. ἁλωμα, subj. aor. in a deliberative question. It is to be rendered by the future. It is followed by a partitive genitive: shall I choose of those things which I know to be evil, so. imprisonment, banishment, etc. We have in this sentence another example of that usage.
which occurs so often in Plato—two constructions condensed into one. The author might have said: ἔλαμα τι τούτων ἃ ἐν όδα διὶ κακᾶ ἑστών, or ἔλαμα τι τούτων ἃ ἐν όδα κακὰ δύνα, or with attraction of the rel., ἄν ἐν όδα κακῶν δύναν. But instead of either we have parts of both.

C. 11. τῇ δὲ καθοραμένη ἄρχῃ, the ever-shifting government. The Eleven who had charge of the prisons, executions, etc., were chosen annually (one from each of the ten tribes, with a secretary). Socrates implies that it were hardly worth while to live subject to the caprice of such a succession of petty tyrants as might chance to be established from time to time (such is the exact force of δὲ καθοραμένη) over the public prisons. Cf. note on δὲ, 25, C. 12. διδόσα. • M. and T., 18, 8, N. 13. ἀλλὰ ταῦτων... ἔλεγον, sc. perpetual imprisonment, because he had no money and therefore would never be released. 15. τυμῆσομαι... τυμήσατε. Observe the change of voice. The middle voice is used of the accuser and the accused, and the active of the judges.

D. 20. βαρύτερα, too burdensome. It is fem. as referring to ἄγαμοι. 21. ἄλλοι δὲ ἄρα, κ.τ.λ., will others, then (or forthwith), bear them easily? The clause is an irregular apodosis to ύμεῖς μὲν ὄνεις, κ.τ.λ. 27. κἂν μὲν ταῦτας ἀπελαύνω, κ.τ.λ., and if on the one hand I do repulse them, they will themselves drive me out of the city. ἐξελώσι is Attic fut. G. 110, II, 2, N. 1 (b); H. A. 424.

E. 4. ἡμῖν, Eth. Dat., please tell us, is inserted simply to make the discourse more emphatic and subjective. G. 184, 8, N. 6; Π. A. 770. 5. ἐξέλθον, sc. into exile. 8. ὡς εἰρω-νευμένη, supposing that I spoke ironically.

Δ. 12. ὁ δὲ ἀνέγερτος, κ.τ.λ., and that a life without investigation is not worth living, literally, not to be lived. This clause depends on λίγω ὅτι, and ἀνέγερτος, contrary to the prevailing usage, is to be taken in an active sense. The active meaning, however, carries with it the passive. 13. ράτα δ’, this on the other hand. δέ emphasizes the apodosis in the latter of the two supposed cases. M. and T. 57.

Β. 18. διὰ τὴν ἐκκαίρων ἐκτίσεων, as much as I was about to pay, i. e., as much as I should be likely to be able to pay.
οὐδὲν γὰρ ἢν ἐσθάλαζε implies that he would have considered the loss of property, if he had it, no real loss. This accords with what he had said above (37, B), that he would not amerce himself to the amount of any evil, for he did not deserve it. 19. τινὶ δὲ νῦν γὰρ, but now I can not amerce myself in a sum of money, for I have not got it. It is usually printed thus: τινὶ δὲ—νῦν γὰρ, and treated as a case of apophasis. But this reading of Cron comes to the same thing. 25. αἰτῶ δὲ ἑγγυνάωθαί. Intell. φαμεῖ, quod continentur praecedenti verbo κελεύωντο. Stalb. 26. ἐξεργασάμεθα. Cf. note, 20, E. The comparatively small fine in which Socrates here proposes to amerce himself (only half a talent, or about $500), and the whole strain of his remarks on the subject, prove that he was not in earnest. Accordingly the Apology ascribed to Xenophon denies that he proposed a counter and lower assessment. He was not really desirous to preserve his life. He must have foreseen that his judges would not accept such a substitute for the death penalty, which the accusers had named in their indictment. He must also have known that his freedom of speech, his playful irony, and especially his assumption of entire innocence which merited reward instead of punishment, would provoke the hostility of those judges at least who had already pronounced him guilty, and, as they had to choose between the penalties proposed by the parties, they would certainly choose that of the accusers and put him to death. According to Diogenes Laertius, eighty who had voted for his acquittal now passed over to the majority and voted for his death. Cf. Cic. Orat. 1, 54: Socratis responsorio sio judices exarserunt, ut capitis hominem innocentissimum condemnarent.

Here ends the second part of the Defense. The vote is now taken touching the penalty, and Socrates is condemned to death by an increased majority. He then concludes his speech in a tone of conscious innocence and moral heroism, in which, as Cicero says, he appears, not so much in the attitude of a culprit or a suppliant before his judges, as of their master and lord.

C. 1. Οὐ πολλῶν ... χρόνων. The remainder of the life of Socrates (now 70 years of age) was so short, that it was
hardly worth their while to incur so much dishonor for the sake of extinguishing what would soon have terminated in the course of nature. 2. ἔνομα ἐξετε καὶ αἰτίαν, you will have the name and blame, both here in a bad sense, though often in a good one. For ἄνα, cf. note, 17, A.

D. 15. τολμᾷς καὶ ἀνασχυντίας, i. e., what Socrates would consider audacity and shamelessness, viz., daring to say and do such things, whether true or false, noble or ignoble, as would disgrace him, while persuading them. Cf. εἰὼ τις τολμᾷ πᾶν ποιεῖν, below, 39, A.

E. 20. τότε, sc. while making my defense, before sentence was pronounced. 23. ἔκεινος, sc. ἀπολογησάμενος, having defended myself in that way.

A. 8. μὴ οὐ...γ. G. 218, N. 2; H. A. 867. 5. θάττων γάρ, κτλ. Cf. Homer’s Αἰχ. II. ix. 505.

B. 6. ἢ...ὅν, as...being = inasmuch as I am. ὑπὸ τοῦ βραδυτέρου. Cf. Od. viii. 329: οὐκ ἄρετα κακὰ ἐργα· κιχάνει τοι βραδώς ἀκίν. 7. δεινὸς is the opposite of πρεσβύτης, and ὀξεῖς of βραδός. The swifter pursuer, viz., vice, is represented as overtaking the swifter party, viz., the judges who condemned Socrates; while Socrates himself, tardy with years, is seized upon by the more tardy pursuer, viz., death. 9. θανάτου δικὴν δοφλῶν, having incurred sentence of death. ὑπὸ τῆς ἀθλείας, sc. as judge. Compare Maximus Tyrius (Diss. 9), where he says: Socrates was, indeed, put to death, but the Athenians were condemned, and God and truth was their judge. 10. διαλεκτίκας μοχθηρίαν καὶ ἀθείαν = having been convicted of wickedness and injustice. 12. μετρίως ἔχειν, to be suitable, i. e., well.

C. 14. τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο, the after this, i. e., the sequel, or consequence. 16. χρησμοφόδον, ἄταν μελλωσιν ἀποθανεῖσθαι. This idea, that the soul, when about to leave the body, shows its divine nature and prophetic power, was widely prevalent among the ancients. Thus Patroclus predicts the death of Hector (II. xvi. 851 sqq.), and Hector prophesies the death of Achilles (II. xxii. 858 sqq.); cf. also Phaed. 84, E; Xen. Apol. 80; Cic. de Div. i. 80; Sex. Empir. Math. ix. 20. 19. οἷον ἐμὲ ἀπεκτόνατε. For the double acc., cf. G. 159, N. 4; H. A.
725. 21. τοῦ διδόναι ἐλεγχον τοῦ βίου, from giving proof of your life, i. e., from the necessity of letting your manner of life be put to the proof.

D. 26. ἀνωτέρωτες ἀνθρώπους, by putting men to death.

28. οὐ γὰρ ἐσθ αὖη. G. 28, 3, N. 1; H. A. 480, 8.

E. 6. ἵπτερ, notice the preposition ἵπτερ rather than περί, as if he would defend the conclusion. 6. εἰ δὲ οἱ ἄρχοντες ἀρχολιαν ἄροντι, while the magistrates are busy, and I do not yet come, whither when I have come, I must be put to death, i. e., before the Eleven (cf. note, 37, C) are ready to lead me away to prison.

A. 12. τι περε νοε, what in the world it means, or what can be its meaning. Cf. note, 20, D. ἕ ἄνδρες δικασταὶ. He has habitually addressed the court hitherto as ἄνδρες Ἀθηναίος. The change here is intentional, since that portion of the court whom he now addresses were judges indeed, that is, administrators of justice. 14. ἡ γὰρ εἰσβοήθῃ μοι μαντικῇ ἡ τοῦ διαμονίου, for the customary prophetic voice of the divinity. Cf. 31, D, note ibid. Schleiermacher considers ἡ τοῦ διαμονίου as a gloss, because Plato elsewhere calls the voice itself τὸ διαμόνιον, and where a genitive of source is added to μαντικῆς, φωνῆς, etc., it is not τοῦ διαμονίου, but τοῦ θεοῦ. Stallbaum admits that the combination here is unusual, but does not, for that reason, feel at liberty to depart from the established reading. 16. καὶ πᾶν ἐπὶ σμικρῶς, even on very trifling occasions. πᾶν is often placed thus before the preposition for the sake of emphasis. 18. ἃ γε δὴ οἰδεῖν ἃν τις καὶ νομίζει, which one might certainly suppose to be, and are in fact usually considered. The relative is the object of the first verb and the subject of the second. The former verb is optative, to denote what any one might naturally suppose; the other is indicative, to denote what is in fact the prevailing sentiment. The reader will observe the difference between οἴσωμαι and νομίζω here implied and habitually observed.

B. 27. τοῦτο δύσδον γεγονότα. In a conversation with Hermogenes, recorded by Xenophon (Mem. iv, 8), Socrates assigns several reasons why, aside from his hopes for another world, he deemed it better for his happiness in this life, and
better for his reputation, that he should die then rather than live to a more advanced age. Add to these the considerations touching a future life, which follow in the next chapter of the Apology, and we have the most complete demonstration of his deliberate preference to be condemned rather than to be acquitted, and thus a justification of the otherwise inexplicable manner and spirit of his defense.

C. 4. Few passages in the Greek classics have been oftener cited, translated, and commented upon in ancient or modern times, than the chapter on which we now enter. Cf. Plut. Cons. ad Apol.; Xen. Cyrop. viii, 7, 18 sqq.; Cic. Tusc. Quest. i, 41, where it is translated; also the Christian Fathers, Eusebius, Theodoret, etc., etc. 5. δυνήν γὰρ θάνειον. Stallbaum remarks, that here we doubtless have the true Socratic doctrine of a future state, whereas the Phaedo and other Dialogues exhibit Plato’s views on the subject. Accordingly Xenophon in his Cyropædia, as above cited, makes Cyrus on his death-bed discourse in exact accordance with the passage before us. 6. οἷον μὴ δὲν εἶνα, of such a nature as to be nothing, i.e., to be annihilated. So below, D: οἷον ὑπνός, and E: οἷον ἀποθηκήσαι. 7. κατὰ τὰ λεγόμενα, according to what is said, i.e., the common opinion. 8. τῇ ψυχῇ, dat. for the gen. G. 184, 8; H. A. 767. The gen. would represent the subject of the action. 9. τοῦ τῶν. The gen. of the place from which, without a preposition, may follow a verbal noun as well as a verb. τοῦ εὐθείας, for τοῦ εὐταύτου, because of the motion expressed by μετοικησις.

D. 9. εἶτε μηδεμία. This εἶτε has its correlative in el δ’ αὖ below, E, which is only more emphatic than another εἰτε. Compare οὗτε . . . οὐδέ γε, 19, E, and note ibid. 10. οἷον ὑπνός. Cf. Od. xiii, 79, 80: νεὶδομος ὑπνός . . . θανάτῳ ἄγχοιτα ἐνεὼς. 12. ἐγὼ γὰρ δὲν οἶμαι introduces a long and involved sentence. The force of the δὲ falls on εἰπεῖν several lines below, where it is repeated (cf. notes, 17, D, and 23, B). οἶμαι itself and δὲοι are also repeated. 18. μὴ ὅτι ἰδίωτην, not only a private individual. H. A. 1085, a. The reader need not be informed that by the great king the Greeks mean the king of Persia, the richest and most powerful sovereign with whom they had
to do in all their early history. The comparison of death to night and sleep has always been, as it is now, common especially with the poets. Cf. Hom. Il. xiv, 231; xvi, 672; Od. xiii, 80; Catul. v, 5; Hor. Od. i, 28, 15.

A. 26. εἰς Ἀδωνις, to Pluto’s, sc. house or realm. So we 41 omit the word house after the owner’s name, and the word church after the name it bears. 1. Μίνως τε καὶ Ράδαμάνθυς, nom. by attraction to the relative ὁ πρεσβύς. Minos and Rhadamantius were brothers (hence closely connected by τε καὶ), both sons of Jove, and celebrated kings, judges, and lawgivers, the former in Crete and the latter in the islands of the Αἰγεα. Αἰακός, who reigned in Αἰγίνα, was also a son of Jupiter, and the father of Peleus and Telamon. Triptolemus was the favorite of Demeter, the inventor of the plow and agriculture, and the great hero in the Eleusinian Mysteries. We find Minos represented as performing the office of judge in the lower regions in the Homeric poems (Od. xi, 568 sqq.); Rhadamantius in Pindar (Olymp. ii, 187 sqq.) when Αἰακός was first added to the number, we do not know. In the Gorgias (523, E) these three are represented as administering justice at the entrances to Tartarus and to the Isles of the Blessed: Rhadamantius to souls from Asia, Αἰακός to those from Europe, and Minos, as president judge, to decide in doubtful cases. Triptolemus is assigned that office only in this passage, though in the Homeric Hymn to Demeter (153) he sits in judgment on earth. Perhaps he is introduced here to give prominence to the Eleusinian hero, or since others, whose names are not mentioned, are here said to be judges in the lower world, we may perhaps suppose that the common opinion ascribed to Triptolemus and others the same office and occupation there which they held on earth. The conception is, however, limited here to those early and just judges and lawgivers whom the imagination of the Greeks had invested with the dignity of demigods (ὅσοι τῶν ἡμείων δίκαιοι ἔγενον ἐν τῷ ἐαυτῶν βίῳ). 5. ἐπὶ πόσῳ ἐν τίς δίζαιρ ἐν ὑμῶν; Quanti tandem estimatis. So Cicero renders it. Tusc. Quest. i, 41, 98. 7. ἔπει ἐμοῦ, κ.τ.λ., for to myself also the converse there would be delightful, where I might converse with Pala-
medes and Ajax the son of Telamon. Both these Grecian heroes had come to a tragical end, the former at the hands of the army, the other by his own hands, in consequence of unjust decisions brought about by the wiles of Odysseus. The story of Ajax is found in Homer (Od. xi, 541 sqq.); that of Palamedes in the Tragic Poets, especially Euripides.

B. 10. ἀντιπαραβάλλοντι... οὐκ ἐν ἄθικε σὺ. This clause is explanatory of the foregoing, hence it is without a connective, and hence also the participle in the dative answering to ἄμωγε. 11. τοῦ μέγατον is in apposition with the following proposition. G. 187, N. 8; H. A. 626, b. In this proposition the participle ἔκτασθαι is in the accusative, agreeing with the subject of διἀγειν, with which οὐκ ἐν ἄθικε σὺ is again understood. 15. τῶν ἐπὶ Τροίαν ἄγοντα, sc. Agamemnon, to see whether he was really as great, and Odysseus as wise, and Sisyphus as crafty, as the Poet represents them to have been. Hom. ll. iii, 178; Od. ix, 19; ll. vi, 183.

C. 18. ἄμηχανον ἐν σὺ κολάσμων, would be an immense sum of happiness. The genitive is partitive. Or it can be, as Ast supposes, a genitive of specification = in respect of happiness. 19. τοῦτον γε ἐνεκά, sc. for conversing with men and examining them—they do not, methinks, for this put men to death there, as they do here. 25. ἐν τῷ τούτῳ = one thing, viz., this. The τῷ first states it indefinitely; then τούτῳ is added to define it.

D. 2. ἀπαλλάχθαι πραγμάτων, to be set free from the business and troubles of life. The perfect is used as referring to a completed condition or state, and that conceived, not actual. 4. βλέψου ἵνα. The tense in anticipation looks at the result as already reached; it was better as conceived, in anticipation by an overruling Providence.

E. 9. ταῦτα ταῦτα λυποῦντες ἀπερ ἐγὼ ὑμᾶς ἐλύσων, i.e., besiege them with warnings and exhortations. λυπεῖν here takes a double accusative, as a verb of doing ill. G. 165; H. A. 725, a. 12. εἰ δοκῶσι τι εἶναι μηδὲν ὄντες, if they think they are something when they are nothing. The same idea is expressed in the same words by Paul, Gal. vi, 3.
CRITO.

A. 1. τηρικάδε, at this time of day, that is, at so early an hour. τηρικά and its corresponding relative and demonstrative words, together with their derivatives, have respect, in Attic usage, not to time in general, but to the hour of the day, or, figuratively, to the precise day or hour of some event. η ου τηρόε ετοι, or is it not still early in the morning? Buttman writes τηρόε (without the iota subscript); Fischer τηροε; the earlier editions τηρωί, which Bekker, Ast and Stallbaum shorten into τηροε after the authority of the poets and the old grammarians. 2. πάνυ μεν οδιν, certainly it is, is the most common expression of full assent in Plato’s Dialogues. Sometimes it stands in construction with a verb, as in Apol. 26, B, but more frequently by itself, as here. πάνυ γε is also frequent in affirmative answers, cf. Apol. 25, C. The πάνυ expresses assent, the μεν and γε restriction, and οδιν accordance = certainly so far (it is) as you say. 4. τηρικα μάλωτα, what time of day about. μάλωτα, with words of number, denotes uncertainty, or indefiniteness. 5. ὁρθρός βαβύς, very early dawn. τηροε is simply morning; δρόβρος is the dawn or rising of the day. βαβύς adds emphasis, very early. We speak of midnight deep, deep night, etc. The Greeks extend the same figure to morning and evening—the former in its earliest, and the latter in its latest stages. 6. του δεσμωτηρίου. I have said in the Preface, perhaps the same cell, hewn out of the solid rock, near the old Agora, which now bears the name of “the Prison of Socrates.” Professor Felton says: “undoubtedly; I read the Phdeo there, and when I came to the passage where Crito says, the sun is yet upon the mountains, I stepped to the entrance of the cell, and lo! the shadows
covered the valleys, but the sun still lingered on Mars' Hill, the Acropolis, and Lycabettus." 7. ἔπαγονσα, to hearken and hence open the door for admittance. ὅσος gives emphasis to the expression of surprise: I wonder how it happened that he was willing to admit you, sc. at so very early an hour, as he was not accustomed to open the prison gate very early, cf. Phædo, 59, D. 9. καὶ τι καὶ εἰρεγίγναι, and he has also been somewhat obliged by me. The augment in this verb is commonly omitted, but no rule can be recognized. 12. Ἐπικώς πάλαι, a considerable time since.

B. 13. εἰς πώς, then how did it happen, that, etc., expressive of surprise. 15. οὐδ᾿ αὐτῶς ἤθελον, I should not myself prefer to be in so much sleeplessness and sorrow, sc. if I had been at liberty to choose simply for myself; but for your sake I felt constrained not to disturb your quiet slumbers. This reason is implied here and more fully expressed below: ἐπίθετος σε οὐκ ἤγειραν, ἵνα ὅσ ἦθελα διάγης. 16. ἐν τοσοῦτον, sc. so much as I have suffered, while I have been watching your peaceful slumbers. The preceding ἀγρινια shows that τοσοῦτον belongs not only to ἀγρινια, but also to λίπη = so much both sleeplessness and sorrow. 17. ὅσ ἦδεως = ὅτι οὕτως ἦδεως. So below, ὅσ πάθος = ὅτι οὕτω πάθος.

Stallb. 1. διάγης. G. 218; H. A. 881, a. 2. τρόπον, turn of mind, or manner of life, hence = character, Lat. mores. For the gen., see G. 173, 1; H. A. 744. As to the sentiment, compare Xen. Mem. iv, 8, 2. 6. τηλικούτου δότα, a man of my age, sc. 70, Apol. 17, D.

C. 8. οὐδ᾿ οὖδὲν αὐτῶς ἐπιλύετα, κ.τ.λ., but not at all does their age set them free from grieving at their present fortune, literally, as to not grieving, or so as not to grieve. το ἀγανακτεῖν is acc. of specification, and does not differ essentially from διὸ ἀγανακτεῖν. μὴ ὅξι = ne non, or quo minus. G. 283, 6 and 7; H. A. 1084, a. Instead of αὐτῶς, αὐτός was the reading previous to Bekker. 14. ὅσ ἐμοὶ δοκῶ. Cf. note, 18, A. 15. ἐν τοῖς βαρύτατοι. This is one of several ways in which the superlative is strengthened by the Greeks. The origin of the formula is variously explained. In such passages as this, it may be analyzed as Stallbaum does, viz., = ἐν
NOTES.

In other passages, τοίς seems to be neuter, and to be used like a pronoun, i.e., εν τοίς = εν τοίτοις. 

H. A. 652, a. 16. τίνα ταύτην, sc. φέρεις = τίς ζωσμόν αὐτῆς ἡ ἀγγελία, ἢν φέρεις. 

ἡ τὸ πλοῖον, κ.τ.λ., or has the vessel arrived, etc. The ἢ in such interrogative sentences is restrictive of a more general question, or corrective of the foregoing context — but why do I ask? The vessel here mentioned is that in which Theseus returned from Crete, bringing back in safety the seven young men and seven maidens whom the Athenians were obliged to send every year as a tribute to Minos, the Cretan king. Ever after this unexpected deliverance, the same vessel (patched and repaired till its identity became a vexed question for the speculative philosophers) was sent every year in sacred procession to the island of Delos, as a thank-offering to Apollo. 

And from the moment when the sacred stern was crowned with garlands till its return, it was unlawful to defile the purified city with any public execution. It so happened that the vessel set sail for Delos the very day before the condemnation of Socrates. He thus gained a respite of some thirty days, which he spent in prison, but in free conversation with his friends. See the whole thing explained in full, Phædo, 58. Cf. also Xen. Mem. iv, 8, 2; Plut. Vit. Thes., etc.

D. 18. δοκεῖ μὲν. μὲν is not unfrequently used, especially after δοκεῖ, εἶμι, and the like verbs, without the corresponding ἢ expressed, but implying some such clause as σαφῶς ἢ οὐχ εἶμι. It may indeed be taken as simply the same with the longer form μὴν. Here δοκεῖ μὲν is employed with that Attic urbanity which avoids positive assertions, even when no doubt is intended, for just below he says: δὴ λοιπὸν οὖν, ἵνα ἥκει τῆμερον. 

Suniwm was the southeastern promontory of Attica.

23. τῶν ἀγαθῶν. G. 188, 1; H. A. 776. A formula of prayer or well-wishing, often used by the Greeks in entering upon any enterprise or at the mention of any anticipated event, equivalent to the Latin, quod bene vertat. The use of it by Socrates in this connection is a striking illustration of his cheerfulness and hopefulness in view of death.

Α. 27. τοι, I suppose, ui fallor. τῇ υστεραῖ σὴν ἢ λυ̣ ι̣ δῆ = 44
the next day after the ship may arrive. ἐστεραίσι is followed
by ἥ because it involves a comparative. 1. Φασὶ γε τοι ὧν, so say, at least, to be sure, those who have the disposal of these things, sc. the Eleven. Phasit is emphatic, they say so, to be sure, though Crito would fain doubt it and show them to be mistaken, if he can but persuade Socrates. 2. τῆς ἐπιστοῦσης ἡμέρας, the coming day, i.e., the day about to dawn = to-day. G. 179, 1; H. A. 759. 3. τῆς εὐερας, the second day = to-morrow. Socrates means, of course, the same days which Crito above calls τὴνμερον and ἀφ`ρον. 4. ὀλίγον πρότερον, a little while ago, of course after midnight; dreams before midnight the ancients deemed false. 5. κυνυκείες = δοκεῖς in Attic writers. How it came to have that meaning, see explained in Stalib. ad loc., and in the Lexicons. ἐν καρφῳ των, quite opportunely.

B. 9. ἡματι κεν τριτάτω, κ.τ.λ. These are the words of Achilles declaring to Agamemnon his intention to return home to Phthia, and his expectation to arrive there on the third day. Hom. II. ix, 368. Socrates finds in them a beautiful accommodation to his own departure to his heavenly home. This dream is not to be set down as a mere fiction of Plato. Besides the general truthfulness and trustworthiness of this dialogue, Socrates was a notorious dreamer of dreams or seer of visions, and a full believer in their divine significance. Moreover, he was a great reader and admirer of Homer. What, then, could be more natural or probable than that his approaching departure to another world, which he talked of by day and meditated on by night, should present itself before him in his dreams and clothe itself in the familiar language of the Homeric Poems? 11. ἐναργεῖς, clear, i.e., easy to be understood. μὲν οὖν = imo vero, nay but. 12. διαμωρε is used as a form of address, in itself respectful, and in its own proper signification only respectful, yet sometimes applied in such a connection, and spoken in such a tone of irony or severity, that some lexicographers have erroneously concluded that it was in its nature a term of reproach as well as of honor. Compare ζ μακάρε Κρίων below, and our My dear sir, My excellent fellow. 13. ἐν καὶ νῦν, yet even now, implies that Crito had
previously plied Socrates with unavailing arguments of the same kind. 14. οὐ μία, not one merely. Al. οὐδεμία. 15. χωρὶς μὲν... ἦν δὲ, besides the first place sustaining the loss of an invaluable friend, I shall in the second place incur the reproach of many. The unusual concurrence of μὲν and δὲ in the same proposition, sets forth strongly the twofold evil. The correction of Wolf, τοῦ ἐστερησθαί for σοῦ ἐστερησθαί of the MSS. is with good reason adopted in all the recent editions. 16. οὐδένα μὴ ποτὲ. This combination has the same emphasis of negation as οὐ μὴ = such as there is no reason to expect that I shall ever find. G. 257; H. A. 1032. 17. ὡς οἷός τε δὲν σε σφίκειν. The ὡς belongs with the participle δὲν, not, as Buttmann and some others have taken it, with the infinitive ἀμελήσας, and performs here the office which it usually performs with a participle, viz., of denoting the ground or supposition on which Crito would appear to many to have neglected the preservation of the life of Socrates: as if I was able, i. e., supposing that I was able to save you—a supposition which, in this case, was contrary to the fact, since the inflexible will of Socrates rendered it impossible for Crito to save him. Cf. G. 277, N. 2, a; H. A. 978.

C. 19. τίς ἄν αἰσχίνων εἰς ταῖς δόξα, ἢ δοκεῖν, what reputation could be more dishonorable than this—than to be reputed. Here the comparative is first followed by a genitive, and then by an explanatory clause with ἢ. It will be observed that δόξα and δοκεῖν have the same root. 26. ἐσπερ ἐν πραξθῇ, just as they may chance to be done, however that may be. H. A. 914, B.

D. 28. αὐτά δὲ δῆλα τὰ παρόντα. Al. δῆλοι by conjecture. But the emendation is not necessary. The passage is explained by Stallbaum, Jacobs, and others, as an example of anacoluthon: Nam Crito quum additurus esset haec: ὅτι ὑπὸ τῶν πολλῶν ἐξειργασμένα εστὶν, constructione repente mutata, rem multo gravior eloquitur, dicens: ὅτι οἷοι τε εἰσιν οἱ πολλοί. Stallb. 4. εἰ γὰρ ὅφελον. G. 251, 2, N. 1; H. A. 871, a. 5. 88 ἑνα... ἡσα. The past tense of the indicative here implies that they are not able. G. 216, 3; H. A. 884. 7. οὔτε γὰρ φρόνυμον, κ.τ.λ. The noble sentiment is here implied, that so
long as the multitude can not alter a man’s character for better or worse, all else is of no account. The concluding clause in this chapter, ποιοντι...τίχωσιν, means, that the multitude are governed by mere chance and caprice instead of fixed principle.

E. 10. ἔριε γε μὴ ἔμοι προμηθεῖ, you do not, do you, feel anxious for me, etc., in form expecting a negative answer, yet implying a suspicion or a fear that he does. G. 282, 2; H. Λ. 1015; cf. also 25, A. 11. οἱ συκοφάνται. The word is well explained in the Lexicon of Liddell and Scott, and the class of men in Smith’s Dictionary of Antiquities. 12. πράγματα παρέχουσιν, make trouble. Notice here present of continued action; with ἄφαγασθώμεν, aorists of single act. 13. ἦ καὶ πᾶσαν, κ.τ.λ., either to lose even all our property, or at least large sums of money, or even to suffer some additional heavier penalty, such as imprisonment, exile, or death, cf. below, 53, B. 15. ἵσων αὖρο χαίρειν, bid it farewell, that is, dismiss the fear.

45 A. 16. ἡμεῖς γὰρ ποιοῦσιν δικαίοι ἵσμεν, cf. H. Λ. 944, a. For ποιοῦσιν, cf. note, 44, A. 18. ἄλλα ἔμοι πεἰθοῦ. ἄλλα with the imp. suggests an anticipated unwillingness or objection. 21. μὴ τοῖνῦ φοβοῦ. The sentence, interrupted by a long explanation, is resumed in μὴ ταῦτα φοβοῦμεν, below, B, and is there followed by the correlative clause, μὴ ὁ Πλέγας.

23. τούτοις is contemptuous, like the Latin ista, cf. below, 48, 4. τούτων τῶν πολλῶν, and Demosthenes, passim. 24. ὡς εὐτελεῖς, sc. εἰσιν, how easily they can be bought. Crito knew this from his own experience, cf. Xen. Mem. ii, 9, 1. εἰ δὲν αὔτος, for them, sc. to bribe them.

B. 25. σοι is made emphatic by its position. ὑπάρχει, is ready for your use. ἵκαρά is added to express the idea that his property alone is, in his opinion (ὡς ἐγκαμάν), sufficient. Crito was wealthy, cf. note, 38, D. 27. ξένοι. Simmias and Cebes were Thebans, cf. Phæd. 59, C. Notice the omission of the article; ξένοι are mentioned only as a class, and are then particularized by οὗτοι. If you do not think proper to spend my money, there are strangers, these. 3. ἄποκαμος, fail, or hesitate. ἄποκαμος is more frequently followed by a parti-
ciple, though sometimes, as here, by an infinitive. Π. Α. 988 and 986. 4. ὦ ἔλεγεν ἐν τῷ δικαστήριῳ, cf. Apol. 37, C. D.
5. τι χρησίμοις, ὄντες ὑμᾶς. G. 188, Ν. 2; H. Α. 777, a. 6. ἀλλοσε, by attraction for ἀλλαχῶν. G. 158, Ν. 4 and 3; H. Α. 1008.

C. 10. οὐδὲ δικαιο. οὐδὲ is emphatic, not even right. 13. σπεύδοντες τοις καὶ ἔπευσαν. See the same combination of the opt. with the ind.—of the probable with the actual—Apol. 40, Α.: οἰδεῖς ὅν τις καὶ νομίζειται.

D. 16. οἰκήσει καταλιπτέων. G. 279, 4, Ν. It is an emphatic form, as if Socrates were in haste to leave his children orphans. Observe the force of the ἐκ in ἐκθεοῦσιν and ἐκπαιδεύσατι, to bring up and educate completely. 16. τοῦ σῶν μήρας, so far as you are concerned. Orphans at Athens were provided for by the state, and intrusted to the care of the Archon Eponymus. Still they must, of course, be subjected to many inconveniences (cf. Hom. Π. xxii, 490); and so far as Socrates was concerned, his children would be left to do well or ill, just as they might chance to do. 19. χρή. Al. χρήν. 21. ῥαθυμότατα is the opposite of ἀγαθός καὶ ἀνδρείος. 23. φάσκοντά γε δή, especially if one claims.

Ε. 27. Καὶ ἂ ν ἐκοθήκει τῆς δίκης, κ.τ.λ., both the coming in of the case into court, cf. Demos. adv. Phorm.: μελλούσης τῆς δίκης εἰσέναι εἰς τὸ δικαστήριον. 28. ὡς εἰσῆλθεν. Later editors and the best MSS. read thus instead of εἰσῆλθεν, the reading of Stallbaum. ἐξέν μη εἰσέλθειν. G. 278, 2; H. Α. 973. He could have avoided the trial, either by flight and voluntary exile, or by inducing, as he might easily have done, the accusers to withdraw the charges before the trial had commenced. αὐτὺς ὦ ἄγων, κ.τ.λ., the entire management of the case. Socrates did not employ advocates, or resort to any of the ordinary means of influencing the judges. 2. κατάγελως. Cornar, with the approval of Schleiermacher, Stallbaum, and others, suggests that there is an allusion in this word to the absurd and ridiculous conclusion of a comedy, which has its three parts, the πρόκασις, ἐπίτασις, and καταστροφή, corresponding with the ἐσωσόδος, ἄγων, and κατάγελως of the Socratic drama, as it is here represented. 3. διαπεφευγότας ἥμᾶς δοκεῖν
is expository of τὸ τέλεσθαι του ἡμ. And finally this almost
farcical conclusion of the matter, that it should seem to have
slipped out of our hands, through some sloth and unmanliness
of ours.

46. 1. εἰ τι...δηλωτ ἡν. Cf. note, Apol. 28, B. The
force of the perfect is seen not only in βεβολείτον, but also in
τερπάχθη = to have consulted, to have been done. 10.
ἀδύνατον, κ.τ.λ., impossible (for us) and no longer practicable.

δ. 18. ἡ προνοία, κ.τ.λ. For the omission of the copula
(εστιν), cf. H. A. 611. For the sentiment compare the words
of Paul to the Galatians, iv, 17: καλὸν δὲ ζηλούοντας ἐν καλῷ.
17. τῶν ἐμῶν μηδενὶ ἄλλῳ πεῖθεν οὗ ἢ τῷ λόγῳ. The strongest
argument, in other words, the truth as it appears to his mind
after careful consideration, is here beautifully represented by
Socrates as his best friend, and the only one to whom he
yields a controlling influence. See Lex., ἐμὸς, II, 2.

ε. 24. πλεῖον limits μορμολύττεια, as it is construed by
Stallbaum; not ἐπισέπουσα, as it is construed by Buttmann.
26. δεσμοὺς καὶ θανάτους. Observe the force of the plural.
All these in their worst forms and degrees are mere bugbears
to frighten children—such is the spirit of the passage. See
Gorgias, 473, D, where to Polus’ fearful array of punishments,
the rack, castration, crucifixion, covering with pitch and burning
alive, Socrates replies: Μορμολύττει, You are bringing
up bugbears, not proofs. Compare Paul’s emphatic enumeration
of his sufferings, 2 Cor. xi, 23: ἐν κόσμῳ, ἐν πληγῇ, ἐν
φυλακῇ, ἐν θανάτῳ. 27. μετριώτατα σκοποῦμεθα. Cf. note,
Apol. 39, B. This question, in many editions, is put into the
mouth of Crito. But it seems more appropriate to Socrates,
who, in the next sentence, answers himself, as he often does.

88 1. ἀναλάβομεν, resume for further consideration. 2. ἑκάστοτε,
in every instance, sc. when we were discussing the subject in
our frequent former conversations. Hence the imp. ἔλεγεν
here and below repeatedly.

D. 3. πρὶν governs δεῖν. 4. Κατάδηλος is for ἐκάδηλον,
being attracted by λόγος. ἄνα = forsooth, as it seems. H. A.
1048, 1, and note, Apol. 34, B. ἄλλως = temere, without
reason. 8. ἵθι ἔχω, sc. in danger of losing my life. 10. τι
λέγειν, to say something, sc. to some purpose, of some importance, cf. Xen. Mem. ii, 1, 12.

E. 14. ὅσα γε ταύτα ἔσται, in all human probability. 27. ἑκάστος is explained below by καλός.

B. 27. τὰ τοιαῦτα, such things as these. 28. τοῦτο πρᾶττεν, practicing this, making a business of it. Cf. Herod. vi, 125: ἡμεροδρόμον τε καὶ τοῦτο μελετῶντα. So πρακτέον, below. We see here Socrates' fondness for illustrations drawn from the common pursuits of life. 10. καὶ ἔδεισεν γε, yes, and eat and drink. γε = yes. So καὶ υἱῶς γε, Apol. 34, D, might be rendered, yes, and sons. The eating and drinking here come within the province of the λαρᾶς, as the gymnastic exercises come under the direction of the παιδορρήθης.

D. 1. ἀλογ簋νεσθαι καὶ φοβεῖσθαι. These verbs are often followed, as they are here, by an accusative of the person before whom one must be ashamed and afraid, especially to do anything dishonorable or wrong. 8. ἐγκατεστῆσθαι ... ἀπὸλλαμβάνειν. The imperfect has reference to what was said in former discussions, cf. ἔλεγεν ἐκάστοτε above, and below: πῶς αὐτὰ τοιαῦτα ἔλεγεν. H. A. 883; M. and T. 11, N. 6.

E. 8. πειθόμενοι μὴ τῇ τῶν ἐπαίτων δόξῃ, by obeying not the opinion of the wise; but of the unwise, is implied in the antithesis by the position of μὴ. Cf. Xen. Mem. iii, 9, 6: κάι μὴ ὁ δὲ δοξάζειν = not what he knows, but what he does not know. 16. φ. ... λαβᾶται, which the unjust injures. The editions before Bekker changed φ. to δ. But the MSS. have φ., and λαβᾶται may be followed either by the accusative or the dative. 17. φαύλωτερον = cheaper, less valuable, the opposite of τιμώτερον, below.

A. 24. τί ... ἡμᾶς. τί for ὅ τι, cf. G. 282, 1; H. A. 1011; 48. For the two acc. cf. G. 165; H. A. 725, a. 1. μὲν = μὴν.

B. 5. οὕτως τε ὁ λόγος, κτλ., is correlative to καὶ τῶν ἄσκωτων. To the suggestion, that the multitude have power to put him to death, Socrates has a twofold answer: in the first place, that does not invalidate the argument which we have gone through with, nor make it any less conclusive, or in any way different from what it was, before his life was endangered; and in the second place, he says, consider also,
whether this doctrine, once admitted by us, abides or not, that we must not set the highest value on mere living, but on living well. 11. Τὸ δὲ εὖ, κ.τ.λ. And does it still remain true that to live well is the same thing as to live honorably and justly, or does it not remain true? πρὸτερον, aforetime, i. e., in former discussions.

C. 18. σκέψεως. G. 154; Π. A. 995. ἀναλώσεως χρημάτων, 44, E, seqq.; δόξης, 45, B, seqq.; παιδων τροφῆς, 45, C, D. 19. μη, sc. ὅρα. G. 218, N. 2; Η. A. 867. ὅρα is expressed below, 49, D. 20. ἰδίως, lightly, rashly. 21. καὶ ἀναβοσκομένων γ' ἀν, yes, and would restore them to life again. For the force of ἀν with the participle, cf. G. 211; Η. A. 987, b. 22. τούτων τῶν πολλῶν is added to express contempt, and, in connection with οὐδενὶ ξίν νῦ, it implies, that it is characteristic of the multitude to act thus without reason. ὁ λόγος αἰτεί, the argument so establishes the point. This use of αἰτεί arises from its use to express a victory at the games, or a conviction in a court of justice. Cf. ratio vincit, Hor. Sat. i, 3, 115, et al. αἰτεί, see Lex. A, 5. 24. καὶ χρήματα τελοῦντες . . . καὶ χάριτας. Zeugma, τελοῦντες being strictly applicable only to χρήματα, and ἄγοντες being required with χάριτας. 25. καὶ αὐτοί, κ.τ.λ., and whether we shall do right ourselves both in leading out of prison, and in being led out.

D. 28. μη οὐ δέν, κ.τ.λ., we must not consider the question, whether we must die, if we remain in prison and keep quiet, nor whether we must suffer anything else, however dreadful, rather than do wrong, i. e., we must not take the consequences into the account at all, but only the question of right and wrong. Before μη οὐ, there is an ellipsis of a verb of seeing, or fearing, and the meaning is, I fear, that we must not take into account, etc. G. 218, N. 2; Η. A. 867.

E. 9. δε εὖ περὶ πολλοῦ, κ.τ.λ., as I esteem it of great importance to do this with your consent. 11. εἶναι. Η. A. 1016, c; M. and T. 71, N. 1. οὐ λαμβάνεις, to your satisfaction.

A. 14. ἐκόμισας ἀδίκητον εἶναι = ἐκόμισας ἀδικεῖν δείν ἤμαι. G. 281, 2; Η. A. 991, a. 20. καὶ πάλαι . . . ὅρα, and so for a long time we, men of such advanced years.
B. 22. ἃ παντὸς μᾶλλον, or rather. The repeated and pressing questions mark the reluctance of Crito to accept the conclusion. 25. ὑμῶς, yet, i.e., whatever may be the consequences. 26. τυγχάνει δὲ, turns out to be. 3. ὡς οἱ πολλοὶ odiouai. The general sentiment of antiquity not only justified but required retaliation, as just and manly, of. Meno. cap. iii: αὐτὴ ἑστιν ἄνδρος ἀρετή, ἰκανὸν εἶναι τά τῆς πράξεως πράττειν, καὶ πράττεται τοὺς μὲν φίλους εὔ ποιεῖν, τοὺς δὲ ἐχθροὺς κακῶς. Eurip. Fragm.: ἐχθρὸν κακῶς δρᾶν ἄνδρός ἦγομαι μέρος. Xen. Mem. ii, 6, 35. A similar view is also taken in Plato's Republic, B. I. But Socrates in the Gorgias, 469, A, insists that it is far better to suffer wrong than to do wrong.

C. 5. οὗ φαίνεται, it appears not, that is, it is clear from the argument that we must in no case do an injury. 15. οὐδὲ ἀν οὗτον, κ.τ.λ., not even if he suffer anything however severe by them. 21. κοινοῖς, whether you hold these opinions in common with me, and think as I do.

D. 16. καθομολογῶν, admitting to your detriment. So L. and S. But perhaps καθομολογῶν differs from ὁμολογῶν only in emphasis or extent = in admitting all this. 25. τῆς ἀρχῆς, the premise or first principle of the argument, so that it is never right to do an injury, etc. To τῆς ἀρχῆς, as the premise, τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο stands opposed as the conclusion.

A. 7. ἀπόειναι ἐντένη, in going out hence, so. from prison. 50 This clause is to be connected, not only with ποιοῦμεν, but also with ἐμπένομεν, whether in going out hence ... we abide by what we have admitted to be right. 12. Οὐ γὰρ ἐννοοῖ. “One might almost think that Crito will not understand because he dreads the repugnant conclusion.” Cron. 14. ἀποδιδόσκειν; used of stealthy flight, and so especially of slaves. 15. τὸ κοινὸν τῆς πράξεως, the commonwealth. So Cic. in Verr. ii, 46, 114; a communi Siciliae. For an imitation of this personifying of the state, see also Cic. in Cat. i, 7, 18. 17. ἀλλὰ τι ἢ = nonne, do you not. G. 282, 3; H. A. 1015, b.

B. 20. ἀναεροπάθθα, be immediately and utterly subverted. For this force of the perfect, cf. H. A. 849, a. οἱ γενόμεναι δίκαι, the judgments that have been rendered. 24. ἢπερ ... ἀπολλυμένου; in behalf of this law which is threat-
ened with destruction. The present participle, as often, denotes expectation or apprehension. Cf. M. and T. 10, 1, N. 7.

C. 26. ὅτι ἢδικεν γὰρ ἡμᾶς. The ὅτι in direct quotations is pleonastic. The γὰρ refers to an implied clause: we do right to escape, for the state did us an injustice, sc. when it pronounced sentence against us. 6. τῷ ἔρωστῳ τε καὶ ἀποκρίθησαν. The reader will recognize here an allusion to the well-known method of discussion, which was so characteristic of Socrates as to be called “the Socratic method.”

D. 8. πρῶτον μὲν. The second question, which answers to this as the first, is found in ἀλλὰ τοῖς περὶ τὴν τοῦ γενομένου τροφὴν, κ.τ.λ., and is introduced with ἀλλὰ instead of ἔπειτα, in consequence of the intervening question, μέμφει τε, κ.τ.λ. 9. ἐλάμβανεν, imperfect to denote the process through which the wife was obtained. The editions previous to Buttmann had ἔλαβε. 12. ἔχουσιν, participle. 16. ἐν μονοκόλῳ καὶ γυμναστικῇ, i. e., in physical and mental education, cf. Repub. 376, E: ἦ μὲν [παιδεία] ἐπὶ σώμασι γυμναστικῇ, ἦ δὲ ἐπὶ ψυχῇ μονοκόλῳ. The former comprehended the whole exercise and training of the body, in which the Greeks so excelled; the latter the entire discipline and culture of the mind, or, as the word denotes, the department of the muses. The prominence which the Greeks gave to the cultivation of the taste and the emotions, helps to explain the name by which they called this department of education. Some writers add a third department, viz., γράμματα, letters, or primary education. Cf. Smith’s Dic. of Antiq. Gymnasium. Aristotle, in his Politics, viii, 2, makes four departments, adding to letters, gymnastics, and music, the department of drawing and painting, γραφικῇ.

E. 19. δοῦλος. Cf. Cic. pro Cluentio, 53: Legum omnes servī sumus, ut libéri esse possimus. 23. ἦ πρὸς μὲν ἄρα σοι τῶν πατέρα. The unusual position of σοι (hyperbaton) is explained by the fondness of the Greeks for bringing contrasted words into juxtaposition. σοι is dat. after εἰς ἵσον.

A. 28. ἄρα. Cf. note, 46, D. 2. καὶ σὺ δὲ ἡμᾶς, κ.τ.λ., is an emphatic repetition of πρὸς δὲ τὴν πατρίδα, etc., above.
NOTES.

4. ὃ τῆς ἀληθείᾳ τῆς ἀρετῆς ἐπιμελόμενος is ironical. 7. ἡ πατρίς. We insert the article, contrary to our former reading. It seems necessary to mark the particular fatherland of any individual.

C. 18. πείθειν depends on δεῖ, implied in ποιητῶν.

D. 1. τῷ ἐξουσίαν πεποιηκάνα, by having given liberty. 2. δοκιμασθῇ, when he has been examined and approved, i.e., admitted to the rank of a citizen, al. δοκιμάσῃ. 4. ἐξείναι depends on προαγορεύομεν.

E. 12. ὠμολογηκέναι ἔργῳ denotes a "tacit compact," but one of a very different kind from that fiction, in which some political philosophers of modern times find the origin of society and government.

A. 17. πρωτιβιτῶν ἢμῶν, so. ἡ πείθεσθαι ἢ πείθειν, al- though we refer it to your choice, i.e., lay it before you for consideration, the allusion being to the peculiar rights and privileges of an Athenian citizen in canvassing laws when they are proposed, and moving for their repeal afterward, if they are found to be oppressive. The style is intentionally repetitious in imitation of the style of conversation. 21. ἐνέξεσθαι = will be implicated in, or obnoxious to. So ἐνοχὸς = obnoxious, cf. Xen. Mem. i, 1, 64: πῶς οὖν ἐνοχὸς ἄν εἶν τῇ γραφῇ. 22. ἐν τοῖς μάλιστα. Cf. note, 48, C: ἐν τοῖς βαριτάραι.

B. 1. διαφερόντως, pre-eminently aδυνατ. 2. θεωρίαν, a spectacle, such as the games and religious festivals. As these were attended by the leading men from all Greece, the non-attendance of Socrates, with the single exception of going once to the Isthmian games, might well be remarked as an indication of singular satisfaction with Athens. 4. στρατευόμενος. Cf. ἐν Ποσιδώνι καὶ ἐν Ἀμφιπολεί καὶ ἐπὶ Δηλίῳ, Apol. 28, E, and note, ibid. 6. ἐπιθυμία first governs πάλαις and νόμον in the gen., and then is followed by the infin. εἰδέναι, with which is to be understood a pronoun in the acc., referring to those genitives, a desire of another city or other laws—to know them; classed by Cron as a case of prolepsis. H. A. 878.

C. 9. τὰ τε ἄλλα καί, besides all the rest, so. of your
acts, which prove your preference for Athens. Cf. note on 

αλλ’ τε... καλιν. Apol. 36, Α. 11. φυγῆς τιμήσασθαι. Cf. 

note, Apol. 37, Ο. 16. αἰσχύνει, respect, lit., feel ashamed 

before. ἐντείνει, regard, lit., turn yourself toward.

Ε. 26. "Ἀλλ’ τι ὅν ἂν φαιέν ἃ, ὁ δὲ ὑπ’ αὐτῷ, they 

would say, violate, etc., lit., do you do anything else than 

violate. The ἂν would regularly follow φαιέν; but when 

two clauses are incorporated in one (especially with φαιή or 

φαιέν), the particle is often attracted out of its place, cf. 

Hermann on the particle ἂν. 1. ἐν ἔτειν ἐδομήκοντα. Cf. 

Apol. 17, Ο. 4. οὔτε δακταῖμον... οὔτε Κρήτην. These 

states were often cited as models of law and order by Plato 

and other political philosophers of the day, cf. Republic 544, 

Ο; Legg. 634. δῆ = scilicet. ἐκάστοτε = quotescunque de 

iis loquercis. Stallb.

Δ. 11. ἐὰν ἦμιν γε πείδη. Sub. αλλ’ ἐμμενείς.

B. 21. τῇ τούτων πολιτείᾳ, to the polity of these men, 

instead of these states, as if πολιτῶν, instead of πόλεων, had 

preceded. Examples of this figure (synecdoche) are frequent in 

Plato. 24. βεβαιώσεις τῶν δικαστῶν, κ.τ.λ., that is, will 

confirm others in an opinion favorable to the judges, so that 

they will be regarded as having decided the case right. 28. 

τὰς τε εὐνομομένας... τοὺς κοσμωτάτους, the cities that have 

good laws, and the men who have the most regard for law 

and order. 8. τινας λόγους, what discourses, Socrates? such 

forsooth as you utter here, that, etc. ἃ is strictly or, 

and ἀνασκυπήσεις διαλεγόμενος is understood after it. 5. 

ἄν φανείσαθαι. Cf. note on ἄν... διαφθαρήσοντα, Apol. 

29, Ο.

D. 7. ἀπαρεῖς, you will depart, lit., carry away, remove. 

9. ἐκεῖ γὰρ... ἀκολοχία. The Thessalians were infamous 

for their social and political vices. Cf. Demos. Οι, i, 22: 

ταῦτα γὰρ (τὰ τῶν Θεταλῶν) ἀποτα μὲν ἰν δῆπον φύσει καὶ 

ἐν πάσιν ἀνθρώποις; and Athenæus, vi, 260, Β: ἀκολοχοῦ 

καὶ περὶ τῶν βιον ἀσέλγεις, and many other passages from 

different authors. 11. σκεῦην, a cloak or wrapper sufficient 

to cover the whole body, as is implied in περιβάλλειν. The 

word is often used of robes or costumes for the stage.
Δίφθερα is a dress of skins, worn by rustics, and hence peculiarly fit for a disguise. 18. Σχῆμα is also referred to the dress by Stallbaum, but it is better to take it in the more general sense of gait, or personal appearance, as the Latin habitus also is often used.

E. 16. ἢς, δὲ μὴ, κ.τ.λ., perhaps not, if you do not offend any one; but if otherwise, i. e., if you do offend any one, you will hear, etc. 18. εἰπερχόμενος δὴ βίωσει, κ.τ.λ., so you will pass your life in fawning upon everybody and being their humble servant—doing what, but feasting in Thessaly, having gone abroad for an entertainment, forsooth, into Thessaly. The irony, which runs through the whole, is made more pungent by the contemptuous repetition of Thessaly. 22. πῶς ἢμιν ἴσωνται? what will become of them—where shall we find them? G. 184, 3, N. 6; H. A. 770.

A. 22. Ἀλλὰ δὲν = at enim, at inquies. Stallb. 24. τι δε; why, pray? A question of surprise. 26. ἀπολαύσωσιν is, of course, ironical, as it often is taken in a bad sense. ἦ τοῦτο μὲν ὁ, or not this indeed, sc. ποιήσως, i. e., you will not take your sons to Thessaly. ἀντανάκλ., here, in Athens. 27. θρέψονται καὶ παιδεύονται, fut. mid. in the sense of fut. pass. G. 199, 3, N. 4; H. A. 496.

B. 10. οὔτε γὰρ ἐκβάδε ... οὔτε ἐκείος, neither here in this life ... nor when you come thither, into another world. These two clauses beginning with οὔτε are correlative to each other, while those beginning with οὔτε are only emphatic additions to the former.

D. 25. οἱ κορυβαστικῶτες, those who celebrate the rites of the Corybantes in the worship of Cybele in Phrygia. As these rites were accompanied with noisy music and wild dancing, the Corybantes were an expressive figure of persons so inspired and possessed with certain ideas or feelings, as to be incapable of seeing or hearing anything else. In the case of Socrates, it is the voice of the Laws, in other words, the voice of God, that so rings in his ear and possesses his soul. The passage is one of singular beauty. The Laws stand before him personified, embodied, clothed with more than human authority. They reason with him. They
expostulate with him on the folly and wickedness of the course which his friends are pressing upon him. They draw nearer and nearer to him, and speak in more earnest and commanding tones, till at length he can see and hear nothing else, and puts an end to the fruitless arguments and entreaties of his friends in those words of humble yet sublime piety: It is the voice of God—let us obey.