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PLATONIS CRITO

WITH INTRODUCTION NOTES AND APPENDIX

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PREFACE.

No apology is needed for a new edition of the Crito. The only edition in English which possesses more than a purely ephemeral value is Dyer's reproduction of Cron (Boston, 1885). And to my mind the Crito is one of the finest of Plato's minor dialogues, breathing the most exalted morality, full of the deepest historical interest, and above all (as I think I have shewn in my Introduction) perfect as a work of art. As in the Apology, so here, I have followed on the whole the readings of the Bodleian. But I am as far as possible from wishing to disparage the second family of manuscripts, and it will be seen from my critical appendix that I have not infrequently preferred a reading traceable to it.

The editors to whom I am most indebted in the formation of the text are Schanz and Kral: for the interpretation I have found Cron's edition far the most valuable. I have also consulted the editions by Wohlrab and Göbel, and other critical contributions to the study of the dialogue referred to in my notes. But I have frequently
ventured to differ from the other editors in the interpretation of the dialogue: and a large part of the commentary is my own.

I have again gratefully to acknowledge my obligations to Mr Neil.

Emmanuel College,
November 25, 1887.
INTRODUCTION.

The Crito is one of the Socratic tetralogy of dialogues, embracing the Euthyphro, the Apology, the Crito and the Phaedo. The justification for grouping these together is that each of them is concerned with the circumstances of Socrates' trial, imprisonment and death. At the outset of the Euthyphro, we are favoured with a description of Socrates' accuser, together with a brief account of the indictment: while in the rest of the dialogue Plato proceeds to refute by anticipation the charge of impiety, shewing how infinitely more reverent is the scepticism of Socrates than the unreflecting orthodoxy of which Euthyphro is the exponent. The Apology was intended by Plato to be a triumphant vindication of the whole faith and practice of his master in society, religion and politics. In the Crito and the Phaedo we are brought face to face with issues which are at once narrower and wider: narrower, inasmuch as they deal with one particular aspect of Socrates' personality, the Crito with his political, the Phaedo with his eschatological views, freely developed and expanded by Plato: wider, because in both we are introduced to problems of more universal interest, in the Crito to the relation between the individual and the State, in the Phaedo to the immortality of the soul.
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If we regard the Euthyphro as a kind of prologue to the great trilogy of which Socrates is the central figure, we shall see in the Crito as it were the second drama, related to the first and last much as the Choephoroi is related to the Agamemnon and the Eumenides. From one point of view, indeed, there might seem to be a closer connection between the Crito and the Phaedo than between it and the Apology: for while in the first member of the trilogy we have Socrates' *Apologia pro vita sua*, the other two set before us his *Apologia pro morte sua*: in the Crito we have the citizen's justification for remaining to die, in the Phaedo the philosopher's, the hope of immortality. But on a closer examination we shall see that our dialogue is rather an epilogue to the Apology than a prologue to the Phaedo. There is little in the doctrine of the two first dialogues that travels beyond the standpoint of the historical Socrates, whereas in the purely philosophical sections of the Phaedo, Socrates speaks for Plato rather than for himself. And in the second place, we are introduced in the Crito to an elaborate refutation of the political prejudice against Socrates which lent such fatal force to the indictment, a prejudice touched upon, it is true, in the Apology, but for the first time thoroughly exposed and rebutted in our dialogue. So far from being the enemy of his country and the corrupter of his fellow-citizens, the Crito sets before us Socrates as the only true patriot, faithful to his country and her laws even at a moment when average Athenian morality as interpreted by the mouth of Crito pronounced it to be not only ex-

1 See my Introduction to the Apology, pp. xxiv—xxv.
2 Chapters xix—xxii.
cusable but his imperative duty to break the laws and save his life. The structure of the dialogue is admirably adapted for the purpose of exhibiting the patriotism of Socrates, and reveals throughout a close analogy to the actual circumstances of Socrates' trial, defence and condemnation. As the correct apprehension of this analogy will bring still more clearly into view the real scope and meaning of the Crito, I will endeavour to trace it in detail: the subject-matter of our dialogue will be considered later.

In the trial of Socrates, there were three parties concerned—the prosecution, represented by Meletus and his associates, Socrates himself as the defendant, and the judges. The charge was virtually one of High Treason: Socrates, it was alleged, had been unfaithful to his country by endeavouring to demoralise her youth and refusing to recognise her gods. A verdict of guilty was returned and Socrates condemned to death: this much the Apology gives us. In the Crito, as it appears to me, the semblance of a trial is still preserved, under the mask of dialogue. This time Socrates is judge, Crito prosecutor, the State prisoner at the bar. The charge is wrong-doing (ādikeiv): the verdict one of acquittal. I see frequent indications of such a juridical structure throughout the Crito, such as the personification of the Laws, the use of ἀπόλλωναί νόμον as a figurative expression for breaking the laws (50 A, 50 B, 51 A, 54 C), perhaps also the use of εἰσηγεῖσθαι in 48 A (οὐκ ὄρθως εἰσηγεῖ, εἰσηγούμενος τῆς τῶν πολλῶν δόξης δεῖν ἡμᾶς προντι-ζεῖν περὶ τῶν δικαίων καὶ καλῶν καὶ ἀγαθῶν καὶ τῶν ἐναν-τίων), and in particular the words of Socrates in 50 B,

1 See Crito, Chapter V.
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just after the Laws have been brought upon the stage: πολλά γὰρ ἂν τις ἔχω, ἀλλως τε καὶ ἁίτωρ, εἰπείν ὑπὲρ τοῦτον τοῦ νόμου ἀπολλυμένου ὅσ τὰς δίκας τὰς δικασθείσας προστάτει κυρίας εἶναι1. The framework upon which the Crito hangs is hidden throughout the two opening chapters by the dramatic setting of the dialogue, nor does it emerge into view for some time, owing to the peculiar form which Crito’s speech against the State of necessity assumed: partly for artistic reasons, and partly no doubt in order to conform to historical truth, Plato felt bound to make Crito arraign the State indirectly rather than directly—by means of earnest entreaties addressed to Socrates urging him to effect an illegal escape. It is not till we reach the sixth Chapter, in which Socrates begins to expound and emphasize the principle upon which the verdict ought to hinge, that the essentially legal structure of the dialogue first comes clearly before our eyes. Socrates the judge lays down the higher and unwritten law by which the State is to be judged: οὔτε ἄρα ἀνταδικεῖν δεὶ οὔτε κακῶς ποιεῖν οὐδένα ἀνθρώπων, οὔτ’ ἄν ὀτιοῦν πάσχῃ υπ’ αὐτῶν (49 c). The State is next heard in her own defence: she pleads that her very existence is endangered (xi), that Socrates above all Athenians owes her even more than filial obedience and regard (xiii—xiv), finally, after a brief reply to the arguments of Crito (xv), she concludes by holding out to Socrates a prospect of rewards in the

1 Cron’s remark on this passage is true, but not (I think) the whole truth: ‘Dabei wird man an die Sitte zu Athen erinnert, dass, wenn es sich um Abschaffung eines Gesetzes handelte, dies durch erwählte Anwälte (συνήγοροι) vertheidigt wurde.’
other world, at the same time reiterating her own innocence: ἡδικημένος ἀπει, ἐὰν ἀπίης, οὐ χ ὑφ ἡμῶν, ἄλλα υ ὑπὸ ἀνθρώπων (54 B). Socrates then pronounces verdict of acquittal: εὰ τοῖνυν, ὃ Κρῖτων, καὶ πρᾶττωμεν ταύτῃ, ἐπειδή ταύτῃ ὅ θεὸς υφηγεῖται.

Enough has now been said to establish what is I think a clear analogy between the structure of our dialogue and the circumstances of Socrates' trial: but in order to obtain an accurate comprehension of the meaning of the verdict delivered by Socrates, it is necessary to inquire somewhat more particularly into the position assigned to Crito and to the Laws. Crito is not merely the friend of Socrates, pleading with passionate earnestness against the sacrifice of the associate whom he held so dear: he is also the mouthpiece of Athenian public opinion. This is clearly implied in the arguments by which he endeavours to induce Socrates to make his escape: "many men," he says in 44 B, "who do not know you and me well, will think me guilty of neglect, because I might have saved you, if I had been willing to spend money": and again in 45 E, "I for my part feel ashamed for you and for us who are your friends. It will be thought that the whole of this thing which has befallen you is due to our cowardice, I mean your appearance in court when you need not have appeared, the process itself, and last of all, the crowning absurdity of the whole transaction, that you should be thought to have given us the slip through a sort of cowardice and unmanliness upon our part, because we did not save you and you did not save yourself, when it was possible and practicable for you to do so, if we had been good for anything at all." Had Socrates complied with the invitation of his
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friend, not only would no Athenian have condemned him, but to the mass of his countrymen his conduct would have appeared not only natural, but perfectly just: the ties of friendship were stronger in their estimation than those of patriotism. Speaking of the reproaches which he would have to endure for leaving Socrates to die, Crito asks in 44 c: "what character could be more dishonourable than the character of preferring one's money to one's friends? The people will never believe that it was you who refused to escape, and we who were anxious to save you." The concluding part of Crito's appeal is even more emphatic: "And besides, Socrates, I think you are trying to do what is wrong, betraying yourself, when you might be saved (45 c)." Crito is throughout the representative of average Athenian morality, and from the fact that he nowhere recognises the paramount duty which both Socrates and he as surety for his friend owed to the State, we can see how lightly the yoke of patriotism pressed upon an age that produced a Theramenes and an Alcibiades.

Let us now examine the part played by the Laws in the dialogue. It is easy to go wrong here: for that which is acquitted by Socrates is not the verdict or sentence which the unjust judges had pronounced against him: Socrates indeed declares again and again throughout the dialogue that his condemnation was flagrantly unjust. Nor yet is it strictly speaking the constitution of Athens in particular, for Socrates was far from viewing democracy with an altogether favourable eye: but what really stands arraigned before him is the State in the abstract as opposed to the Individual—in other words the principle that alone renders
possible the existence of any kind of State, aristocracy no less than democracy, the νόμος δις προστάτει τὰς δίκας τὰς δικασθείςας κυρίας εἶναι (50 B).

We are now in a position to comprehend the full meaning of Socrates’ decision. His acquittal of the State is at once a condemnation of his judges and a counter-accusation of High Treason against the people themselves. For if the State was innocent, the guilt rested with the judges, who had misinterpreted the law: and the postponement of public interests to the apparent advantage of the individual, which forms the very pith and marrow of Crito’s appeal, is shewn to be just as treasonable as Socrates himself was patriotic.

Up to this point we have been concerned chiefly with the form of the dialogue: it remains to consider the doctrine. We shall find that both in respect of ethical and political teaching the Crito remains true to the creed of the historical Socrates. This is exactly what we should expect beforehand, if the real purpose of Plato, as I have endeavoured to shew, was to hurl back the charge of High Treason from the Socrates of history upon the Athenians at large.

We note first of all the peculiarly Socratic method which is employed throughout the inquiry. The entire dialogue is but an illustration of the precept which is enunciated in 46 B: ἐγὼ οὐ μόνον νῦν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀεὶ τοιοῦτος, οὗς τῶν ἐμῶν μηδενὶ ἄλλῳ πείθεσθαι ἢ τῷ λόγῳ, διὸ ἀν μοι λογιζομένῳ βέλτιστος φαινηται. Here the λόγος is μηδενὶ τρόπῳ ἀδικητέον εἶναι: it forms so to speak the major premise of Socrates’ practical syllogism, of which the minor is established by the plead-

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1 See note in loc.
ing of the Laws (50 a foll.). The historical accuracy of our dialogue is apparent in its ethical doctrine no less than in its method. We seem to hear the voice of Socrates when we read that only the wise man’s judgment is deserving of regard (47 a), and still more when we find this statement backed up by the familiar illustrations from the arts (47 b foll.): nor is the conception of wickedness as a disease of the soul, and the preference of soul over body (47 e foll.), out of harmony with Socrates’ teaching. Equally Socratic is the sentiment in 48 b: οὐ τὸ ζήν περὶ πλείστου ποιητέων, ἀλλὰ τὸ εὖ ζήν: and the refusal in 49 e to permit any divergence between theory and practice is only the οὐδεὶς ἐκὼν ἀμαρτάνει stripped of its paradox. I think also that Socrates would have willingly accepted the fundamental λόγος of the dialogue—μηδενὶ τρόπῳ ἀδικητέων εἶναι—even if he never actually so expressed himself. The objections raised by Zeller and many editors, on the ground of passages in Xenophon and Aristotle¹, seem to be directed rather against the apparent altruism of such a doctrine than at the doctrine itself. But in the mouth of Socrates the sentiment, so far from being altruistic, was dictated by conscious egoism. He refrained from doing wrong, not out of regard for others, but because of its effect upon his own soul: for just in proportion as the value of our

¹ In Mem. ii. 6. 35 all that Socrates says is that if Crito-bulus believes that virtue in a man is νικᾷ τοῦς μὲν φίλους εἰς ποιούντα, τοὺς δὲ ἐχθροὺς κακῶς, he will not find it hard to make friends. Mem. iii. 9. 8 proves nothing either way. In Aristotle Rhet. ii. 23, p. 1398a 24 (Σωκράτης οὐκ ἐφὶ βαδίζειν ὡς Ἀρχέλαος: ὃς βρω γὰρ εἶναι ἐφὶ τὸ μὴ δύνασθαι ἀμύνασθαι, ὡσπερ καὶ κακῶς) it seems to me that Socrates is only making use of a popular definition of ὃς to illustrate his own.
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souls exceeds that of our bodies, is the supreme importance of keeping them healthy and free from stain, if we would consult our own individual interests. Rightly understood, this thorough-going vindication of virtuous conduct even under the extremest provocation is altogether in harmony with a creed which regarded soul as the true self, and self-knowledge and self-development as the end of life.

The political teaching of the Crito faithfully represents the opinions held by Socrates and establishes his right to the title of patriot, in contrast to his fellow-countrymen. Whether we regard the decision itself, or the grounds by which it is enforced, the whole political bearing of the dialogue may be summed up in the words which Xenophon puts into the mouth of Socrates: \( \phi \eta \mu \iota \gamma \alpha \rho \ \varepsilon \gamma \omega \tau \_ \nu \omicron \mu \omicron \nu \ \delta \acute{i} \kappa \alpha \iota \omicron \nu \ \varepsilon \iota \nu \iota \) (Mem. iv. 4. 12). To break the laws is to strike at the root of all society (50 A): it is not merely a breach of contract (51 E), it is State-murder, a crime worse than matricide (50 B, 51 A foll.), because our country is far more to us than a mother. What an emphatic assertion of the old Greek theory of life is here! The very man whose daily work it was to preach self-study and self-knowledge proclaims that we should live for the State rather than for ourselves. Nor if we view the question rightly is there any contradiction. Socrates refused to separate the \( \beta \iota \omicron \sigma \ \pi \rho \alpha \kappa \tau \iota \kappa \omicron \acute{o}s \) from the \( \beta \iota \omicron \sigma \ \theta \varepsilon \omega \rho \rho \eta \tau \iota \kappa \omicron \acute{o}s \); he claimed to be a political as well as a moral reformer: \( \omicron \iota \mu \iota \ \mu e t \ \delta \lambda \iota \gamma \omega \nu \ ' \Lambda \theta \eta \nu \alpha \iota \omicron \nu \), he says in the Gorgias, \( \nu \iota \nu \mu \iota \ \varepsilon \iota \pi \omega \mu \omicron \nu \omicron \sigma \), \( \varepsilon \pi \iota \chi \varepsilon \iota \rho \iota \nu \ \tau \_ \omicron \ \omicron \omicron \omicron \).
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ὅς πολιτικὴ τέχνη καὶ πράττειν τὰ πολιτικὰ μόνος τῶν νῦν (521 Ε). He exhorted the Athenians ἀφ’ ἐστίας ἀρχεσθαι καθαίρειν τὴν πάλιν—to reform the State by reforming themselves: and, conversely, he believed that the full development of the individual could only be attained in the service of the State. The only possible life as it appeared to Socrates was the life of a citizen. He condemned the increasing divergence between public and private interests in his day, and traced to this among other causes the decline of Athenian prosperity (Mem. iii. 5. 21).

It may appear strange that a man so prone to doubt and inquiry should have hesitated to call in question the authority of the laws: but the fact is undeniable. Socrates would have agreed with the remark of Cleon in Thucydides (iii. 37. 4) οἷ μὲν γὰρ τῶν τε νόμων σοφώτεροι βουλονται φαίνεσθαι—καὶ ἐκ τοῦ τοιούτου τὰ πολλὰ σφάλλουσι τὰς πόλεις. His whole life was distinguished by absolute fidelity to the laws of his country: he had upheld them against the fury of the people and the tyranny of the thirty: and now he consents to death rather than break them. It was for their strict subordination to law and authority that Socrates entertained so warm an admiration for Sparta and Crete: and the same feeling underlies the praise which he bestows in Xenophon upon the Athens of the past (Mem. iii. 5). The generation before his birth appeared to him a kind of golden age, when the State flourished and the citizens were happy under the old unreflecting morality, where no right was known but that of law. The limitation of Socrates’ genius appears here. Had he carried out his principles to their fullest logical
development, he would not have shrunk from submitting to the test of his dialectic the whole question of the validity and authority of law, as a condition of the stability of social life: but to him it is almost an axiom that the law should be obeyed. The fact is that Socrates' rationalism was only half-complete. If reason presided over one hemisphere, μαντική appeared to him to rule the other. It was reserved for Plato to dethrone μαντική and make νοῦς the sole monarch of the world. But in Socrates' way of thinking, the Laws derive their validity from God, and have no need of human reason to establish it: they are of the same family with the Laws in the Unseen World, and he who offends against the one is held guilty by the other: ἡμεῖς τέ σοι χαλέπανοὐμεν ζῶντι, καὶ ἐκεῖ οἱ ἡμέτεροι αἴδελφοι οἱ ἐν "Ἄιδου νόμοι οὐκ εὐμενῶς σε ὑποδέξονται, εἰδότες ὅτι καὶ ἡμᾶς ἐπεχείρησας ἀπολέσαι τὸ σοῦ μέρος (54 C).

The Crito therefore presents us with what is upon the whole a faithful picture of Socrates both as a man and as a teacher. Only in two respects does it appear to travel beyond the views which may with certainty be ascribed to him. While still in the vigour of life and possessed with the ardour of his mission, Socrates on no occasion expressed himself so despairingly about his country as we should infer

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1 See this admirably worked out in Nohle's "Die Statslehre Platos in ihrer geschichtlichen Entwicklung" (Jena, 1880), pp. 10—13.

2 In Politicus 209 C priests and soothsayers are placed on the same level with slaves, artisans and merchants.

3 See also Xen. Mem. iv. 4. 25 καὶ τοῖς θεοῖς ἔρα, ὃ Ἰππία, τὸ αὐτὸ δικαὶν τε καὶ νόμιμον εἶναι ἀρέσκει.
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from various passages in the Crito: on the contrary he thought the reformation of Athens quite within the range of practical politics (Xen. Mem. iii. 5). Nor would he have spoken of a future life so confidently as the Laws with his approval speak towards the close of the dialogue. But even here we must allow something for the influence which the imminent prospect of death might exert even upon the ardent spirit and sternly logical mind of a Socrates. On the whole I think it probable that his unjust condemnation may have led him to despair, not so much of Athens, as of the Athenians: but I cannot bring myself to believe that he could ever have dogmatically asserted or approved of the doctrine of immortality. Plato seems to be responsible for that.

In conclusion, let us endeavour to sum up the reasons which induced Socrates to remain and die. First and foremost, we may put the influence of his 'divine sign.' Although this is nowhere expressly mentioned in the Crito, yet there seems to be an allusion to it in the words with which the dialogue concludes—πράττωμεν ταύτη, ἐπειδὴ ταύτη ὁ θεὸς ύφη-γεῖται. The very pleading of the Laws is but the voice of the divine sign made articulate: see my note upon 54 D καὶ ἐν ἐμοὶ αὐτῇ ἡ ἡχὴ τούτων τῶν λόγων βομβεῖ καὶ ποιεῖ μὴ δύνασθαι τῶν ἄλλων ἀκούειν. The rejection too of Crito's offer was the best possible refutation of the charge of treason, as it revealed Socrates in the light of a true patriot in the midst

1 44 D, 48 C and especially 49 D οἶδα γὰρ ὅτι ἠλέγοις τινὶ ταύτα καὶ δοκεῖ καὶ δόξει. ὡς οὖν οὔτω δέδοκται καὶ οἷς μὴ, τούτοις οὐκ ἔστι κοινὴ βουλή, ἀλλ' ἀνάγκη τούτους ἄλληλων καταφρονεῖν, ὀρφάντας τὰ ἄλληλων βουλεύματα.
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of men, with whom private and personal interests weighed more than regard for their country and her laws. Nor must we forget, in the third place, that Socrates was now old, and had finished his mission: it was hardly possible to find a more opportune moment for dying. Had he been thirty and not seventy, I doubt if we should admire him so much: I think we should have thought him lacking in spirit. Plato in his place would probably have escaped, and I for one should not have blamed him. As it was, the death of Socrates was the best thing that could happen for his fame and influence: it was well worth while to die, if only for the sake of the impulse which his death imparted to the greatest of his pupils.
ΚΡΙΤΩΝ.

[Α περὶ πρακτέου. Ἡθικός.]

ΤΑ ΤΟΥ ΔΙΑΛΟΓΟΥ ΠΡΟΣΩΠΑ
ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ, ΚΡΙΤΩΝ.

St. I.

I. ΣΩ. Τί τηνικάδε ἀφίξαι, οὗ Κρίτων; ἢ οὐ πρὸ ἐτί ἐστίν;  ΚΡ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.
ΣΩ. Πηνικα μάλιστα;  ΚΡ. ὁ Ὀρθρος βαθὺς.
ΣΩ. Θαυμάζω, ὅπως ἡθέλησέ σοι ὁ τοῦ δεσμωτηρίου φύλαξ ὑπακούσαι.
ΚΡ. Εὐνήθης ἦδη μοι ἐστίν, ὁ Σώκρατες, διὰ τὸ πολλάκις δεύρο φοιτᾶν, καὶ τι καὶ ἐνηργήτηται ὑπ᾿ ἐμὸν.
ΣΩ. "Ἀρτι δὲ ἣκεις ἢ πάλαι;  ΚΡ. Ἐπιεικῶς πάλαι.

Β  ΣΩ. Εἶτα πῶς οὖν εὐθὺς ἐπήγειράς με, ἀλλὰ συγὴ παρακάθησαι;
ΚΡ. Οὐ μᾶ τὸν Δία, ὁ Σώκρατες οὐδὲ ἀν αὐτὸς ἦθελον ἐν τοσαύτη τε ἀγρυπνίᾳ καὶ λύπῃ εἶναι.
άλλα καὶ σοῦ πάλαι θαυμάζω, αἰσθανόμενος, ὡς ἦδεως καθεύδεις· καὶ ἐπίτηδες σε οὐκ ἥγειρον, ἵνα ὡς ἦδιστα διάγγης. καὶ πολλάκις μὲν δὴ σε καὶ πρότερον ἐν παντὶ τῷ βίῳ ηὐδαιμόνισα τοῦ τρόπου, πολὺ δὲ μάλιστα ἐν τῇ γῇ παρεστώσῃ ξυμφορᾷ, ὡς βαδίως αὐτὴν καὶ πράως φέρεις.

ΣΩ. Καὶ γὰρ ἂν, ὃ Κρίτων, πλημμελές εἰη ἁγανάκτειν τηλικοῦτον ὄντα, εἰ δὲι ἡδὴ τελευτᾶν.

25 ΚΡ. Καὶ ἄλλοι, ὃ Σῶκρατες, τηλικοῦτοι ἐν τοῖς αὐταῖς ξυμφοραῖς ἀλίσκονται, ἄλλ' οὖδὲν αὐτοὺς ἐπιλύεται ἡ ἥλικια τὸ μῆ ὦν ἂγανακτεῖν τῇ παρούσῃ τύχῃ.

ΣΩ. Ἐστι ταύτα. ἀλλὰ τί δὴ οὕτω πρῶτον ἀφίξαιεν.

ΚΡ. Ἀγγελίαν, ὃ Σῶκρατες, φέρων χαλεπτήν, οὐσοὶ, ὡς ἐμοὶ φαίνεται, ἄλλ' ἐμοὶ καὶ τοῖς σοῖς ἐπιτηδείοις πᾶσιν καὶ χαλεπτήν καὶ βαρείαν, ἦν ἐγὼ, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκῶ, ἐν τοῖς βαρύτατοι ἂν ἐνέγκαιμι.

35 ΣΩ. Τίνα ταύτην; ἢ τὸ πλοῖον ἀφίκται ἐκ Δῆλου, οὐ δεῖ ἀφικομένου τεθνάναι με;

ΚΡ. Οὐ τοῖς δὴ ἀφίκται, ἄλλα δοκεῖ μὲν μοι ἥξειν τῷ τήμερον εἷς ὅν ἀπαγγέλλουσιν ἡκοντές τίνες ἀπὸ Σουνίου καὶ καταλιπόντες ἐκεῖ αὐτό. δῆλον οὖν ἐκ τούτων τῶν ἀγγέλων, ὅτι ἥξει τήμερον, καὶ ἀνάγκη δὴ eis αὐριον ἔσται, ὃ Σῶκρατες, τὸν βλοῦν σε τελευτᾶν.

Π. ΣΩ. Ἀλλ', ὃ Κρίτων, τύχῃ ἀγαθῇ. εἰ ταύτῃ τοῖς θεοῖς φίλου, ταύτῃ ἔστω. οὐ μέντοι οὖμαι ἥξειν αὐτὸ τήμερον.

'The ship will arrive to morrow.
A vision has told me that I shall live two days.'

5 ΚΡ. | Πόθεν τούτῳ τεκμαίρειν;

ΣΩ. Ἐγὼ σοι ἐρῶ. τῇ γάρ που ὑστεραλα δεῖ με ἀποθυγήσειν ἢ ἢ ἣν ἔλθῃ τὸ πλοῖον.

'43 Β
KR. Φασί γέ τοι δή οί τούτων κύριοι.

ΣΩ. Οὐ τοῖνυν τῆς ἐπιούσης ἡμέρας οἶμαι αὐτὸ ἡξεω, ἀλλὰ τῆς ἑτέρας. τεκμαίρομαι δὲ ἐκ τινος ἐνυπνίου, ὦ ἐώρακα ὀλίγον πρότερον ταύτης τῆς ἑκ νυκτὸς. καὶ κινδυνεύεις ἐν καίρῳ τινὶ οὐκ ἐγείραι με.

KR. Ἡν δὲ δή τί τὸ ἐνυπνίον; ΣΩ. Ἐδόκει τίς μοι γνυή προσελθοῦσα καλὴ Β καὶ εὐειδής, λευκὰ ῥμάτια ἐχοῦσα, καλέσαι με καὶ ἐπιεῖν ὥ Σώκρατες, ἡματί κεν τριτάτῳ Ψήν ἐρίβωλον ἱκοῖον.

KR. Ἀτοπον τὸ ἐνυπνίον, ὦ Σώκρατες. ΣΩ. Ἐναργῆς μὲν οὖν, ὦς γέ μοι δοκεῖ, ὦ Κρίτων.

Ι. ΚΡ. Δίαν γε, ὦς ἐοίκεν. ἄλλ', ὥ δαμάνυε Σώκρατες, ἔτι καὶ νῦν ἐμοὶ πεῖθοι καὶ σώθητι· ὡς ἐμοὶ, ἔαν σὺ ἀποθάνης, οὐ μία ἕμφορα ἔστιν, ἀλλὰ χωρὶς μὲν σοῦ ἐστερηθῶσαι, τοιοῦτον ἐπιτηδείου, ὄλον ἐγώ οὐδένα μὴ ποτε εὐρήσω, ἔτι δὲ καὶ πολλοῖς δόξω, οὐ ἔμε καὶ σε μὴ σαφῶς ἴσωσιν, ὡς οἶδος ΚΤ ἀν σε σοφεῖν, εἰ ἰθέλουν ἀναλίσκειν χρήματα, ἀμελήσαι. καὶ τοῦ τίς ἄν αἰσχὼν εἶ ἑτα ταύτης δόξα ἕ δοκεῖν χρήματα περὶ πλεῖονοι ποιεῖσθαι ἑ φίλους; οὐ γὰρ πείσονται οἱ πολλοὶ, ἐς σὺ αὐτὸς οὐκ ἥθελησας ἀπιέναι εὐθέως ἡμῶν προθυμομενῶν.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ τί ἡμῖν, ὥ μακάριε Κρίτων, οὔτω τῆς τῶν πολλῶν δόξης μέλει; οἱ γὰρ ἐπιεικέστατοι, ὀν μᾶλλον ἄξιον φροντίζειν, ἡγήσονται αὐτὰ οὔτω πε-15 πρᾶξθαι, ὥσπερ ἄν πραξθῇ.
τῆς τῶν πολλῶν δόξης μέλειν. αὐτὰ δὲ δῆλα τὰ παρόντα νυνί, ὅτι οἱ οἱ τ’ εἰσιν οἱ πολλοὶ οὐ τὰς συμπρότατα τῶν κακῶν ἐξεργάζεσθαι, ἀλλὰ τὰ μέγιστα σχεδόν, εάν τις ἐν αὐτοῖς διαβεβλημένος ἦ.

ΣΩ. Εἴ γὰρ ὄφελον, ὁ Κρίτων, οἱ οἱ τ’ εἶναι οἱ πολλοὶ τὰ μέγιστα κακὰ ἐργάζεσθαι, ἵνα οἱ οἱ τ’ ἥσαν καὶ ἄγαθὰ τὰ μέγιστα, καὶ καλῶς ἂν εἴχειν νῦν δὲ ὁδότερα οἱ οἱ τε· οὕτε γὰρ φρόνιμον οὕτε ἀφρονα δυνατὸν ποιῆσαι, ποιοῦσι δὲ τότῳ ὁ τι ἂν τύχωσι.

IV. KP. Ταῦτα μὲν δὲ οὕτως ἔχετω· τάδε δέ, ἐν ὦ Σώκρατες, εἰπέ μοι. ἤρα γε μὴ ἐμοῦ προμηθεῖ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιτηδείων, μή, ἐὰν σὺ ἐνθένδε ἔξελθης, οἱ συκοφάνται ἥμων πράγματα παρέχωσιν ὡς σὲ ἐνθένδε ἐκκλέψασιν, καὶ ἀναγκασθοῦμεν ἢ καὶ πάσαν τὴν οὐσίαν ἀποβαλεῖν ἢ συγκα ἁρῆματα, ἢ καὶ ἄλλο τι πρὸς τούτοις παθεῖν· εἰ γὰρ τι τοιοῦτον ὑπὸ βοήθεια, ἐκεῖνον 45 αὐτὸ χαίρειν· ἠμεῖς γὰρ πον δικαίοι ἐσμεν σῶσαντές σε κινδυνεῦσιν τούτοις τῶν κινδυνοῦν καὶ, ἐὰν δεή, ἐτι τοῦτον μείζω. ἀλλ’ ἐμοὶ πείθου καὶ μὴ ἄλλως πολει.

ΣΩ. Καὶ ταῦτα προμηθοῦμαι, ὁ Κρίτων, καὶ ἄλλα πολλά.

KP. Μήτε τοῖνυν ταῦτα φοβοῦ· καὶ γὰρ οὐδὲ 15 πολὺ τάργυρίον ἐστὶν, ὁ θέλουσι λαβόντες τινὲς σωσάς σε καὶ ἐξαγαγεῖν ἐνθένδε. ἔπειτα οὐχ ὅρας τούτους τοὺς συκοφάντας ὡς εὐτελεῖς, καὶ οὐδὲν ἂν δεῖ ἐτ’ αὐτοὺς πολλοῦ ἀργυρίου; σοὶ δὲ ὑπάρχει μὲν τὰ ἐμὰ χρήματα, ὡς ἐγὼ οἴμαι, ικανά· ἐπείτα καὶ ἐ’ τι Β ἐμοῦ κηδόμενος οὐκ οἴει δεῖν ἀναλίσκειν τὰμά, ξένοι οὕτωι ἐνθάδε ἐτοιμοὶ ἀναλίσκειν· εἰς δὲ καὶ κεκόμικεν ἐπ’ αὐτὸ τοῦτο ἀργυρίου ικανόν, Σιμμίας ὁ Ἐθβαῖος·
ἐτοιμὸς δὲ καὶ Κέβης καὶ ἄλλοι πολλοὶ πάνυ. ὥστε, ὁπερ λέγω, μήτε ταῦτα φοβούμενος ἀποκάμης σαυτὸν σώσαι, μήτε, ὁ ἐλεγες ἐν τῷ δικαστηρίῳ, δυσχερές σοι 25 γενέσθω, ὧτι οὐκ ἀν ἔχουσι ἐξελθὼν ὅ τι χρῶσαυτὸν πολλαχοῦ μὲν γὰρ καὶ ἄλλοσ, ὅποι ἀν ἀφίκη, ἀγα- 26 πήσοι σε· εὰν δὲ βούλῃ εἰς Ῥεταλίαν ἑναι, εἰσὶν ἐμοὶ ἐκεὶ ἔνοι, οἳ σε περί πολλοῦ ποιήσονται καὶ ἀσφαλείαν σοι παρέξουσι, ὥστε σε μηδένα λυπεῖν 30 τῶν κατὰ Ῥεταλίαν.

V. Ἕπι δὲ, ὁ Σάκρατες, οὐδὲ δίκαιον μοι δοκεῖς ἐπιχειρεῖν πράγμα, σαυτὸν προδοῦναι, εἴδων σωθῆναι· καὶ τοιαύτα σπεύδεις περὶ σαυτὸν γενέσθαι, ἀπερ ἀν καὶ οἱ ἐχθροὶ σου σπεύσασίν τε καὶ ἐσπευσάνσε δια- 27 φθείραι βουλόμενοι. πρὸς δὲ τούτοις καὶ τοὺς νικές τους σαυτὸν ἐμοιγε δοκεῖς προ- 32 27 ὁ διδόναι, οὐσοι εἰδὼν καὶ ἐκβρέψαι καὶ 28 ἐκπαιδεύσαι ὀἰχήσει καταλιπών, καὶ τὸ σοῦ μέρος, ὅ τι ἀν τύχωσι, τούτο πράξουσιν· τεῦξονται δὲ, ὡς τὸ εἰκός, τοιούτους οἴκητε εἰσθένει γλύγεσθαι ἐν ταῖς ὀρφανίαις περὶ τοὺς ὀρφανοὺς. ἡ γὰρ οὐ χρῆ ποιεῖσθαι 29 παῖδας, ἡ εὐνυδαταλαυπωρεῖς καὶ τρέφοντα καὶ παι- 31 δεύοντα· σοὶ δὲ μοι δοκεῖς τὰ ραθυμότατα αἱρεῖσθαι· ἵππε δὲ, ἀπερ ἀν ἀνήρ ἄγαθος καὶ ἄνδρεώς ἔλοιπο, 15 ταῦτα αἱρεῖσθαι, φάσκοντά γε δὴ ἀρετής διὰ παντὸς τοῦ βίου ἐπιμελεῖσθαι· ὡς ἔγωγε καὶ ὑπὲρ σοῦ καὶ Ἔ ὑπὲρ ἥμων τῶν σῶν ἐπιτηδείων αἰσχύνομαι, μὴ δόξη 32 28 ἄπαν τὸ πράγμα τὸ περὶ σὲ ἀνανδρία τινι· τῇ ἡμετέρᾳ πεπράχθαι, καὶ ἡ εἰσόδος τῆς δίκης εἰς τὸ δικαστήριον ὡς εἰσήλθες ἐξὸν μὴ εἰσέλθειν, καὶ αὐτὸς ὁ ἄγων τῆς δίκης ὡς ἐγένετο, καὶ τὸ τελευταῖον δὴ
τοῦτι, ὅσπερ κατὰγελώς τῆς πραξεως, κακία τινὶ καὶ ἀνανδρία τῇ ἡμετέρᾳ διαπεφευγέναι | ἡμᾶς δοκεῖν, οὗ-46
25 τινὲς σε οὕξι ἐσώσαμεν οὗδὲ σὺ σαυτόν, οἶον τε ὅν καὶ δυνατόν, ει τι καὶ μικρὸν ἠmom ὀφελὸς ἦν. ταῦτα οὖν, ὁ Σῶκρατες, ὥρα μη ἀμα τῷ κακῷ καὶ αἰσχρὰ ἦ σοι τε καὶ ἡμῖν. ἀλλὰ βουλευον, μᾶλλον δὲ οὐδὲ βουλεύεσθαι ἐτὶ ὥρα, ἀλλὰ βεβουλεύσθαι. μία δὲ 30 βουλή τῆς γὰρ ἐπιούσῃς νυκτὸς πάντα ταῦτα δεὶ πεπράχθαι. εἰ δ’ ἐτί περιμενοῦμεν, ἀδύνατον καὶ οὐκέτι οἶον τε. ἀλλὰ παντὶ τρόπῳ, ὁ Σῶκρατες, πείθου μοι καὶ μηδαμῶς ἄλλως ποιεῖ.

VI. ΣΩ.  "Ω φίλε Κρίτων, ἡ προθυμία σου Β πολλοῦ αξίαν, εἰ μετὰ τινὸς ὀρθύτητος εἴη· εἰ δὲ μη, ὅσῳ μείζον, τοσοῦτῳ χαλεπω- τέρα. σκοπεῖσθαι οὐν χρὴ ἡμᾶς, εἰτε ταῦτα πρακτέον εἴτε μη· ὡς ἐγὼ οὐ μόνον νῦν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἄει τοιοῦτος, οἷος τῶν ἐμῶν μηδενὶ ἀλλῳ πείθεσθαι ἡ τῷ λόγῳ, ὅσ αὖ μοι λογιζομένῳ βέλτιστος φαίνηται. τοὺς δὲ λόγους, οὓς ἐν τῷ ἐμ- προσθεν ἔλεγον, οὐ δύναμαι νῦν ἐκβαλεῖν, ἐπειδὴ μοι ἱδε ἡ τύχη γέγονεν, ἀλλὰ σχεδὸν τι ὦμοιοι φαίνονται μοι, καὶ τοὺς αὐτοὺς πρεσβεύω καὶ τιμῶ, οὖσπερ καὶ Κ πρότερον· ὅν ἐὰν μη βελτίω ἔχωμεν λέγειν ἐν τῷ παρόντι, εὖ ὅσι ὅτι οὐ μὴ σοι ἔγγυχρησίω, οὐδ’ ἂν πλεῖον τῶν νῦν παρόντων ἡ τῶν πολλῶν δύναμις 15 ὡσπερ παῖδας ἡμᾶς μορμολύττεται, δεσμοὺς καὶ θα- νάτους ἐπιπέμπουσα καὶ χρημάτων ἀφαιρέσεις. πῶς οὖν ἂν μετριώτατα σκοποίμεθα αὐτά; εἰ πρῶτον μὲν τοῖτον τὸν λόγον ἀναλάβοιμεν, ὃν ὦ λέγεις περὶ τῶν δοξῶν, πότερον καλὸς ἐλέγετο ἐκάστοτε ἦ ὦ, ὅτι ταῖς 20 μὲν δὲ τῶν δοξῶν προσέχειν τὸν νοῦν, ταῖς δὲ οὗ· ἢ D
πρὶν μὲν ἐμὲ δὲν ἀποθνῄσκειν καλῶς ἐλέγετο, νῦν δὲ κατάδηλος ἄρα ἐγένετο, ὡτι ἄλλως [ἴενκα λόγου] ἐλέγετο, ἂν δὲ παιδία καὶ φλυαρία ὡς ἀληθῶς; ἐπιθυμῶ δ’ ἐγωγ’ ἐπισκέψασθαι, ὡς Κρίτων, κοινὴ μετὰ σοῦ, εἰ τί μοι ἀλλοιώτερος φανεῖται, ἐπειδὴ ὑδε ἔχω, ἢ ὁ αὐτὸς, 25 καὶ ἐάσομεν χαίρειν ἢ πεισόμεθα αὐτῷ. ἐλέγετο δὲ πως, ὃς ἐγὼμαι, ἐκάστοτε ὑδε ὑπὸ τῶν οἰομένων τι λέγειν, ὥσπερ νῦν δὴ ἐγώ ἔλεγον, ὡτι τῶν δοξῶν, ὡς οἱ ἀνθρώποι δοξάζουσιν, δέοι τὰς μὲν περὶ πολλοὶ Ε ποιεῖσθαι, τὰς δὲ μή. τούτῳ πρὸς θεάν, ὡς Κρίτων, 30 οὐ δοκεῖ καλῶς σοι λέγεσθαι; σὺ γάρ, ὅσα γε τάν-47 θρώπεια, ἐκτὸς εἰ τοῦ μέλλειν ἀποθνῄσκειν | αὔριον, καὶ οὐκ ἂν σὲ παρακρούοι ἡ παροῦσα ξυμφορά. σκόπει δὴ οὐχ ἱκανῶς δοκεῖ σοι λέγεσθαι, ὡτι οὐ πάσας χρή τὰς δόξας τῶν ἀνθρώπων τιμᾶν, ἄλλα 35 τὰς μὲν, τὰς δ’ οὖ; τί φης; ταύτα οὐχὶ καλῶς λέγεται;

ΚΡ. Καλῶς.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τὰς μὲν χρήστας τιμᾶν, τὰς δὲ πονηρὰς μή;

ΚΡ. Ναὶ.

ΣΩ. Χρήσται δὲ οὐχ αἱ τῶν φρονίμων, πονηραὶ δὲ αἱ τῶν ἀφρόνων;

ΚΡ. Πῶς δ’ οὖ;

VII. ΣΩ. Φέρε δὴ, πῶς αὖ τὰ τοιαύτα ἐλέγετο;

Β γυμναξόμενος ἀνὴρ καὶ τοῦτο πράττων τότερον παντὸς ἀνδρὸς ἐπαίνῳ καὶ ψόγῳ τὸν νοῦν προσέχει, ἡ ἐνὸς μόνου ἐκείνου, ὡς ἂν τυγχάνῃ ιατρὸς ἡ παιδοτρίβησις ὡς;

ΚΡ. Ἐνὸς μόνου.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν φοβεῖσθαι χρή τοὺς
8

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right and wrong will be destroyed: ψόγους καὶ ἀσπάζεσθαι τοὺς ἐπαίνους τοὺς τοῦ ἐνὸς ἐκεῖνου, ἀλλὰ μὴ τοὺς τῶν 10 πολλῶν.

ΚΡ. Δῆλα δή.

ΣΩ. Ταύτῃ ἀρα αὐτῷ πρακτέων καὶ γυμναστέουν καὶ ἐδεστέουν γε καὶ ποτέον, ἥ ἄν τῷ ἐνὶ δοκῇ τῷ ἐπιστάτῃ καὶ ἐπαίνουτι, μᾶλλον ἥ ἥ ξύμπασι τοῖς 15 ἄλλοις.

ΚΡ. Ἡστη ταύτα.

ΣΩ. Εἶδον. ἀπειθήσας δὲ τῷ ἐνὶ καὶ ἀτιμάσας αὐτοῦ τὴν δόξαν καὶ τοὺς ἐπαίνους, τιμήσας δὲ τοὺς C τῶν πολλῶν λόγους καὶ μηδὲν ἐπαίνουτων, ἀρα οὐδὲν 20 κακὸν πείσεται;

ΚΡ. Πῶς γὰρ οὐ;

ΣΩ. Τί δʼ ἐστι τὸ κακὸν τοῦτο; καὶ ποὶ τείνει, καὶ εἰς τί τῶν τοῦ ἀπειθοῦντος;

ΚΡ. Δῆλον ὅτι εἰς τὸ σῶμα τοῦτο γὰρ διόλλυσι. 25

ΣΩ. Καλῶς λέγεις. οὐκόν καὶ τάλλα, ὥς Κρί- των, οὕτως, ἵνα μὴ πάντα διώμεν, καὶ δὴ καὶ περὶ τῶν δικαίων καὶ ἀδίκων καὶ ἀσχηρῶν καὶ καλῶν καὶ ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν, περὶ ὧν νῦν ἡ βουλή ἡμῖν ἐστιν; πότερον ὃ τῇ τῶν πολλῶν δόξῃ δεῖ ἡμᾶς ἐπεσθαί καὶ φοβεῖσθαι 30 αὐτῇ, ἢ τῇ τοῦ ἐνὸς, εἰ τίς ἐστιν ἐπαίνῳ, ὅν δεῖ καὶ ἀσχήνεσθαι καὶ φοβεῖσθαι μᾶλλον ἡ ξύμπαντας τοὺς ἄλλους; ὃ εἰ μὴ ἀκολουθήσομεν, διαφθερόμεν ἐκεῖο καὶ λωβησόμεθα, ὃ τῷ μὲν δικαίῳ βέλτιον ἐγύγνετο, τῷ δὲ ἀδίκῳ ἀπώλλυτο. ἥ οὐδὲν ἐστι τοῦτο; 35

ΚΡ. Ὁμιαί ἐγώγε, ὥς Σώκρατες.

VIII. ΣΩ. Φέρε δὴ, ἐὰν τὸ ὑπὸ τοῦ ὑγιεινοῦ μὲν βέλτιον γιγνόμενον, ὑπὸ τοῦ νοσῶ- δους δὲ διαφθειρόμενον διολέσωμεν πει-
θόμενοι μὴ τῇ τῶν ἐπαίοντων δόξῃ, ἀρα

Ε βιωτὸν ἡμῖν ἔστιν διεφθαρμένου αὐτοῦ;

ἔστι δὲ που τοῦτο τὸ σῶμα· ἢ σωλήν;

ΚΡ. Ναι.

ΣΩ. Ἄρ’ οὖν βιωτὸν ἡμῖν ἔστιν μετὰ μοχθηροῦ
cαὶ διεφθαρμένου σώματος;

ΚΡ. Οὐδαμῶς.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ μετ’ ἐκείνου ἂρ’ ἡμῖν βιωτὸν διε-

φθαρμένου, ὥ τὸ ἀδικον μὲν λωβάται, τὸ δὲ δίκαιον

οὐνήσιν; ἢ φαυλότερον ἤγουμεθα εἶναι τοῦ σώματος

48 ἐκείνο, ὦ τὶ ποτ’ ἐστὶ τῶν | ἡμετέρων, περὶ ὃ ἢ
te ἀδικία καὶ ἡ δικαιοσύνη ἔστιν;

ΚΡ. Οὐδαμῶς.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ τιμωτερον;

ΚΡ. Πολὺ γε.

ΣΩ. Οὐκ ἄρα, ὥ βέλτιστε, πάνω ἡμῖν οὔτω φρο-

ντιστέου, τί ἐροῦσιν οἱ πολλοὶ ἡμᾶς, ἀλλ’ ὃ τὶ ὁ ἐπαιὼν 20

περὶ τῶν δικαίων καὶ ἄδικων, ὁ εἰς, καὶ αὐτή ἡ ἀλη-

θεία. ὥστε πρῶτον μὲν ταύτη οὕκ ὀρθῶς εἰσῆγει,

εἰσηγούμενος τῆς τῶν πολλῶν δόξης δεῖν ἡμᾶς φρο-

ντίζειν περὶ τῶν δικαίων καὶ καλῶν καὶ ἄγαθῶν καὶ
tῶν ἐναντίων. ἀλλὰ μὲν δὴ, φαίη γ’ ἂν τις, οἶοι τέ 25

eἰσιν ἡμᾶς οἱ πολλοὶ ἄποκτινυναι.

Β ΚΡ. Δῆλα δὴ καὶ ταῦτα· φαίη γὰρ ἂν, ὡ Σώ-

κρατεῖ.

ΣΩ. Ἀληθῆ λέγεις. ἀλλ’, ὁ θαυμάστε, οὖτὸς

tε ὁ λόγος, ὅν διελθείθαμεν, ἐμοιγε δοκεῖ ἐτι Ὄμοιος 30

eἰναι καὶ πρότερον καὶ τὸνδε αὖ σκόπει, εἰ ἐτι μένει

ἡμῖν ἢ οὐ, ὅτι οὐ τὸ ζῆν περὶ πλείστου ποιητέου,

ἀλλὰ τὸ εὖ ζῆν.

ΚΡ. Ἀλλὰ μένει.

A. C.
ΣΩ. Τὸ δὲ εὖ καὶ καλῶς καὶ δικαῖως ὅτι ταύτων ἔστιν, μένει ἢ οὐ μένει;

ΚΡ. Μένει.

IX. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἐκ τῶν ὀμολογουμένων τούτων σκεπτέον, πότερον δίκαιον ἐμὲ ἐνθένδε πειράσθαι ἐξείναι μὴ ἀφιέντων Ἀθη-ναίων, ή οὐ δίκαιον καὶ ἐὰν μὲν φαίνηται δίκαιον, πειρόμεθα, εἰ δὲ μὴ, ἐώμεν. ἂς δὲ σὺ λέγεις τὰς σκέψεις περὶ τὰ ἀναλώσεις χρημάτων καὶ δόξης καὶ παῖδων τροφῆς, μὴ ὥς ἀληθῶς ταύτα, ὡς Κρίτων, σκέψεις γὰρ τῶν ῥαδίως ἀποκτινυύτων καὶ ἀναβιω-

ΣΟ. Σκοπῶμεν, ὡς ἀγαθὲ, κοινῆ, καὶ εἰ πὴ ἔχεις ἀντιλέγειν ἐμοῦ λέγοντος, ἀντίλεγε, καὶ σὺ πείσομαι εἰ δὲ μὴ, παύσαι ἥδη, ὡς μακάριε, πολλάκις μοι λέγων ἢ

25 τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον, ὡς χρῆ ἐνθένδε ἀκόντων Ἀθηναίων ἐμὲ ἀπιέναι: ὡς ἐγὼ περὶ πολλοῦ ποιοῦμαι πεῖσαι σε, ἀλλὰ μὴ ἀκόντως ταύτα πράττειν. ὡρα δὲ δὴ τῆς σκέψεως τὴν ἀρχὴν, ἐὰν σοι ἰκανὸς λέγηται, καὶ
49 πειρῶ ἀποκρίνεσθαι | τὸ ἐρωτῶμενον, ἢ ἂν μάλιστα ὁίη.

. KR. Ἀλλὰ πειράσομαι.

Χ. ΣΩ. Οὐδενὶ τρόπῳ φαμὲν ἐκόντας ἀδικητέον εἶναι, ἢ τινὶ μὲν ἀδικητέον τρόπῳ, τινὶ δὲ οὐ; ἢ οὐδαμῶς τὸ γε ἀδικεῖν οὔτε ἀγαθῶν οὔτε καλὸν, ὡς πολλάκις ἡμῖν καὶ ἐν τῷ ἐμπροσθεν χρόνῳ ὦμολογήθη; ἢ πᾶσαι ἡμῖν ἐκεῖναι αἱ πρόσθεν ὦμολογίαι ἐν ταῖς ὑλικοῖς ἡμέραις ἐκεκυμέναι εἰσίν, καὶ πάλαι, οὐ Κρῖτων, ἀρα τηλικοὶ θεοὶ ἀνδρεῖς πρὸς ἀλλήλους σπουδὴ διαλεγο- 5 μενοι ἑλάθομεν ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς παῖδων οὐδὲν διαφέροντες; ἢ παντὸς μᾶλλον οὕτως ἔχει ὡσπερ τότε ἐλέγετο ἡμῖν εἰτε φασίν οἱ πολλοὶ εἰτε μή, καὶ εἰτε δεὶ ἡμᾶς ἐτι τῶντε χαλεπώτερα πάσχειν εἰτε καὶ πραότερα, ὡμως τὸ γε ἀδικεῖν τῷ ἀδικοῦντι καὶ κακῶν καὶ αἰσχρῶν τυγχάνει ὑν παντὶ τρόπῳ; φαμὲν ἢ οὐ; 10

KR. Φαμέν.

ΣΩ. Οὐδαμῶς ἄρα δεὶ ἀδικεῖν.

KR. Οὐ δήτα.

ΣΩ. Οὐδὲ ἀδικούμενον ἄρα ἀνταδικεῖν, ὡς οἱ πολλοὶ οὐνται, ἐπειδή γε οὐδαμῶς δεὶ ἀδικεῖν. 15

C

KR. Οὐ φαίνεται.

ΣΩ. Τί δὲ δή; κακουργεῖν δεί, ὦ Κρῖτων, ἢ οὐ; 20

KR. Οὐ δεὶ δήτου, ὦ Σωκράτες.

ΣΩ. Τί δὲ; ἀντικακουργεῖν κακῶς πάσχοντα, ὡς οἱ πολλοὶ φασίν, δίκαιον ἢ οὐ δίκαιον;

KR. Οὐδαμῶς.

ΣΩ. Τὸ γὰρ ποιεῖν ἀνθρώπους τοῦ ἀδικεῖν οὐδὲν διαφέρει.
KR. 'Ἀληθῆ λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Οὐτε ἄρα ἀνταδικεῖν δεῖ οὔτε κακῶς ποιεῖν οὐδένα ἀνθρώπων, οὐδ’ ἂν ὠτιοῦν πάσχῃ ὑπ’ αὐτῶν. καὶ ὧν, ὦ Κρίτων, ταῦτα καθομολογῶν, ὅπως μὴ παρὰ δόξαν ὁμολογῆσ. οἶδα γὰρ ὅτι ὀλίγως τισὶν διαταῦτα καὶ δοκεῖ καὶ δόξει. οἶς οὖν οὔτω δέδοκται καὶ οἷς μὴ, τοῦτοις οὐκ ἔστι κοινὴ βουλή, ἀλλὰ ἀνάγκη τούτους ἀλλήλων καταφρονεῖν, ὁρῶντας τὰ ἀλλήλων βουλεύματα. σκόπει δὴ οὖν καὶ σὺ εὖ μάλα πότερον κοινωνεῖς καὶ ξυνδοκεῖς σοι καὶ ἄρχω- μεθα ἐντεύθεν βουλευόμενοι, ὡς οὐδέποτε ὀρθῶς ἔχον- τος οὔτε τοῦ ἄδικεῖν οὔτε τοῦ ἀνταδικεῖν οὔτε κακῶς πάσχοντα ἀμύνεσθαι ἀντιδρῶντα κακῶς, ἣ ἀφίστασαι καὶ οὗ κοινωνεῖς τῆς ἀρχῆς ἐμοὶ μὲν γὰρ καὶ πάλαις ἐν οὕτω καὶ νῦν ἔτι δοκεῖ, σοὶ δὲ ἐμὴ ἀλλήδε δέδοκται, λέγε καὶ δίδασκε. εἰ δ’ ἐμμένεις τοὺς πρόσθε, τὸ 45 μετὰ τοῦτο ἂκονε.

KR. 'Ἀλλ’ ἐμμένω τε καὶ ξυνδοκεὶ μοι· ἀλλὰ λέγει.

ΣΩ. Λέγω δὴ αὖ τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο, μᾶλλον δὲ ἐρωτῶ· πότερον ἀ ἄν τις ὁμολογήσῃ τῷ δίκαιῳ ὄντα 50 ποιητέον ἢ ἐξαπατητέον;

KR. Ποιητέον.

XI. ΣΩ. 'Εκ τούτων δὴ ἄθρευ. ἀπαίωντες ἐν- τεύθεν ἡμεῖς μὴ πείσαντες τὴν πόλιν | πό- 50 τερον κακῶς τινας ποιοῦμεν, καὶ ταῦτα οὖς ἠκιστα δεῖ, ἡ οὖ; καὶ ἐμμένομεν οἷς ὁμολογήσαμεν δικαίως οὕσιν ἢ οὖ; 

KR. Οὐκ ἔχω, ὦ Σῶκρατε, ἀποκρί- νασθαι πρὸς ὁ ἐρωτᾶς· οὐ γὰρ ἐννοοῦ.

ΣΩ. 'Ἀλλ’ ὅδε σκόπει. εἰ μέλλουσιν ἡμῖν ἐν-
θένδε εἴτε ἀποδιδράσκειν, εἴθ’ ὅπως δεῖ ὀνομάσαι τοῦτο, ἐλθόντες οἱ νόμοι καὶ τὸ κοινὸν τῆς πόλεως τοῖς ἐπιστάνταις ἔροιντο· 'εἰπέ μοι, ὡ Σώκρατες, τί ἐν νῦν ἔχεις ποιεῖν; ἀλλὰ τί ἡ τούτω τῷ ἔργῳ, ὡ ἐπίχειρεῖς, διανοεῖς τοὺς τε νόμους ἡμᾶς ἀπολέσαι καὶ ξύμπασαι τὴν πόλιν τὸ σὸν μέρος; ἡ δοκεῖ σοι οἶδον τε ἐτι ἐκείνη τὴν πόλιν εἶναι καὶ μὴ ἀνατετράφθαι; ἐν ἦ αἴ 15 γενόμεναι δίκαι μηδὲν ἵσχύσωσιν, ἀλλὰ ὑπὸ ἰδιωτῶν ἀκυροὶ τε γίγνονται καὶ διαφθείρονται; τί ἐροῦμεν, ὡ Κρίτων, πρὸς ταῦτα καὶ ἄλλα τοιαῦτα; πολλὰ γὰρ ἄν τις ἔχωι, ἄλλως τε καὶ ρήτωρ, εἰπεῖν ὑπὲρ τούτου τοῦ νόμου ἀπολλυμένου, ὃς τὰς δίκας τὰς δικασθείσας 20 προστάτει κυρίας εἶναι. ἡ ἐροῦμεν πρὸς αὐτούς, ὅτι ἡδίκει γὰρ ἡμᾶς ἡ πόλις καὶ οὐκ ὀρθῶς τὴν δίκην ἐκρίνειν; ταῦτα ἦ τί ἐροῦμεν;

KR. Ταῦτα νη Δία, ὡ Σώκρατες.

XII. Ἔ. Τί οὖν, ἄν εἰπωσιν οἱ νόμοι· ὡ Σώκρατες, ἢ καὶ ταῦτα ὠμολόγητο ἡμῖν τε καὶ σοί, ἢ ἐμμένειν ταῖς δίκαις αἰσ ἄν ἡ πόλις δικάζῃ; εἰ οὖν αὐτῶν θαυμάζομεν λεγόμενον, ὡς ἄν εἰποι ὅτι ὡ Σώκρατες, μὴ θαύμαζε τὰ λεγόμενα, ἄλλ' ἀποκρίνου, ἐπειδὴ καὶ εἰσθαν χρήσθαι τῷ ἐρωτῶν τε καὶ ἀποκρίνεσθαι. φέρεν

They would reply: "The bargain was that you should obey us without any qualification, as our child and slave. Persuasion you might bring to bear upon us, but not force.

γὰρ, τί ἐγκαλῶν ἡμῖν καὶ τῇ πόλει ἐπιχειρεῖς ἡμᾶς ἀπολλύναι; οὐ πρῶτον μὲν (ἐ) ἐγεννήσαμεν ἡμεῖς, 10 καὶ δι' ἡμῶν ἐλάμβανε τὴν μητέρα σου ὁ πατήρ καὶ ἐφύτευσέν σε; φράσον οὖν τούτων ἡμῶν, τοῖς νόμοις τοῖς περὶ τούς γάμους, μέμφει τι ὦς οὐ καλῶς ἐχουσίων; οὐ μέμφομαι, φαίνην ἂν. ἡ ἀλλὰ τοῖς περὶ τὴν τοῦ γενομένου τροφῆν τε καὶ παιδείαν, ἐν ἦ καὶ σὺ 15
ἐπαιδεύθης; ἦ τοῦ καλῶς προσέταττον ἡμῶν οἱ ἐπὶ τούτους τεταγμένοι νόμοι, παραγγέλλοντες τῷ πατρὶ τῷ σῷ σε ἐν μουσικῇ καὶ γυμναστικῇ παιδεύειν; καλῶς, φαίην ἂν. 'εἰεν. ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἐγένον τε καὶ Ἔ

20 ἑξετάραφης καὶ ἐπαιδεύθης, ἔχοις ἃν εἰπεῖν πρῶτον μὲν ὡς οὐχὶ ἡμέτερος ἦσθα καὶ ἔκγυος καὶ δούλος, αὐτὸς τε καὶ οἱ σοὶ πρόγονοι; καὶ εἰ τοῦθ' οὔτως ἔχει, ἃρ' ἐξ ἵσου οἷς ἐναι σοι τὸ δίκαιον καὶ ἡμῶν, καὶ ἀπ' ἃν ἡμεῖς σε ἐπιχειρῶμεν ποιεῖν, καὶ σοὶ ταῦτα ἀντιποιεῖν οἷς δίκαιον εἶναι; ὁ πρὸς μὲν ἀρα σοι τὸν πατέρα οὐκ ἐξ ήσον ἦν τὸ δίκαιον καὶ πρὸς τὸν δεσπότην, εἰ σοι ὡν ἔτυγχανεν, ὡστε, ἀπερ πάσχοις, ταῦτα καὶ ἀντιποιεῖν,—οὔτε κακῶς ἀκούοντα ἀντιλέγειν οὔτε τυπτόμενον | ἀντιτύππειν οὔτε ἄλλα τοιαῦτα πολλά'.

51 30 πρὸς δὲ τὴν πατρίδα ἄρα καὶ τοὺς νόμους ἔσται σοι; ὡστε, ἐάν σὲ ἐπιχειρῶμεν ἡμεῖς ἀπολλύναι δίκαιον ἡγούμενοι εἶναι, καὶ σὺ δὲ ἡμᾶς τοὺς νόμους καὶ τὴν πατρίδα καθ' ὅσον δύνασαι ἐπιχειρήσεις ἀνταπολληνυναι, καὶ φήσεις ταῦτα ποιῶν δίκαια πράττειν, δ ἦ

35 ἀληθείᾳ τῆς ἀρετῆς ἐπιμελόμενος; ὁ οὔτως εἰ σοφός, ὡστε λέληθεν σε, ὅτι μητρὸς τε καὶ πατρὸς καὶ τῶν ἄλλων προγόνων ἀπάντων τιμιωτέρον ἔστιν ἡ πατρίς καὶ σεμινότερον καὶ ἀγιώτερον καὶ ἐν μείζονι μοίρᾳ καὶ παρὰ θεοῖς καὶ παρ' ἄνθρωποις τοῖς νοῦν ἔχονσι, καὶ σέβεσθαι δεὶ καὶ μᾶλλον ύπείκειν καὶ θωπεύειν πατρίδα χαλεπαίνουσαν ἡ πατέρα, καὶ ἡ πείθειν ἡ ποιεῖν ὃ ἂν κελεύῃ, καὶ πάσχειν, εάν τι προστάτη ταδεῖν, ἡσυχίαν ἀγοντα, εάν τε τύπτεσθαι εάν τε δεϊσθαι, εάν τε εἰς πόλεμον ἄγη τρωθησόμενον ἡ

40 ἀποθανοῦμεν, ποιητέου ταῦτα, καὶ τὸ δίκαιον οὔτως ἔχει, καὶ οὐχὶ ύπεικεῖου οὖν ἀναχωρητέον οὔνδε λειπ-
τέον τὴν τάξιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν πολέμῳ καὶ ἐν δικασ-
τηρίῳ καὶ πονταχοῦ ποιητέον, ἃ ἀν κελεύῃ ἡ πόλις
καὶ ἡ πατρίς, ἡ πείθεω αὐτῆς ἢ τὸ δίκαιον πέφυκε,
βιάζεσθαι δὲ ὁχὶ ὁσιον οὔτε μητέρα οὔτε πατέρα, πολὺ ἕο
δὲ τούτων ἐτὶ ἦττον τὴν πατρίδα; τί φήσομεν πρὸς
tαῦτα, ὁ Κρίτων; ἀληθῆ λέγειν τοὺς νόμους ἢ οὔ;
KR. 'Εμοιγε δοκεῖ.

XIII. ΣΩ. 'Σκόπει τοίνυν, ὁ Σώκρατες,' φαίειν
ἀν ἵσωσι οἱ νόμοι, εἰ ἡμεῖς ταῦτα ἀληθῆ
λέγομεν, ὅτι οὐ δίκαια ἡμᾶς ἐπιχειρεῖσ
dρᾶν ἢ νῦν ἐπιχειρεῖσ. ἡμεῖς γὰρ σὲ
γεννήσαντες, ἐκθρέψαντες, παιδεύσαντες,
μεταδόντες ἀπάντων ἃν οἷοί τ' ἦμεν

Di kalóν σοὶ καὶ τοῖς ἅλλοις πᾶσιν πολῖταις, ὁμως
προσαγορεύομεν τῷ ἐξουσίαν πεποιηκέναι Ἀθηναίων
τῷ βουλομένῳ, ἐπειδὰν δοκιμασθῇ καὶ ἱδῇ τὰ ἐν τῇ
πόλει πράγματα καὶ ἡμᾶς τοὺς νόμους, ὧν ἂν μὴ ἱο
ἀρέσκωμεν ἡμεῖς, ἐξεῖναι λαβόντα τὰ αὐτοῦ ἀπείναι
ὅποι ἂν βούληται. καὶ οὔδεὶς ἡμῶν τῶν νόμων ἐμ-
pοδῶν ἐστιν οὐδ' ἀπαγορεύει, εάν τέ τις βούληται
ὑμῶν εἰς ἀποκλαίαν ἴναι, εἰ μὴ ἀρέσκωμεν ἡμεῖς τε
καὶ ἡ πόλις, εάν τε μετοικεῖν ἄλλοσε ἐλθών, ἴναι 15
ἐκεῖσθε, ὅποι ἂν βούληται, ἔχοντα τὰ αὐτοῦ. · ὃς δ' ἂν

Ε ὑμῶν παραμείνῃ, ὅρων ὅν τρόπον ἡμεῖς τὰς τε δίκας
dikázmēn καὶ τάλλα τὴν πόλιν διοικοῦμεν, ἦδη φαμὲν
touτον ὁμολογηκέναι ἐργῷ ἡμῶν ἃ ἂν ἡμεῖς κελεύω-
μεν ποιήσειν ταῦτα, καὶ τὸν μὴ πειθόμενον τριχῇ 20
φαμὲν ἀδικεῖν, ὅτι τε γεννηταῖς οὐσιν ἡμῶν οὐ πεῖθε-
tαι, καὶ ὅτι τροφεύση, καὶ ὅτι ὁμολογήσῃς ἡμῶν πεί-
θεσθαι οὔτε πείθεται οὔτε πείθει ἡμᾶς, εἰ μὴ καλῶς
52 ti poioûmen protiâventwv | ἡμῶν καὶ οὐκ ἀγρίως ἐπι-
25 ταττόντων ποιεῖν ἃ ἔν κελεύωμεν, ἀλλὰ ἐφιέντων δυνών θάτερα, ἡ πείθειν ἡμᾶς ἡ ποιεῖν, τούτων οὐ- 
δέτερα ποιεῖ.

ΧΙ. Ταύταις δὴ φαμεν καὶ σέ, Σώκρατες, ταῖς 
αἰτίαις ἐνέξεσθαι, εἰπέρ ποιήσεις ἃ ἐπι- 
νοεῖς, καὶ ὥν ἡκίστα Ἀθηναίων σέ, ἀλλ’ 
ἐν τοῖς μάλιστα.' εἰ οὕν ἐγὼ εἰποίμι:

In your case, 
Socrates, the bar-
gain is particularly
binding: no one 
has lived more 
constantly in A-
thens than you. 
Even during the 
trial you might 
have chosen ex-
ile rather than 
death.

5 ἐστιν, ὅτι σοι καὶ ἡμεῖς ἑρέσκομεν καὶ ἡ πόλις· οὐ 
γὰρ ἂν ποτε τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἀπάντων δια-
φερόντως ἐν αὐτῇ ἐπεδόμεις, εἰ μὴ σοι διαφερόντως 
ἥρεσκεν, καὶ οὔτ’ ἐπὶ θεωρίαν πώποτ’ ἐκ τῆς 
πόλεως ἐξῆλθες, οὔτε ἄλλοσε οὐδαμόσε, εἰ μὴ 
ποι στατευ-

10 σόμενος, οὔτε ἄλλῃ ἀποδημίᾳ ἐποίησε χῶποτε, 
ὁσπερ οἱ ἄλλοι ἀνδρωποί, οὐδ’ ἐπιθυμίᾳ σε ἄλλης 
πόλεως οὐδὲ ἄλλων νόμων ἔλαβεν εἰδέναι, ἀλλὰ ἡμεῖς 
σοι ἰκανοὶ ἦμεν καὶ ἡ ἡμετέρα πόλις· οὔτω σφόδρα 
ἡμᾶς ἤροο, καὶ ὄμολογεῖς καθ’ ἡμᾶς πολιτεύσεσθαι,

15 τά τε ἄλλα καὶ παῖδας ἐν αὐτῇ ἐποίησο, ως ἀρεσκοῦ-
σης σοι τῆς πόλεως. ἔτι τοίνυν ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ δίκῃ ἐξῆ 
σοι φυγῆς τιμήσασθαι, εἰ ἐβούλου, καὶ ὡτε 
νῦν ἀκούσῃς τῆς πόλεως ἐπιχειρεῖς, τότε ἐκούσῃς 
ποιή-

20 σαι. σὺ δὲ τότε μὲν ἐκαλλωπίζου ὃς οὐκ ἄγανακτῶν,

25 εἰ δέων τεθνάναι σε, ἀλλὰ ἦροο, ὡς ἐφησθα, πρὸ τῆς 
φυγῆς θάνατον· νῦν δὲ οὔτ’ ἐκεῖνος τοὺς λόγους αἰσ-
χύνει, οὔτε ἡμῶν τῶν νόμων ἐντρέπει, ἐπιχειρῶν 
διαφθείραι, πράττεις τε ἀπερ ἂν δοῦλος φαυλότατος D
κρίτων

πράξειν, ἀποδιδράσκειν ἐπιχειρῶν παρὰ τὰς ἔννοι-κας τε καὶ τὰς ὁμολογίας, καθ' ἂς ἦμιν ἔννεθον 3ο πολιτεύεσθαι. πρῶτον μὲν οὖν ἦμιν τοὺτ' αὐτὸ ἀπό-κριναι, εἰ ἀληθὴς λέγομεν φάσκοντες σε ὁμολογηκέναι πολιτεύεσθαι καθ' ἦμιν ἑργα, ἀλλ' οὐ λόγος, ἣ ὦκ ἀληθή. τί φῶμεν πρὸς ταῦτα, ὁ Κρίτων; ἀλλο τι ἡ ὁμολογὰμεν;

ΚΡ. Ἀνάγκη, ὁ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Ὅλλο τι οὖν ἀν φαίειν ἡ ἔννοικας τᾶς πρὸς ἦμις αὐτοὺς καὶ ὁμολογίας παραβαίνεις, οὐχ ἐπὶ ἀνάγκης ὁμολογήσας οὐδὲ ἀπατηθεῖς οὐδὲ ἐν ὦλιῳ χρόνῳ ἀναγκασθεὶς βουλεύσασθαι, ἀλλ' ἐν ἐτεσιν ἐβδομήκοντα, ἐν οἷς ἔξην σοι ἀπιέναι, εἰ μὴ ἡρέσκομεν ἦμεις μηδὲ δίκαια ἐφαίνοντό σοι αἱ ὁμο- λογίαι εἶναι; σὺ δὲ οὔτε Λακεδαίμονα προηροῦ οὔτε Κρήτην, ἂς δὴ ἐκάστοτε φίς εὐνομεῖσθαι, οὔτε ἀλλιν οὐδεμίαν τῶν Ἐλληνίδων πόλεως οὐδὲ τῶν βαρβαρι-λοι τε καὶ τυφλοὶ καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι ἀνατυπηκότες οὖντο σοι δια-φέροντως τῶν ἄλλων Ἀθηναίων ἥρεσκεν ἡ πόλις τε καὶ ἦμεις οἱ νόμοι δήλον ὅτι τίνα γὰρ ἄν πόλις ἀρέσκοι ἄνευ νόμων; νῦν δὲ δὴ οὐκ ἐμένεις τοῖς 50 ὁμολογημένοις; εἰς ἦμιν γε πείθη, ὁ Σώκρατες καὶ οὐ καταγέλαστός γε ἐσεὶ ἐκ τῆς πόλεως ἐξελθὼν.

XV. Σκόπει γὰρ δή, ταῦτα παραβᾶσα καὶ ἐξα-μαρτάνων τι τούτων τι ἄγαθον ἐργάσει

By making your escape, you will endanger your friends. And whither will you flee? Wherever you go, suspicion and ridicule await you. Your children too will suf-
fer more by your escape than by your death.

Thβαζε ἢ Μέγαραδε—εὑνομοῦνται γὰρ
τὸ φότεραι—πολέμιος ἡξεις, ὦ Σώκρατες, τῇ τούτων πολιτείᾳ, καὶ ὑσοιπερ ἤθονται τῶν αὐτῶν πόλεων, ὑποβλέψονται σε διαφθορέα ἡγούμενοι τῶν νόμων, καὶ βεβαιώσεις τοῖς δικασταῖς τῇ δοξα, ὥστε δοκεῖν ὃρθως τὴν δίκην δικάσαι ὦστις γὰρ νόμοιν διαφθο-

κάτως ἐστίν, σφόδρα που δόξειεν ἄν νέων γε καὶ ἀνοή-

των ἀνθρώπων διαφθορέως εἶναι. πότερον οὖν φεύξει

τὰς τε εὐνομομένας πόλεις καὶ τῶν ἀνδρῶν τοὺς
κοσμιωτάτους; καὶ τοῦτο ποιοῦτι ἄρα ἄξιον σοι ξήν

ἐσται; ἡ πλησιάσεις τούτως καὶ ἀνασχυντήσεις δια-

λεγόμενος—τίνας λόγους, ὦ Σώκρατες; ἢ ὑσπερ

ἐνθάδε, ὦς ἡ ἀρετή καὶ ἡ δικαιοσύνη πλείστου ἄξιον

τοῖς ἀνθρώποις καὶ τὰ νόμιμα καὶ οἱ νόμοι; καὶ οὐκ

οὐει ἁσχημον ἄν φανεῖσθαι τὸ τοῦ Σωκράτους πρᾶγ-

νὰ; ήνεσθαί γε χρή. ἀλλ' ἐκ μὲν τούτων τῶν τόπων

ἀπαρεῖς, ἡξεις δὲ εἰς Θετταλίαν παρὰ τοὺς ξένους

τοὺς Κρίτωνος· ἐκεὶ γὰρ δὴ πλείστη ἀταξία καὶ

ἀκολασία, καὶ ἵσως ἃν ἥδεος σου ἀκούοιειν, ὡς γελαῖος

ἐκ τοῦ δεσμωτηρίου ἀπεδίδρασκες σκευὴν τέ τιων

περιβέμενος ἦ διθέραν λαβῶν ἢ ἀλλὰ οία δὴ εἰώθα-

σιν ἐννεκανάζεσθαι οἱ ἀποδιδράσκοντες, καὶ τὸ σχήμα

to σαυτοῦ μεταλλάξασθαι οὗτος ἄνηρ σμικρὸν

χρόνου τῷ βίῳ λοιποῦ ὄντος, ὡς τὸ εἰκός, ἔτολμησας ἐν

οὕτως αἰσχρῶς ἐπιθυμεῖν ξῆν, νόμους τοὺς μεγίστους

παραβᾶσιν, οὐδεὶς δὲ ἔρει; ἵσως, ἃν μῇ τινα λυπῆσι· εἰ

dὲ μή, ἀκούσει, ὦ Σώκρατες, πολλὰ καὶ ἀνάξια σαυ-

to. ὑπερχόμενος δὴ βιώσει πάντας ἀνθρώποις καὶ

δουλεύων· τί ποιῶν ἣ εὐφυκομενος ἐν Θετταλία, ὥστε

εἰπὲ δείπνων ἀποδεδημηκώς εἰς Θετταλίαν;
λόγοι δὲ ἐκεῖνοι οἱ περὶ δικαιοσύνης τε καὶ τῆς ἄλλης
ἀρετῆς ποὺ ἡμῖν | ἔσονται; ἀλλὰ δὴ τῶν παίδων ἐνεκα βούλεις ζην, ἰνα αὐτοὺς ἐκθρέψῃς καὶ παιδεύῃς.
τί δὲ; εἰς Θετταλίαν αὐτοὺς ἀγαγὼν θρέψεις τε καὶ παιδεύῃς, ἔχειν τοιὸν αὐτῶν τούτο ἀπολαύσωσιν; ἢ τούτο μὲν οὐ, αὐτοὺ δὲ τρεφόμενοι σοῦ ἔσοντος βέλτιον θρέψονται καὶ παιδεύσονται, μὴ ἐξυνόντος σοῦ αὐτῶς; οἱ γὰρ ἐπιτίθεντοι οἱ σοὶ ἐπιμελήσονται αὐτῶν.
πότερον εάν εἰς Θετταλίαν ἀποδημήσῃς, ἐπιμελήσονται, εάν δὲ εἰς "Αἰδοὺ ἀποδημήσῃς, οὐχὶ ἐπιμελή-
βεσονται; εἴπερ γε τι οφελος αὐτῶν ἔστιν τῶν σοι 
φασκόντων ἐπιτιθείων εἶναι, οἰσθαῖ θε γρή. 50

XVI. Ὅλλοι, ὁ Σάκρατες, πειθόμενος ἡμῖν τοῖς 
σοὶς τροφεύσει μήτε παίδας περὶ πλείονοις 
ποιοῦ μήτε τὸ ζήν μήτε ἄλλο μηδὲν πρὸ 
τοῦ δικαίου, ἰνα εἰς "Αἰδοὺ ἐλθῶν ἔχῃς 
πάντα ταῦτα ἀπολογῆσασθαί τοῖς ἐκεῖ 
ἀρχουσιν" οὔτε γὰρ ἐνθάδε σοι φαίνεσαι 
ταῦτα πράττοντι ἀμεινον εἶναι οὔτε δικαιότερον οὔν 
ὁσιώτερον, οὔτε ἄλλῳ τῶν σῶν οὐδενί, οὔτε ἐκεῖσθ 
ἀφικομένῳ ἀμεινον ἔσται. ἀλλὰ νῦν μὲν ἡδικημένος 
κἂπει, εάν ἀπίης, οὐχ ὑφ ἡμῶν τῶν νόμων ἀλλὰ ὑπὸ ἀνθρώπων: εάν δὲ ἐξέλθῃς οὔτως αἰσχρῶς ἀνταδι-
κήσας τε καὶ ἀντικακονρήγησας, τὰς σαυτοὺς ὁμολο-
γίας τε καὶ ἐξοθήκας τὰς πρὸς ἡμᾶς παραβὰς καὶ 
κακὰ ἐργασάμενοι τούτους οὕς ἡκιστα ἔδει, σαυτὸν τε 
καὶ φίλους καὶ πατρίδα καὶ ἡμᾶς, ἡμεῖς τε σοι χαλέ-
πανοῦμεν ζῶντι, καὶ ἐκεῖ οἱ ἡμέτεροι ἄδελφοι οἱ ἐν 
"Αἰδοὺ νόμοι οὐκ ἐμείνως σε ὑποδέξονται, εἰδότες ὃτι 
καὶ ἡμᾶς ἐπεχεῖρησας ἀπολέσαι τὸ σοῦ μέρος. ἀλλὰ 
οἱ ἡμεῖς".
XVII. Taúta, ó phíle étairê Krítow, eũ ἵσθι ὥτι ἑγὼ δοκῶ ἄκοůειν, ὥσπερ οἱ κορυβαντιῶντες τῶν αὐλῶν δοκοῦσιν ἄκοûειν, καὶ ἐν ἐμοὶ αὐτὴ ἢ ἥχη τοῦτων τῶν λόγων βοµβεῖ καὶ ποιεῖ μὴ δύνασθαι τῶν ἄλλων ἄκοûειν. ἄλλα ἵσθι, ὡσ εἰ τὰ νῦν ἐμοὶ δοκοῦντα, ἐὰν λέγησ παρὰ ταύτα, μάτην ἐρεῖς. ὡμοὶ μέντοι εὑ τι οἴει πλέον ποιήσειν λέγε.

ΚΡ. Ἀλλ᾽, ὡ Σώκρατες, οὐκ ἔχω λέγειν.

ΣΩ. Ἔα τοῖνυν, ὡ Κρίτων, καὶ πράττωμεν ταύτῃ, ἐπειδή ταύτῃ ὁ θεὸς ύφηγεῖται.
Кριτών [ἡ περὶ πρακτέου. ἡθικός] In the MSS of Plato each dialogue generally has two or even three titles: the Bodleian MS for example denotes the other three members of the first Tetralogy by the names Εὐθύφρων ἡ περὶ ὅσιου. πειραστικός, Ἀπολογία Σωκράτους. ἡθικός, Φαίδων ἡ περὶ ὕμνης. ἡθικός. In each case only the first of these titles dates from Plato, who generally (but not always) named the dialogue after one of the characters appearing in it. The second title was added by Thrasylus, a rhetorician and literary critic who flourished about the Christian era: it is intended to explain the subject treated of in the dialogue. It is not clear whether the third title was added, as Grote believes (Plato Vol. I. p. 160), by Thrasylus, or by Diogenes Laertius either on his own responsibility or in obedience to some other authority (see Diog. Laert. III. 49); at all events it is meant to indicate the formal scope of the dialogue—whether a dialogue of exposition (ὑφηγητικός, of which ἡθικός is a subdivision), or a dialogue of search (ἕγητικός). Here the Crito is correctly described as an ethical dialogue dealing with a question of duty (περὶ πρακτέου: cf. 46 Β ὅσποι δεικνύειν ὅν κρὴ ἡμᾶς εἶτε ταῦτα πρακτέου εἶτε μή)—viz. is it right to save one’s life by breaking the law?

Crito was one of Socrates’ oldest and most attached friends (Apol. 33 D, Phaedo 115 A foll.). He appears to have been rich and not indisposed to make more money (Euthyd. 304 C). The fact that he had stood surety for Socrates after the trial (Phaedo 115 D) increased his personal danger if Socrates should escape from prison, and reveals in a yet stronger light his devotion to his friend: see note on 45 D. “Plato’s picture of Crito is as of a sensible and kindly man of the world, looking upon life from the point of view of an honest Athenian gentleman, but without any capacity for philosophy”.—Archer-Hind’s Phaedo p. 42.

The scene is in the prison, just before daybreak.
CHAPTER I.

Crito warns Socrates that the ship is on its way back from Delos, and will arrive to-day.

43 A 1. ἡμικάδε = 'at this hour' (ἡμίκα 'at that hour': so τοιόσοδε = 'of this sort') (τοιός 'of that sort'. The distinction is like that between ὅδε and ὁδος. ἡμίκα seems to have been originally a Doric adverb (ἡμός is Doric for ἵσειν): the suffix reappears in αὐτ-ικα.

2. πρφ. Socrates is not surprised to see Crito, for we learn from the Phaedo (59 D, cf. Xen. Mem. IV. 8. 2) that he was daily visited by his friends during the interval between his condemnation and his death: but he is surprised to see him so early. The prison was generally opened somewhat later (ἀνέψητε γάρ οὐ πρφ Phaed. 1. c.). πρφ and not πρω is the correct Attic form of this word. The Bodleian has πρωι.

3. πάνυ μὲν οὖν = 'imo, valde quidem' (Göbel). μὲν οὖν is corrective: see on Apol. 26 B and cf. infra 44 B ἀτοπων τδ ἐνύπνιον, ὡ Σῶκρατες. ΤΕναργής μὲν οὖν οὖν.

4. πηρίκα μάλιστα. πηρίκα means 'at what precise time?' τότε only 'at what time?' μάλιστα makes the question more vague: 'About what o'clock is it?' So τι μάλιστα; = quid potissimum?

Gorg. 448 D.

5. ὁρφρος βαθύς = 'just before daybreak': so Prot. 310 A ἐτι βαθέος ὁρφρον, Ar. Vesp. 216 ἀλλὰ νῦν ὁρφρος βαθύς. ὁρφρος is the morning twilight, and βαθύς implies that it was more dark than light: cf. the expressions βαθεία νυξ, βαθεία ἐσπέρα.

6. θαυμάξω ὁπως. Stallbaum quotes Xen. Mem. I. 1. 20 θαυμάξω ὁπως ποτε ἐπείσησαν Ἀθηναίοι κτλ. The idiom means 'I wonder how it was that etc.:' θαυμάξω ει would mean 'I wonder that'. Infra σοι—ὑπακούσαι = 'to let you in': ὑπακούσιν is often used of answering the door: cf. Phaed. 59 E ὁ θυρωρὸς ὅσπερ εἰώθει ὑπακούειν and ὁ ὑπακούσας of the porter in Xen. Symp. I. 11.

8. διὰ τδ πολλάκις δείρο φοιτάν. Socrates' friends generally met in the δικαστήριον, which adjoined the prison (Phaed. 59 D), and waited till the prison was opened.

9. εὑργέτηται. Where initial εβ- or ολ- precede a vowel in Attic verbs, "that vowel, and not the initial diphthong, receives the augment. Thus—ἐνυγγελεύσης, εὑργέτους, εὐωδώθην, εὐώρκους" (Rutherford, New Phrynichus, p. 245). "τι is equivalent to εβερ-
γεσίαν τινά (α τιπ)” Dyer. καὶ—καὶ above is ‘and also.’ [B and the editors1, except Kral, read ενεργείτησαι.]

12. ἐπιεικῶς πάλαι = ‘some little time’. Theaet. 142 άρτι—

η πάλαι εἰς ἀγροῦ; ’Επιεικῶς πάλαι.

13. εἴτε. On εἴτε indignabundum see Apol. 28 B (εἴτε οὐκ 43 B αἰσχύνει;) and my note there. For εἴτε followed by πᾶς cf. (with Stallbaum) Eur. Iph. Aul. 894 κατὰ πᾶς φέρων γε δέλτον οὐκ ἐμοὶ δίδωσ λαβεῖν;

15. οὔ μά τὸν Δία κτλ. = ‘no! Socrates, believe me, I could wish that I myself were not so sleepless and sorrowful’. οὐ does not anticipate the following οὐδὲ in οὐδὲ αὐτός (ne ipse quidem), but is part of Crito’s reply to Socrates’ question, since εἴτε—παρακα-

θησαι = εἰρήν εὐθὺς ἐπεγείρατι με, ἀλλὰ μὴ σιγῇ παρακαθησαι. For the displacement of τε Stallbaum compares Phaed. 94 D τὰ τε κατὰ τὴν γυμναστικὴν καὶ τὴν ἱατρικὴν. Wohlrab takes οὐ as merely anticipatory of the following negative: I agree with Göbel.

17. ἀλλὰ καὶ σοῦ—θαυμάζω sc. just as you were lately surprised, supra 43 θαυμάζω ὅπως κτλ. For θαυμάζω with gen. see Goodwin’s Greek Grammar p. 222. Cron on the other hand takes ἀλλὰ καὶ as= ‘but furthermore’, while Göbel connects καὶ θαυμάζω with καὶ οὔκ ἣγειρον in the next line—‘both—and’.

18. οὔκ ἣγειρον. The rest of Crito’s reply to Socrates’ πᾶς οὔκ εὐθὺς ἐπηγειρᾶσ με κτλ. By using the conjunctive διάγγης where at first sight we should expect the optative διάγοις in the next line, Crito contrives to indicate that he still wishes Socrates ὡς ἢδιστα διάγεις: cf. Rep. v. 472 C παραδείγματος ἄρα ἐνεκα—ἐξητοῦμεν αὐτὸ τε δικαιοσύνην οὖν ἐστὶ—ἐνα—ἀναγκαζώ μεθα καὶ περὶ ἡμῶν αὐτῶν ὁμολογεῖν. In Apol. 40 D Socrates declares that nothing is ἀμεινον καὶ ἡδίον than sound dreamless sleep.

19. καὶ—μὲν δὴ—καὶ = ‘yes, and’: so also καὶ μὲν δὴ καὶ—γε in Rep. v. 464 B.

20. ἡδαιμόνια τοῦ τρόπου. Inscriptions of the age of Plato shew that verbs beginning with εὐ- regularly had an augment in the secondary tenses: see Rutherford New Phryn. 244 and Meisterhans, Grammatik der Attischen Inschriften 78. Here the mss and edd. (except Kral) read εὐδαιμόνια. On the genitive with εὐδαιμόνια compare Goodwin’s Greek Grammar p. 224: and for the sentiment

1 By “the editors” I mean Cron, Schanz, Wohlrab, Göbel and Kral: see Preface.
Phaed. 58 Ε εὐδαιμων γὰρ μοι ἀνὴρ ἐφαίνετο—καὶ τὸ τρὸπον καὶ τῶν λόγων.

21. ὁς ῥᾳδίως i.q. ὅτι οὕτω ῥᾳδίως (Cron).

24. τηλικοῦτον ὄντα. Socrates was seventy years of age:

v. infra 52 Ε.

43 C 26. ἀλλοκοται ἐν = 'are overtaken by' (Church). In this sense ἀλλοκοται more often takes the dative without ἐν.

οὐδὲν—ἐπιλύται—τὸ μὴ οὕχι ἀγανακτεῖν = 'in no way saves them from being indignant'. Verbs of hindering, if negative themselves, are regularly followed by μὴ oὐ with the infinitive, which may or may not have the article. Goodwin MT. 198 foll. With the present example compare Rep. I. 354 B οὐκ ἀπεσαξήμην τὸ μὴ οὐκ—ἐλθεῖν and Aesch. Prom. 918 οὐδὲν γὰρ αὐτῷ ταῦτ' ἐπαρκέσει τὸ μὴ οὐ πεσεῖν ἀτίμως κτλ. Whitelaw (Transactions of the Cambridge Philological Society III. 1, p. 41 foll.) endeavours, I think with success, to prove that both negatives have a value, the infinitive being consecutive. Thus while ἐκώλυσεν ἐμὲ μὴ ἐπείν = 'he hindered me, so that I did not speak', οὐκ ἐκώλυσεν ἐμὲ μὴ οὐκ ἐπείν = 'he did not hinder me, so that I did not refrain-from-speaking', i.e. keep silence (οὐκ ἐπείν).

29. ἀλλὰ τὶ δὴ. ἀλλὰ reverts to 43 Α τὶ τηρικάδε ἄφιξαι, ὁ Κρίτων; on πρόφ v. note ibid.

34. ἐν τοῖς βαρύτατα. Note the climax: χαλεπὴν—χαλεπὴν καὶ βαρεῖαν—ἐν τοῖς βαρύτατα. The phrase ἐν τοῖς adds emphasis to the superlative. When occurring with the superlative of adjectives, it is best explained by supplying a fresh superlative to agree with the article: this superlative is sometimes expressed, e.g. Cratyl. 427 Ε ὁ δὴ δοκεῖ ἐν τοῖς μεγίστοις μέγιστον εἶναι (so the best MSS, but Schanz rejects μεγίστοις): compare also the kindred expression in Symp. 195 Ε ἐν μαλακωτάσις τῶν μαλακωτάσις. When as here the phrase is linked to an adverb, we must repeat the superlative along with a participle supplied from the verb to which the adverb belongs: thus ἐν τοῖς βαρύτατα ἵνα ἐνέγκαιμι=ἐν τοῖς βαρύτατα φέρουσιν βαρύτατ' ἵνα ἐνέγκαιμι. In Thucydides the phrase has become purely adverbial and may be used even with feminine adjectives, as in the well-known ἐν τοῖς πλείσται δὴ νῆς III. 17, where see Classen's note. Compare Kühner, Griechische Grammatik II. 27.

35. τίνα ταύτην; sc. φέρων ἄφιξαι. ἦ is the Latin an? See my note on Apol. 26 Β. The annual mission to Delos, during
which no criminal was put to death at Athens, had begun the day before Socrates’ trial, when the priest of Apollo decorated the bow of the vessel with garlands. On this occasion the boat was absent thirty days. The mission was intended to commemorate the deliverance of Athens under Theseus from the annual tribute of young men and maidens sent to Crete: see Phaed. 58 a foll. and Xen. Mem. iv. 8. 2.

36. θευνάι is slightly more emphatic than ἀποθυνεῖσκε: see on Apol. 30 c οὔδ’ εἰ μέλλω πολλάκις θευνάι, and infr. 52 c. The infinitive θυνεῖσκε is hardly used by good Attic prose writers, ἀποθυνεῖσκε being used instead: but θευνήκα, ἐθευνήκα are alone right, never ἀποθευνήκα, ἀπεθευνήκα. Rutherford Babrius p. 36.

37. οὗ τοι δὴ ἀφικταὶ = ‘no, it is true that it has not arrived’. 43 D ὄκει μὲν μοι ἡξει. So I read with the second hand in B and most of the editors: Schanz reads ὄκειν μὲν μοι ἡξει. With ὄκειν, as with the Latin videri, the personal construction is generally preferred: if we follow Schanz ὄκειν μὲν μοι is to be taken as an infinitive used absolutely = ‘in my opinion’: cf. Ar. Aves 1235 δεινότατα γὰρ τοι πεισάμεσθ’, ε μοι ὄκειν, and κατὰ τοῦτο εἶναι in Prot. 317 Α (ἐγὼ δὲ τοῦτο ἀπασι κατὰ τοῦτο εἶναι οὐ κρυφόροι)αι, and the common phrase ἐκὼν εἶναι. The construction ὄκει μὲν μοι ἡξει though rare is also allowable: see Phaed. 108 Β ὁ βίος μοι ὄκει ο έμοῖ—τῇ μῆκεν τοῦ λόγου οὐκ ἔξαρκεί, and compare (with Schanz, Novae Commentationes p. 130) Menex. 236 Β ὅτε μοι ὄκειν αὐντίθει τὸν ἐπιτάφιον λόγον: see also infra on 50 Β. For μὲν (after ὄκει) without a following δὲ—a frequent idiom in a clause with ἀλλά, the antithesis to which is really contained in the preceding negative clause—compare (with Stallbaum) Prot. 344 Α οὗ γὰρ εἶναι, ἀλλὰ γενέσθαι μὲν ἐστὶν κτλ.

39. Σοῦνλου. Homer Od. ΙΙΙ. 278 Σοῦνλον ἱδὼν—άκρον Ἀθηνέων (Fischer). Cape Sunium was the great landmark for seamen on the South coast of Attica.

40. ἀγγέλων viz. the ἦκοντες τινες. ἀγγελω in the sense of ‘news’ (nuntii) is not found before Polybius. ἐκ, before ἀγγέλων is like ἐκ of the agent (conceived of as the source) after passive verbs, e.g. Tim. 47 Β δωρηθέν ἐκ θεῶν. Wohlrab and Kral read ἀγγελών with some MSS: Cron, Schanz and Göbel bracket τῶν ἀγγελῶν, on the ground that ἀγγελῶν cannot = ἀγγελίων, and that ἐκ to express the source must be followed by a neuter or inanimate object: but the example I have cited is enough to defend the idiom.

A. C.
CHAPTER II.

Socrates relying on a vision declares that the ship will not arrive till to-morrow.

1. τῦχη ἀγαθῆ sc. εἴη quod bene vortat: ‘I pray that it may be for the best’. The formula is frequent on inscriptions and decrees: see Thucydides IV. 118 ἐδοξεν τῷ δήμῳ.—Δάχης εἴπε, τῦχη ἀγαθῆ τῇ Ἀθηναίων ποιείσθαι τὴν ἐκεχειρίαν. Pl. Symp. 177 ε ἀλλὰ τῦχη ἀγαθῆ καταρχέτω Φαιδρος. With ei ταύτῃ τοῖς θείοις φίλον, ταύτῃ ἐστω compare the last words of the dialogue: πράττωμεν ταύτῃ, ἐπείδη ταύτῃ ὁ θεὸς υφηγεῖται.

44 A

5. τῇ γὰρ ποι. This is the introductory γὰρ (γ’ ἀρα) and should not be translated: see on Apol. 20 ε Χαιρεφώντα γὰρ ἵστε ποι.

6. ύστεραλα.—ἡ ἡ. ‘ἡ προτεραλα et ἡ ύστεραλα perpetuo usu de diebus dicuntur, omisso semper ἡμέρα—προτέρα et ύστέρα de aliis rebus quibuslibet repetitis, concione, proelio etc.’ Cobet, Variae Lectiones 246. The words are often confused with one another in MSS. ύστεραλα being a virtual comparative is followed by ἡ. Note the orthography in ἀποθησκεψ: the i is found in B here and infra 46 D and 48 D: inscriptions also furnish evidence to the same effect: see Meisterhans, Grammatik der Attischen Inschriften p. 86. θησκεψ is connected with θεῖο, φόνος, Skt. han: the ending -ισκω is probably on the analogy of στερ-ισκω, ἀλίσκομαι and the like. Compare Gust. Meyer, Griech. Gr.² pp. 259, 451.

7. γέ τοι δή. γέ τοι =‘at all events’.

οί τούτων κύριοι viz. οί ἐνδεκα, the board of eleven (ten ordinary members and a γραμματεὺς) who had general charge of the prisons and saw that the capital sentence was carried out: Phaed. 59 E, 116 B foll.

9. τῆς ἐτέρας ‘to-morrow’ i.e. the second day ) (τῆς ἐπιοῦσης or that which was just beginning. Soph. O. T. 781 τῷ μὲν οὖσαν ἡμέραν μόλις κατέσχον θάτερα δ’ ἱὼν πέλας μητρὸς πατρός τ’ ἥλεγχον. From Phaedo 59 D—Ε it appears that Socrates was right: the boat did not arrive till the second day.

10. ταύτης τῆς νυκτός: genitive of time within which: Goodwin, Gk. Gr. 227.
II. κινδυνεύεις in the sense of δοκεῖς: so frequently in conversational style.

ἐν καίρῳ τινὶ ‘peropportune’ (Stallbaum). τίς, as Cron remarks, has the effect of a litotes: cf. εἷχον ἀν τινὰ λόγον Απολ. 31 B. οὐκ ἐγείραι. Not μὴ ἐγείραι, because οὐκ ἐγείραι is a single notion: compare 43 B καὶ ἐπίτηδες σε οὐκ ἥγειρον.

13. ἦν δὲ δὴ τί τὸ ἐνύπνιον = ‘but about the vision—what was it?’ For the order compare λέγω δὲ δὴ τί τοῦτο; Symp. 178 D. Socrates was greatly influenced by dreams and oracles and μαντική generally: see Apol. 33 C εἰμοὶ δὲ τοῦτο ὦς ἐγὼ φημὶ προστέτακται ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ πράττειν καὶ ἐκ μαντείων καὶ ἐξ ἐνύπνιων κτλ. The story of this vision is also told (inaccurately) by Diogenes Laertius, II. 5. 35, and referred to in Cic. de Div. I. 52. For two other examples see Phaed. 60 E and Diog. Laert. III. 5. In his respect for divination Socrates presents the most striking contrast to Plato, who places priests' craft and divination in the lowest of the three classes of arts distinguished in the Politicus (290 c foll.). See on this subject Nohle's excellent essay “Die Statslehre Platos in ihrer geschichtlichen Entwicklung”, Jena, 1880.

14. γυνὴ—καλὴ καὶ εὐεδής. Wohlrab points out that a robe of white was significant of joy: compare Legg. XII. 947 B, where Plato in speaking of funerals ordains λευκὴν μὲν τὴν στολὴν ἐχειν πάσαν, θρήνων δὲ καὶ ὀδυρμῶν χωρὶς γλυκεσθαι. So in Aeschylus Pers. 301 λευκὸν ἡμαρ νυκτὸς ἐκ μελαγχλίμου. Probably Socrates identified the vision with ἡ εἰμαρμένη: see Phaed. 115 A ἐμὲ δὲ νῦν ἡδὴ καλεῖ, φαίνε ἀν ἀνήρ τραγικός, ἡ εἰμαρμένη.

16. ἡματὶ κεν τριτάτῳ κτλ. after II. IX. 363 ἡματὶ κε τριτάτῳ 44 B Φθίην ἐρίβωλον ἱκοληπρ, spoken by Achilles. It is possible (as Cron suggests) that the meaning of the line for Socrates lay partly in the fact that Phthia was the home of Achilles: but I feel sure that (rightly or wrongly) Socrates associated Φθίη with φθίω and φθίσις, and derived comfort from the epithet ἐρίβωλον. In Euripides' Electra 836 there is what seems to me a similar play upon the word Φθίας. Orestes has been dissecting a victim with a Δωρικῆ κοτίς, in the presence of Aegisthus. Suddenly he lays it aside and exclaims: οὐχ, ὅπως παστήρια θωνασόμεθα, Φθιάδ' ἀντὶ Δωρικῆς οἶσε τις ἡμῖν κοτίδα; With this Φθίας κοτίς he slays Aegisthus. I am glad to find that Lambinus (as a pupil has pointed out to me) took the same view of Φθίην in this passage. See also infra on 47 B line 14.

18. ἀτοπον τὸ ἐνύπνιον. ὡς ἀτοπον τὸ ἐνύπνιον is an inferior
reading. Possibly we should read ἀπορον, as affording a better antithesis to ἐναργές: Λαυ γέ, ὡς ἐκεῖν, is ironical, for it is clear from the sequel that Crito does not believe the vision: see on 46 ᾞ.

19. ἐναργές μὲν οὖν 'No, it is plain': on μὲν οὖν (immo) v. above 43 Α πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

CHAPTER III.

Crito entreats Socrates to escape and save the reputation of his friend.

1. ὃ δαιμόνις Σώκρατες. ὃ δαιμόνις was a favourite mode of address in Athenian society. The adjective meant originally 'more than human': in Homer it is generally used as an epithet of reproach, in Attic, of affection coupled with remonstrance (as here), or ironically. ὃ μακάρει is used in the same way. Other kindred expressions are ὃ βελτιστε, ὃ ἀριστε, ὃ λῴστε, ὃ θαυμάσιε: the three first mean 'my excellent friend' or 'my fine fellow' (ironical): the last 'my dear sir' (with remonstrance). Often the precise shade of meaning can only be conveyed by the tone of the voice in translating aloud.

2. ἔτι καὶ νῦν. The words imply that Crito had already made many attempts to induce Socrates to escape: cf. infra 48 Ε παῦσαι ἥδη—πολλάκις μοι λέγων τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον, ὡς χρή ἐνθένθε ἀκόντων Ἀθηναίων ἔμε ἀπιέναι. ἔτι καὶ νῦν means 'even at the eleventh hour': cf. Ar. Ran. 1235 ἀλλ' ἤγαθ' ἔτι καὶ νῦν ἀπόδος. For the collocation of present and aorist in πείθου καὶ σώθητι cf. Gorg. 486 c where the MSS read ἔμοι πείθου, παῦσαι δ' ἐλέγχων.

3. οὗ μιὰ = non una = 'more than one'. The Bodleian has οὗ-δεμιὰ: but this can hardly be right. Crito proceeds to enumerate two misfortunes: the loss of his friend and the loss of his reputation. Observe that Crito thinks his reputation will suffer more if Socrates remains to die than if he breaks his own pledge to the Athenian people by inducing Socrates to escape: see Phaed. 115 D. In Crito's judgment (and Crito here as elsewhere represents the average Athenian gentleman of the day) it is a higher duty to serve one's friend than to be true to one's country. It is this point of view which Socrates combats in the sequel, as utterly fatal to the very existence of the State.
4. χωρίς μὲν—άμελήσαι. I have retained the reading of the Bodleian, which all the recent editors have changed. χωρίς is an adverb, as the balance between χωρίς μὲν and ἕτε δέ proves (see also Madvig Adv. i. 369): to regard it as a preposition and insert τοῦ before σοῦ (as Ast does), or to change σοῦ to τοῦ with most editors, introduces far greater difficulties than those which it is sought to overcome. The construction is ἀλλὰ χωρίς μὲν (on the one hand) <ἐμοὶ ἐστίν> σοῦ ἐστερήσθαι, τοιούτου ἐπιτηδείου—ἔτε δέ κτλ. ἕτε δέ is substituted for χωρίς δέ in the second half of the antithesis because χωρίς δέ would require καὶ πολλοῖς δοκεῖν <sc. ἐμοὶ ἐστίν> to balance χωρίς μὲν σοῦ ἐστερήσθαι: this would be awkward, with ἐστίν so far removed. For χωρίς μὲν followed by χωρίς δέ compare Parm. 130 β αὐτὸς σὺ οὐτω διήρρησαι ὡς λέγεις, χωρίς μὲν εἶδη αὐτὰ ἄττα, χωρίς δέ τὰ τοῦτων ἄυ μετέχουτα. Translate the whole sentence thus: 'For to me your death is more than a single calamity: on the one hand, there is the loss of you, a friend such as I shall never find again, and moreover many men, who do not know you and me well, will think me guilty of neglect, because I might have saved you, if I had been willing to spend money'.

5. ἐστερηθεῖσαι. στέρωμαι and its kindred forms have two senses in Plato as in Attic generally: either 'I am debarred from', or 'I am deprived of': an example of the former meaning is Rep. vi. 484 c οἷς τῷ δοντὶ τοῦ δυτός ἐκάστου ἐστερημένοι τῆς γυνής: for the latter cf. Phaed. 117 D οὖν ἄνδρος ἐταίρου ἐστερημένος εἶν.

6. οὐδένα μὴποτε εὐρήσω ὦν ὑπὸ τίνα εὐρήσω. εὐρήσω is of course future. οὐ μὴ with the future indicative (rare), or (far more often) the aorist conjunctive (cf. infr. 46 c οὐ μὴ σοι εὐρηχωρήσω), is a strong negative: for the sense of futurity in the aorist conjunctive compare πι-ο-μαι, ἔδ-ο-μαι (conjunctives with the short vowel as in ἀλλ' ε-ο-μεν) and perhaps Latin faxo, i.e. fac-s-o: see my note on Apol. 29 D and compare Goodwin MT. p. 184.

7. οὐ—μὴ ἵσασιν. Not οὐ—οὐ because the clause is virtually conditional: no one who knew Crito and Socrates well could imagine that Crito had treated him with neglect.

ὡς οἷος τ' ὄν σε σφάζειν = 'because' (in their opinion, whence ὡς) 'I might have saved you'. This clause is explained by ἀμελήσαι: it was because Crito had the money, and didn't use it, that ignorant men might charge him with neglect: had he been penniless, he would have escaped the charge. Crito was very well off: see Euthyd. 304 c. Cron and Göbel take ὡς to mean 'although': so
Schanz in Zeitschrift für die österreichischen Gymnasien, Vol. 20 (1869) p. 87, comparing the concessive use of ἐπεὶ or ἐπεὶ—γε in Prot. 317 οὐ γὰρ λαθεῖν τῶν ἀνθρώπων τοὺς δυναμένους—ὡνπερ ἔνεκα ταύτ' ἐστὶ τὰ προφήται, ἐπεὶ οὐ γε πολλοὶ—οὐδὲν αἰσθάνονται: but it is only in the modern idiom that even this use of ἐπεὶ is concessive: to the Greeks it was causal, 'for, as for the many, they etc.' Note the iota subscript in σφξεῖν: it is regularly found in the present stem of this verb down to 160 B.C.: see Meisterhans, Grammatik der Attischen Inschriften, p. 87.

44 C 9. ταύτης—ἡ δοκεῖν = 'than this, than to be thought'. ταύτης refers forward, not to δοκεῖν, but to ἡ δοκεῖν. For a similar case see Gorg. 500 C οὐ τί ἄν μᾶλλον σπουδάσεις τις καὶ σμικρῶν νοῦν ἔχων ἀνθρώπος, ἡ τούτῳ κτλ. and Cicero De Fin. I. 19 quò nihil turpissimus physico, quam fieri quicquam sine causa dicere. For the repetition of δοκεῖν after δόξα compare infr. 53 B βεβαιώσεις τοῖς δικασταῖς τὴν δόξαν, ἤστε δοκεῖν ὅρθως τὴν δικήν δικάσαι.

10. χρήματα περὶ πλεονοῦ ποιεῖσθαι ἡ φιλον. Socrates had himself very lofty views on the subject of friendship: see Mem. II. 4. 5 καὶ τοὶ πρὸς ποιῶν κτήμα τῶν ἄλλων παραβαλλόμενοι φίλος ἀγαθός ὡς ἄν πολλῷ κρείττων φανεῖτ; ibid. § I he censures the many for saying that a true and good friend is the best of all possessions, and yet caring more for money than for friends.

13. ὁ μακάριε Κρίτων. See on ὁ δαὶμόνιε supra 44 B. τῆς τῶν πολλῶν δόξης. Socrates everywhere insisted that the opinion of the many is worthless, in comparison with that of the man who knows: see my introduction to the Apology p. x. and the passages there cited.

15. φροντίζειν with a genitive, as often in Plato, e.g. Soph. 246 D ἡμεῖς δὲ οὐ τούτων φροντίζειμεν, ἀλλὰ τάληθες ἔφησης.

αὐτά is frequently used, without any expressed antecedent, for the matter under discussion, e.g. 46 C πῶς ἄν μετριώτατα σκοποῦμεθα αὐτά; Gorg. 509 E ἡ καὶ ἐπὶ τούτῳ δεῖ δύναμαι καὶ τέχνην παρασκευά-σασθαι, ὡς, ἐὰν μη μάθη αὐτά καὶ ἀσκήσῃ, ἀδικήσεις;

44 D 18. αὐτά δὲ δῆλα. This use of αὐτά throws light on αὐτικα in the sense of 'for example'. δῆλα (sc. ἐστὶν) is passive: so in Rep. I. 348 E νῦν δὲ δῆλος εἶ δι φήσεις: the idiom is like 'I see thee, who thou art'. As to the omission of the copula it should be noted that Plato rarely leaves it out except in the present indicative (ἐστὶν is more often omitted than εἰ or εἰμι), and in the present infinitive: see Schanz, Novae Commentationes Platonicae, p. 31 foll.
21. **ἐν αὐτοῖς διαβεβλημένοις**—‘falsely accused to them’ (Church). 

**ἐν** is here used as in Menex. 235 D ὅταν δὲ τις ἐν τοιούτω ἀγωνι-ξηταί, οὖσπερ καλ ἐπανεί, i.e. it has reference to a court of law. With αὐτοῖς alone the phrase would mean ‘at odds with them’: πρὸς αὐτοὺς διαβεβλημένοις would be ‘calumniated to them’.

22. **εἰ γὰρ ὄφελον:** formula of wishing: Goodwin MT. 177. Compare our colloquial ‘You ought to have been there’. *εἰ* in wishes is not to be explained by assuming an ellipse of the apodosis: it is more probable that *εἰ* in conditional sentences is a later use, derived from the use of *εἰ* = *σφέι*, cf. sei in Plautus and si-c(e) to introduce a wish. See Monro’s Homeric Grammar, p. 232 foll.

23. **Ἰνα ὅτι τὸ ἡγαν**—‘that they might have been able’. *Ἰνα*, ὅτως, etc. are used with a secondary tense of the indicative (without *ἂν*) in final clauses depending on a wish that can no longer be realised, or on the apodosis to an impossible protasis: see Goodwin MT. p. 72. A similar rule holds for *πρὶν* and *ἐως*: Goodwin 145, 144. Scribes frequently misunderstand the idiom and corrupt the text either (α) by inserting *ἂν*, or (β) by changing the indicatives to conjunctives or optatives: see Cobet, Variae Lectiones pp. 102, 359. Two passages, so far as I know, have not yet been emended. Marc. Aurelius, Book II. 11 τῶν δὲ λαπτῶν εἰ τι κακὸν ἤν, καὶ τούτο ἄν προειδοθοντο, ἵνα επὶ πάντῃ τῷ μη περιπιέτειν αὐτῶ, where read ἐπὶ ἦν. The other is in Solon Frag. 36. 21 (κέντρον δ’ ἄλλος ὡς ἐγὼ λαβὼν—οὔτ’ ἄν κατέσχε δήμον, οὔτ’ ἐπαύσατο) πρὶν ἄν ταράξας πιάρ ἐξέλῃ γάλα, where we should read ἀνταράξας and possibly ἐξείλευν, unless the corruption in ἐξέλῃ lies deeper.

24. **καὶ καλῶς ἂν εἴχεν**. Not of course dependent on *ἵνα*, as the *ἂν* shews, but an independent clause.

The statement that a power to do harm implies the power of doing good rests on the Socratic doctrine that virtue is knowledge. If we know what is good, we are good, but we cannot know what is good without knowing what is evil (this Socrates proved by the analogy of the arts), and so being able to do what is evil: conversely, the power to do evil implies the power to do good. This is all worked out at length in the Hippias Minor (a genuine dialogue), where it is proved that the veracious man is ὁ δυνάμενος ψευδεσθαι: see especially 366 B foll. and 369 B (ἱὼν ὀν ἀλήθειαν, ὅτι ἀναπέφανταὶ ὁ αὐτῶς ἄν ψευθής τε καὶ ἀληθής), and compare Mem. IV. 2. 20.

**ὦν δὲ**—‘but as it is’: sec on Apol. 18 A and Prot. 335 C (quoted there) ἀλλὰ σὲ ἔχρην ἡμῖν συγχωρεῖν—ὦν δὲ ἐπειδὴ οὐκ
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εθέλεις κτλ. The Latin is 'nunc'. οὐδέτερα in the next line is probably adverbal as in Theaet. 184 a (δεὶ δὲ οὐδέτερα i.e. neither καί παρέργῳ σκέψασθαι οὐκ ἦκανὼς σκέψασθαι), although here it would be easy to supply ἔξεργάζεσθαι.

26. ποιούσι δὲ τοῦτο ὅτι ἄν τύχωσι sc. ποιούντες. This does not mean 'they act wholly at random' (Church), as all the editors take it: had Plato meant that, he would have written πράττουσι as in Symp. 181 b ξυμβαίνει αὐτός, ὅτι ἄν τύχωσι, τοῦτο πράττειν. Supply τινὰ implied in φρόνιμον and ἀφρόνα: the construction ποιεῖν τι τινα is quite usual: cf. infra 51 a. Translate: 'they treat a man just as it occurs to them'. Cf. Gorgias 521 c ἄνθητος ἄρα εἰμί, ὥς Καλλίκλεις, ὃς ἄληθῶς, εἰ μὴ οἴομαι ἐν τῇ ἕκαστῃ τῇ πόλει ὄντωσιν ἂν ὅτι τῷ οἰκείῳ τοῦτο παθεῖν. Supply τῷ ἔρχεται: the construction ποιεῖν τι τινα is quite usual: cf. infra 51 a. Translate: 'they treat a man just as it occurs to them'. Cf. Gorgias 521 c ἄνθητος ἄρα εἰμί, ὥς Καλλίκλεις, ὃς ἄληθῶς, εἰ μὴ οἴομαι ἐν τῇ ἕκαστῃ τῇ πόλει ὄντωσιν ἂν ὅτι τῷ οἰκείῳ τοῦτο παθεῖν. Ibid. 522 c (which Stallbaum actually quotes to illustrate his view, as if τατηρεύεται could be a passive to πράττειν as well as to ποιεῖν !) ὅστε ἱσως, ὅτι ἄν τύχωσι, τοῦτο πελεσομαι. Socrates means that 'the many' are altogether thoughtless in their treatment of the individual: witness the way in which Miltiades, Cimon and Pericles were treated (Gorg. 515 e—516 e). They would lightly put a man to death and just as lightly bring him to life again if they could: see infra 48 c μὴ ὡς ἄληθῶς ταῦτα, ὥς Κρίτων, σκέμματα ὧν ἀκλίνως ἀποκτείνων καὶ ἀναβιωσκομένων γ' ἄν, εἰ οἷοι τ' ἥσαν, οὐδενὶ ἔγεν νῦν νῦν, τοῦτω τών πολλῶν.

CHAPTER IV.

In this chapter Crito urges Socrates not to let the fear of danger to his friends or exile to himself prevent him from absconding.

44 E 1. μὲν δή. This particle is regularly used to indicate that some topic is concluded. So at the end of speeches ὁι μὲν δή ταῦτα ἔλεγον, and the tragic τοιαῦτα μὲν δή ταῦτα. Note the contrast between ταῦτα retrospective and τάδε prospective.

2. ἄρα γε μή. ἄρα or ἄρα γε (the addition of γε makes the question more animated) merely indicates that a question is asked: ἄρα μῆ or ἄρα γε μῆ expects the answer 'no': ἄρα γε ὡν or ἄρα γε ὡν expects the answer 'yes'. μῆ (μῶν) can of course stand by itself in the sense of num? as ὡν in the sense of nonne?

3. προμηθεῖ—μή. προμηθείσθαι being virtually a verb of fearing is followed by μή.
4. *oι συκοφάνται* ‘the informers’. The great part played by the law-courts and litigation in Athenian life caused a class of informers to spring up, resembling the ‘delatores’ of the early Roman empire. The origin of the name is obscure: see Liddell and Scott s. v., where a suggestion of Mr Lancelot Shadwell is quoted, according to which the word originally means ‘one who brings figs to light by shaking the trees’: and then metaphorically ‘one who makes rich men yield up their fruit by accusations and other vile arts’: cf. Antipho *περὶ τοῦ χορευτοῦ* § 43 *ἔσειε καὶ ἐσύκοφάντει*.

5. *πράγματα παρέχωσιν* of a prolonged action *(ἀναγκασθῶμεν* of the act and nothing more.

6. ἦς καὶ—ἣ—ἥ καὶ=* aut adeo—aut certe—aut etiam.*

7. ἀποβαλείν is used both of voluntary and of involuntary loss (as here): cf. Symp. 179 ἀποβαλλόν (voluntary): Rep. VIII. 553 ἀποβαλλόντα (voluntary).

8. *ἄλλο τι πρὸς τοὺς παθεῖν* euphemistic for death or exile.

9. δικαίος ἐσμέν = ‘it is right that we’. The Greek idiom is 45 A personal while ours is impersonal. Goodwin MT. p. 195.


12. *καὶ ταῦτα προμηθοῦμαι—πολλά*. Socrates lets the Laws reply infra 53 B.

14. *μήτε τοῦνν*. Note the effective balance: *καὶ ταῦτα—καὶ ἄλλα πολλά*, says Socrates: *μήτε—ταῦτα—μήτε κτλ.* says Crito. The second μήτε is in 45 B, line 24: Crito’s earnestness has an injurious effect upon his style: observe for example the recurrence of ἐπείτα within three lines just below. Wohlrab takes a somewhat different view: “Crito ut ipse hebetioris erat ingenii, ita oratio eius non nullis locis durior est minusque elegans”.


17. *τοῦτος τοὺς συκοφάντας*. *τοῦτος* = ‘istos’ expresses contempt: so very frequently in Greek: cf. Symp. 181 ἐ τοῦτος τοὺς πανθήμοις ἔραστάς. Our English ‘your’ is often used in the same way.


Notes

**45 A**

**εὐτελεῖς** = 'cheap': Crito contemptuously speaks of the informers as a commodity to be bought. We are told in the Memorabilia (II. 9) that Crito had himself suffered much from the συκοφάνται until following the advice of Socrates he engaged a vigorous but poor friend Archedemus to retaliate.

18. **ἐπ' αὐτούς** = 'for them': there is much scorn in this phrase. **ἐπὶ** in this sense is regularly used of inanimate objects (ἐπ' αὐτό τοῦτο line 22): the idea implied in εὐτελεῖς is therefore kept up.

**σοι δὲ ὑπάρχει.** σοι is emphatic |(ἐπ' αὐτούς).

45 B 19. **ὡς ἐγὼ ὁμαί ἱκανά.** ὡς ἐγὼ ὁμαί and similar phrases generally precede the word or phrase which they modify: cf. infin. 46 D ὡσπερ νῦν δὴ ἐγὼ ἔλεγον ὅτι κτλ.: Gorg. 452 B ὡς ἐγὼ ὁμαί, πάνυ καταφρονῶν ἀπάντων, and ibid. 462 A.

**ἐπείτα καὶ εἶ.:** καὶ goes with εἶ and not with ἐπείτα.

20. **ἐμοὶ κηδόμενοι:** on account of the danger from the συκοφάνται, not of course for the loss of the money. Socrates did not think money a good nor the loss of it an evil, either in his own case or in that of his friends: see Apol. 38 B, where he proposes the penalty of 30 minae, to be paid by Plato and Crito and others.

**ξένοι οὗτοι—ἀναλίσκειν.** As ξένοι they would escape the συκοφάνται. The pronoun οὗτοι is deictic: 'see! here are foreigners ready to spend theirs'. Crito in his animation speaks as if the ξένοι were actually present in the prison: "de degentibus in urbe quosque fere quotidiem videbat quasi de praesentibus loquitur Crito" (Buttmann). So in Symp. 175 A ἄλλον δὲ των τῶν παίδων ήκειν ἀγγέλλοντα ὅτι Σωκράτης οὗτος ἀναχωρήσας ἐν τῷ τῶν γειτῶν προθύρῳ ἐστηκεν: where Socrates is not as yet visible. ένθάδε means 'in Athens'. There is a certain awkwardness in the collocation οὗτοι ἐνθάδε (for οὗτοι implies ἐνθάδε): but it is not necessary to omit either of the two words. Crito is somewhat excited and prefers expressiveness to logic: see on 45 A line 14 above. The omission of the copula with ἔτοιμοι is common but not universal in Plato: contrast Prot. 313 B ἔτοιμοι δ' εἶ ἀναλίσκειν: see Schanz, Novae Comment. Plat. p. 35.

22. **ἐπ' αὐτό τοῦτο:** see on line 18 (ἐπ' αὐτούς) above.

**Σιμμίας ὁ Θηβαῖος—Κέβης.** Simmias and Cebe (who was also a Theban) play a prominent part in the discussion about immortality in the Phaedo. See Archer-Hind's edition of the dialogue pp. 40—42.
23. ἄλλοι πολλοὶ πάνω. No doubt some or all of those named in Phaed. 59 B—C as present at the death of Socrates.

24. ὅπερ λέγω: viz. supra line 14. In such phrases the present is preferred to the past: see on ὅπερ λέγω Apol. 21 A.

ἀποκάμης. ἀποκάμμενος is to give over from weariness: cf. infra 45 D σὺ δὲ μοι δοκεῖς τὰ βραθυμότατα αἰρεῖσθαι. Plato uses the verb sometimes absolutely (especially in phrases like Rep. IV. 435 D μὴ τοίνυν ἀποκάμης ἀλλὰ σκόπει: see Schanz, N. C. Pl. 25 note 2), sometimes with a participle: this seems to be the only passage where he has an infinitive following it, but cf. Eur. Ion 134—135 μοιχεῖν οὐκ ἀποκάμμενος. Jacobs is here guilty of the solecism μὴ ἀποκάμης, which is also printed by Schanz in his text.

25. οὐκ ἔλεγες ἐν τῷ δικαστηρίῳ: Apol. 37 C—D.

δυσχερές σοι γενέσθω = 'trouble you'. It may have seemed little to Crito that Socrates should be false to what was said in the excitement of his defence when he himself was ready to break his deliberate promise to the Athenian people: see above on 44 C line 3. On μὴ with the 3rd person of the Aorist Imperative see Goodwin MT. 181.

26. οὐκ ἂν ἔχοις ἐξελθὼν κτλ. Apol. I. c. καλὸς οὖν ἂν μοι ὅ βιος εἴη ἐξελθόντι κτλ. This shews that ἐξελθὼν refers to quitting Athens, not to quitting the prison.

27. πολλαχοῦ—ἀλλοσε. We should expect ἄλλοθι: πολλαχὸς would not mend matters, since ἀγαπᾶν ποι is not Greek. The phrase is not strictly grammatical: καὶ = 'also', not 'and'. ἀλλοσε is of course attributed to the following relative, as in βήμαι κεῖθεν ὅθεν περ ἥκει in Soph. O. C. 1227.

28. εἰς θεταλίαν. According to Diog. Laert. II. 5. 25 So-45 C crates declined invitations from Scopas of Crannon and Eurylochus of Larissa. The story that he refused an invitation to the court of Archelaus (whither Euripides, Agathon, Zeuxis and others went) is better authenticated: see Arist. Rhet. III. 23. 1398a 24 Σωκράτης οὐκ ἔφη βαδίζειν ὡς 'Ἀρχέλαον' ὕβριν γὰρ ἔφη εἶναι τὸ μὴ δύνασθαι ἀμώνασθαι ὁμολογεῖν εἰ ναθάντα, ὡσπερ καὶ κακῶς. Crito's connection with Thessaly is significant as to his political sympathies: in so far as he felt any interest in politics, he favoured the καλοὶ καγαθοὶ or oligarchical party.
CHAPTER V.

Crito concludes his appeal to Socrates by urging that it is wrong to choose the more indolent course and remain to die: he ought to think of his children and his friends.

1. ἐτὶ δὲ ὃνδὲ δίκαιον. With the form of expression compare Apol. 35 B (the concluding part of Socrates’ appeal as this is of Crito’s) χωρὶς δὲ τῆς δόξης, ὃ ἄνδρες, οὐδὲ δίκαιον μοι δοκεῖ εἶναι κτλ. It is not correct to translate δίκαιον here as ‘just’: it is ‘right’, ‘moral’. This is the original meaning of the word, and far more frequent than the other, i.e. just )((σώφρων, φρόνιμος, ἄνδρειος—

the other three cardinal virtues. Aristotle recognises both meanings of the word: see Eth. v. 1120b 25 where the pseudo-Theognic line ἐν δὲ δίκαιοσύνη συλλήβδην πᾶσ’ ἀρετῇ ἐνι (Bergk 147) is quoted to illustrate the wider meaning. It was this sense that Socrates assigned to the word when he declared τὸ δίκαιον to be identical with τὸ νόμιμον: see Mem. iv. 4. 12 and cf. Introd. p. xiii. This wider meaning survives in the English ‘justify’.

2. ἐπιχειρεῖν πράγμα. ἐπιχειρεῖν may take the accusative of a neuter noun denoting some inanimate object. Wohlrab compares Isocrates i. 3 καλὸν μὲν ἔργον ἐπιχειρουσίν. σαυτὸν προδοῦναι is explanatory of πράγμα, to which it stands in apposition.

3. καὶ τοιαῦτα σπεύδεις. There is more force and indignation in σπεύδεις than σπεύδειν would have conveyed.

Crito means that Socrates’ defence was meaningless unless he regarded it as important that he should live. He had spoken of himself as God’s minister to the Athenians: was he to desert his post because they rejected him? See Apol. Chapter xviii.

5. σὲ διαφθείραι—‘σὲ is accented for emphasis, and to disconnect it from ἐσπευσαν’. Dyer.

7. viēis. Socrates had three sons: Lamprocles and two others. Lamprocles was the eldest (Mem. ii. 2. 1); but he was still a youth when Socrates died (Apol. 34 B): the other two were children (Apol. i. c. and Phaed. 116 B). We do not know whether they suffered in any way from their father’s death. For the form viēis see my note on Apol. 20 A: the forms of the second declension (except viēos viēi as well as viōv viō) are preferred in the singular: those of the third in the dual and plural. Attic inscriptions of Plato’s time more often omit the i than not (iōs iōs etc. See Meisterhans, Gram-
matik der Attischen Inschriften, p. 62): there are traces of the same omission in some MSS of Plato, and Schanz now everywhere writes the word without the i (see his preface to the Laws p. viii).

\[\text{προδιδόναι = ἐπιχειρεῖν προδοῦναι, whence the present. So διδόναι often means 'to offer'.}\]

8. **ἐκθρέψαι καὶ ἐπαίδευσαι**: their τροφή and παιδεία was already begun: whence the preposition: cf. infra 50 E ἐξετάραξης (Socrates was a grown man) καὶ ἐπαιδεύθης. τροφή is rather personal and moral surveillance than intellectual: παιδεία *vice versa*.

9. **οἰχήσει καταλιπὼν = 'you will leave in the lurch'.** The words imply that there would be something selfish and cowardly in the betrayal. τὸ σὸν μέρος = pro tua parte, quod ad te attinet (Cron): so infra 50 B.

\[\text{ὁ τι ἄν τύχωσι (sc. πράττοντες) τοῦτο πράξουσι = 'they will have to fare as chance directs', 'they will have to take their chance in life': ὁ τι ἄν τύχωσι as in 44 D. With τοῦτο πράττειν cf. ἀγαθόν τι πράξοντες Alc. ii. 141 D.}\]

11. **ἐν ταῖς ὀρφανίαις—ὀρφανοῦσ.** Göbel points out that the repetition of the idea has a pathetic effect.

12. **ἤ γὰρ οὖν χρή...παιδεύοντα.** Crito here pleads that one owes a duty to one's family as well as to the State: Socrates placed his duty to the State before his duty to his family. ποιεῖσθαι παῖδας i.q. παιδοποιεῖσθαι.

14. **σὺ δέ μοι δοκεῖς τὰ βαθύμουτα αἱρεῖσθαι.** I cannot but think that Crito contrasted the indifference of Socrates with the zeal displayed in his behalf by himself and the others: there is a touch of injured friendship about these words. See the reply of Socrates in 47 A (καὶ οὐκ ἄν σὲ παρακρούοι ἡ παροῦσα ξυμφορά) and my note there.

16. **φάσκοντα γε δὴ = quippe qui dicat.** The touch of sarcasm in φάσκοντα is made sharper by the addition of δὴ. For the assertion itself compare Apol. 30 Α and 37 Β. διὰ παντὸς τοῦ βίου has more force if taken with φάσκοντα than with ἐπιμελεῖσθαι.

17. **ὡς ἔγωγε κτλ. χρὴ αἱρεῖσθαι being virtually an imperative may be followed by ὡς in the sense of 'for'.**

18. **μὴ δοξῇ.** For αἰσχύνομαι followed by μὴ cf. Theaet. 183 Ε 45 Ε Μέλισσον—αἰσχύνομαι ὑπὸ φορτικῶν σκοπῶν.

19. **ἀνανδρία τινὶ τῇ ἡμετέρᾳ.** Here the taunt of cowardice (already implied in βαθύμουτα of 14 and ἀνὴρ ἄγαθός καὶ ἀνδρείος of 15) is openly made: for by ἡμετέρᾳ (as is clear from ὑπὲρ σοῦ in
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17 and οὔδε σὺ σαυτόν in 25) Socrates is meant as well as Crito and his friends. It is implied that death requires less courage than life—a view which Socrates himself held. The reproach is made less biting by τινί.

20. καὶ ἂν εἰσόδος—καὶ αὐτὸς ὁ ἀγών—καὶ τὸ τελευταῖον δὴ τοῦτο—δοκεῖν. This explains in detail ἄπαν τὸ πράγμα. There is clearly an allusion to the stage. The tragedy begins—(εἰσόδος) develops (αὐτὸς ὁ ἀγών)—and ends in a fiasco (ὡσπέρ κατάγελως τῆς πράξεως): "solvuntur risu tabulac". The words are carefully chosen to suggest the comparison. εἰσόδος may be used both of the entrance of an actor (compare the use of εἰσάγειν in Apol. 35 β), and of the coming on of a law-suit (see on Apol. 24 β): ἀγών signifies 'acting' as well as 'pleading': the word always implies rivalry as well as publicity.

21. εἰσήλθες. So I read with E and the second hand in B: the editors (except Stallbaum) generally read εἰσήλθεν. The latter is very idiomatic Greek, for εἰσέρχομαι is used in this way as the passive to εἰσάγω: compare Dem. πρὸς Λάκριτον 49 ποί ὄν ἔδει ταύτην εἰσέλθειν τὴν δίκην, but (see following note) εἰσήλθες goes better with ἔξων μὴ εἰσέλθειν: cf. also on 45 ε infra κακία τινί—δοκεῖν.

ἔξων (sc. σοι) μὴ εἰσέλθειν. Crito probably means that Socrates might have effected his escape in the interval between the lodging of the indictment with the King Archon and the actual trial. Had he done so, the case would have been decided against him by default, see on ἐρήμην κατηγοροῦντες Apol. 18 c. If we read ὃς εἰσήλθεν and not ὃς εἰσήλθες, we must understand αὐτῆ i.e. τῇ δίκῃ after ἔξων—this can hardly be right, for even if Socrates had ascended the trial would have come on: the only difference would have been the absence of the defendant. There is no good authority for the tradition that Anytus wished to make terms with Socrates after the indictment had been lodged; nor would such a course have been tolerated by Athenian law, since ἀδεξεία was a γραφή or offence against the State, not a δίκη or lawsuit with a private individual.

22. τὸ τελευταῖον δὴ τοῦτο—'last of all this present scene': the περιπέτεια as it were or catastrophe of the tragedy. The Bodleian has δήπορον.

23. ὡσπέρ κατάγελως τῆς πράξεως—'a reductio ad absurdum as one might say of the whole affair'. τῆς πράξεως is an objective genitive: cf. Aesch. Ag. 1264 πὶ δήτ', ἐμαυτῆς κατάγελωτ', ἔχω τάδε καὶ σκῆπτρα καὶ μαντεία περὶ δέρη στέφη; See the retort of the
Laws infra 53 D ἵσως ἕν ἡδέως σοι ἀκούοιεν ὡς γελοῖος ἐκ τοῦ δεσμωτηρίου ἀπεδιδορακες κτλ. On κατάγελως (καταγέλαστον) see infra 53 A.

κακία τινι—δοκεῖν = ‘that you should be thought to have given us the slip, through a sort of cowardice and unmanliness on our part’. δοκεῖν διαπεφευγέναι is explanatory of τουτί, exactly as σαυτόν προδόται is of πράγμα in 45 C line 2. The subject to δοκεῖν is se: this is easily supplied from the context (το πράγμα το περὶ σε in 19 and ὃς εἰσήλθες in 21). For the expression compare Phaed. 115 C εάνπερ γε λάβῃτε με καὶ μη ἐκφύγω ἡμᾶς, and for διαφεύγω with a personal object see Symp. 174 A χθέσ γὰρ αὐτὸν διέφυγον τοῖς ἐπινικίοις. Göbel takes ἡμᾶς as subject to δοκεῖν: Wohlrab τὸ τελευταῖον δὴ τουτί: the other editors fail to give any clear explanation of this difficult passage. There is some awkwardness in having δοκεῖν διαπεφευγέναι as virtually a subject to δοξῆ in line 18 above: but the grammatical subject is τουτί, to which δοκεῖν is in apposition. Mudge conjectures δοκῇ, but the text is quite sound.

25. οὐδὲ σὺ σαυτόν. The relative clause passes into a main 46 A sentence as in Xen. Anab. I. 4. 9 ἵχθων—οὖς οἱ Σύροι θεοῦς ἐνόμιζον, καὶ ἀδικεῖν ὁνε εἰὼν, οὐδὲ τὰς περιστερὰς: compare also Gorg. 452 D τὶ ἐστι τοῦτο δ φίλος σὺ μέγιστον ἀγαθὸν εἰναί—καὶ σὲ δημιουργὸν εἰναὶ αὐτόν, and see my note on Apol. 40 A ἀ γε δὴ οἰκεῖον—καὶ νομίζεται.

οἰόν τε ὣν καὶ δυνατόν. The twofold expression is for emphasis: cf. infra line 31 ἀδύνατον καὶ οὐκέτι οἰόν τε. οἰόν τε is ‘feasible’: δυνατόν ‘possible’.

27. ἄμα τῷ κακῷ. ἄμα is used in much the same way as πρὸς: τῷ κακῷ is substantival. So in the Gorgias (474 E foll.) το αἰσχρόν is defined as that which is at once λυπηρόν τε καὶ κακόν: see also 475 B οὐκοίν εἰπέρ αἰσχρὸν τὸ ἀδικεῖν τοῦ ἀδικεῖσθαι, ἢτοι λυπηρότερον ἐστὶ καὶ λύπη υπερβάλλων αἰσχρῶν ἢν εἰσ ἤ κακῶ ἢ ἄμφοτέρους;

28. μᾶλλον δὲ =vel potius, as in Gorg. 449 A μᾶλλον δὲ, ὦ Γοργία, αὐτῶς ἡμῖν εἰπέ. οὐδὲ is ne—quidem.

29. βουλεύεσθαι | (βεβουλεύεσθαι. “Charm. 176 C οὗτοι, ἢν δ’ ἐγώ, τί βουλεύεσθον ποιεῖν; οὔδεν, ἐφι ο Ἱαμιδῆς, ἀλλὰ βεβουλεύειμεθα.” Jacobs. Note the fourfold recurrence of βουλεύεσθαι (Σουλῆ).

30. τῆς γὰρ ἐπιούσης νυκτὸς. Apparently Crito does not believe the vision (see on 44 B above): the γυνὴ καλὴ καὶ εὐειδὴς left Socrates one night more in which to effect his escape. With τῆς ἐπιούσης νυκτὸς cf. τῆς ἐπιούσης ἡμέρας in 44 A.

33. μηδαμῶς ἄλλως πολεῖ: see on 45 A μη ἄλλως πολεῖ.
CHAPTER VI.

Crito’s pleading is now concluded. In reply, Socrates begins by laying down the principles which should guide his decision. He first recalls one great doctrine on which he had insisted throughout all his life, viz. that no opinions are worth regarding except the opinions of those who know. See Introduction pp. xi and xii.

2. τολλοῦ ἀξία sc. ἐστίν, although εἰ—ἐλη follows: a “mixed conditional sentence” Goodwin MT. 118. It would not be possible to understand ἄν εἰ: if the optative of the copula is omitted in an apodosis with ἄν, the ἄν must be inserted: see Meno 96 B υύκοιν εἰ μήτε οἱ σοφισταί μήτε οἱ αὐτοὶ καλοὶ κα’ γαθοί δυντες διδάσκαλοι εἰσι τοῦ πράγματος, δὴ λοι, ὡτι οὐκ ἄν ἄλλοι γε: But even apart from this, in cases like the present Greek prefers the more dogmatic form of expression. Note εἰ—ἐλη and not εἰ—ἠν: Socrates speaks as one who has not yet made up his mind—ready to follow ὁτι ἄν ὁ λόγος ὡσπερ πνεύμα φέρη (Rep. III. 394 D).

4. σκοπεῖσθαι is placed in the emphatic position at the beginning of the sentence as if=σκοπεῖσθαι ἀλλὰ μὴ προσθυμεῖσθαι.

5. οὐ μόνον νῦν. So the MSS: there is no reason to read οὐ νῦν πρῶτον with Nauck and Schanz. The omission of the copula is not very common in Plato except when it is ἐστίν: yet cf. Prot. 335 C ἐγὼ δὲ τὰ μακρὰ ταῦτα ἀδύνατος: Theaet. 169 B ἰσχυρικῶτερος μέντοι ἐγὼ ἐκείνων. εἰ and ἐσμέν are also sometimes omitted: ἠν rarely, except in the phrase εἰ μη διὰ τις (σε or the like): parts of the conjunctive and optative are very seldom omitted: εἴναι however is left out very frequently. See Schanz, Novae Comm. Pl. 31—35.

6. τῶν ἐμῶν μηδενί ἄλλῳ πείθεσθαι. This is the reply to Crito’s πείθον μοι (46 Α), for τῶν ἐμῶν includes Socrates’ friends as well as everything else that could be called his.

7. ἡ τῷ λόγῳ—φαίνηται. A faithful description of Socrates’ rule of life. For example, before entering on a line of conduct he would inquire if it harmonised with the conception or definition (λόγος) of τὸ δίκαιον which he had arrived at by the exercise of his reason: and if it did, nothing ever deterred him from so acting: see my Introduction to the Apology p. xi; compare also Phaed. 100 Α, where Plato uses the phraseology of the Socratic method to describe his own procedure ὑποθέμενος ἐκάστοτε λόγον ὁν ἄν κρίνω ἐρρωμενέστατον εἴναι, ἀ μὲν ἄν μοι δοκή τούτῳ συμφωνεῖν, τίθημ
ϕιλήθη ὑπτα—ὡ δ’ ἄν μή, ὡς ὅου ψευθή. Σee also Euthyphr. 
6 E ταύτην τοίνυν με αὐτήν διδάξων τὴν ἱδέαν, τὶς ποτὲ ἐστιν, ἵνα εἰς ἐκείνην ἀποβλέπων καλ ἄρνεμον αὐτή παραδείγματι, δ’ μὲν ἄν τοιοῦτον ἥ, ἄν ἄν ἡ σὺ ἡ ἀλλὸς τις πράττῃ, φῶ δόσον εἶναι, δ’ δ’ ἄν μῆ τοιοῦτον, μὴ φῶ: and compare as to this point Dr Jackson on the “incomplete Protagoreans” of the Theaetetus in Journal of Philology, Vol. XIII. 249—250.

9. ἔλεγον: imperfect, because Socrates is referring to the teaching of his whole life. Infra ἐκβάλειν = ‘throw over’, ‘discard’, as in Rep. vi. 503 A τὸ δόγμα τούτο μῆτ’ ἐν πόνοις μῆτ’ ἐν φόβοις μῆτ’ ἐν ἀλλη μηδεμιᾷ μετὰβολῇ φαίνεσθαι ἐκβάλλοντας. μοι γέγονεν is ‘has come to me’: cf. Euthyphr. 3 Β σὺ τὸ δαμόσων φῆς σαυτῷ ἐκάστοτε γίγνεσθαι.

10. ὃμοιοι (sc. λόγοι) is probably the subject and not the predicate, otherwise in place of ἐκβάλειν we should expect a word = ‘to change’: the predicate is φαίνονται (sc. βελτιστοί). ὃμοιοι is not = οἱ αὐτοί (idem) but = Latin similes: the two ideas are carefully distinguished in Theaet. 159 A εἶ ἀρα τι συμβαίνει ὃμοιον τῷ γίγνεσθαι ἡ ἀνόμοιοι—ὁμοιούμενον μὲν ταύτῳ φήσομεν γίγνεσθαι, ἀνομοιούμενον δὲ ἐτερον; ἀνάγκη. Socrates becomes more confident as he goes on: σχεδόν τι ὃμοιοι—καὶ τοὺς αὐτοὺς πρεσβεύων κτλ.

11. πρεσβεύω is a lofty and somewhat poetic word, frequently 46 C used of regard paid to the gods.

12. βελτίων ἐξωμεν λέγειν = βελτίους ἐξωμεν λόγους.

13. οὐ μή σοι ἑνυγχωρῆσο: see on 44 B οὐδένα μὴ ποτε εὑρήσω. 
οὐδ’ ἄν πλεῖω—μορμολύττεται: πλεῖω is adverbial like ἐλάττω in Rep. 396 D ἐλάττω δὲ καὶ ἤττουν—ἐσφαλμένον: cf. also infra 53 A ἐλάττω ἐξ αὐτῆς ἀπεδήμησας. The Μορμῶ was well known in the Greek nursery (see Theocr. xv. 40 οὐκ ἀξίω τυ, τέκνον. Μορμῶ—δάκνει ἵππος). Other bogies were 'Ακκω, 'Αλφίτω, Λαμία, Γοργώ, Μορμολύκη, 'Εμπούσα: see Becker's Charicles E. T. pp. 224—225. Compare the well-known passage in the Phaedo (77 E) ἀλλ' ἐσως ἐνι τις καὶ ἐν ἡμῖν παῖς, ὡστις τὰ τοιαῦτα φοβεῖται τοῦτον ὄν περιώμεθα πείθειν μὴ δεδιέναι τὸν θάνατον ὦσπερ τὰ μορμο- λύκεια.

It should be noted that the order of the words ὦσπερ παῖδας ἡμᾶς is very idiomatic: the effect is almost to identify the objects compared. If ἡμᾶς preceded ὦσπερ παῖδας the connection between the two would be much less close. Still more idiomatic is the λ. C.
construction in similes with ὀπερ and a preposition. If it is wished to bring the objects compared into the closest possible union, ὀπερ (ὡς) with the preposition is placed first, and the preposition itself written only once: see for example Rep. VIII. 545 ὡς πρὸς παίδας ἡμᾶς παιζοῦσας καὶ ἐρεσχηλοῦσας, Theaet. 170 λ ὀπερ πρὸς θεοὺς ἔχειν τοὺς ἐν ἐκάσταις ἀρχονταῖς. Manuscripts however often violate the rule so far as the omission of the preposition is concerned: see Cobet, Variae Leciones p. 165 foll.

15. δεσμοὺς καὶ θανάτους κτλ. δεσμοῖ—chains (δεσμά—imprisonment: see on Apol. 32 C. The plural (δεσμοί, θάνατοι, χρημάτων ἀφαιρέσεις) adds to the rhetorical effect: the many have a variety of deaths etc., from which to choose our μορμώ. 16. επιτέμπουσα: compare Phaed. 62 C πρὸν ἀν ἀνάγκην τινὰ θεὸς εἰπεμψή. The word means 'inflicting on' (Church), not of course 'threatening with'. Socrates means that death is only a μορμώ, not simply in the anticipation but in the actual suffering of it. Dr Verrall suggests επέμπουσα as if=='assuming the forms of' like the Empusa. I am not quite satisfied that επέμπουσα is rightly formed, nor even allowing this does the construction seem quite natural: but I am convinced that Plato wrote επιτέμπουσα rather than επιφέρουσα let us say, because the ending is identical with εμπουσα: see my note on 47 B line 14 for more examples of the play upon words in Plato.

17. αὐτὰ—'the question': see on 44 C ἡγησονται αὐτὰ ὀτω πεπράξθαι.

πρῶτον μὲν: repeated infra 48 A (ὡς πρῶτον μὲν ταύτῃ οἷς ὄρθως εἰσήγει), where the first inquiry is concluded: the second point is then raised by way of protest against the first (ibid. ἀλλὰ μὲν δὴ, φαίη γ' ἄν τις, οἷοι τε εἰσίν ἡμᾶς οἱ πολλοὶ ἀποκτητών): hence πρῶτον μὲν has no εἴτα or εἴτα δέ to balance it.

18. τοῦτον τὸν λόγον ἀναλάβομεν = 'recur to this view': οὗτος is often = 'that of yours', here made clearer by ὅν σὺ λέγεις. ἀναλαμβάνω is 'iterum sumo'—take up where I laid down' as in Rep. VI. 490 D πάλιν ἀνειλήφαμεν τὴν τῶν ἀληθῶς φιλοσόφων φύσιν. The reference is to 44 B—D, and 45 E.

19. πότερον καλῶς ἐλέγετο κτλ. This depends on ἀναλάβομεν: cf. Apol. 19 A ἀναλάβωμεν οὖν ἓς ἀρχῆς τίς ἡ κατηγορία ἐστίν; In English we must say 'recur—and ask if'. 'The subject to ἐλέγετο is ὁ λόγος, to be understood from τοῦτον τὸν λόγον: it is defined by the clause ὅτι ταῖς μὲν—οὗ. The imperfect is used because Socrates
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refers to the teaching of his whole life, see on ἔλεγον in line 9 above. ἐκάστοτε means on every occasion when the subject was discussed. If there was one thing on which Socrates insisted more than any other, it was that no man's opinion is worth anything on any subject which he has not studied: see Grote Vol. viii. p. 239 foll.

20. η̣ πρὶν μὲν ἐμὲ κτλ. Three alternatives: either (a) the 46 D doctrine that only some δόξαι are worthy of regard was right, or (b) it was wrong, or (c) it was right then and wrong now. In his statement of the third alternative Socrates substitutes the application for the statement of the general principle—was I right in thinking it my duty to die then, although others thought otherwise, and am I wrong now?

21. ἐμὲ δεῖν ἀποδηνήσκειν. Apol. 40 Β κινδυνεύει γάρ μοι τὸ ἐξίμβε- βηκός τοῦτο ἀγαθὸν γέγονενα: and Socrates must often have said the same in declining Crito's former invitations to escape: see on 44 β ἐτι καὶ νῦν ἔμοι πείθου καὶ σώθητι.

22. κατάδηλος ἄρα: i.e. of course ὁ λόγος: with δῆλος as with δίκαιος Greek prefers the personal mode of expression. ἄρα = 'after all' expresses surprise and disappointment. See on Apol. 34 c ἐγὼ δὲ οὐδέν ἄρα τούτων ποιήσω.

ἀλλως [ἐνεκα λόγου]. I believe ἐνεκα λόγον to be a gloss on ἀλλως: the expression (ὁ λόγος) ἀλλως ἐνεκα λόγου is excessively awkward. For ἀλλως used in this way (= 'otherwise than it ought' i.e. nearly = eikή temere) cf. Phaed. 76 ε ἀλλως ἄν ὁ λόγος οὔτος εἰρημένοις εἶν, and the adverbial expression τὴν ἀλλως, as in Theaet. 172 ε οί ἀγώνες οὐδέποτε τὴν ἀλλως ἀλλ' ἀεί τὴν περὶ αὐτοῦ.

23. ὃς ἀληθῶς. Like τῷ οὖν and τῇ ἀληθείᾳ this expression is frequent in the dialogues of Plato's early and middle period: in the later dialogues ἀληθῶς, οὖτος and ἀληθεία (less frequent) are more common: see Schanz in Hermes (1886) xxi. 3, pp. 439—459. As for the origin of the phrase, Schanz accepts the explanation given by Fox, according to whom ὃς is the ablative of the article, as ἀληθῶς is of ἀληθεία: but surely τῶς and not ὃς is the ablative of τῶ. The old explanation (which I prefer) is to regard the phrase as parallel to ὃς ἐτέρως, ὃς ἀλλως etc., and due to attraction like θαυμασίως ὃς: ἄνδρες σοφοὶ ὃς ἀληθῶς (Phaed. 63 A) for example is short for σοφοὶ οὖτος, ὃς ἀληθεὶς ἔστιν. Kühner's Ausführliche Grammatik II. p. 921.

24. ἐπισκέψασθαι κοινὴ μετά σοῦ. κοινὴ σκοπεῖν, κοινὴ ἐξητεύν etc. were almost technical terms of the Socratic dialectic: see Introd. to Apol. p. xv.
25. ἀλλοιωτερός, like ὁ αὐτός, is in the predicate.

27. τῶν οἰομένων τι λέγειν. Socrates means himself primarily: but he chooses a phrase which will include Crito too, so as to make his conclusion appear as the verdict of all right-minded men. λέγειν τι (οὐδὲν λέγειν, ‘to be right’) (‘to be wrong’: so in English ‘there is something in what you say’. So τι ποιεῖν = ‘to be making something of it’ in Symp. 173 A. ὦδε before ὑπὸ τῶν οἰομένων refers forward to ὅτι τῶν δοξῶν—τάς δὲ μῆ.

28. ὠσπερ νῦν δὴ ἔλεγον goes with the following clause: in Eng. ‘that as I said just now’: see on 45 B ὃς ἐγὼ οἴμαι ἱκανά. νῦν δὴ = ἀφρίως as so often (see my note on Apol. 37 c): Cobet would write νυνδή, and Schanz now follows him: B too has νυνδή here. There is no special force in the imperfect: ἔλεγον and ἐφην (like ἐκέλευν) in Phaed. 59 E and Phaedr. 228 B) are sometimes used as aorists. See also Goodwin MT. 8.

τῶν δοξῶν ἂς—δοξάζουσιν...τάς δὲ μῆ: contrast this with 46 C lines 19—20. The principle is enunciated more precisely because upon it hinges the argument down to 48 A.

46 E 30. πρὸς θεῶν: only in entreaties, not in asseverations: Apol. 25 c.

31. ὅσα γε τάνθρωπεια = ‘in all human probability’: for ὅσα γε cf. infr. 54 D ὅσα γε τὰ νῦν ἐμοὶ δοκοῦντα.

ἐκτὸς ἐಃ τοῦ μέλλειν—αὐριον. Why αὐριον? It is certain that Socrates believed that he would die upon the third day, but as Crito disbelieved the vision (see on 46 A) Socrates waives the point for the present. μέλλειν ἀποθνῄσκειν = ἀποθανεῖσθαι.

47 A 33. παρακροθοί. Like σφάλλειν this word is probably a metaphor from the palaestra: cf. Theaet. 168 A τὰ σφάλματα ἄ αὐτός ὑφ’ ἑαυτόν καὶ τῶν προτέρων συνονσίων παρεκέκροντο. The original meaning may have been to give an unfair blow, hit below the belt. There is a touch of irony in ὕκ ἄν σὲ παρακροθοί: Socrates knew well that it was Crito and not he whose mental vision was dimmed by the coming doom (see Phaed. 84 E). I think the words are meant as a reply to Crito’s taunt in 45 D σῦ δὲ μοι δοκεῖς τὰ ῥαθυμότατα αἴρεινθαι, where σῦ is emphatic: see note. For this reason I have printed σὲ with an accent.

34. οὐχ ἱκανός: infra οὐχὶ καλῶς in line 36 is stronger: cf. in 46 B the change from ὅμοιοι to τοὺς αὐτοὺς: see note in loc. Hirschig’s οὐχὶ καλῶς (the one tolerable suggestion of the thirty odd
suggestions which he has made on the Crito) completely misses the point.

36. ἀλλὰ τὰς μὲν, τὰς δ’ οὐ; After these words some inferior MSS (and the second hand in B) read οὐδὲ πάντων, ἀλλὰ τῶν μὲν, τῶν δ’ οὐ; Apart from their slender MS authority, the words are objectionable (a) because they correspond to nothing either in 46 c (ταῖς μὲν δεῖ τῶν δοξῶν προσέχειν τοὺς νοῶν, ταῖς δὲ οὐ), or in 46 D (τῶν δοξῶν ἢς οἱ ἀνθρώποι δοξάζουσιν κτλ.), and (b) because they anticipate line 42 χρηστάλ ὑπ’ οὐχ οἱ τῶν φρονιμῶν, πονηραί δὲ οἱ τῶν ἀφρόνων; Plato is especially careful to avoid any premature indications of the course of an argument: he professes to follow ὅπῃ ἄν ὁ λόγος ἀσπερ πνεῦμα φέρῃ (Rep. III. 394 b).

CHAPTER VII.

In this chapter Socrates recalls the familiar illustrations by which he used to enforce the doctrine that no opinion deserves to be considered except that of those who know, and applies them to the case in point. Introduction p. xii.

1. τὰ τοιαύτα ἐλέγετο. τοιαύτα refers to what follows: so in Rep. vi. 488 ά νόησον γὰρ τοιοῦτον γενόμενον εἰτε πολλῶν νεῶν πέρι εἰτε μᾶς. It is a mistaken idea that τοιαύτα is invariably prospective, and τοιοῦτος retrospective. The imperfect ἐλέγετο is used because Socrates is recalling the doctrines taught throughout his life: see on ἐλέγεν in 46 b.

2. γυμναζόμενος ἀνήρ κτλ. For the asyndeton cf. Rep. l. c. 47 B ναύκληρον μεγέθει μὲν καὶ ράμη ὑπέρ τούς ἐν τῇ νητί πάντας, and Apol. 22 ά (where see note) ἡ μὴν ἐγὼ ἐπαθὼν τι τοιοῦτον· οἱ μὲν μάλιστα κτλ. καὶ τούτῳ πράττων =‘and making this his work’: hoc agens. Buttmann compares Xen. Hell. iv. 8. 22 οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐκράτουν αὐτοῦ αἱ τοῦ σώματος ἡδοναί, ἀλλ’ αἰ, πρὸς ὃ εἰ ἔργω, τοῦτ’ ἐπράττεν. Compare πράγμα =‘profession’ in Apol. 20 c.

5. ἱστρός ἢ παιδοτρίβης: see Gorg. 452 ά foll. The ἱστρός is there regarded as the δημοιργὸς ύγιείας: the παιδοτρίβης as the man whose ἔργον is καλὸνς τε καὶ ἱσχυρὸς ποιεῖν τοὺς ἀνθρώπους τὰ σώματα: and so Soph. 228 Ε περὶ μὲν ἁίσχος γυμναστική, περὶ δὲ νόσῳ ἱστρική; φαίνεσθον. In another passage of the Gorgias (464 Β foll.) ἱστρική and γυμναστική are described as the two
branches of the art which looks after the body (ἡ τοῦ σώματος θεραπεία); they are correlative (ἀντίστροφοι) with δικαιοσύνη (δικαστική) and νομοθετική, the two subdivisions of πολιτική or the art which pays attention to the soul. Plato frequently places the two professions side by side: e.g. Prot. 313 D ἐὰν μή τις τύχῃ γυμναστικὸς ἦ iatρός ὤν: Polit. 295 c et al. Cron remarks that both professions were united in the person of Herodicus of Selymbria: compare Rep. III. 406 B Ἡράδικος δὲ παιδοτρίβης ὥν καὶ νοσῶθης γενόμενος, μίξας γυμναστικῆς ἰατρικῆς, ἀπέκνασε πρῶτον μὲν καὶ μάλιστα ἑαυτόν, ἐπειτ' ἄλλους υπερευθεῖν.

9. ἀλλὰ μή: ἀλλὰ is regular in such antitheses: see on Apol. 23 D.

12. ταύτη—ἡ ἄν κτλ. Note the position of ταύτη: it serves to throw special emphasis on the clause introduced by ἥ ἄν.

καὶ γυμναστέων καὶ ἐδεστέων γε καὶ ποτέον: this explains πρακτέων. In ἐδεστέων γε the γε is added because what follows inculcates obedience to the ἰατρός as γυμναστέων to the παιδοτρίβης: καὶ—γε is frequently used in this way to introduce something which belongs to a different class from the things already enumerated. Gorg. 450 D ἀριθμητικὴ καὶ λογιστικὴ καὶ γεωμετρικὴ καὶ πεπευτικὴ γε καὶ ἄλλαι πολλαὶ τέχναι: here the first three arts hang together, being all concerned with number or mathematics. On the food of a Greek athlete cf. Aristotle Eth. Nic. II. 1106 a 36 ff. οὗ γὰρ ἐὰν τῷ δέκα μναί (a mina was about 15.2 oz. Τρογ) φαγεῖν πολὺ, δύο δὲ ὄλγων, ὅ ἀλειπτικὸς εἰς μνᾶς προστάξεις ἐστὶ γὰρ ἔσως καὶ τοῦτο πολὺ τῷ ληφομένῳ ἡ ὄλγων. Μιλῶν μὲν γὰρ ὄλγων, τῷ δὲ ἀρχομένῳ τῶν γυμνασιῶν πολὺ.

13. τῷ ἐπιστάτῳ καὶ ἐπαίτουτι. The argument gains additional point if it is noted that the word ἐπιστάτης suggests ἐπιστάται and so leads up to ἐπαίτουτι: Socrates wishes to deduce from the example of training the general principle that only he who knows deserves to be regarded. The word ἐπιστάτης is sometimes used in the sense of a trainer: cf. Xen. Mem. III. 5. 18 ἐν τοῖς γυμνικοῖς ἀγώνοι πειθοῦνται τοῖς ἐπιστάταις (= paedotribas, as Schneider correctly explains it), and see also Rep. VII. 521 e σώματος γὰρ αὕτης καὶ φιλισεως ἐπιστάται (sc. γυμναστικῆς). Plato repeatedly thinks of ἐπιστάται when he uses the words ἐπιστάτης or ἐπιστάτω: see for example Prot. 312 D f. ἐὰν δὲ τίς ἐκεῖνον ἐρωτε: ὅ δὲ σοφιστὴς τῶν τι σοφῶν ἐστι; τί ἂν ἀποκριναίμεθα αὐτῷ; πολας ἔργας ἐπιστάτης; τί ἂν ἐπειμεν αὐτῶν εἶναι—ἡ ἐπιστάτην τοῦ ποιήσαι δεινῶν.
I have insisted on this point partly because the editors have ignored it and partly on account of the light it throws on the meaning of the vision in 44 B: Socrates was greatly influenced by similarity of name.

It should be noted that \( \text{ἐπαίνεω} \) is a favourite word of Plato’s, but less common in other authors. Protagoras used the word frequently: according to Kock on Arist. Nubes 650 it was probably an importation from the Ionian philosophical schools into the sophistic and philosophical circles of Athens.

17. \( \text{ἰεῖν} \) was pronounced \( \text{ἰὔν} \) with intervocalic aspiration as in \( \text{ταῦς} \): the derivation is doubtful, but it can hardly come from \( \text{εἰμι} \).
see on Apol. 18. Possibly it is connected with ἑιά: for as Timaeus s. v. says, it is not only συγκατάθεσις τῶν εἰρημένων, but also συναφή πρὸς τὰ μέλλοντα; whence Suidas explains it as = ἄγε δῆ. Here for example it leads up to ἀπειθήσας δὲ κτλ.: cf. Symp. 204 C εἰεν δῆ, ὥς ξένης καλῶς γαρ λέγεις. (parenthetical) τοιοῦτος ὡν ὁ “Ἐρως τίνα ξρείαν ἔχει τοῖς ἀνθρώποις;

18. τὴν δόξαν καὶ τοὺς ἑπαίνους—τοὺς τῶν πολλῶν λόγους: so all the best MSS. The difficulties felt with regard to the text arise from a misapprehension of the argument. Socrates is gradually passing from the illustration to the case which it was intended to illustrate. Hence at first when he is only elucidating the illustration he introduces more detail: supra 47 B φοβείσθαι χρῆ τοὺς ψόγους καὶ ἀσπάζομαι τοὺς ἑπαίνους: as the application draws near there is somewhat less detail (ἀτιμάσας τὴν δόξαν καὶ τοὺς ἑπαίνους): when we are on the verge of the application, there is only τιμήσας τοὺς τῶν πολλῶν λόγους, because it is a λόγος τῶν πολλῶν which all this was meant to illustrate, viz. that Crito and his friends and Socrates himself are cowards in leaving Socrates to die. Schanz brackets and Kral omits καὶ τοὺς ἑπαίνους: the other editors rightly retain the words. Ziwsa in the Zeitschr. f. d. öst. Gymn. 1879 p. 106 reads ἀπειθήσας δὲ τῷ ἐνι καὶ ἀτιμάσας αὐτοῦ τὴν δόξαν καὶ τοὺς ψόγους, τιμήσας δὲ τοὺς τῶν πολλῶν ἑπαίνους.


26. καὶ δῆ καὶ is used to introduce a climax, or (as here) the crowning point of the reasoning—the application: see on Apol. 26 D.

27. δικαίων καὶ ἀδίκων: Cron draws attention to the chiastic arrangement:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{δικαίων} & \; \times \; \text{ἀσχόρων} \; \times \; \text{ἀγαθών} \\
\text{ἀδίκων} & \; \times \; \text{kαλῶν} \; \times \; \text{kακῶν} \\
\end{align*}
\]

(1) yer

31. μᾶλλον ἢ ἐξυμπαντας τοὺς ἄλλους: supra 47 B μᾶλλον ἢ ἢ ἐξυμπαντας τοῖς ἄλλοις.

32. εἰ μὴ ἀκολουθήσομεν, διαφθεροῦμεν ἐκεῖνο καὶ λωβησόμεθα. εἰ μὴ with fut. ind. is more vivid and impassioned than ἢν μὴ with aor. conj. λωβῇσθαι is to add insult to injury. ἐκεῖνο is νοῦς: cf. Rep. VII. 527 D—Ε ἐν τούτους τοῖς μαθήμασιν ἐκάστου ὄργανόν τι ψυχὴς ἐκκαθαίρεται τε καὶ ἀναξιωπυρεῖται ἀπὸλλυμενον καὶ τυφλοῦμενον ὑπὸ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιτηδευμάτων, κρεῖτ-
Here Socrates finally disposes of the first point raised by Crito, viz. that we should regard the opinions of the many, and proceeds to discuss the second (see above, 44 D)—that the many can take away our lives.

2. ὑπὸ τοῦ νοσώδους. νοσώδεις is not here = 'diseased,' but 'causing disease,' 'unwholesome,' )( υγιεινόν: so in Theaet. 171 E τὰ υγιεινὰ καὶ νοσώδη.

3. πειθόμενοι μὴ τῇ τῶν ἐπαίδευτων δόξῃ. Note the position of μὴ: Plato has arranged his words so as to express the double meaning of μὴ πειθόμενοι τῇ τῶν ἐπαίδευτων δόξῃ, and πειθόμενοι τῇ τῶν μὴ κτλ., for the text at once suggests ἀλλὰ τῇ τῶν μὴ ἐπαίδευτων. Compare Legg. II. 671 D νήφοντας τῶν μὴ νήφοντων στρατηγοὺς, ὥς δὴ χωρὶς μέθη διαμάχεσθαι δεινότερον ἡ πολεμίος εἶναι μὴ μετὰ ἀρχόντων ἀθορύβων sc. ἀλλὰ μετὰ ἀρχόντων νηφόντων. Hirschig foolishly corrupts the text to πειθόμενοι τῇ τῶν μὴ ἐπαίδευτων δόξῃ.

6. τοῦτο τὸ σῶμα. τοῦτο is of course in the predicate: Wohl- 47 E rab is wrong in reading τοῦτο σῶμα with Buttman.; for σῶμα without
the article is ‘body’ generally, i.e. ‘matter’, not ‘the body’: cf.
Sypm. 211 Α οὖν’ αὖ φαντασθῆσαι αὐτῷ τὸ καλὸν οἶνον πρόσωπὸν
tι οὐδὲ χεῖρες οὐδὲ ἄλλο οὖδὲν ὤν σῶμα (i.e. body, matter) μετέχει.

8. μετὰ μοχθηροῦ. The preposition μετὰ is far more frequent
than σῶν in Plato, as in Attic Greek generally (except Xenophon):
σῶν denotes a much closer connection. μοχθηρὸς like ποινήρος meant
originally ‘afflicted’ (as here), then ‘depraved’, ‘corrupt’, for τοῖος
γὰρ νῦν ἐστὶν ἐπιχειροῦν ἀνθρώπων οἶνον ἐπ’ ἡμαρ ἁγγοι πατὴρ
ἀνδρῶν τε θεῶν τε (Hom. Od. xviii. 136—137). So also Ar. Ἀν.
493 χλαίναν γὰρ ἀπώλεσ’ ο’ μοχθηρὸς Φυγνίων ἐρίων διὰ τοῦτον:
compare (for ποιηρός) Solon Frag. 14 οὐδὲ μάκαροι οὐδεὶς πέλεται βροτός,
ἄλλα ποιηροὶ πάντες, and Hesiod Frag. 95. 1 (ed. Götting) ποιη-
ρότατον καὶ ἄρστον (of Heracles). It is we and not the Greeks
who by suffering are made strong. Cf. Simonides Frag. 5. 10—13
ed. Bergk.

10. οὐδαμῶς. Plato held that it is better to die than to suffer
incurable disease: Gorg. 512 Α—α passage which is parallel to this
both in respect of the illustration and the application—ei μὲν τις
μεγάλοις καὶ ἀνιάτοις νοσήμασι κατὰ τὸ σῶμα συνεχόμενος μὴ ἀπεπνήγη,
οὗτος μὲν ἄθλιος ἐστὶν ὃτι οὐκ ἀπέθανε κτλ.: where see Thompson on
the “meditative skipper”. The whole subject is discussed in Rep.
iii. 405 foll. The presence of too many doctors, says Plato, proves
that a city is physically unsound just as a plethora of ἀκασταλ proves
that it is unsound morally: ibid. 410 Α it is prescribed that doctors
in the ideal state shall only endeavour to cure τοὺς μὲν εὐφνείς τὰ
σώματα καὶ τὰς ψυχὰς—τοὺς δὲ μὴ, ὅσοι μὲν κατὰ σῶμα τοιοῦτοι,
ἀποθνῄσκειν ἐάσοσι, τοὺς δὲ κατὰ τὴν ψυχὴν κακοφνείς καὶ
ἀνιάτοις αὐτοὶ ἀποκτενοῦσιν. This is declared to be the most
merciful way of treating the patients themselves and the best thing
for the State. Herodicus is censured as μακρὸν—τὸν θάνατον αὐτῷ
ποιήσας (406 Β), because he prolonged his life by a course of
medical treatment: the right view is that οὐδενὶ σχολῇ διὰ βίου
κάμνειν ἰατρενομένῳ (ib. 406 Σ).

11. ἄλλα μετ’ ἐκείνου ἄρ’ ἥμιν κτλ. So I read with the Bod-
leian: the editors mostly follow less good MSS and read ἄλλ’—ἄρα.
The ἄλλα introduces a fresh point in the argument: cf. Apol. 37 C
ἄλλα χρημάτων, καὶ δεδεσθαί ἐως ἄν ἐκτίσω; For the collocation
ἄλλ’ ἄρα (ἄρα in this connection generally invites the answer ‘no’)
compare Lysis 208 D ἄλλ’ ἄρα ἐπειδῶν οἰκάδε ἔλθης παρὰ τὴν μητέρα,
ἐκείνῃ σε ἐφ’ τοι ἐπείν ὃ τι ἄν βούλῃ κτλ.; Euthyd. 292 C ἄλλ’ ἄρα
πάντας καὶ πάντα ἄγαθοις;—οὐκ οἴμαι ἐγώγη, ὦ Σωκρατες. Here ἀρα is separated from ἀλλά in order to let the full stress of the sentence-accent fall on μετ’ ἐλείνου, which introduces the application.

12. ὁ τὸ ἄδικον μὲν λωβάται. Elsewhere Plato uses the accusative after λωβάσθαι: the dative is here preferred in order to avoid the appearance of ambiguity. Ar. Eq. 1408 ὤν ἠξέφυν αὐτὸν οἷς ἐλωβᾶθ᾽ οἱ εἶνοι. The verb of kindred meaning λυμαίνεσθαι—not found in Plato—may also be construed with a dative as well as with an accusative.


14. ἀλλὰ μὲν καὶ ἀνθρώπου γε ψυχή ἡ εἴπερ τι καὶ ἔλλο τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων τοῦ θείου μετέχει κτλ. and Prot. 313 A ὥ δὲ περὶ πλείωνος τοῦ σώματος ἡγεί, τὴν ψυχήν, καὶ ἐν ὁ πάνταν ἐστὶ τὰ σὰ ἡ εὖ ἡ κακῶς πράττειν, χρηστοῖ ὁ ποιηροῦ γενομένου κτλ. Socrates never wearied of asserting the dignity of the soul.

15. περὶ ὅ τι τε ἄδικα κτλ. In Rep. x. 609 b injustice is described as a disease of the soul: τὶ οὖν; ἦν δ᾽ ἐγὼ· ψυχὴ ἀρα οὐκ ἔστιν ὅ ποιεῖ αὐτὴν κακὴν; καὶ μάλα, ἐφη, ἢ νῦν δὴ διῆμεν πάντα, ἄδικα τε καὶ ἀκολούθα καὶ δειλία καὶ ἀμαθία.

19. οὐκ ἀρα—πάνυ ἡμῖν οὗτο: οὗτο goes with πάνυ. I think this more probable than to take οὔ πάνυ together: πάνυ seems too emphatic to admit of this interpretation.

20. ἀλλ᾽ ὣ τι ὁ ἐπατῶν. The Bodleian has ὅτι, which may be right, as the Greeks probably considered ὅ τι and ὅτι to be the same word (= quod): see my Apology p. 123.

22. πρῶτον μὲν instead of being followed by εἶτα or ἐπειτα (δὲ) corresponds to ἀλλὰ μὲν δὴ in line 25 below: the second argument of Crito is quoted as an objection to Socrates' refutation of the first: see on πρῶτον μὲν in 46 c.

εἰσηγεῖ, εἰσηγούμενος. The word εἰσηγεῖσθαι (auctor esse) means to introduce a subject or a proposal in a formal way: see Thuc. iv. 76. 2 Πτοιοδώρου—εἰσηγοῦμένοι τάδε αὐτοῖς παρεσκευάσθη, and Pl. Symp. 176 E τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο εἰσηγοῦμαι τὴν μὲν ἀρτι εἰσελθοῦσαν αὐλητρίδα χαίρειν εἰὰν κτλ. Perhaps Plato chooses the word in order to suggest that Crito as it were εἰσῆγε δίκην κατὰ τῶν νόμων—the Laws being on their defence: see Introd. pp. vii—xiv.

25. ἀλλὰ μὲν δὴ: here begins Socrates' reply to the second point raised by Crito: see above 44 D. μὲν δὴ = 'for that matter', 'as to that': cf. Gorg. 471 Α εἴπερ γε, ὦ φίλε, ἄδικος. ἀλλὰ μὲν δὴ πῶς οὐκ ἄδικος; 492 Ε ἀλλὰ μὲν δὴ καὶ ὡς γε σὺ λέγεις δεινός ὁ βλός:
NOTES ON

Rep. III. 406 A καὶ μὲν δὴ—ἀτοπόν γε τὸ πῶμα οὕτως ἔχοντι: ibid. III. 409 B.

26. ἀποκτιννύναι is preferred by Plato to ἀποκτείνειν.

27. δήλα δὴ καὶ ταῦτα κτλ. = 'of course, that is also evident: yes, Socrates, he will say so.' If the text is right, I think δήλα δὴ καὶ ταῦτα is an aside: the answer to Socrates' remark is contained in φαίη γὰρ ἂν. Crito (who is not yet convinced by Socrates' reasoning) first declares that the power of the many to put one to death (ταῦτα) is as obvious as the necessity of regarding what they think of one (καὶ): he then assents to Socrates' remark. See above 44 ὅ αὐτὰ δὲ δὴλα τὰ παρόντα νῦν, ὅτι οἶοι τ' εἰσὶν οἱ πολλοὶ κτλ.

With Cron and Kral I have retained the vulgate, because I think it presents the fewest difficulties. Wohlrab gives δήλα δὴ καὶ ταῦτα to Socrates, φαίη γὰρ ἂν, ὡ Σώκρατες to Crito, and ἀληθῆ λέγεις to Socrates: Schanz brackets φαίη γὰρ ἂν, and gives both δήλα δὴ καὶ ταῦτα and ἀληθῆ λέγεις to Crito: Göbel prints "δήλα δὴ καὶ ταῦτα", φαίη γὰρ ἂν ὡ Σώκρατες. Σω. ἀληθῆ λέγεις. I think the text is probably right as it stands: but if not, I should transpose and read φαίη γὰρ ἂν δὴλα δὴ καὶ ταῦτα, ὡ Σώκρατες, taking δήλα δὴ as an adverb as it is in the MSS (δηλαδὴ).

29. ὧθαυμάσει: see on ὧ θαυμάσων Σώκρατες in 44 B.

οὔτὸς τε: τε corresponds to καὶ in καὶ τόνδε αὐ σκόπει line 31. There is virtually an anacoluthon, since οὔτὸς τε ὃ λόγος—δοκεί leads us to expect καὶ ὅδε αὐ ὃ λόγος (sc. δοκεί ἐτι ὃμοιος εἶναι), ὅτι οὐ τὸ ᾧν κτλ.: but whether the second principle is still binding or not, has not yet been decided: whence καὶ τόνδε αὐ σκόπει κτλ.

30. ὃμοιος εἶναι καὶ πρότερον: the MSS read τῷ καὶ πρότερον: but as τῷ πρότερον for τῷ προτέρῳ or τῷ πρότερον εἰρήμενως is, to say the least of it, unusual, and the καὶ is awkward, I follow Wex, Madvig and recent editors (except Göbel) in reading καὶ πρότερον. ὃμοιος καὶ πρότερον = similis quam antea: see above 46 B σχεδὸν τι ὃμοιοι φαίνονται μοι καὶ τοὺς αὐτοὺς πρεσβεύω καὶ τιμῶ, οὕσπερ καὶ πρότερον.

32. οὐ τὸ ᾧν περὶ πλεῖστον ποιητέον, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἐς ᾧν. Socrates held this view during the trial: see Apol. 28 B and ch. XXIII. Compare Gorg. 512 E μὴ γὰρ τοῦτο μὲν, τὸ ᾧν ὅποσον ὃν ἥρων, τὸν γε ὡς ἀληθῶς ἄνδρα ἐστέον ἐστὶ καὶ οὐ φιλοψυχητέον, ἀλλὰ—σκεπτέον τιν' ἃν πρόπον τοῦτον δν μέλλει ἥρων βιῶναι ὡς ἄριστα βιῶν.

35. τὸ δὲ ἐς—ταὐτὸν ἐστίν: Cron remarks that this clause is
necessary because εὐ δὴν has a double meaning (see above on 47 B τῷ ἐπιστάτῃ καὶ ἐπιαντέτι): it is necessary also to identify εὖ with δίκαιος because the next chapter opens with the question πότερον δίκαιον ἐμὲ ἐνθένον πειράσθαι εξείναι.

It should be noted that ταῦτα τοσοῦτον τοιοῦτον τηλικοῦτον are regular in Plato, not ταῦτα and the like: see on Apol. 24 C. Schanz now thinks it probable that Plato always used the forms in -ν: see his Preface to the Laws p. vi.

CHAPTER IX.

This and the following chapter make a kind of interlude. Socrates has now reached his principle or λόγος, viz. ὥστε οὐ τὸ δὴν περὶ πλείστον ποιητέον, ἀλλὰ τὸ δίκαιος δὴν. Before introducing the Laws to prove that if Socrates made his escape he would violate this principle, Socrates pauses to emphasize the full force and meaning of this λόγος, and the irrelevancy of every other. Throughout this and the following chapters it must be borne in mind that Socrates identified τὸ δίκαιον with τὸ νόμιμον: see Introd. p. xiii.

1. ἐκ τούν ὁμολογουμένων: the present as in ὁπέρ λέγω and the like (Graser quoted by Wohlkrab). See above on ὁπέρ λέγω in 45 B. τούτο refers forward to πότερον δίκαιον κτλ.

2. πότερον δίκαιον κτλ. δίκαιον is ‘right’: see on 45 C above. Crito had put the question on the same grounds in the passage referred to εἰτε δὲ—οὐδὲ δίκαιον μοι δοκεῖς ἐπιχειρεῖν πρᾶγμα. ἀφιέναι is not ‘to permit’ (ἐφιέναι), but ‘to let go free’, as in Apol. 29 C ἀφελεμέν σε.

4. ἦ οὐ δίκαιον: more emphatic and clear than ἦ οὖ: so in B 48 C above μὲνι ἦ οὐ μὲνει.

6. ἦς δὲ σὺ λέγεις τὰς σκέψεις: viz. in 45 A—46 A. The relative clause is placed first so as to let emphasis be thrown on σὺ (ἐγὼ: αἱ δὲ σκέψεις ἃ σὺ λέγεις would be much less pointed. Cron remarks that when the antecedent is adopted into the relative clause, the article is more usually omitted, as in οὐς ἴ δολες νομίζει θεοὺς οὐ νομίζων. Tr. ‘as for the considerations you mention, about’ etc.

8. ἄς ἄληθὼς: see on 46 D above.

9. σκέψιμα τὴν. σκέψιμα is of course in the predicate. The antecedent to ταῦτα is not σκέψεις but ἀναλώσεως χρημάτων καὶ δίκης
kai παιδων τροφος. On μη ἃ (= nescio an sit) see Goodwin MT. 83: probably some word expressing fear or apprehension ought to be understood: see on Apol. 39 η μη ου τοιτ' ἃ χαλεπον.

tων ρηδως ἀποκτινυόντων κτλ. Gorg. 521 C (quoted above on 44 D) ἀνόητος ἄρα εἰμι, ὦ Καλλικλεις, ὡς αληθῶς, εἰ μη οἷομαι ἐν ἀρε τῇ πόλει ὄντινου ἄν ὁ τι τύχοι τοιτο παθεῖν. We are of course not justified in seeing here an allusion to the alleged remorse of the Athenians after Socrates' death: the tradition about their repentance is late and untrustworthy: see Grote, Vol. VIII. p. 302. For ἄν with the participle in apodosis cf. Legg. VI. 781 ο πολλ' ἁμείνον ἄν εχοντα, ει νόμων ἐτυχεν: Goodwin MT. 114. The word ἀναβιωσκευται more often means 'to come to life again': for the causative sense cf. Phaed. 89 B ἐάνπερ γε—μη δυνώμεθα αύτῶν ἀναβιωσκευται.

10. οὐδενὶ ξυν νῦ. Wohlrab compares Ar. Nub. 580 ἡν γαρ ἃ τις εξοδος μηδενὶ ξυν νῦ. Plato occasionally uses ξυν in such adverbial phrases, e.g. ξυν πολλιφ' θορίζω Rep. VI. 492 B: otherwise it generally occurs in religious uses like Legg. III. 682 η ξυν τισι Χάραι καλ Μώσαις, or where the connection is a very close one, as in Legg. III. 678 ήν ταῖς τεχναίς ως ἐπος εἰπείν πάντα σχεδο ταπολκέλει; Gorg. 513 η ξυν τοῖς φιλτάτοις ἡ αἱρεσις ημῶν ἐσται ταύτης τῆς δινάμεως τῆς ἐν τῇ πόλει: see also note on μετὰ in 47 E.

τούτων τῶν πολλῶν: οὐτος like the Latin iste expresses contempt. Note in the next sentence the emphatic place assigned to ημῶν (τοῖς πολλοῖς).

11. ὁ λόγος οὐτως αἰρεῖ = 'ratio ita evincit' (Cron) is a frequent phrase in Plato: see Parm. 141 D ως γε ὁ λόγος αἰρεῖ. Sometimes the object is expressed as in Rep. X. 607 B ὁ γαρ λόγος ημᾶς ἤρει. Near akin is the use of αἰρεῖν = 'to secure a conviction', as in Apol. 28 η τοῖτ' ἐστιν ὦ ἐμὲ αἰρήσει, ἐάνπερ αἰρῇ, where see note.

12. ηνὼ νη. See on 46 D above.

48 D

14. καλ χάριτας: the plural is preferred to the singular, not only because Socrates is speaking for Crito as well as for himself, but because it balances the plural χρήματα more neatly. It is hardly necessary to supply εἰδότες from τελοῦντες: τελείων χάριν (χάριτας) is to 'pay a debt of gratitude'.

15. ἕξαγοντες τε καλ ἕξαγόμενοι: ἕξαγων τε καλ ἕξαγόμενος would be more logical and less grammatical.

τῇ ἀληθείᾳ: see on ως ἀληθῶς 46 D.

17. μη οὐ δεὶ ὑπολογίζεσθαι: for the syntax compare note on
μή ὁ δ' ἄληθώς—γι in 48 c. ὑπολογίζεσθαι is 'to entertain a reflection pointing to the opposite line of conduct from that which we are, or ought to be, pursuing': see on Apol. 28 b. We have the same sentiment and the same mode of expression in Apol. 28 ὃ δὲ—μενοντα κινδυνεύων, μηδὲν ὑπολογίζομενον μητε θάνατον μητε ἀλλο μηδὲν πρὸ τοῦ αἰῶρου. παραμένοντας differs from μενοντας as 'staying here' from 'standing fast' or 'holding our ground'.

19. οὔτε ἀλλο ὅτιοιν πάσχειν πρὸ τοῦ ἀδίκειν: so the MSS. Schanz reads οὔτ’ el after Forster. el δὲ is to be supplied from the preceding clause.

20. καλῶς—λέγειν—ὅρα δὲ τί δρῶμεν: it is time for deeds, not words: supra 46 A ἀλλὰ βουλεύον, μᾶλλον δὲ οὔθε βουλεύοσθαι ἢτι ὥρα, ἀλλὰ βεβουλεύσθαι. δρῶμεν is the deliberative conjunctive.

24. παύσαι. In Attic 'stop!' is παῦσαι or παῦε (not παῦν, 48 E though in Homer παῦεo is found). παῦε is the only form of this word used intransitively in good writers: the plural is παῦσθε and παῦσασθε: see Cobet V. L. pp. 264, 367, and Rutherford on Babrius 28. 8.

26. πείσαλ σε, ἀλλὰ μή ἀκοντος ταῦτα πράττειν. The MS reading πείσαλ σε ταῦτα πράττειν, ἀλλὰ μή ἀκοντος cannot be right: for apart from the awkwardness of ἀλλὰ μὴ ἀκοντος, ταῦτα πράττειν could only mean 'to let me remain and die': an impossible meaning, since it leaves ταῦτα without an antecedent, Socrates as yet professing not to have made up his mind but to be willing to follow ὅν ὁ λόγος ἀγγ.: see line 22 σκοτῶμεν, ὅ ἀγαθό, κοινὴ κτλ. I follow Meiser (Fleckeisen's Jahrb. 1874, p. 40) in transposing ταῦτα πράττειν and ἀλλὰ μὴ ἀκοντος (sc. σοῦ): ταῦτα πράττειν (= 'to do what I do', 'to act herein') depends on περὶ πολλοῦ ποιοῦμαι, and is coordinate with and not subordinate to πείσαι, which is used absolutely. Translate: 'for I think it important to persuade you, and not to act in this without your consent'. Cron, Schanz and Kral retain the MS order, changing πείσαι to πείσασ, with Buttmann, Hermann and Madvig; Wohlrab alone among recent editors retains the MS reading. By Wex (Fleckeisen's Jahrb. for 1856, p. 669) πείσαι is rejected as "ein erklärendes Glossem zu dem falsch verstandenen πράττειν. Platon also schrieb ὦς ἐγὼ—ποιοῦμαι σε ταῦτα πράττειν, ἀλλὰ μὴ ἀκοντος sc. πράττε". Göbel discusses the passage at length in his Fulda program 1882 p. 10 foll., and claims to have solved all difficulties by the change of πείσαι to παῦσαι: but in reality this is
only mending one fault by two others, for (a) παῦσαι would inevitably lead to ἀκοντα: (b) ἄλλα μή is not ‘aber nicht’, but ‘nicht’; i.e. it must introduce not a mere qualification, but a direct antithesis to some word in the preceding clause: and πεἰσαι (or πεἴσας) is exactly such a word. The choice clearly lies between Meiser’s view and that of Cron: I prefer the former, because (a) even if πεἶσας were right I think Plato would either have written περὶ πολλοῦ ποιοῦμαι πεἶσας σε, ἄλλα μή ἀκοντος, ταῦτα πράττειν, or (less likely) περὶ πολλοῦ ποιοῦμαι ταῦτα πράττειν πεἶσας σε, ἄλλα μή ἀκοντος, and (b) because in ταῦτα πράττειν = ‘do what I am doing’, ‘act in this matter’, the force of ταῦτα seems to me more obscure if it follows σε than if it follows ἀκοντος.

27. ὀρα—την ἀρχὴν ἐὰν κτλ. For ὀρα followed by ἐὰν compare (with Wohlrab) Rep. iv. 432 C ὀρα ὅν καὶ προθυμοῦ κατιδεῖν ἐὰν πως πρότερος ἐμοῦ ἐδής καὶ ἐμοὶ φράσσῃς. ἐὰν is not here = ‘whether’ (a meaning it never bears), but ‘si forte’, ‘in case’: in such expressions there is no real ellipse of the apodosis: see Monro’s Homeric Grammar, p. 212.

την ἀρχὴν is ‘the outset’, ‘the start’: from its use in such examples as the present it came to mean ‘principle’, as so often in Aristotle.

49 A 29. ὦ ἄν μάλιστα οἶη, i.e. in the way to which your opinion most inclines: ὦ is adverbial and goes with οἶη, as in οἷς θαύτῃ ταὐτῇ: ἔχειν is not to be understood.

CHAPTER X.

In this chapter Crito is made to admit (a) that it is wrong to requite wrong with wrong or evil with evil, and (b) that it is our duty to carry out in practice that which we have in theory admitted to be right. Introduction p. xii.

1. οὖθεν τρόπῳ—ἀδικητέων εἶναι. For the syntax compare Gorg. 507 D τὸν βουλῷμενον—εὐδαίμονα εἶναι σωφροσύνην μὲν διωκτέον καὶ ἀδικητέον κτλ., and for the sentiment itself Apol. 37 B πεπεισμένοι δὴ ἐγὼ μηδένα ἀδικεῖν πολλοῦ δέω ἐμαυτῶν γε ἀδικήσεων: Gorg. 469 B μέγιστον τῶν κακῶν τυγχάνει ὑν τὸ ἀδικεῖν: and Rep. 1. 335 D.

2. ὥ τινι—τινὶ ἐὰν οū: τὸς is here accented because it is em-
phatic: see on Apol. 26c (ἐίναι τινάς θεούς), where I refer to Theaetetus 147 b τινὸς γὰρ ἐπιστήμην ἀποκρίνεται οὐ τοῦτ’ ἐρω-τηθείς.


4. ὡς πολλάκις—ὡμολογήθη. It has been doubted by Zeller and others whether the doctrine here maintained was ever held by the historical Socrates: but I have no doubt that it was. In harmony with his egoistic principles, Socrates denied that it is ever right to wrong another, because wrongdoing has an injurious influence on one’s own soul: see Introd. p. xii.

5. ἦ πᾶσαι. In the MSS ὀπερ καὶ ἀρτι ἐλέγετο is written before ἦ πᾶσαι: but as there is nothing to which the words can be referred, I agree with recent editors in omitting them. The alternative (Meiser) is to write ὀπερ καὶ ἀρτι ἐλέγετο after ἦ and take the words as an allusion to 46 b νῦν δὲ κατάδηλος ἁρὰ ἐγένετο, ὅτι ἄλλως [ἐνεκα λόγου] ἐλέγετο, ἦν δὲ παιδία καὶ φλυαρία ὡς ἀληθῶς.


8. πάλαι—ἄρα. πάλαι goes with ἐλάθομεν—διαφέροντες: ἄρα as usual expresses surprise: see on Apol. 34 c ἐγὼ δὲ οὐδὲν ἄρα τούτων ποιήσω;

τηλικοῖδε. After τηλικοῖδε the MSS read γέροντες άνδρες: I think with Cron and Schanz that γέροντες is a gloss on τηλικοῖδε. Fischer and Wohlrab defend the word on the ground that γέροντες άνδρες makes a good antithesis to παίδων: but the phrase γέροντες άνδρες is a trifle awkward, and άνδρες alone seems to me more forcible as the opposite of παίδων.

9. σπουδὴ is emphatic, nearly = σπουδὴ ἄλλ’ οὐ παιδία (suggested by παιδὼν in the next line).

10. παιδῶν οὐδὲν διαφέροντες is almost a proverbial phrase, as 49 b Wohlrab remarks: compare Theaet. 177 b ἡ ῥητορικὴ ἐκείνη πως ἀπομαραίνεται, ὥστε παίδων μηδὲν δοκεῖν διαφέρειν: Prot. 342 E ὥστε φαίνεσθαι τὸν προσδιαλεγόμενον παιδὸς μηδὲν βελτίω. Here and indeed generally διαφέρειν means ‘to be better than’ and not simply ‘to differ’.

A. C.
NOTES ON X 49 B

11. παντὸς μᾶλλον = \textit{assuredly}' (i.e. more than anything) is frequent in Plato, e.g. Prot. 344 B παντὸς μᾶλλον ἔλεγχος ἐστι.

12. εἶτε φασὶν οἱ πολλοὶ εἶτε μὴ. For the form of the sentence compare Apol. 27 C εἰτ' οἷν καὶνά εἶτε παλαίδα, ἀλλ' οὖν δαμόνα γε νομίζω κατὰ τὸν σῶν λόγον. Asyndeton is regular in this kind of explanatory clause: see on Apol. 22 A. I have printed a colon before εἶτε φασὶν, cf. Apol. 1. c. ὤμος in line 14 thus becomes more easy and natural.

13. εἶτε καὶ = \textit{or if you like}: so in Apol. 27 E ὡσπερ ἄν ἐπὶ τὰς ἱπποὺς μὲν παῖδας ἥγοιτο ἥ καὶ ἄνων.

14. τὸ γε ἀδικεῖν: see on 49 A, line 3.

καὶ κακὸν καὶ αἰσχρὸν. In Gorg. 474 C foll. it is shewn that ἀδικεῖν is both κάκων and αἰσχρὸν than ἀδικεῖσθαι. Note the symmetry throughout this speech of Socrates: it begins with οὐδεὶς τρόπῳ and ends with παντὶ τρόπῳ: and the two alternatives are presented in such a way that the one which finally prevails is placed both first and last: the order is a.b.a.b.a.

19. οὐδὲ ἀδικούμενον ἄρα ἀνταδικεῖν: ἄρα is of course \textit{therefore}: for ἀδικούμενον ἀνταδικεῖν is ἀδικεῖν πως. Socrates does not in this assume that he has been wronged by the \textit{law}: only by men: see on 54 C.

ὡς οἱ πολλοὶ οἴνοματι. The ordinary Greek view is well summed up in the prayer of Solon (Frag. 13. 4—5) εἶναι δὲ γλυκῶν ὥδε φίλοις, ἐχθροῖς δὲ πικρῶν, τοῖς μὲν αἰδοίοιο, τοῖς δὲ δεινῶν ἱδεῖν. Just so Medea in Euripides (807—810) μὴδεὶς με φαύλην κασθενή νομίζεις μηδ' ἁσχαίν, ἀλλὰ θατέρου τρόπου, βαρεῖαν ἐχθροῖς καὶ φίλοις εὐμενή τῶν γὰρ τοιοῦτων εὐκλεῖσθατος βίον. Socrates himself declares that this was the prevailing morality in Greece: Mem. ii. 3. 14 καὶ μὴν πλείστον γε δοκεῖ ἀνήρ ἑπαύνον ἄξιος εἰναι, ὅτι ἄν φθάνῃ τοὺς μὲν πολεμίους κακῶς ποιῶν, τοὺς δὲ φίλους εὐεργετῶν: but everything is against the supposition that this view commended itself to him, and even Pittacus, if we may trust Diogenes Laertius (i. 4. 78), had already declared against it in the memorable words φίλου μὴ λέγειν κακῶς, ἀλλὰ μὴ δὲ ἐχθρὸν. See Introd. p. xii.

49 C

22. τί δὲ δή; = \textit{once more} introduces a new departure: with τί δὲ; (infra line 24) the departure is less new: from ἀδικεῖν to κακουργεῖν the transition is greater than from κακουργεῖν to ἀντικακουργεῖν.

23. οὐ δεῖ δὴ ποιεῖν: contrast this with οὐ φαίνεται in 21: here at
least Crito can answer without hesitation, for *kakourgeiv* suggests the idea of a criminal or malefactor: see L. and S. s. v.

27. *τὸ γάρ ποιον *κακός *ποιεῖν κτλ.* In Rep. i. 335 B foll. *ἄδικεν* is identified with *κακοῦσ* *ποιεῖν* rather than *κακῶς* *ποιεῖν* through the middle term *βλάπτειν*.

30. *κακῶς* *ποιεῖν—πάσχῃ ὑπ’ αὐτῶν* is circumlocutory for *ἀντικακουργεῖν*. For οὐδ’ ἂν ὁτιόν πάσχῃ = ne tum quidem si quidvis patiatur, compare Rep. vii. 522 ε*ε* ει*κ*ι λα ετι οὖν μέλλει τάξεων ἐπαίνειν: Polit. 297 B οὐκ ἂν πλήθος οὖδ’ ὡντινων οὐν. The subject to πάσχῃ is understood from the unexpressed subject to *ἀνταδικεῖν* and *κακῶς* *ποιεῖν*: see note on Apol. 29 οὐκ ἔσθεν ἰδέαις ἠστίν αὐτόν οἴδεν.

32. *καθομολογών*: the κατά points to the gradual piecemeal character of the admissions: cf. Gorg. 499 B πάλαι τοι ἀκροβάλλει καθομολογῶν, ἐνθυμομένοις ὅτι κἀν παίζον τίς σοι ἐνδικτὶ ὀπισθών, τούτον ἀσμένος ἔχει ὡςπερ τὰ μετάφασια: see also Rep. vi. 487 B—C where it is said that Socrates leads one on little by little till lo! when at the end all the little admissions are added up μέγα τὸ σφάλμα καὶ ἐναντίον τοῖς πρώτοις.

33. *οἶδα γάρ ὅτι ὀλίγοις πιοί—δώγελ.* This confession that his *49 D* doctrines are for the few and not for the many is more in the vein of Plato than of Socrates. It is possible that Socrates may have been led to howl this language by his condemnation on an unjust charge: but while actively engaged on his mission he was as far as possible from despairing, as is clear from Xen. Mem. iii. 5. See Introduction p. xv.

34. *οἷς οὖν—τούτοις οὐκ ἐστὶ κοινὴ βουλή.* Compare Apol. 31 E—32 A and Phaed. 82 D τούτοις μὲν ἀπασίν—ἐκείνου οἷς τι μέλει τῆς ἑαυτῶν ψυχῆς—χαλεῖν εἰπόντες οὐ κατὰ ταυτὰ πορεύονται αὐτῶς ὡς οὐκ εἰδόσιν ὅπῃ ἑρχόνται: ibid. 64 B—C εἰπωμέν—πρὸς ἡμᾶς αὐτῶς, χαλέῖν εἰπόντες ἐκεῖνοι (sc. τοῖς πολλοῖς).

36. *ἀλλήλων καταφρονεῖν*: the many laugh at the philosopher (Rep. vii. 517 A), and if the philosopher laughs at them, ἦττον ἄν καταγελαστὸς ὁ γέλως αὐτῷ εἰς ἡ ὁ ἐπὶ τῇ ἀνώθεν ἐκ φωτὸς ἡκούσῃ (sc. ψυχῆς): Rep. vii. 518 B.

38. *κοινωνεῖς* is used with reference to *κοινὴ βουλή* in 38: so infra in 42. *ἐντεῦθεν* in the same line = ἐκ τούτου τοῦ λόγου and is explained by ὡς οὐδέποτε κτλ.: compare (with Jacobs) Prot. 324 A ἐνθα δὴ πᾶσ παντὶ θυμοῦται καὶ νουθετεῖ, δῆλον ὅτι ὡς εἰς ἐπιμελείας καὶ μαθήσεως κτητῆς οὐσίας.

40. *οὔτε τοῦ ἀνταδικεῖν.* After these words we might expect
οὖστε τὸν κακούργειν, but as Göbel points out ἀδικεῖν has already been identified with κακούργειν (in c above, line 27): and besides it is on the injustice of τὸ ἀντικακούργειν rather than of τὸ κακούργειν that the rest of the dialogue turns.

49 E 42. τῆς ἀρχῆς: said with reference to ἀρχώμεθα in 28: see note on 48 E above.

44. τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο = 'my next point': see on Apol. 39 B.

48. μᾶλλον δ' ἐρωτῶ = vel potius interrogō: Socrates said his say by questions oftener than by answers: see Apol. 33 B. For μᾶλλον δέ see above on 46 A.

50. ἐξαπατητέον: to believe a theory and yet not carry it into practice is a living lie: to Socrates this seemed not only wrong, but impossible, since knowledge is virtue and οὐδέσ εἰκὼν ἀμαρτάνει: see Introd. to Apol. p. xi.

CHAPTER XI.

With this chapter the third division of the dialogue begins. Crito has now admitted the major premise which is to determine the action of Socrates, viz. that under no circumstances is it right to do wrong or requite wrong with wrong or evil with evil. The minor premise is still wanting, and to establish this Socrates introduces the Laws of Athens, who endeavour to prove that if he complied with Crito's invitation, Socrates would be guilty of wrong-doing, and retaliation in wrong-doing. In this chapter they urge that escape would be wrong because it would mean the entire negation of the State and civic life. See Introduction pp. x—xiv.

1. ἐκ τούτων = 'in the light of this', 'starting from these premises': so in 48 B ἐκ τῶν ὀμολογουμένων.

50 A 4. οἷς ὀμολογήσαμεν δικαίως οὐσίν = τούτως ἂ ὀμολογήσαμεν δίκαια ὑπά with a reference to 49 E πότερον ἂ ἀντίς ὀμολογήσῃ τῷ δίκαια δυτά ποιητέον ἡ ἐξαπατητέον; δίκαια ὑπά is attracted to οἷς = τούτως ἂ: for a similar case see Apol. 37 B ἀντὶ τούτον δὴ ἔχωμαι (MSS ἐλωμαι) ὡν ἑν ὡδ' ὅτι κακῶν δυτῶν i.e. τούτων ἂ ἑν ὡδ' ὅτι κακὰ δύνα.

6. οὐκ ἔχω—οὔ γὰρ ἐννοῶ: the words are full of pathos: Crito sees but too clearly what the conclusion will be.

8. ἀλλ' ὡδὲ σκόπει: ὡδε and not ὡδε is the reading of B. It is characteristic of Socrates to let the Laws speak for themselves:
like Plato he was nothing if not clear and emphatic. For a similar example see Theaet. 166 a foll. I think too that Plato wished to save Socrates from the charge of selfishness and lack of feeling, when his friends were so deeply moved, and hence the fatal argument comes not from his mouth but from the Laws.

μέλλονυιν ἡμᾶν: the dative depends on ἐπιστάντες: Cron compares Symp. 192 D ei αὐτοῖς—ἐπιστάντας ὁ "Προφαστος—ἐροῦτο.

9. εὖθ' ὁπως δεῖ ὁνομάσαι τοιτο. ἀποδιδράσκειν suggests a runaway slave or a deserter, and these words are added to spare Crito's feelings, "mitigandae orationis causa" (Stallbaum). For the Greek Stallbaum compares Legg. i. 633 λ περὶ τῶν θύης ἄλλης ἀρετῆς εἰτε μερῶν εἰτε ἀπτ' αὐτά καλεῖν χρεῶν ἐστὶ.

10. ἐλθόντες—ἐροῦτο: cf. Rep. vii. 538 ὁ ὑπεν—ἐλθον ἐρωτημα ἐρημα, τί ἐστι τὸ καλῶν. The synonym τὸ κοινὸν θύης πόλεως is added with a view to τὴν πόλιν (line 15) and ην πόλις (22) afterwards. The editors refer to Prot. 319 D τὸ κοινὸν θύης πόλεως οὔτως ἐχεί and Cic. Verr. ii. 2. 114 a communi Siciliae. It is possible that Cicero had the whole passage in view when he wrote (Cat. i. 17) Quae (sc. patria) tecum Catilina sic agit et quodam modo tacita loquitur.

11. ἐπιστάντες is regularly used of a vision 'standing over' one: see Symp. 192 D (quoted on line 8 above). The word occurs naturally to Socrates, who had a devout belief in visions: see on ἦν δὲ δὴ τί τὸ ἐνύπνιον in 44 λ. Lucr. iii. 959 et necopinanti mors ad caput adstitit.

12. ἀλλο τι ἦ—aliqua quale quid quam? i.e. nonne? see on Apol. 24 C: ἀλλο τι alone can bear the same meaning. With ὡ ἐπιχειρεῖ contrast 45 C ἐπιχειρεῖν πράγμα: the influence of the preceding ἐργῳ causes ὡ to be preferred to the more usual ὅ.

13. τοὺς τε νόμους ἡμᾶς ἀπολέσαι: ἡμᾶς is emphatic, almost 50 b deictic: the voice should pause before and after it. The laws and constitution of Athens are arraigned before Socrates: whence ἀπολέσαι 'to kill', 'destroy', viz. by giving an adverse verdict. So in Legg. ix. 857 λ, where the metaphor is still kept up: προδότη καὶ λεποσύλῳ καὶ τῷ τοὺς τῆς πόλεως νόμους βίᾳ ἀπολλύντι—the parricide, as it were, of his country's laws. See Introduction pp. viii—viii.

τὸ σοῦ μέρος: 'as far as lies with you': so in 45 D above. In ἧ δόκει σοι οἶνον τε it is better to regard δόκει σοι as parenthetical ('think you') and understand ἐστίν with οἶνον τε than to understand
NOTES ON XI 50 B

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14. ἐκείνην τήν πόλιν einai: Buttmmann reads πόλιν πόλιν einai: but einai here = 'exist' (ἀνατετράφθαι: it is not the copula.

16. δίκαι is here 'judgments', 'decisions' not 'lawsuits': this use is frequent in Homer, but rare in Attic. γενόμεναι = δικασθείσαι as in line 20.

17. ἀκυροὶ is opposed to κύριαι: see line 21.

19. ἄλλωσ τε καὶ ῥήτωρ: the imagery of a trial is still kept up: see Introduction p. vii.

20. ἀπολλυμένου: see note on line 13 above. Cron remarks that throughout all this passage there is an allusion to the custom of appointing σωφυγοροὶ or advocates to defend any law which it was proposed to repeal.

21. ὅτι introduces the direct quotation as in Apol. 21 C ἀποφανῶν τῷ χρησμῷ ὅτι οὕτως ἐμοῦ σοφιτερός ἐστι, ἀν δ' ἐμὲ ἐφησθα: infr. 50 C.

22. ἢδικεὶ γάρ: the force of γάρ is clear ('Yes, I do mean to wrong the laws) for' etc. Instead of ἢδικεὶ Heindorf requires ἄδικει: the present of this verb is frequently used of an injury committed in the past because the injury is supposed to continue till it is atoned for. But Socrates speaks as one who has outlived the sense of injury: the imperfect ἢδικεῖ is thus in keeping with the spirit of his motto ἐν εὐφημίᾳ χρή τελευτάν (Phaed. 117 E).

23. ἔκρινεν: the Aorist, not the imperfect, in spite of ἢδικεῖ.

CHAPTER XII.

The Laws proceed to argue that Socrates is their child and slave, bound to render them all the obedience due to parents and masters, or rather more, because one's fatherland should be more to one than parents.

2. καὶ ταυτά = 'this too', viz. the reservation that you were to question our decrees, and disobey them if they seemed to you wrong. The antecedent to ταυτά is implied in the words ἢδικεὶ γάρ—ἔκρινεν (50 C). The suggestion of Keck to read ταυτά for ταυτά obscures the connection and leaves καὶ unexplained: the meaning of καὶ is fixed by the following line: ἃ ἐμένεν—δικάζῃ, i.e. 'or to abide by the
decisions delivered by the State', sc. without any clause of reservation.

3. ταῖς δίκαις: δίκαι = 'decisions', 'judgments', as in 50 B, line 16.

4. αὐτῶν θαυμάζομεν λεγόντων = 'should be surprised at their language': θαυμάζειν is regularly followed by a genitive of the person: Goodwin, Gk. Gr. 222.

5. οὖς: see on 50 B. Infra in line 7 καλ = 'also'.

6. τῷ ἐρωτάν τε καὶ ἀποκρίσεσθαι = τῷ διαλέγεσθαι by a common periphrasis: Stallbaum refers to Phaed. 75 D καὶ ἐν ταῖς ἐρωτήσεσιν ἐρωτώντες καὶ ἐν ταῖς ἀποκρίσεσιν ἀποκρινόμενοι.

10. ἀπολλύναι: see on 50 B, line 13. πρῶτον μὲν corresponds 50 D to ἀλλὰ in line 14: the second question thus becomes more vivid: for a similar case compare 48 A and 53 B. ἐγεννήσαμεν = γενέσθαι ἐποίησαμεν 'called into existence': Aristotle has γεννῶντων αὐτῶν (sc. τὸν οὐρανὸν) = γενέσθαι αὐτῶν λεγόντων (De Cael. II. 283 b 31).

11. καὶ δι’ ἡμῶν ἐλάμβανεν—ἐφύτευσέν σε; This explains ἐγεννήσαμεν. Note λαμβάνω in the sense of 'I take to wife': so Eur. Alc. 325 γυναίκ’ ἀρπάσαν ἐστὶ κοιμᾶσαι λαβεῖν. Göbel remarks that the imperfect calls up the circumstances and provisions of the courtship (if there was any) and wedding: for the collocation of the imperfect and the aorist cf. infra 52 C οὗτω σφόδρα ἡμᾶς ἦροῦ καὶ ὠμολόγεις—καὶ παῖδας ἐν αὐτῇ ἐποίησώ.

12. τούτων ἡμῶν τοῖς νόμοις: here and in line 17 Schanz follows Hirschig in bracketing τοῖς νόμοις (νόμοι): but the addition of these words makes the Greek far more explicit and emphatic. τούτως is deictic.

13. τοῖς περὶ τοὺς γάμους: Cron remarks that Socrates is thinking chiefly of the laws which established the legal validity of marriage and as a consequence the legitimacy of the children. Some account of the laws relating to marriage is given in Becker’s Charicles E. T. pp. 473—498.

14. ἐξουσία is probably the participle: τι points to this (Cron). For ἀλλὰ v. note on line 10 above.

15. τροφήν τε καὶ παιδείαν. Plato frequently uses this expression to denote the upbringing and education of a child: e.g. Rep. IV. 445 E τροφή τε καὶ παιδεία χρησάμενος ἀνήλθομεν. τροφή is the wider term, including the general care of the body: in παιδεία the care of the soul is the prominent idea.
16. ἢ oὐ καλῶς: ἢ— the less authenticated reading—would = Lat. An? ἢ oὐ is simply Nonne?

οἱ ἐπὶ τούτως τεταγμένων νόμων: the antecedent to τούτως is implied in τροφῆν τε καὶ παιδείαν (line 14). The word παραγγέλλωτε is not to be pressed: it is doubtful to what extent Athenian parents were compelled by law to educate their children: see Becker’s Charicles E. T. p. 228.

18. μονική καὶ γυμναστική: the two branches of Greek education—the end being to produce a sound mind in a sound body: Pl. Rep. ii. 376 E ἐστι δὲ ποι ἢ μὲν (sc. παιδεία) ἐπὶ σῶμασι γυμναστική, ἢ δὲ ἐπὶ ψυχῇ μονική. The latter in its wider signification included γράμματα (reading, writing, and arithmetic), κιθάρισις (lyre-playing), and learning by heart passages of the poets, especially Homer. See Becker’s Charicles E. T. 226—236.

19. καλῶς. This only commits Socrates to the utility of μονική and γυμναστική: whether μονική and γυμναστική were rightly taught is quite another question. It is impossible to believe that Socrates approved of Athenian methods of teaching: for he never wearied of attacking the ignorance of his countrymen, and knowledge according to him could be taught. In the Protagoras (339 foll.) Plato makes him prove by an elaborate caricature of the popular way of expounding the poets that no true education comes from that quarter. Plato himself rejected the popular education both in its actual curriculum and still more in respect of its method: see Rep. vii. 521 c foll.

eἰεὖ: see on 47 b above.

20. ἐξεταράφης: ἐξ- signifies that Socrates was no longer a child: so Ar. Nub. 1380 ὠναίσχυντε, ὅ ἐξ ἔθρεψα. 21. καὶ ἐγγόνως καὶ δόουλος: Cron compares Hdt. vii. 104, where Demaratus says of the Lacedaemonians ἐλέυθεροι γὰρ ἐντες οὐ πάντα ἐλεύθεροι εἶσι: ἐπεστὶ γάρ σφι δὲ σπότης νόμοις. See also Pl. Legg. iii. 700 A οὐκ ἢν—μήν ἐπὶ τῶν παλαιών νόμων ὁ δήμος τίνων κύριος, ἀλλὰ τρόπον τινα ἐκών ἐδούλευε τοῖς νόμοις.

22. αὐτός τε καὶ οἱ σοι πρόγονοι: Socrates is, so to speak, δόουλος κάκ δόουλων. With this form of expression compare Apol. 42 Α δίκαια πεπονθάς ἐγὼ ἐσομαι ὑπ' ὑμῶν, αὐτός τε καὶ οἱ νιέις.

23. ἀρ' ἐξ ἵσου—καὶ ἡμῖν = 'do you think that your rights are on a level with ours?' (Church): καὶ = atque, as in pariter atque. The καὶ after ἡμῖν is explanatory, as in 50 d, line 11.

25. ἡ πρὸς μὲν ἄρα—πρὸς δὲ τὴν πατρίδα ἄρα. An a fortiori argument: you may not retaliate on your parent or your master:
how much less upon your country and her laws! Compare Apol. 28E δεινά ἄν εἶχαν ἐλεγασμένος—εἶ δὲ μὲν µε ὁ ἄρχωντες ἐταττον—
τὸ τε μὲν οὐ ἐκεῖνοι ἐταττον ἔµενον—, τοῦ δὲ θεοῦ τάττοντος—φιλο-
σοφοῦντα µὲ δεῖν ἦν—, ἐντάδε θα δὲ—λάπομι τὴν τάξιν: see my note
on the passage. Here, as usual, ἄρα expresses surprise: the presence of ἄρα
in both clauses makes the antithesis more pointed, and in-
creases the rhetorical effect: Cron compares Prot. 325 B—C τὰ μὲν ἄλλα ἄρα τοὺς νόεις διδάσκονται—, ἐφ' ὃ δὲ ἦν τε ἦµια θάνατος—
καὶ πρὸς τῷ θανάτῳ χρηµάτων τοῦ δεµεύσεις καὶ ὦς ἐποὺ εἰπεῖν Ἐουληθοῦ
τῶν οἰκῶν ἀνατροπαὶ, ταῦτα δ' ἄρα οὐ διδάσκονται. The position
of σοι between the preposition and its noun is noteworthy: it is the
less remarkable, because σοι τῶν πατέρα is nearly equivalent to σοῦ
“Lydia die per omnes te deos oro” of Hor. Carm. 1. 8. 1.
26. οὐκ εἶ ἦσον ἡ: the imperfect implies that Socrates’ father
is dead. οὐκ goes closely with εἶ ἦσον: beware of taking it as =
nonne?
27. εἶ σοι οὐν ἑτύγχανεν = ‘if you had chanced to have one’. It
is not necessary to supply οὐκ ἄν εἶ ἦσον ἡν το δίκαιον: οὐκ εἶ ἦσον ἡν
is the apodosis, for Greek (like Latin) prefers the more direct and
dogmatic mode of expression (ἡν, erat, rather than ἡν ἄν, esset):
Goodwin MT. 97.
ὡστε ἀπερ πᾶσχοις: this explains εἶ ἦσον: if there had been
equality of rights, Socrates might retaliate: otherwise not. As οὐκ
εἶ ἦσον forms a single negative idea ) ( ἔσται sc. εἶ ἦσον in line 30, we
might have expected ὡστε οὐχ ἀπερ πᾶσχοις ταῦτα καὶ ἀντιποιεῖν,
just as in 31—33 we have a positive clause with ὡστε to explain the
positive ἔσται εἶ ἦσον: Plato however prefers to illustrate εἶ ἦσον,
rather than οὐκ εἶ ἦσον. Perhaps he was anxious to avoid the
accumulation of negatives.
28. οὐτε κακῶς—ἄλλα τοιαῦτα πολλά. This is not epexegetetic
of ὡστε—ἀντιποιεῖν (as the editors say) but explains οὐκ εἶ ἦσον ἡν το
δίκαιον: supply οὐκ ἡν σοι το δίκαιον. κακῶς ἀκούειν (male audire) is
the passive of κακῶς λέγειν (male dicere): so ἀποθυμήσκῳ φεύγω etc.
serve as passives to ἀποκτεῖνω διώκω etc.: see on Apol. 17 A.
29. τυπτόμενον ἀντιτύπτειν: see the amusing scene in the 51 A
Clouds 1409 foll. Phidippides beats his father Strepsiades, justifying
himself in these words: καὶ πρῶτ’ ἐρήσομαι σε τούτ’ παίδα µ’
ὸντ’ ἐτύπτεις; Στρ. ἐγωγέ σ’ εὔνοον γε καὶ κηδόμενος. Φειδ. εἰπέ ἰη
µοι οὐ κἀµέ σοι δικαίων ἐστὶν εὔνοειν ὁµοίως, τύπτειν τ’, ἐπειδὸηπερ τὸδ’
It should be noted that one of the charges falsely brought against Socrates was that he set sons against their parents: see Introduction to Apol. p. xxx.

30. ἢσται σοι sc. εἰξ ισον τὸ δίκαιον. The MSS read ἤσται, which Stallbaum vainly defends. The choice lies between ἤξ ισον ἢσται σοι (Hirschig) and ἢσται σοι (Schanz). I prefer the latter, both because it changes less, and because I dislike the cadence of the first: I think Plato, had he chosen to repeat ἤξ ισον, would have omitted σοι. I have added a mark of interrogation after ἢσται σοι: see on line 32.

31. ὥστε κτλ. A result deduced from ἢσται σοι (sc. ἤξ ισον). Note the emphatic σὲ ᾧ ἡμεῖς and in the next line σὺ ᾧ ἡμᾶς: I follow Göbel and Kral in writing σὲ against σε of the MSS.

32. καὶ σὺ δὲ κτλ. In place of καὶ σὲ ἡμᾶς—ἐπιχειρεῖν κτλ.—as we should naturally expect after ὥστε, a vivid question is substituted: compare on 50 D line 10. At the same time a better antithesis is provided for ἡν σὲ ἐπιχειρῶμεν ἡμεῖς ἀπολλύναι, and the awkwardness of the two accusatives in καὶ σὲ ἡμᾶς κτλ. is avoided. For καὶ—δὲ see following note.

33. ἐπιχειρήσεις is of course an independent question: I know no case of καὶ—δὲ in a dependent sentence. This example is instructive as to the origin of the combination καὶ—δὲ = 'and also': the καὶ goes with the intervening words (cf. Aesch. Prom. 972—973 χλιδῶ; χλιδῶντας ὡδὲ τοὺς ἐμοὺς ἐγὼ ἐχθροῦς ἐδομη· καὶ σὲ δ᾽ ἐν τούτως λέγω). The precise force of δὲ in this place is difficult to explain. The editors say that it is used "ad augendam oppositionem gravitatem: pro simplici καὶ σὺ ἡμᾶς dictum est: καὶ σὺ δὲ ἡμᾶς, usus habet infrequentit" (Stallbaum). For this 'not uncommon use' no parallels are quoted: and I prefer to regard it as the δὲ found sometimes in interrogative sentences, e.g. Prot. 312 Α σὺ δὲ, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγὼ, πρὸς θεῶν, οὐκ αὖν αὐξύνοιο εἰς τοὺς Έλληνας αὐτῶν σοφιστὴν παρέχων;

34. ταῦτα ποιών sc. ἡμᾶς: cf. 50 E line 24 and note on 44 D ποιούσι δὲ τοῦτο ὅ τι ἂν τύχωσιν. τῇ ἀληθείᾳ is bitterly sarcastic: Socrates habitually professed ἐπιμελεῖσθαι ἀρέτης: see Apol. 30 Α and 41 E: ἐπιμελεῖσθαι indeed was almost a technical term in Socrates' preaching: see Xen. Mem. 1. 2. 3. 4 etc. Sarcasm is frequently brought out by adding a qualifying participial clause at the end of a sentence in this way: e.g. Apol. 34 Α εὐρίσκετε—πάντας ἐμοὶ βοηθεῖν ἐτοίμους τῷ διαφθείροντi, τῷ κακά ἐρ γαζομένω τοὺς οἰκείους αὐτῶν, ὡς φασὶ Μέλητος καὶ Ἀντος. It should be noted that the manu-
scripts of Plato often fluctuate between ἐπιμελούμενος and ἐπιμελο-
μενος: here the Bodleian has ἐπιμελούμενος. On the adverbial phrase
τῇ ἀληθείᾳ see supra note on ὡς ἀληθῶς 46 D.

35. ἦ οὖτως εἰ σοφός. The Bodleian has ἦ without accent: other MSS read ἦ. ἦ is a far superior reading: for the Laws having first taken Socrates at his own estimate (ὁ τῇ ἀληθείᾳ τῆς ἀρετῆς ἐπιμελούμενος) now proceed to take him at other people's. It is clear from Apol. 18 B that σοφός (like φροντισθής) was almost a nickname of Socrates. Here of course the word is used with bitter irony, as indeed it often was in Socrates' time: cf. Meno 75 c τῶν σοφῶν—
καὶ ἐριστικῶν καὶ ἀγωνιστικῶν: Xen. Mem. II. 1 21 Πρόδικος ὁ σοφός.

36. λέληθέν σε ὅτι κτλ: it is implied that the new σοφία (of which Socrates and the Sophists were thought to be the professors) tended to lessen the hold of the State upon the individual: see Ar. Nubes 889—1104.

μητρός τε καὶ πατρός. For the order compare with Cron Prot.
346 α οὖν ἀνδρὶ πολλάκις συμβήκαι μητέρα ἡ πατέρα ἀλλόκοτον ἡ
πατρίδα ἡ ἀλλο τι τῶν τοιούτων: infra 51 c οὗτε μητέρα οὗτε πα-
τέρα. For the sentiment Stallbaum compares Cic. De Off. 1. 57
"Cari sunt parentes, cari liberi, propinqui, familiares: sed omnes
omnia caritates patria una complexa est: pro qua quis bonus
dubitet mortem oppetere, si ei sit profuturus?" That one's country
has the first claim on one, and one's family and friends only the
second, was the recognised principle of both Greek and Roman civic
life, during their most flourishing periods. In setting self-study
above political life Socrates was unconsciously preaching a view
whose logical issue amounted to the dissolution of the old life which
it was his aim to restore.

37. τιμώτερον—καὶ σεμνότερον καὶ ἀγιώτερον is a climax:
τιμώς is one of the loftiest epithets that can be applied to τὰ
θρώπινα: σεμνός is applied to τὰ θεία as well: ἀγιός almost exclusively
to τὰ θεία. Translate 'worthier and more august and more sacred'.

38. ἐν μείζονι μορφῇ: an elevated and somewhat poetic ex-
pression: Cron compares Hdt. II. 172 καὶ ἐν οὐδεμιῇ μορφῇ
μεγάλη εἶχον.

39. ἀνθρώποις τοῖς νοῦν ἔχουσι: few and far between: see
Tim. 51 E νοῦ δὲ θεού (sc. μετέχειν φατέον), ἀνθρώπων δὲ γένος
βραχὺ τι.

41. καὶ ἦ πείθειν sc. δὲι. For πείθειν used absolutely cf. Apol.
35 C διδάσκειν καὶ πείθειν, and supra 48 ἐ πείσαι σε.
NOTES ON

43. \( \text{έαν \ te \ ('whether') \ τύπτεσθαι \ éaν \ te \ δείσθαι \ sc. \ προστάτη} \). This is to explain \( \text{έαν \ τι \ προστάτη \ παθεῖν \ of \ line \ 42.} \)

44. \( \text{έαν \ te \ εἰς \ πόλεμον \ κτλ. \ éaν \ te \ is \ here='and \ if': \ the} \) apodosis is \( \text{ποιητέον \ ταύτα.} \) Socrates had himself fought bravely for his country at Potidaea (432 B.C.), Delium (424 B.C.) and Amphipolis (422 B.C.): see on Apol. 28 E.

46. \( \text{καὶ \ υἷς \ ὑπεικτέον—λειπτέον \ τὴν \ τάξιν. \ ὑπείκειν} \ is \ to \ give \ way \ (it \ may \ be \ slowly) \ before \ the \ enemy, \ rather \ than \ remain \ to \ die} \ (\text{ἀποδανοῦμεν \ in \ 45): \ cf. \ Rep. \ VIII. 555 E \ τὸν \ ἄει \ ὑπει-κοντα—πιτρώσκοντες. \ ἀναχωρεῖν \ is \ to \ retreat: \ Symp. 221 Α \ ἀπὸ \ Δηλίου \ φυγῇ \ ἀνεχώρει \ τὸ \ στρατόπεδον. \ λειπεῖν \ τὴν \ τάξιν \ suggests \ the \ λιποταξίαν \ γ \ αφή. \ The \ whole \ clause \ is \ meant \ to \ elaborate \ the \ idea \ in \ éaν \ te \ εἰς \ πόλεμον \ ἄγγ\ πρωθυπόμενον \ ἡ \ ἀποδανοῦμεν,} \) \( \text{ποιητέον \ ταύτα.} \)

51 C

49. \( \text{ἡ \ πείθεω} \ sc. \ δεῖ, \ to \ be \ supplied \ from} \) \( \text{ποιητέον, \ by \ a} \) frequent idiom. Stallbaum quotes Gorg. 492 D \( \text{τὰς \ μὲν} \) \( \text{ἐπιθυμίας}\) \( \text{φῆς \ οὗ \ κολαστέον, \ et \ μέλλει \ τις \ οἷον \ δεῖ \ εἶναι,} \) \( \text{ἔωντα \ δὲ \ αὐτᾶς \ ως} \) \( \text{μεγίστας \ πιλήσωσιν \ αὐταῖς \ ἀμόδεθν \ γὲ \ ποθεν \ ἔτοιμα \ ζεῖν.} \)

50. \( \text{βιάζεσθαι.} \) \( \text{βιάζεσθαι} \) \( \text{and} \) \( \text{πείθεω} \) \( \text{are \ often \ connected \ or} \) \( \text{opposed:} \) \( \text{cf. \ Gorg. 517 B \ πείθοντες} \) \( \text{καὶ} \) \( \text{βιαζόμενοι} \) \( \text{ἐπὶ} \) \( \text{τοῦτο:} \) \( \text{Rep. VI. 488 D \ ὁπως} \) \( \text{άρξουσι} \) \( \text{ἡ} \) \( \text{πείθοντες} \) \( \text{ἡ} \) \( \text{βιαζόμενοι} \) \( \text{τὸν} \) \( \text{ναύκληρον.} \)

CHAPTER XIII.

In this chapter the Laws insist that to remain in Athens is to have pledged oneself to obey them, for emigration is free to all.

2. \( \text{ἀληθῆ} \) \( \text{is \ of \ course \ predicative, \ like} \) \( \text{οὐ \ δίκαια} \) \( \text{in \ the \ next} \) line.

5. \( \text{γεννήσαντες} \) \( \text{ἐκβρέψαντες} \) \( \text{παιδεύσαντες:} \) \( \text{see \ on} \) \( \text{50 D} \) \( \text{and} \) \( \text{on} \) \( \text{50 E.} \)

51 D

8. \( \text{προαγορεύομεν} \) \( \text{τῷ} \) \( \text{ἐξουσίαν} \) \( \text{πεποιηκέναι=} \) \( \text{‘we \ proclaim \ in-asmuch \ as \ we \ have \ given \ permission’. \ τῷ} \) \( \text{βουλομένῳ} \) \( \text{depends \ on} \) \( \text{ἐξουσίαν,} \) \( \text{and} \) \( \text{Ἀθηναῖών} \) \( \text{is \ a \ partitive} \) \( \text{genitive \ after} \) \( \text{τῷ} \) \( \text{βουλομένῳ.} \) \( \text{ἐπειδὰν—νόμος} \) \( \text{is \ also \ to \ be \ taken \ with} \) \( \text{ἐξουσίαν} \) \( \text{πεποιηκέναι:} \) \( \text{the} \) permission is \( \text{ipsō \ facto} \) \( \text{accorded \ as \ soon \ as} \) \( \text{the} \) \( \text{δοκιμασία} \) \( \text{is \ past.} \) \( \text{In \ line} \) \( \text{10} \) \( \text{φ} \) \( \text{ἐν} \) \( \text{μὴ} \) \( \text{ἀρέσκωμεν} \) \( \text{ἡμεῖς} \) \( \text{depends \ on} \) \( \text{ἐξείναι,} \) \( \text{which} \) itself \( \text{belongs \ to } \) \( \text{προαγορεύομεν}. \) \( \text{The} \) apparent awkwardness of the sen-
tence is due to the use of ἐξουσιάν without a following infinitive: but this use is not uncommon in Plato, e.g. Rep. viii. 557 D where it is said of democracy πάντα γένη πολιτείων ἐξελ διὰ τὴν ἐξουσίαν: ἐξουσία was perhaps one of the familiar watchwords of Athenian democracy: cf. Thuc. vii. 69 ὑπομομακτικον—τῆς—ἀνεπιτάκτον πᾶσιν—ἐξουσίας.

9. ἐπειδὰν δοκιμασθῇ. On attaining the age of 18, every Athenian was enrolled in the ληξιαρχικῶν γραμματείων or register of his deme, after the usual δοκιμασία or examination. This particular examination was called δοκιμασία ἐσὶ ἀνήρ to distinguish it from the δοκιμασίαι which the various magistrates had to undergo before entering upon office. It marked the coming of age of the young Athenian citizen: but it was not till he was 20 that he took part in the public assembly and attained the full privileges of citizenship. From 18 to 20 he had to serve in the περίπολου or patrol which guarded the frontiers of Attica. Stallbaum compares Aesch. in Timarch. § 18 ἐπειδὰν δ’ ἐγγραφῇ εἰς τὸ ληξιαρχικὸν γραμματείον καὶ τοὺς νόμους γνώριμος καὶ εἰδῆ τοὺς τῆς πόλεως καὶ Ἰδών δυνᾶται διαλογίζεσθαι τὰ καλὰ καὶ τὰ μὴ κτλ.


12. καὶ οὐδεὶς—βούληται: omitted by mistake in B.

14. ἀποικίαν: an Athenian colony: contrast μετοικεῖν in 15. ἀρέσκομεν is changed by Madvig (Adv. Crit. i. 369) into ἀρέσκομεν: but the text is quite sound. ei μὴ ἀρέσκομεν is the protasis to the apodosis implied in βούληται—eiς ἀποικίαν ἴναι: it explains why one might wish to emigrate: tr. ‘if any of you wants to go to a colony, supposing we and the State should not satisfy him’.

οὐδεὶς—ἀπαγορεύει, εάν—βούληται is the regular form of a general (as opposed to a particular or special) conditional sentence: Dem. Ol. 2. 12 ἄπας μὲν λόγος, ἄν ἀπὸ τὰ πράγματα, μάταιον τι φαίνεται καὶ κενὸν: Goodwin MT. 108.

15. ἐλθὼν is not otiose: since μετοικεῖν = ‘be an alien’ (μέτοικος): for μετοικεῖν ἄλλος ἐλθὼν, μετοικήσας might have been substituted. See Goodwin MT. 24.

19. ὠμολογηκέναι ἔργῳ ἠμῖν = ‘to have virtually covenanted with us’. 
21. γεννηταίς: so B, rightly: inferior mss have γεννήτας. “γεννηταί sunt genitores: γεννήτας gentiles.—Legg. XI. 928 D δία-
φοραι πατέρων τε πρός αὐτῶν παῖδας γίγνονται καὶ παῖδων πρός
γεννητάς μείζους ἢ χρεῶν. Contra ib. IX. 878 D τοὺς γεννήτας καὶ
tοὺς συγγενεῖς”. Wohlrab. MSS however do not always observe
this rule.

22. τροφεύσι: Socrates, so to speak, would have paid no
τροφεῖα: Rep. vii 520 b.

όμολογήσας ἢμῖν πείθεσθαι: ἤμῖν, as Göbel remarks, is to be
taken with ὀμολογήσας. For the present πείθεσθαι cf. 50 C ἢ καὶ
ταῦτα ὀμολόγησο—ἐὰ μὲν εὖν ταῖς δἰκαῖ; and inf. 52 D ὠμολογη-
κέναι πολιτευέσθαι. In each of these passages Madvig (Adv. Crit. 1.
370 note 1) changes the present to the future infinitive, on the
ground that ὀμολογῶ με ποιεῖν = confiteor me facere, promitto me
facturum = ὀμολογῶ με ποιήσεω (not ποιεῖν). The truth is that
ὀμολογεῖν has two meanings, viz. ‘to confess’, and to ‘bargain’ or
‘promise’: and, since the word ‘promise’ itself implies futurity, it
may even in this sense be followed by a present infinitive, although
the future is preferred, when the notion of futurity is more promi-
nent. Just so in English we can say ‘I promise to do’ as well as
‘I promise that I will do’. The same distinction holds in my
opinion for ἐπίζω, ἐπίσ ἐστι, προσδοκῶ, ἐπίθετος εἰμι, οἴμαι, φημί,
νομίζω, δοκῶ, εἰκὸς ἐστι etc. with the present and future infinitive:
although Madvig, Cobet, and the stricter school of critics generally
insist that the notion of futurity must be expressed by the infinitive
as well. See Madvig Adv. Crit. 1. 156 foll., Cobet Var. Lect. 97 foll.,
Rutherford’s Babrius p. 13, and on the other hand Kühner Gr. Gr.
ii. p. 163 ff.

24. προτιθέντων: the object is ποιεῖν α ἀν κελεύωμεν. προτιθέναι
is to propose some course of action, without, at the same time,
excluding an alternative: this is still further brought out in ἀλλ’
ἐφίλετων δυνῶν θάτερα κτλ. ἄγριως ἐπιτάσσεωι suggests the angry
329 C ὡσπερ λυττῶντα τινα καὶ ἄγριον δἐσποτὴν ἀποφυγόν. For
the asyndeton see on τὰ τοιαῦτα ἔλεγε τοῦ 47 A above. I have printed
a colon before προτιθέντων as in 49 B.
CHAPTER XIV.

It is here argued that Socrates, if he were to abscond, would more than any other Athenian be guilty of a breach of bargain, because throughout all his life, even during the trial as well as before, he had shewn that Athens was more to him than any other city.

1. Σώκρατες. So B: inferior mss read ο Σώκρατες. The 52 A effect of omitting ο is to increase the impressiveness, since ο Σώκρατες is the regular mode of address: in English we obtain the same effect by exactly the opposite means.

2. ἐνέξεσθαι i.q. ἐνοχον ἐσεσθαι.

3. ἐν τοῖς μάλιστα. See above on ἐν τοῖς βαρύτατα 43 C.

4. καθάπτουντο. καθάπτεσθαι (in Homer with acc., in Attic with gen.) is 'to fasten on', 'attack': Thuc. vi. 16. 1 ἀνάγκη γὰρ ἐντεθεν ἄρξασθαι, ἐπειδὴ μον ὁ Νικίας καθήπατο.

5. τούτων refers forward to the clause introduced by δὲ.

6. διαφερόντως: differently from, i.e. more than: so too διαφέρειν. For the repetition of διαφερόντως in the protasis cf. Apol. 31 D εἰ ἐγὼ πάλαι ἐπεχείρησα πράττειν τὰ πολιτικὰ πράγματα, πάλαι ἀν ἀπολόγῃ.

7. ἐπὶ θεωρίαν "ad spectandos ludos sollemnes, videlicet Olympicos, Nemeacos, Isthmios, Pythios, ad quos spectandos ex universa Graecia homines confluerebant." Stallbaum.

8. ἐξῆλθες. An hypothetical clause οὐ γὰρ ἀν—ἐπεδήμεις is now followed by an unconditional statement of fact. After ἐξῆλθες in inferior mss and in the margin of B are found the words δι᾽ ἐμα όπαξ εἰς ἱσθμὼν. The interpretation (for such it probably is) was already in the text used by Athenaeus: see v. 216 B ἐν δὲ τῷ Κρίτωνι,—Πάλαιν ὀοῦδε ποιήσασθαι ποτὲ ἀποδημαν τῶν Σωκράτη ἐξω τῆς εἰς ἴσθμον πορείας. Nowhere else in Plato do we find any mention of such a journey, and at least one passage seems distinctly to deny it: Phaedr. 230 c ἐκ τοῦ ἄστεος οὖτ᾽ εἰς τὴν ὑπεροπλάν ἀποδημεὶς οὐτ᾽ ἐξω τείχους ἐμοίγε δοκεῖς τὸ παράπαν ἐξεῖναι. Diogenes Laertius seems to have found the story in Favorinus, but not in Plato: he also attributes to Aristotle (no doubt wrongly) a statement to the effect that Socrates visited Delphi as well: see II. 5. 23 καὶ Πυθιόδιν ἐλθεὶν Ἀριστοτέλης φησιν: ἀλλὰ καὶ εἰς ἴσθμον, ὡς Φασωρίνος ἐν τῷ πρῶτῳ τῶν ἀπομνημονευμάτων.
el μὴ τοι στρατευσόμενος: viz. at Potidaea, Delium, and Ampipolis: see on 51 B above, and Apol. 28 E.

15. ἀποδημίαν. Cron remarks that οὐδεμίαν is omitted after ἀποδημίαν for the sake of euphony.


ἐπίθυμία σε ἄλλης πόλεως—ἐλαβεν εἰδέναι. By an idiom analogous to οὐδά σε τίς εἰ the object of the infinitive εἰδέναι is made dependent on the word (ἐπίθυμία) upon which the infinitive itself depends: cf. Gorg. 513 εἰπεξερητέον ἐστὶ τῇ πόλει καὶ τοῖς πολίταίς θεραπεύειν: Rep. iv. 443 β εὑθὺς ἄρχειμνοι τῆς πόλεως οἰκίζειν. So in Latin quaram potiendi spe (Cic. de Fin. i. 60).

19. ἦρου—ὡμολογεῖς—ἐποιήσω: for the combination of imperfect and aorist see on 50 D καὶ δι’ ἡμῶν ἐλάμβανεν τὴν μητέρα σου ὁ πατὴρ καὶ ἐφύτευσεν σε. With ὡμολογεῖς πολεεύσεσθαι contrast 51 ε ὡμολογηθάτης ἡμῶν πείθεσθαι: see note in loc.

20. τὰ τὲ ἄλλα καὶ τὸ τε and in particular’. The τὰ τὲ ἄλλα goes grammatically with ὡμολογεῖς, not with πολεεύσεσθαι (Cron) or with καὶ ἐπολεεύειν to be supplied from it (Stallbaum, Wohlrab, Göbel): to beget children in the city was virtually to pledge oneself (ὡμολογεῖν) to obey its laws.

21. ἐτο τοῦνν. τὸνν = ‘moreover’, as often in Plato and the orators. Apol. 33 E.

22. φυγῆς τιμήσασθαι = ‘to propose the penalty of exile’. Cf. Apol. 37 C ἄλλα δὴ φυγῆς τιμήσωμαι; τῶς γὰρ ἄν μου τοῦτο τιμήσαστε. In an ἄγων τιμήτος, like Socrates’ trial, it was the duty of the accused, should he be found guilty, to propose a counter penalty to that demanded by the prosecutor. Socrates proposed a fine of 30 minae: see Apol. 38 B.

24. ἐκαλλωπίζου ὡς οὐκ ἀγανακτῶν: viz. in Apol. 37 C—38 Λ. So Theaet. 195 D καλλωπίζομεν ὡς τε εὐρηκότων ἡμῶν καλῶν.

25. τεθνάναι: see on τεθνάναι in 43 C above.

26. λόγους αἰσχύνει: quite different from ἐπὶ λόγους αἰσχύνει: here the λόγοι are personified. Cf. Charm. 169 C ἡ σχίνει τοὺς παρόντας.

27. ἐντρέπει. ‘Turn to’ naturally passes into ‘give heed to’, ‘regard’: so advertere in Latin.

28. διαφθείραι: because the Laws are personified: see Introd. p. vii.
29. ἀποδιδράσκειν is the regular word to denote the running away of a slave: see on 50 A above.

30. ξυνθέο πολιτεύσα: see on ὁμολογήσας ἕμων πελεσθαί in 51 E.

33. ἔργῳ belongs to ὁμολογηκέναι: see 51 E ἢδη φαμὲν τούτον ὁμολογηκέναι ἔργῳ ἕμων ἄ ἄν ἡμεῖς κελεύομεν ποιῆσεν. ἀλλ' οὗ λύγῳ is bracketed by Gobel, after Hoenebeek: but the words serve to emphasize ἔργῳ—'with deeds, not with words'. It is implied that a verbal compact is less binding than one in which deeds take the place of words. The opposition of λόγος and ἔργον is familiar from Thucydides. For ἀλλά see note on 47 B.

34. ἀλλο τι ἦ 'nonne': supra on 50 A. ὁμολογῶμεν is a deliberative conjunctive: like imperatival expressions generally, the deliberative conjunctive can be used in subordinate as well as in principal clauses: as here the full construction is ἀλλο τι ἐστιν ἦ (=quam, not aut) ὁμολογῶμεν. Cf. Crat. 425 D ei μὴ ἀρα δὴ—ἀπαλλαγῶμεν i.e. 'unless perhaps we are to get off'. See Postgate in Proceedings of the Cambridge Philological Society, Vol. III. Part I. pp. 50—55.

37. ἄν φαίνειν: for the position of ἄν compare Phaed. 87 A τί οὖν, ἄν φαίνῃ δ λόγος, ἐτὶ ἀπιστεῖς;

38. ἡμᾶς αὐτούς. αὐτοὺς seems to emphasize ἡμᾶς: there is no reflexive meaning. Cron compares Phaed. 79 A ἀλλο τι ἡμῶν αὐτῶν τὸ μὲν σῶμα ἐστι, τὸ δὲ ψυχή; For αὐτοὺς Gobel conjectures σαντοῦ, comparing 54 C: at first sight there seems no occasion for the unusually emphatic mode of expression. I think the meaning is 'bargains made actually with us': bad as it always is to break a bargain, it is still worse when the party to it is one's country: cf. 51 A—C μητρὸς τε καὶ πατρὸς καὶ τῶν ἄλλων προγόνων ἀπάντων τιμωτέρον ἐστιν ἡ πατρίς κτλ.

41. ἔτεσιν ἐβδομήκοντα: Socrates was born in 469 B.C.

ἐν οἷς ἔξην σοι ἀπιέναι: hardly accurate: see 51 D.

44. ἀς δὴ ἐκάστοτε φῆς εὐνομέσθαι: as in Xen. Mem. III. 5. 15—16 and IV. 4. 15, and often in Plato e.g. Prot. 342 A foll. and Rep. VIII. 544 C ἣ τε ὑπὸ τῶν πολλῶν ἐπαίνομεν ἡ Κρητική τε καὶ Λακωνικὴ αὐτῇ καὶ δευτέρα κτλ. What Socrates most admired in Crete and Sparta was their implicit obedience to the law: they formed the best possible illustration of his principle—τὸ δίκαιον is τὸ ὑμοῦ: see Introd. p. xiii. ἐκάστοτε sc. quotiescumque de iis loquieris (Stallbaum).
NOTES ON XIV 52 E

45. 

46. ἐλάττω—ἀπεδήμησας: comparative of ὀλίγα—ἀπεδήμησας. For the statement itself see note on ἐξῆλθες in 52 B above.

47. ἀνάπηροι are "quicumque carent vel membro aliquo et parte corporis vel certe eius usu". Fischer. For the ἀνα- cf. ἀναπλέως, ἀναπιμπλάναι in their medical sense: see on Apol. 32 C.

49. δήλον ὅτι: adverbial: ὅτι as in εἴδοσ' ὅτι. The adverb is placed for emphasis at the end of the sentence as εἰκότως is so often in Demosthenes: just so in Symp. 195 B φεύγων φυγῇ τῷ γῆρας, ταχὺ δὲ δήλον ὅτι: θάττων γοῦν τοῦ δέοντος ἣμῖν προσέρχεται.

50. ἀνευ νόμων goes closely with πόλις: 'a city without laws'. The other meaning which suggests itself—'who could like a state without liking her laws?'—cannot be got out of the Greek: ἀνευ νόμων cannot = ἀνευ τοῦ νόμους ἀρέσκειν. The reasoning is—no one could like a state which had no laws: you like your state, therefore you like her laws. Schanz (after Hirschig) brackets δήλον ὅτι—ἀνευ νόμων: but the clause contains a valuable and strictly relevant idea, viz. that a πόλις ἀνευ νόμων is a πόλις ἀπολις.

νῦν δὲ δῆ = 'but now forsooth'. οὐκ ἐμμενεὶς is better than οὐκ ἐμμενεῖς (so Schanz with the second hand in B): cf. πράττεις and παραβάλλεις in 52 D.

51. ἐὰν ἡμῖν γε πεῖθῃ = 'yes, if you take our advice'. For the form of expression cf. 53 E οὔδεις ὅσ' ἔρει; ἵσως, ἀν μὴ τωα λυπῆς: see also 53 C—D and 54 B.

καὶ οὐ καταγέλαστός γε ἐσεῖ = 'and at least you will escape being laughed at'. This reappears in 53 D. ὅ καταγέλαστον makes one καταγελάν: ὅ γελοιον only γελάν. Hence γελοιον often = 'fancy', 'amusing'. Symp. 189 B (Ioquittur Aristophanes) φοβούμασι περὶ τῶν μελλόντων ῥηθήσεσθαι, οὐ τι μὴ γελοία εἴπω, τοῦτο μὲν γὰρ ἀν κέρδος εἶ ἤ καὶ τῆς ἥμετέρας μοῦσης ἐπιχώριον, ἀλλὰ μὴ καταγέλαστα.

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CHAPTER XV.

The Laws now reply in detail to the arguments of Crito: see Chapters III—V and compare Introduction pp. viii—ix. Escape will bring danger on his friends, misery and disgrace upon himself, and to say the least will leave his children in no way better provided.

1. σκόπει γὰρ δὴ 'Just consider'. γὰρ is introductory: see on 44 A.

παραβὰς καὶ ἕαμαρτάνων. Note the difference of tense: an ἕαμαρτια remains so till it is expiated. Cf. ἡδίκει in 50 C, where see note. ταῦτα in ταῦτα παραβὰς is not 'these duties' (Göbel), but 'these transgressions': a cognate accusative.

4. σον οἱ ἐπιτήδειοι is preferred to οἱ σοὶ ἐπιτήδειοι for reasons of sound, and also perhaps because ἐπιτήδειοι is still felt to be an adjective.

5. καὶ αὐτοὶ φεύγειν = 'et ipsi exulare': sc. as well as you: καὶ στερηθῆναι τῆς πόλεως i.e. ἄτιμοι γενεάθαι sc. by banishment. On στερηθῆναι see above, note on 44 B. The Laws here reply to Crito's pleading in 44 E and 45 E.

6. σχέδον τι 'pretty nearly', propemodum. σχέδον τι, ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν, and ἐμβραχύ all mean much the same: the first generally goes with adjectives, the second with οὐδεῖς or πᾶς; the third is found only with relatives (ἐμβραχύ περὶ θτοῦ ἀν βούληται Gorg. 457 A).

7. πρῶτον μέν: the second alternative comes infra in D ἀλλ' ἐκ μὲν τούτων τῶν τῶν ἀπαρεῖς, ἥξεις δὲ εἰς Θετταλίαν κτλ. See on πρῶτον μέν in 50 D.

9. Ὑθβαζ. For θῆβαςδε: η was in fact pronounced dz: see Gustav Meyer, Griechische Grammatik 2 p. 219. So 'Ἀθήναζε θύραζε χαμαζε. Note the double accent in Μέγαράδε (so Bekker, Cron, Schanz, Göbel: Wohlrab however reads Μεγάραδε and Kral Μεγαράδε): δε is enclitic. The constitution of Thebes and Megara was oligarchical: hence εἰνομοῦνται γὰρ ἄμφοτεραι is said (not without a touch of sarcasm) from Socrates' point of view.

10. πολέμιος ἥξεις τῇ τούτων πολιτείᾳ. Because even though you approve of their constitution, you have violated your own, and may violate theirs next, now that you have ceased to believe that δίκαιον is νόμιμον. τούτων is masculine.

12. ὑπαβλέψονται σε = 'will eye you askance'. So in Symp. 220 B ol δὲ στρατιῶται ὑπέβλεπον αὐτὸν ὡς καταφρονοῦντα σφῶν.
NOTES ON XV 53 B

υπο- is 'from under the eyebrows': i.e. with a scowling expression (ταυρηδον υποβληψα Phaed. 117 B), or sometimes furtively, of the stolen glances of lovers: see L. and S. s. v.

diaφθορα των νόμων: see on 50 B and Introd. p. vii.

13. βεβαιώσεις τοίς δικαστάις τὴν δίξιν ὁστε δοκεῖν. τοῖς δικαστάις is a dativus commodi. For τὴν δίξιν ὁστε δοκεῖν see on 44 C τὸ αἰσχρόν εἰθα ταυτής δίξια ἡ δοκεῖν κτλ.

15. σφόδρα που—diaφθορεῖς ἐναι: since it is easier diaφθειρεῖς ἄνοιξτος ἀνθρώπος than reasonable laws. νόμων and ἀνθρώπων are opposed. The indictment of Socrates is to be found in Apol. 24 B Σωκράτη φησιν ἄδικειν τοὺς τε νέους diaφθειροντα καὶ θεοὺς οὓς ἡ πόλις νομίζει οὐ νομίζοντα, ἔτερα δὲ δαίμονα καίνα.

18. κοσμωτάτους: κόσμος is ὁ κόσμον ἔχων Gorg. 506 E.

19. ἣ πλησίασεις τοῦτοις. τοῦτοις = τοῖς κοσμωτάτοις: whence ἀναψυχθέσεις.

20. τίνας λόγους;—ἡ οὐσπέρ. More vivid than τοὺς αὐτοὺς λόγους οὐσπέρ. B has ἥ: so Cron and Göbel. Schanz and Wohlrab read ἢ with some MS authority. ἥ = Latin -ne? ἥ = Latin an?: see on Apol. 26 B.

21. ὡς ἡ ἀρετὴ—πλείστου ἄξιον: see Apol. 30 A—B, and note.

23. ἀσχημον ἄν φανείσθαι. On ἄν with future participle see Goodwin MT. p. 60. Hirschig reads ἀναφανείσθαι.

τὸ τοῦ Σωκράτους πράγμα = 'Socrates and everything about him'. So οἱ περὶ 'Ἀνυτον = 'Anytus and those with him': Apol. 18 B. There is some contempt in the expression: cf. Hipp. Maior 286 E φαίνων γὰρ ἐν ὑπὸ τὸ ἐμὸν πράγμα καὶ ἓδωκτόν. Χρῆμα is used in much the same way, only with still more contempt, e.g. Rep. viii. 567 E ἡ μακάριον, ἥν δ' ἐγὼ, λέγει τυράννον χρῆμα. Weariness and disgust are expressed by a similar phrase in the first line of the Clouds: ὁ Ζεῦς βασιλεῦ, τὸ χρήμα τῶν νυκτῶν ὅσον.

24. οἶεσθαι γε χρή: a way of answering one's own question: so infra 54 B.

25. ἀπαρεῖς: Socrates as an exile moving from city to city: cf. Apol. 37 D καλὸς οὗν ἀν μοι ὁ βιος εἰ ἐξελθώτι, τηλικῶδὲ ἀνθρώπῳ ἀλλην ἐξ ἄλλης πόλεως ἀμειβομένῳ καὶ ἐξελαμισμένῳ ᾧν. The Laws are now replying to Crito's proposal in 45 C.

26. πλείστη ἀταξία καὶ ἀκολασία. ἀταξία is the opposite of κοσμωτής: ἀκολασία of σωφροσύνη: see Gorg. 506 D—507 A. Thessaly and Macedonia were almost proverbial for licence and debauchery: see (for Thessaly) Xen. Mem. 1. 2. 24 Κριτια—φυγών εἰς
The image contains a page from Plato's *Crito* and an annotation by Theopompus. The text is written in Greek and Latin, and it discusses various aspects of dress and personal disguises. The annotations provide context and clarify certain terms and phrases. The text includes references to other works such as *Phaedo* and *Meno*. The discussion touches on the use of clothing as a form of self-expression and the implications of certain types of apparel and masks in ancient society.
NOTES ON XV 53 E

85: 'Αγάθων δὲ ποῦ ὡς τιν; ἀπολιπῶν ἐμ' οἴχεται, ἀγαθὸς ποιητὴς καὶ ποθεύως τοὺς φίλους. ποι γῆς ὁ τλῆμων; ἐς μακάρων εὐωξίαν: Αγαθον had settled at the court of Archelaus king of Macedon. Schanz brackets and Kral rejects ἐν Θεσσαλίᾳ: but there is rhetorical force in the double mention of Thessaly at the end of the two clauses: see on 53 D line 26.

38. ὠσπερ ἐπὶ δειπνον—Θεσσάλιαν; added with bitter scorn to explain the Θεσσαλῶν εὐωξία.

54 A 40. ἀλλὰ δὴ: alluding to Crito's plea in 45 C—D. ἀλλὰ δὴ is like 'at enim 'oh but', and introduces a counter-argument: see Protag. 338 C ἀλλὰ δὴ βελτίων ἥμων αἰρήσεσθε τῇ μὲν ἄληθείᾳ.—ἀδύνατον ἥμιν, ὥστε Πρωταγόρου τούδε σοφωτέρων τῶν ἑλέσθαι· εἰ δὲ αἰρήσεσθε κτλ. In accordance with this and other examples, I have printed a full stop after παίδευσης: the other editors take the sentence as interrogative.

42. τι δέ;—quid vero? Note the emphatic place of εἰς Θεσσαλίαν: Thessaly had an evil name: see on 53 D.

43. ἵνα καὶ τοῦτο ἀπολαύσωσιν: τούτῳ = τῷ ἐξον εἰναι. ἀπολαύσωσιν has ironical force: the word is ordinarily used of something good. So in Eur. Phoen. 1204—5 Κρέων δ' ἔοικε τῶν ἐμῶν νυμφευμάτων τῶν τ' Οἰδίπου δύστηνος ἀπολαύσαι κακῶν κτλ. ἀπολαύσωσιν is construed generally with gen. of the object from which the enjoyment is derived, except where that object is a neuter pronoun: inferior MSS here read τοῦτο σου.

44. οὖ i.e. οὖς έσται. παίδευθησομαι is used as well as παίδευσομαι in the passive sense: θρέψομαι is however better than τραφήσομαι.

45. ξυνόντος. ξυνεῖναι and ξυνούσια are regularly used in Plato of the relation between teacher and pupil, e.g. Gorg. 515 B τίνα φήσεσι βελτίων πεποιηκέναι ἀνθρωπον τῇ συνούσιᾳ τῇ σῇ; Hence the τόκος ἐν καλῷ of Symp. 206 B.

46. ἐπιμελήσουνται: see on 51 A line 34 above. Schanz brackets ἐπιμελήσουνται here, reading οἱ σοὶ αὐτῶν πότερον κτλ.: but the sentence is spoken from Socrates' point of view.

54 B 49. σοι of course goes with ἐπιτηδείων. For οἱςθαί γε χρή in the next line see on 53 D.
CHAPTER XVI.

The Laws conclude their appeal by asking Socrates to think of the future world as well as this: see Introd. pp. viii and xvi.

2. τροφεύσοι: see 51 A. Meiser reads τοὺς σοὶς γεννηταῖς καὶ τοῖς σοὶς τροφεύσοι.

3. πρὸ τοῦ δικαίου after πλεονος, as after other comparatives in Phaed. 99 A el μὴ δικαίτερον ὑμην καὶ κάλλιον εἶναι πρὸ τοῦ φεύγειν τε καὶ ἀποδιδάσκειν ὑπέχειν τῇ πόλει δίκην ἣν τιν’ ἀν τάτην. Cobet needlessly rejects πρὸ: see Wohlrab in Fleckeisen’s Jahrb. for 1876 p. 126. For δικαίον see note on 45 C ἐτὶ δὲ οὐδὲ δικαίον above.

4. ἱνα εἰς 'Αἰδοὺ ἐλθὼν: the belief in a future life is expressed more dogmatically here than in the Apology: see 40 C foll. Compare Introd. p. xvi.

5. τοῖς ἐκεῖ ἄρχουσιν: compare Gorg. 526 D—Ε ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν—ὑπὸ τούτων τῶν λόγων πέπεισμαι καὶ σκοπῶ ὅπως ἀποφανοῦμαι τῷ κριτῇ ὑπὸ ὑγιεστάτην τὴν ψυχὴν—καὶ ὁνειδίζω σοι ὅτι οὐχ οἶδα τι' ἔσει σαυτῷ βοηθῆσαι, ὅταν η δίκη σοι ἕ καὶ ἡ κρίσις ἣν νῦν δὴ ἐλεγον, ἀλλὰ ἐλθὼν παρὰ τὸν δικαστὴν τὸν τῆς Ἀἰγύπτες νῦν, ἐπειδὰν σοι ἐπιλαβόμενος ἀγγὴ, χασμήσει καὶ ὅλιγονες οὐδὲν ἤπτον η ἐγὼ ἐνθάδε σοῦ ἐκεῖ.

7. οὐδὲ δικαίότερον οὐδὲ ὅσιώτερον. οὐδὲ joins ἀμεινον to δικαίότερον: οὔτε in line 6 corresponds to οὔτε in line 8. δικαίον is τὸ προσήκον περὶ ἀνθρώπων: οὕτω, τὸ προσήκον περὶ θεοῦ: see Gorg. 507 B.

8. οὐδὲ ἀλλῶ. οὐδὲ joins σοι in line 6 to ἀλλῶ. ἐκεῖσε of the future world: see on Apol. 40 E ὃς ἄρα ἐκεῖ εἶσιν ἀπαντεῖς οἱ τεθνεῖτε: cf. τοῖς ἐκεῖ ἄρχουσιν in line 5 and ἐκεῖ in C line 16.

10. οὐχ ὑφ’ ήμῶν τῶν νόμων, ἀλλὰ ὑπὸ ἀνθρώπων: the ἀνθρώπων are the δικασταί, falsely so called: see Apol. 24 D—Ε. For the full significance of this sentence see Introduction pp. x—xi: and cf. note on 49 B οὐδὲ ἀδικοῦμεν ἄρα ἀνταδικεῖν. Hence ἀνταδικήσας and ἀντικακουργήσας in 11 and 12 have for their object not the laws, but the δικασταί.

11. οὔτως ἀιχρῶς goes with ἔξελθης and is explained by the two participles that follow. There is an allusion to 49 B—D.

13. παραβάς καὶ κακὰ ἔργασάμενος: these participles explain ἀνταδικήσας τε καὶ ἀντικακουργήσας.
14. οὖς ἡκιστὰ ἔδει, σαυτόν τε κτλ. Note the emphatic place of σαυτόν: oneself is the last person one should injure. Compare Apol. 37 B πεπεισμένος δὴ ἐγὼ μηδένα ἄδικείν πολλοῦ γε δὲ ἐμαυτόν γε ἄδικησειν. Socrates’ philosophy was egoism: see Introd. pp. xii—xiii. σαυτόν τε καὶ φίλους καὶ πατρίδα καὶ ἡμᾶς sums up the argument of Chapters XI—XV.

16. οἱ ἐν "Αἰδον νόμοι: Cron refers to Soph. Antig. 450 foll. οὔ γὰρ τι μοι Ζεὺς ἦν ὁ κηρύξας τάδε, οὐδʼ ἡ ἐννοικὸς τῶν κάτω θεῶν Δίκη τοιούτος ἐν ἀνθρώπωσιν ἅμας ἑν σάμου.

54 D 19. μὴ σε πείσῃ: Goodwin MT. p. 181.

CHAPTER XVII.

Socrates concludes by giving his verdict in favour of the laws and constitution of Athens. Introd. pp. xi and xvi—xvii.

1. ὁ φίλε ἐταίρε Κρίτων. There is pathos and sympathy in this unusually long mode of address: Cobet and Naber utterly spoil the passage by omitting Κρίτων: Göbel omits ἐταίρε.

2. οἱ κορυφαντῶντες τῶν αὐλῶν δοκοῦσιν ἀκούειν. The Corybantes were priests of Cybele whose worship was attended with much clamour of dancing and music on the flute. Lambinus aptly compares Hor. Epist. 1. 1. 7 ‘est mihi purgatam crebro qui personet aurem’. Göbel omits δοκοῦσιν ἀκούειν, but the text as it stands is far more impressive. Just so the demonstrative is repeated in αὐτῇ ἢ ἡχῇ τούτων τῶν λόγων, and in the last line of the chapter: πράττουμεν ταύτῃ, ἐπειδὴ ταύτῃ ὁ θεὸς ὑφηγεῖται.

5. βομβεῖ καὶ ποιεῖ μὴ δύνασθαι τῶν ἄλλων ἀκούειν. Socrates might have said much the same of his δαιμόνιον σημεῖον: compare Apol. 40 A—B. I think Plato meant to suggest that the pleading of the Laws coincided with the voice of the divine sign: see Introd. p. xvi.


11. ἐπειδὴ ταύτῃ ὁ θεὸς ὑφηγεῖται. Compare the words with which the Apology concludes (42 Λ) ἄδηλον παντὶ πλήν ἢ τῷ θεῷ. The voice of the Laws seems to Socrates to be the voice of God: his divine sign would not allow him to escape. See Introd., p. xvi.
APPENDIX.

List of Deviations from the Bodleian.

As the text of this edition is based upon Schanz’s collation of the Bodleian, it may be convenient to note the most important deviations from this ms. When I differ from Schanz and the other editors, it will generally be found that I have kept more closely to the ms reading: most of the cases in which I have departed from it are discussed in the notes. Whenever I have adopted a reading which may be traced to some member of the second family of mss, best represented by T = Bekker’s 1, I have signified this by writing fam. sec. after the reading in question.

Readings of B.  The present edition.

43 A  πρωλ  πρω
   ευρεγέτηται  ευρεγέτηται
43 B  ευδαιμόνισα  ηυδαιμόνισα
43 C  χαλεπὴν καὶ βαρείαν
(“καὶ βαρείαν punctis notatum,” Sch.)  χαλεπὴν (fam. sec.)
43 D  δοκεῖν μὲν μοι ἡξειν
(“ν verbi δοκεῖν punctis notata in B.” Sch.)  δοκεῖ μὲν μοι ἡξειν (fam. sec.)
44 B  οὐδεμία ξυμφορά
44 C  σώζειν
44 E  ἄλλο τι πρὸς τούτοις
(corrected by second hand)  ἄλλο τι πρὸς τούτοις
45 A  φοβῆ  φοβεῖ
45 E  πεπράχθαι
(corrected by second hand)  πεπράχθαι
   ὡς εἰσῆλθεν
   τὸ τελευταῖον δῆπο
46 A  πεπράχθαι
(corr. sec. manus)  πεπράχθαι
46 D  ἄλλως ἐνεκα λόγου
       νῦν ὃν
47 A  ἃν σὲ  ἃν σὲ
Readings of B.  

47 B δηλαδή  
η' el  
(corr. sec. manus)  

47 D ἡ τῆς τοῦ ἐνός  
(corr. sec. manus)  
ἀκολουθήσωμεν (?)  

47 E ἡ οὐξί;  
(corr. sec. manus)  
ἡ φαυλότερον  

48 A ἀλλ' ὅτι  

48 B δηλαδή  
τῷ καὶ πρότερον  

48 E πείσαι σὲ ταῦτα πράττειν,  
ἀλλὰ μὴ ἀκοντος  

49 A ἡ (saepius: corr. sec. man-

50 A ἡ οὐ;  
(corr. sec. manus)  

50 B ἵσχύσωσιν  
tὰς δικασθείσας  
(corr. sec. manus)  

50 C ἡ καὶ ταύτα  
ἡ ἐμμένειν  
(corr. sec. manus)  

50 E ἄρ' ἐξ ἵσου  
ἡ πρὸς μὲν ἄρα  

51 A πρὸς δὲ τὴν πατρίδα ἄρα  
ἐξέσται  
ἐὰν σὲ  

51 C ἡ τὸ δίκαιον (?)  
ἡ οὐ; (corr. sec. manus)  

51 D ———  

53 A καταγέλαστός τε  

53 B τῶν αὐτῶν πόλεων  

53 D καταλλάξας  
(corr. in marg. sec. manus)  

54 B οὔτε ὁσιότερον  

The present edition.  

δηλαδή  
ἡ' (fam. sec.)  

ἡ τῆς τοῦ ἐνός  
ἀκολουθήσωμεν (fam. sec.)  
ἡ οὐξί;  
ἡ φαυλότερον  
ἀλλ' ὅτι  
ἡ δηλαδή  
καὶ πρότερον  
πείσαι σὲ, ἀλλὰ μὴ ἀκοντος ταῦτα  
πράττειν  
ἡ  
ἡ  
ἡ  
ἡ ἵσχύσωσιν  
tὰς δικασθείσας (fam. sec.)  
ἡ καὶ ταύτα (fam. sec.)  
ἡ ἐμμένειν  
ἄρ' ἐξ ἵσου  
ἡ πρὸς μὲν ἄρα  
πρὸς δὲ τὴν πατρίδα ἄρα  
ἐξέσται  
ἐὰν σὲ  
ἡ τὸ δίκαιον  
ἡ οὐ;  
καὶ οὐδέσι ημῶν τῶν νόμων ἐμπο-

dῶν ἐστιν οὖδ' ἀπαγορεύει, ἐὰν  
tε τις βουληταί "om. B, in  
marg. manu satis vetusta add.  
b." Sch.  
καταγέλαστός γε (fam. sec.)  
tῶν αὐτῶν πόλεων (fam. sec.)  
μεταλλάξας (fam. sec.)  
οὖδὲ ὁσιότερον (fam. sec.)
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